Argument #2: From the Nature of Rationality

[Davin]

1. Is logic prescriptive or descriptive
2. Is logic merely a human invention
3. Supernaturalism as a requirement for self-determination

1.)

Logic is descriptive. It describes things. In your example "So, if I say, 'The man fell down,' I am describing a process. If I say, 'Push the man, and he will fall down,' I am prescribing a process." The second is not just a prescriptive statement, it does prescribe one to push a man but then it describes what will happen when you push a man. A logical statement would be, "If you push the man, then he will fall down" including the common knowledge hidden premises (of course most of the time when one pushes me, they fall down).

Logic describes things, that's all it does, it doesn't prescribe anything. When we use logic properly, we don't have a desire in mind, because otherwise, our logic is likely to be subject to confirmation bias. Logic doesn't tell people how they ought to think, each person decides how they ought to think, logic is just a systematic process used to ensure a standard of reasoning that has shown to be accurate. We call people irrational when they use fallacies in their logic, not because they ought to not use fallacies, but because they do use fallacies. One could say people ought not to use fallacies, but that's not a logical statement, it's a prescription. We can say logically that if one wants to be rational, then they should avoid using fallacies. That is not a prescription, it's a description, because you can't be logical while using fallacies.

2.)

Logic is a human invention, just as math is. Logic is like math for statements, nothing more. If one wants an accurate view of the world, then logic is the way to go, because when one doesn't think logically, then they can't be sure that what conclusions they draw are accurate. The "laws" of logic are just as much an invention as the "laws" of gravity. The laws of gravity are not an accurate representation of gravity, as can be shown with complicated movements of very large and very small objects, however it's good enough for almost all purposes.

The comparison aside, logic is only the discovery of removing the margin of error from guesses and creating a way to be sure of what we're stating.

3.)

Well this came from nowhere. Why is there a supernatural requirement for logic to exist?

Thus the conclusion is ridiculous and squishy:

Three assumptions with no logic that follows.

And once again, no matter how many times you state your conclusion, it doesn't make your logic follow.



"I have not read Conway or Kochen. There is nothing in QM, however, that relieves the materialist from the necessity of determinism." This is a severe misunderstanding of QM. What follows those statements only shows your ignorance of QM and your reliance on mere assertions over testing if those assertions match reality.


Rationality is objective by nature, ought is subjective by nature, trying to assign "ought" to rationality goes against the nature of rationality.

If all people were given the same data, and used logic, then all people must necessarily come to the same conclusion. This goes against the subjectivity you keep trying to assert that rationality requires. The data that is known is subjective to each person, the rational thinking is not, logic is the same for everyone. In this way, rationality is objective, logical and mechanical. No need for using subjective terminology in an attempt to destroy the objective nature of rationality just so that it matches your baseless assertions. Also rational thinking does comply with the concept of determinism, so your first premise needs to be corrected to make the logic follow.



"Very simply, because if materialism were true, then everything would be determined by the laws of nature." This is a huge assumption because we haven't determined what the "laws" of nature are for how we make decisions. Until we are certain how we make decisions, everything stated about how we make decisions is mere speculation.

[skevosmavros]

(Snip stuff aimed at others)
You quoted the very first line of my paragraph and then ignored everything after it,

Just because I didn't quote it doesn't mean I ignored it.  I was just trying to keep the quote scroll-factor low.  One can always scroll up to see the bits I snipped.

and then stated I offered a mere assertion. Skev . . . in proper English composition, the topic sentence comes first and is followed by details. As such, I stated my topic up front and went on to explain it. All of the "step by step" that you are asking for is found in the very post you apparently ignored.

I'll be as patient as you like, but I do ask you to consider the words I have already written.

Just to be sure I went back and reread the bits I snipped - I still see no compelling argument for free will being required as part of a definition for rationality (or if you prefer, "I still see no compelling argument for free will being an essential part of the nature of rationality" - better?).

All I see are repeated rephrasings and illustrations of your claim, nothing resembling an argument (that is, an argument that free will is inherently part of the nature of rationality).  For example:

In other words, if there is no part of you that is capable of stepping “outside” the laws of nature and “thinking for itself,” then everything in your brainâ€"including your thoughtsâ€"is absolutely determined by the laws of nature. If that is true, then you aren’t thinking anymore than a rock is thinking when it falls.

This nicely outlines and illustrates your claim that rational thinking requires one to be "capable of stepping outside the laws of nature" so that one can engage in "thinking for itself", but it doesn't actually argue this.

You're asking me to equate two very different things - a rock falling and a brain thinking.  Even if I voluntarily put myself into a deterministic straight-jacket, and view the rock falling and the brain thinking as both totally deterministic events - they are still quite distinct from each other.  Even in a deterministic universe, I can comprehend the rock falling to be arational, and the brain thinking to be rational (or irrational!).

I understand that you disagree - I just don't agree that you have presented sufficient argument or demonstration that free will is an essential part of the nature of rationality.

------ SIDE POINTS ------
To be fair, I realise I'm essentially asking you to go off on a tangent, since you're actually arguing for something else in this thread (materialism is false/the supernatural exists).  The claim I'm asking you to defend (that free will is part of the nature of rationality) is merely one of your premises in that argument -- it's not what you're here to argue.  But for me it is the primary sticking point.

If you can convince me that determinism is incompatible with rationality, you'll be well on your way to making me a supernaturalist (not entirely there though, as I'm not actually a determinist but a compatibalist on the topic of free will, so you may just wind up making me rethink what rationality is, but even that would be a big deal for me).

In short, if you make me accept that premise, you're on your way.

Also - just for the record and very briefly, I'm already happy to agree that immaterial things can be said to "exist", just not in the way that material things exist.  The immaterial things that I believe exist are not the sorts of things typically labeled "supernatural" - and by immaterial existence, I don't just mean concepts either.  For example, I accept that democracy "exists", and not just as an abstract concept, but it doesn't exist the same way that a rock exists.  So I'm not strictly speaking a materialist, so not all of your work is ahead of you when it comes to making me accept that something immaterial is required for rationality.  I just don't see it being required.
------ END SIDE POINTS ------

As for your question about the definition of rationality, we're talking about much more than definitions. A definition is merely a semantic issue. I'm talking about the ontology of rationality. For instance, the definition of "man" doesn't include the air in the room around him, but if there is no room around him, I can promise you there won't be any man--at least not one that can do anything.

Firstly, my concerns about "the definition of rationality" map just fine to concerns about the ontology, so please don't be distracted by my use of the term "definition" - I have expressed it differently above, I hope that suffices.

Secondly - your man and air metaphor again nicely illustrates your point - air is indeed typically required for men to exist.  Now all you have to demonstrate/argue is that free will is similarly vital for rationality to exist.  Can you do so without simply arguing from metaphor and illustration?  I'd genuinely like to see such an argument.  This is the closest you get:

I'm not arguing that the supernatural is found in the definition of 'rational.'

I didn't claim you were, I claimed that you seem to have "free will" (not the supernatural) built into your definition of rationality - but we're no longer discussing definitions, right?  ;-)

I am arguing that the rational cannot exist in a deterministic universe, because the rational presupposes--by definition--a conforming to reason, that is, a conforming to the laws of logic, which is a prescriptive concept. Prescriptions, though, cannot exist in a deterministic model as determinism only allows for description. Therefore, rationality is impossible under determinism.

Even if I accept that the "laws of logic" are "prescriptive concepts" (I'm not 100% sure I know what you mean by that, since the history of logic strongly suggests to me that the laws of logic (the "logical absolutes"?), like other natural laws discovered/elucidated by humans (laws of thermodynamics etc) are based at least partly on observation, but I'll let it slide for now), all you've done is shift your claim from "determinism is incompatible with rationality" to "determinism is incompatible with prescriptive concepts".  How so?  Why cannot one be predetermined to detect, perceive, understand, assert or be compelled by prescriptive concepts?

Also, moving forward a bit, even if I eventually accept that the universe DOES contain the supernatural, and even if I also accept that some supernatural element IS inherently part of rational thinking -- couldn't the supernatural realm be just as deterministic as the natural realm?  After all, if cause and effect does not operate within the supernatural realm, what does?  Randomness?  Chaos?  Some other alternative?  When I "step outside myself" to "think rationally", how are my thoughts going to be any more free from being the result of cause and effect?  More to the point, how would freeing my thoughts from cause and effect make them rational?

Adding the supernatural to the mix doesn't really solve the claimed problem of determinism being incompatible with rationality, does it?  How so?

Edit: in other words, I'm arguing from the nature, not definition of rationality. See the title of the thread. :-)

Thanks again,

[hackenslash]

There is nothing in QM, however, that relieves the materialist from the necessity of determinism. All the talk of uncertainty is epistemological. The uncertainty is with respect to an observer (whether that observer is an intelligent being or, more commonly, something a simple as a photon), not the thing itself.

Bzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz. Thank you for playing. Here's what you could have won:

The uncertainty in quantum mechanics has precisely bugger all to do with an observer, so this is yet another topic in which you're holding forth in ignorance. The uncertainty in quantum mechanics is inherent in the system, which means that a particle doesn't actually have a position or a velocity until the collapse of the wavefunction, which is the only role of the observer.

As for the necessity of determinism, you have merely proclaimed this, with no support whatsoever. Most importantly, you still haven't demonstrated that the brain being governed by the principles elucidated in our physical laws entails determinism.

[Sophus]

I can see that.  The whole point, however, was that this thread has been a matter of arguing "more than the sum of our parts, therefore extra part".

Physically speaking, you're not more than the sum of your parts. The parts just work together in really nifty ways.

[PoopShoot]

The parts just work together in really nifty ways.

That would be the "more" of which I was speaking.  I guess the bare bones version of the point was that finding a really neato property that has emerged from various interactions doesn't mean that there has to be magic involved.

[hackenslash]

Except, of course, that to the credulous, emergence is itself magical. They really can't see how anything can be emergent. Really, the entirety of theistic argumentation is merely one massive argumentum ad ignorantiam, and nothing more than convoluted semantic fabrication such as we've seen from the resident apologist in this thread.

[PoopShoot]

This reminds me of an article I have in the July '10 issue of Game Informer magazine.  It was about notable game glitches.  Many of them were unexpected emergent behaviors in the game that wasn't programmed in, yet happened anyway.

1 - The Elder Scroll IV: Oblivion - The game contains a quest wherein a prisoner needed to be spoken with.  The glitch was that he was periodically found dead.  An intensive investigation discovered that the guards were getting hungry and killing the prisoner for his food.  Remember, the guards were not programmed to do this, they chose to do so on their own based on an interaction of other programmed behaviors.

2 - Dead to Rights: Retribution - The main character's (Jack) pet dog was programmed to fetch ammunition.  One of the side effects to this was that he recognized live grenades as ammunition, which he would fetch and obediently drop at Jack's feet.  They didn't program the dog to fetch live grenades, indeed, they aren't even ammunition, yet they had ot add programming to tell the dog that ONLY inactive grenades were valid ammo.

3 - Terminus - In testing, missiles fired would simply blow up.  It turns out that the mechanics of the game were so detail oriented that the game was accounting for the missile's diameter and it was getting caught in the firing tube.  They didn't program the game to worry about the size of the missile, but by programming those two details, the game assumed that the missile would get stuck in the tube.

4 - The Maw - One of the achievements in this game was to feed every creature.  It was soon discovered, however that some of the creatures were disappearing.  The conundrum was solved when a tester noticed a hostile creature slamming the small creatures into mountains.  When one was slammed hard into a narrow crevice, the game didn't like that it was getting stuck, so it spewed the little guys out at near infinite velocity, rocketing them into space.  Again, the game wasn't programmed to do this, it did so on its own.

The above examples are nothing compared to some of the emergent properties found in nature, but then computer programs are simple compared to the detail in nature as well.  The first example to me is the most striking, as it involves the computer generated character making a decision it wasn't programmed to make.

[Sophus]

This reminds me of an article I have in the July '10 issue of Game Informer magazine.  It was about notable game glitches.  Many of them were unexpected emergent behaviors in the game that wasn't programmed in, yet happened anyway.

1 - The Elder Scroll IV: Oblivion - The game contains a quest wherein a prisoner needed to be spoken with.  The glitch was that he was periodically found dead.  An intensive investigation discovered that the guards were getting hungry and killing the prisoner for his food.  Remember, the guards were not programmed to do this, they chose to do so on their own based on an interaction of other programmed behaviors.

2 - Dead to Rights: Retribution - The main character's (Jack) pet dog was programmed to fetch ammunition.  One of the side effects to this was that he recognized live grenades as ammunition, which he would fetch and obediently drop at Jack's feet.  They didn't program the dog to fetch live grenades, indeed, they aren't even ammunition, yet they had ot add programming to tell the dog that ONLY inactive grenades were valid ammo.

3 - Terminus - In testing, missiles fired would simply blow up.  It turns out that the mechanics of the game were so detail oriented that the game was accounting for the missile's diameter and it was getting caught in the firing tube.  They didn't program the game to worry about the size of the missile, but by programming those two details, the game assumed that the missile would get stuck in the tube.

4 - The Maw - One of the achievements in this game was to feed every creature.  It was soon discovered, however that some of the creatures were disappearing.  The conundrum was solved when a tester noticed a hostile creature slamming the small creatures into mountains.  When one was slammed hard into a narrow crevice, the game didn't like that it was getting stuck, so it spewed the little guys out at near infinite velocity, rocketing them into space.  Again, the game wasn't programmed to do this, it did so on its own.

The above examples are nothing compared to some of the emergent properties found in nature, but then computer programs are simple compared to the detail in nature as well.  The first example to me is the most striking, as it involves the computer generated character making a decision it wasn't programmed to make.

Ha! That's fascinating. The more complex game programming gets the more, I suppose, we can expect the unexpected.

[PoopShoot]

The more complex game programming gets the more, I suppose, we can expect the unexpected.

At this point most video game bugs aren't so much emergent as they are a matter of oversight, such a flower that grows bigger by collecting pedals in the level with no programmed size-cap grew large enough to dwarf mountains in one game.  They merely capped the size and that fixed it.  That said, the fact that the complexity of games keeps growing has actually made beta-testing just as important as alpha testing in online games because there are glitches that don't become apparent until thousands of people get online and get dirty.  Also, as the complexity increases, the frequency of emergent glitches rises.

[Jac3510]

1. Is logic prescriptive or descriptive
2. Is logic merely a human invention
3. Supernaturalism as a requirement for self-determination

1.)

Logic is descriptive. It describes things. In your example "So, if I say, 'The man fell down,' I am describing a process. If I say, 'Push the man, and he will fall down,' I am prescribing a process." The second is not just a prescriptive statement, it does prescribe one to push a man but then it describes what will happen when you push a man. A logical statement would be, "If you push the man, then he will fall down" including the common knowledge hidden premises (of course most of the time when one pushes me, they fall down).

Logic describes things, that's all it does, it doesn't prescribe anything. When we use logic properly, we don't have a desire in mind, because otherwise, our logic is likely to be subject to confirmation bias. Logic doesn't tell people how they ought to think, each person decides how they ought to think, logic is just a systematic process used to ensure a standard of reasoning that has shown to be accurate. We call people irrational when they use fallacies in their logic, not because they ought to not use fallacies, but because they do use fallacies. One could say people ought not to use fallacies, but that's not a logical statement, it's a prescription. We can say logically that if one wants to be rational, then they should avoid using fallacies. That is not a prescription, it's a description, because you can't be logical while using fallacies.

Which makes logic prescriptive. Logic does not describe the way we think. It describes right thinking. Obviously, all prescriptions include a measure of description. Not all description, however, includes prescription. Prescription necessarily includes the ought, which is meaningless in a deterministic world.

Notice your use of "should." You say, "they should avoid using fallacies." That is a prescription any way you cut it. Your entire paragraph assumes prediction. If I want to be rational, then I shouldn't use fallacies. You assert this is not a prescription, but that is exactly what it is. You have prescribed the means by which we are to be rational.

I'll comment on the obligation to rationality more below.

2.)

Logic is a human invention, just as math is. Logic is like math for statements, nothing more. If one wants an accurate view of the world, then logic is the way to go, because when one doesn't think logically, then they can't be sure that what conclusions they draw are accurate. The "laws" of logic are just as much an invention as the "laws" of gravity. The laws of gravity are not an accurate representation of gravity, as can be shown with complicated movements of very large and very small objects, however it's good enough for almost all purposes.

The comparison aside, logic is only the discovery of removing the margin of error from guesses and creating a way to be sure of what we're stating.

Math was not invented by humans. It was discovered by humans. Same with logic.

3.)

Well this came from nowhere. Why is there a supernatural requirement for logic to exist?

Thus the conclusion is ridiculous and squishy:

Three assumptions with no logic that follows.

And once again, no matter how many times you state your conclusion, it doesn't make your logic follow.

Because rationality requires logic, logic is prescriptive, prescription implies ought, but ought is meaningless under determinism, and thus by extension rationality is meaningless under determinism. Prescription can only hold if self-determination is possible, and self-determination is impossible under materialism. Thus, rationality is impossible under materialism, which means rationality is only possible under supernaturalism.

"I have not read Conway or Kochen. There is nothing in QM, however, that relieves the materialist from the necessity of determinism." This is a severe misunderstanding of QM. What follows those statements only shows your ignorance of QM and your reliance on mere assertions over testing if those assertions match reality.

Rationality is objective by nature, ought is subjective by nature, trying to assign "ought" to rationality goes against the nature of rationality.

If all people were given the same data, and used logic, then all people must necessarily come to the same conclusion. This goes against the subjectivity you keep trying to assert that rationality requires. The data that is known is subjective to each person, the rational thinking is not, logic is the same for everyone. In this way, rationality is objective, logical and mechanical. No need for using subjective terminology in an attempt to destroy the objective nature of rationality just so that it matches your baseless assertions. Also rational thinking does comply with the concept of determinism, so your first premise needs to be corrected to make the logic follow.

"Very simply, because if materialism were true, then everything would be determined by the laws of nature." This is a huge assumption because we haven't determined what the "laws" of nature are for how we make decisions. Until we are certain how we make decisions, everything stated about how we make decisions is mere speculation.

You consistently confuse conclusions with assumptions.

In any case, yes, if all people had precisely the same data (and givens), then following logic, all would reach the same conclusions. People, however, do not have the same data, nor the same givens. Logic, in and of itself, is not concerned with truth. It is concerned with the proper relationship of propositions. Consider the following:

1. Jac has met all women
2. All women Jac has met are blond
3. Therefore, all women are blond

This is a perfectly valid logical argument. It obviously isn't sound, because both premises are false. We only know that a posteriori, though. (We should here distinguish between formal logic and material logic . . . the argument is formally valid, but materially false.)

So when we are being rational, we ask two questions: 1. is the argument valid, and 2. is it sound? The first is merely mechanic. The second requires justification and gets into epistemological issues. In other words, it asks, what reason to have I have for thinking this might be true? Or, put differently, "Why ought I believe this?" Again, we see "ought" rearing its head again. It is impossible on this level to discuss what is logical or illogical without discussing what we ought or ought not accept. Yet if determinism is true, there is no "ought" to accept. There is no such thing as justification of truth, and therefore, there is no such thing as a "reason" to believe something is "true." As such, the test for soundness goes out the window, as with all logic, and thus, all rationality.

Rationality, logic, and prescription are all inseparable. You ought to be rational enough to accept that.

Which leads me back to the duty to be rational. The simple fact that we ought to be rational is sufficient to prove my entire argument. The entire argument rests on the idea that rationality presumes prescription. It is absolutely evident that it does (though I will try to demonstrate it more formally below, at skev's request). Yet more basically, the very notion that we ought to be rational in the first place in and of itself is prescriptive, and since prescription is meaningless under determinism, it is absurd to say we ought to do anything. If determinism is true, I can't say that you ought to be rational. Whether you make a rational or irrational "choice" isn't up to you. It's all just physics. You didn't have a choice at all in the matter on what to think, say, believe, or do. If you have no "choice" but to "choose" one thing, it is ridiculous to say that "choice" was the one you "ought" to have made, and that includes the choice to be rational.

But still more to the point, even if somehow you could make a choice (which would be impossible), it would be impossible for me to judge your choice as either rational or irrational, because no matter what conclusion I come to, it is the conclusion I must necessarily come to based on the laws of physics. If I say you commit this or that fallacy, I'm not really saying anything. I'm just doing what the chemicals in my brain tell me to do. And if I say instead that same statement is valid, I came to no such conclusion--again, I'm simply saying what the chemicals in my brain tell me to do. Still further, your evaluation of my claim that your statement is (ir)rational would be in precisely the same situation--completely determined.

The "ought" is completely meaningless. You ought not do anything, and I ought not do anything in response. Even if rationality were possible (and I contend it would not be), it would not matter, because no one ought to be rational. They would just be doing exactly what they would have to do! Therefore, the obligation to rationality presupposes some ability to act in a self-determined manner if it is to have any meaning, which is to say, that something supernatural exists.

Now, because of the length of this reply, on to Skev's in the next.

[Jac3510]

Ok, Skev -- your entire post was essentially you asking me for a formal argument that "free will" (your term, not mine) is "part" of rationality. That's fair. Let me restate the argument, then, with appropriate sub-arguments.

1. If rational thought is possible, materialism is false;
2. Rational thought is possible;
3. Therefore, materialism is false.

Sub argument for (1)

A. Rational thought requires self-determination
B. Self-determination is impossible in materialism
C. Therefore, if rational thought is possible, materialism is false.

Sub argument for (A)

a. Rational thought is prescriptive
b. That which is prescriptive requires self-determination
c. Therefore, rational thought requires self-determination

Briefly, let me defend (b) here before we provide a sub-argument for (a). Prescription describes what ought to be; description describes what is. Under determinism, things cannot be other than what they are, therefore, it is meaningless to say that they ought to be some other way, and therefore, prescription is meaningless (to illustrate, we may as well say a computer ought to do something it is not programmed to do).

Two more sub arguments. First, for (a)

i. Rational thought is that which conforms to the laws of logic
ii. The laws of logic are prescriptive
iii. Therefore, rational thought is prescriptive

(i) should be uncontroversial enough. This leaves us only with (ii):

* Prescription describes what ought to be
** The laws of logic describe how we ought to think (not necessarily how we do think)
*** Therefore, the laws of logic are prescriptive

Getting away from syllogistic defense on this last point, you can see more on this in detail in what I argued to Davin. In logic, we distinguish between valid and sound arguments. Things can be valid all day long, and we can create valid syllogisms a priori as long as we like. We will never know, however, if our argument is sound (supposing, at the very least, that it deals with the word), unless our propositions are true. This, of course, raises the thorny epistemological question: how do I know if something is true? Whatever answer you provide, you most certainly will talk in some way about justification. Indeed, in giving your criteria for truth (whether mathematical certainty, moral certainty, or mere probability is your guide), you will inevitably, by the very fact that you are giving criteria, be giving prescriptions. That is what a justification is--why I ought to think this or not think this. You say, "I am justified in thinking this because . . ." If there is no justification, you ought not think it. Therefore, the ought factor--that is, prescription--is totally inseparable from basic logic, which makes it inseparable from rationality.

A second point is the same one I made to Davin above. We can get far more basic and get away from the rationality argument proper and just look at prescription. The fact that prescription is impossible in determinism means that it can only exist in a world that contains a supernatural element. I contend that rationality is fundamentally prescriptive, but it's easy enough to see that we use prescriptions in pretty much every aspect of life. It would be counter-intuitive, to say the least, to tell me that prescription, in fact, is meaningless. That, however, seems to me to be the necessary result of philosophical materialism (or, if you prefer, naturalism; I don't much care to quibble over the particular word here).

I hope this is more to your satisfaction.

[hackenslash]

And still no support for the bald assertion that materialism=determinism.

[Ihateusernames]

And still no support for the bald assertion that materialism=determinism.

After following this discussion, I'm actually kinda curious as to what else materialism might lead to than determinism...  :pop:

And back to lurking for now! ====>

[dloubet]

My understanding is that atomic decay of an atom is Random. That's random with a capital R. We can tell atomic decay is outside the realm of cause and effect -- and thus truly random -- by observing that there is no "extra" energy present in the debris of an atom that has decayed. Extra energy that would have to be present if anything "nudged" -- or caused -- the atom to decay.  

With such Random events happening all the time, I have to think determinism is dead.

I think the universe is stochastic. It is mechanical in its operation, but can accomodate random input such as atomic decay.

That means the universe operates according to strict physical law, but at the same time is not deterministic, and thus the future is not written in stone.

[Davin]

Which makes logic prescriptive. Logic does not describe the way we think. It describes right thinking. Obviously, all prescriptions include a measure of description. Not all description, however, includes prescription. Prescription necessarily includes the ought, which is meaningless in a deterministic world.

Notice your use of "should." You say, "they should avoid using fallacies." That is a prescription any way you cut it. Your entire paragraph assumes prediction. If I want to be rational, then I shouldn't use fallacies. You assert this is not a prescription, but that is exactly what it is. You have prescribed the means by which we are to be rational.

I'll comment on the obligation to rationality more below.

I never said logic describes the way we think, I said that it describes a way to think that allows us to be sure that what we're stating is accurate and standardized. If you want to call that "right" thinking, go ahead, no one has to agree with you just because you state something.

Nice, taking part of my sentence out of context, beautiful work, it almost brings a tear to my eye to see how many dishonest tactics you use to "prove" your argument. That cut portion of my sentence may be a prescription "any way you cut it," however for this to have been an honest point, you would have not cut it and kept it in context. Secondly, it's not a prescription, it's a description. Prescriptions prescribe things, my sentence prescribes nothing, just describes that one cannot be rational while using fallacies. I noticed that you italicized the "if" at the start of the sentence, because that is very important to the entire context of the sentence.

Math was not invented by humans. It was discovered by humans. Same with logic.

That's it? Well then here's my equally robust rebuttal: No, you're wrong.

Because rationality requires logic, logic is prescriptive, prescription implies ought, but ought is meaningless under determinism, and thus by extension rationality is meaningless under determinism. Prescription can only hold if self-determination is possible, and self-determination is impossible under materialism. Thus, rationality is impossible under materialism, which means rationality is only possible under supernaturalism.

Still, just stating things over and over again doesn't make your logic follow: logic is not prescriptive, prescription is subjective, logic is not. You can use logic for prescription, however that doesn't mean that that is what logic is.

You consistently confuse conclusions with assumptions.

You constantly confuse assumptions with conclusions.

And more than just making a bold statement and pretending like I proved my point, I'll explain: you stated that there can be no naturalistic explanation for rational thought, yet you don't know how people think (no one on this planet knows enough about how humans make decisions), you're asserting some thing without evidence... that is a baseless assertion. See how it works? Instead of just making statements, I make statements that make sense while showing my evidence.

In any case, yes, if all people had precisely the same data (and givens), then following logic, all would reach the same conclusions.

Good glad we agree on this (without the "givens" that is).

People, however, do not have the same data, nor the same givens.

Really? Like I said in the very same paragraph you're responding to? Thanks for clarifying something I had clearly stated.

Logic, in and of itself, is not concerned with truth.

Good job, baby steps, take your time as needed, we just need to get to removing your desire to inject subjective crap into something intended to to be objective.

It is concerned with the proper relationship of propositions. Consider the following:

1. Jac has met all women
2. All women Jac has met are blond
3. Therefore, all women are blond

So wait, what is this logic prescribing? After all it "is a perfectly valid logical argument" and you said that "logic is prescriptive," then how could this be "a perfectly valid logical argument" if it's not prescribing anything?

So when we are being rational, we ask two questions: 1. is the argument valid, and 2. is it sound? The first is merely mechanic. The second requires justification and gets into epistemological issues. In other words, it asks, what reason to have I have for thinking this might be true? Or, put differently, "Why ought I believe this?" Again, we see "ought" rearing its head again. It is impossible on this level to discuss what is logical or illogical without discussing what we ought or ought not accept. Yet if determinism is true, there is no "ought" to accept. There is no such thing as justification of truth, and therefore, there is no such thing as a "reason" to believe something is "true." As such, the test for soundness goes out the window, as with all logic, and thus, all rationality.

Rationality, logic, and prescription are all inseparable. You ought to be rational enough to accept that.

Which leads me back to the duty to be rational. The simple fact that we ought to be rational is sufficient to prove my entire argument. The entire argument rests on the idea that rationality presumes prescription. It is absolutely evident that it does (though I will try to demonstrate it more formally below, at skev's request). Yet more basically, the very notion that we ought to be rational in the first place in and of itself is prescriptive, and since prescription is meaningless under determinism, it is absurd to say we ought to do anything. If determinism is true, I can't say that you ought to be rational. Whether you make a rational or irrational "choice" isn't up to you. It's all just physics. You didn't have a choice at all in the matter on what to think, say, believe, or do. If you have no "choice" but to "choose" one thing, it is ridiculous to say that "choice" was the one you "ought" to have made, and that includes the choice to be rational.

But still more to the point, even if somehow you could make a choice (which would be impossible), it would be impossible for me to judge your choice as either rational or irrational, because no matter what conclusion I come to, it is the conclusion I must necessarily come to based on the laws of physics. If I say you commit this or that fallacy, I'm not really saying anything. I'm just doing what the chemicals in my brain tell me to do. And if I say instead that same statement is valid, I came to no such conclusion--again, I'm simply saying what the chemicals in my brain tell me to do. Still further, your evaluation of my claim that your statement is (ir)rational would be in precisely the same situation--completely determined.

The "ought" is completely meaningless. You ought not do anything, and I ought not do anything in response. Even if rationality were possible (and I contend it would not be), it would not matter, because no one ought to be rational. They would just be doing exactly what they would have to do! Therefore, the obligation to rationality presupposes some ability to act in a self-determined manner if it is to have any meaning, which is to say, that something supernatural exists.

Now, because of the length of this reply, on to Skev's in the next.

You do like to go on and on without saying very much. You can argue that people "ought" to be rational because of duty and obligation, however there is no reason why everyone must be rational, it's just your assertion.

You came to the table with very odd definitions of things like rationality, materialism, naturalism, logic... etc. that all depend on your view of the world, however make the words almost completely useless to use out of the context of this argument. Your definition of rational thinking is very different than the normal, common and even pedantic definitions of rational thinking, then act like your peculiar definition some how solidifies your position. It doesn't. Now you're arrogant enough to say that it's everybody's obligation and duty to be rational as if it's some kind of universal obligation that every one must fulfill? Sorry, but little babies that die after only a few months have no obligation to be rational, people with mental development disorders have no obligation to be rational, a man falling down a cliff to his death has no obligation to be rational, a person in the middle of the desert all alone has no obligation to be rational... etc. Obviously being rational isn't a universal obligation if there are several times and several people who do not fulfill that obligation without any bad effects on them or any one/thing else. In short, there is no universal requirement for anyone to be rational.

Now let's tackle your silly point about if the world were deterministic (I'm not saying that it is, this is just a thought experiment), that people aren't really making choices: When water boils, do we just say, "that's just the laws of physics?" When water freezes do we just say, "that's just the laws of physics?" When we describe how the sun works do we just say, "that's just the laws of physics, it doesn't mean anything?" No, some of us explain the processes of how those things happen. In the same way, even in a deterministic world, we'd describe thoughts and choices. In fact, if it turns out that the universe is pre-determined, then we'd all act exactly the same as we're determined to act. Maybe we'd refine the definitions, but to say that "it doesn't mean anything therefore stop defining things" just doesn't make any sense. We'd still define thoughts and decisions just as humans define everything. Why do you want to drop the definitions of things if the universe turns out not to be the way you want it to be? Also, why are all your odd definitions of things wrapped around your world view?

Now if you'd just have an honest conversation, that would be great, however I don't think that you have the ability to have an honest discussion as evidenced by several pages of text showing your use of disingenuous (at best) tactics. I know that you allow yourself to just make bold accusations without providing the evidence and reasoning for it, while you question everyone else as if they can be held to a different standard than you hold yourself to, so here's a short list:

Straw Man: in your first post, "The worldview on which most versions of atheism are built is called philosophical naturalism, materialism, or physicalism." Already covered that this statement is not just unfounded, but an attempt to put "most" atheists into one box. Then you went on to express a very bad understanding of materialism and determinism.

False Dichotomy and Argument from Ignorance: "If rational thought is possible, materialism is false" You have yet to construct a link to how this statement is true or even at least valid. Of course that may depend on your ever changing definition of rational thought covered next. However just because you can't think of other options, doesn't mean that other options don't exist.

Moving the Goal Post:
First Post: "so let’s define rational thought if it isn’t obvious to everyone. Rational thought is thought which is characterized by reason, and reason, of course, is the intellectual faculty by which knowledge is gained."

Later Definition: "However, that which makes a thought "rational" is a thought that stands in accordance with what we ought  to think given the constraints of logic, which is to say, it is what we ought to think following the normal intellectual process we call reason."

--Then later:

Davin: "So, by your definition; in order to be rational, one must be able to act irrationally?"

Jac3510: "Yes, of course."

So rationality went from one definition to another, then yet another addendum as the discussion went on.

Moving the Goal Post 2:

Jac3510: If there is no randomizing component [...], then you can predict exactly what the computer will do in response to your move--not because it is the rational thing to do, but because it is forced to make a particular move with reference to your particular position and its predefined value system.

So a computer isn't being rational because: you can predict what it will do and it has a predefined value system, got it.

Davin: This is only true for some programs, Deep Blue for instance made choices that no one could predict. The program was programmed to adjust the values it was giving based on learning gained from playing against humans.

See? Not all programs operate that way so this must be wrong and computers are making rational choices right? The program was learning and making decisions based on what was learned.  This matches your first definition of rational thought right?

Jac3510: Wrong. Deep Blue learned from its matches, and thus, given each game, it had a new dataset from which to work. The moves are always determined based on the dataset.

Oh wrong?, even though I refuted exactly what you said are the problems with a computer making rational decisions? Oh you're adding onto that, that because all decisions are based on a dataset then the computer can't be rational.

Davin: Wrong. Not just a dataset. Any way, how is this different than people basing their decisions on what they've learned?

If computers aren't being rational for making decisions based on what they know, then people making decisions on what they know are equally irrational.

Jac3510: Yes, just a dataset. It doesn't matter the source of that data. It could have been built in or learned.That dataset, of course, is acted upon by a library of functions, but the dataset is the determinative factor always. And it is different from what people learn exactly as I described above. We have the ability to choose. Computers don't.

Just a dataset really? Oh wait, not just a dataset because then you said "That dataset, of course, is acted upon by a library of functions" which means it's not just a dataset despite in your same paragraph you said it was. Nice job refuting yourself. But anyway, where has this goal post moved to now? Oh some vague and silly statement that humans can choose and computers can't. This is ridiculous because if computers couldn't make decisions, they wouldn't work. Any way the goal post keeps on moving for a few more posts after this. Later you said that humans can learn through being corrected, so I mentioned that programs do that as well to which you moved the goal post to that a person can be "wrong" while the program can't, to which I asked what the difference was... to which you dropped it. Notice that every time I showed that your statement was incorrect, that you added something on? I did.

Bare Assertions: "I have not read Conway or Kochen. There is nothing in QM, however, that relieves the materialist from the necessity of determinism." This a bare assertion as well as contrary to evidence. Not only does QM relieve "the materialist from the necessity of determinism" but it describes how it frees one from the necessity of determinism. It's a bad idea to ignore evidence, just because it conflicts with your beliefs.

Taking things out of context: Already one covered in this post.

And many more that I haven't covered in this post, including the hilarious hi-jinks of avoiding the points I'm making to instead respond to things I've never even said.

Truly, you must be a great hero championing the crest of arrogance on top the steed of assumption, wielding the sword fallacy, and protected by the armor of ignorance.