Argument #2: From the Nature of Rationality

[Davin]

All qualifications aside, fine, I agree. The theory of gravity is descriptive. And why would you not call it prescriptive? Bear with me, because this should help me explain my basic point, and it should help us identify our difference of thought here.

Why don't we just skip the game and you tell me your idea?

Calculating the best move isn't rational. Nor is making the right move rational. "Rational" implies a certain context. For example, let's say Qh3 was the best move on the board possible. Kasparov and DB can both tell you that for reasons that neither you nor I could possibly think of. Now, suppose a brand new chess player just decides on a whim to make the same move. There is a difference in context. Kasparov and DB have made certain calculations. For the new player, it just strikes his fancy. For Kasparov, the move may be rational (we'll address DB next). For the new player, it isn't rational or irrational. It was just done "on a whim." Beginner's luck.

So why is it rational for Kasparov? For two reasons: first, he is capable of considering the move in the context of other moves. DB can certainly do that. However, what Kasparov can do that DB can't is, once he has discovered the best move, choose to act in a manner that is not in his best interest. If he decides to make another move, we can say that he made an irrational move. There was no reason for it. In fact, there were reasons not to do so. The same can't be said about the new player. Their bad moves aren't necessarily irrational. The best move they have under the circumstances may be a bad move that Kasparov can take advantage of, whereas had Kasparov himself made the move, it would have been irrational.

DB cannot fulfill this second aspect of the criteria for rationality, namely, free choice. DB is not free to make its own decisions. Its decisions are 100% determined by its programming. There is nothing "inside" of DB that can step outside of its dataset and decide whether or not it wants to execute the command. To colloquial terms, it doesn't have free will. It doesn't have a choice between being rational or irrational; ergo, it isn't being "rational" at all. It is just doing what DB does. To put it in the technical terms I've been using through this thread, it makes no sense to talk about DB's moves in prescriptive terms, i.e., "DB ought to move his queen to h3." You may as well tell a rock it "ought" to fall. If the program determines that to be most valuable move given its dataset, it will make that move. If not, it will make another. The entire process is strictly descriptive. Again, there is, then, no rationality.

Describe the "ought" because it seems as though there's no solid definition.

Yes, still just a dataset. That dataset may be a part of the initial program. They may be learned by repeated use or by exposure to some environment. But the program always acts on data. Computer programs don't "choose." They calculate variables based on the program's architecture and execute based on that. In other words, a computer's actions are strictly deterministic.

No, not just a dataset. In fact many programs run just fine without datasets. Programs can even run without any input data. They can even run without any output data. What this means is that programs are more complex and sometimes more basic than just something that processes data. I did notice however that you stopped using the term dataset and continued on with the term data as if you were talking about the same thing, very poor form.

We can say the same thing for outputs of humans, if it's not correct, we go back in and help them to be able come up with the correct answer. Again, I see no distinction between the rationality of a computer and the rationality of a person. The difference I see is how we correct the person against how we correct these kinds of basic programs.

Human thought doesn't seem to be that way. If it turns out that it is, then I argue that human thought isn't rational either. That's my whole point. A predetermined thought is not a rational thought. It's just a predetermined thought. It isn't rational because rationality presuppose prescriptive value: we ought to think this or that. If we do, we're rational; if we don't, we're irrational. That kind of language makes absolutely no sense when applied to software. The best you can say is, "It ought to do this or that [if I've understood the data correctly]." In fact, this is the entire reason we can troubleshoot programs. We expect certain output given certain input precisely because the output is determined by the input relative to the program's architecture. If the output is not what we expect, then the problem is either with the data or with the series of commands it is subject to. We look until we find the problem and we fix it.

There are many programs where the whole deal with using them is because we can't determine what they will do. If you go to a grocery store and use the club card thing, then you're participating in that. The reason computers are used is because the process is too complicated for a human and no one can determine what the results will be... because if some one could, then the companies that data mine wouldn't need to spend billions a year on computers that do it. The results however, have shown to be effective, which is why they do it.

Just as Kasparov couldn't determine the moves Deep Blue would make, and if the programmers that programmed deep blue could determine what moves Deep Blue would make, then they could beat Kasparov... which they couldn't. Some of the people that helped with Deep Blue played against Kasparov and lost, yet Deep Blue won. That is an example of Deep Blue performing in a way that could not be determined.

Again, if it turns out that the human brain is nothing but a complex, deterministic machine--which must be the case under materialism--then Kasparov would work exactly like DB. In that case, human thought is not rational, because it is strictly deterministic. But since our experience strongly suggests that we have the ability to choose to act freely in an irrational manner, then we have good reason, until proven otherwise, to take it for granted that we can, in fact, be rational or irrational, and that the way we think is fundamentally different from the way computer's think.

Let me repeat for emphasis, if future studies demonstrate that our brains work exactly like a highly complex DB, and that we, in fact, have no self-determination over our thoughts, then the conclusion is not that computers are rational, but that human thought is arational, which is the point of my entire argument. Externally determined thought is not rational. Only thought that has a self-determined component can be considered rational (or irrational) because of the prescriptive nature of rationality.

Any way, before this goal post moves any further, just state all your objections right now and then we can discuss those.

The process is just the same as yours. I want to make an A on my test. Logic and experience tells me I'd better study, not stay up all night talking on a discussion board. The rational thing to do is to study. The irrational thing to do is to stay up all night talking on the discussion board.

Not for me, I never studied for any test and still got A's, while also hardly ever sleeping more than four hours a night.

Notice the nature of the choice. By defining a rational thing, you are simultaneously defining the irrational thing. If the rational thing to do is turn right, then the irrational thing is to turn left. If the rational thing is to make save your money, the irrational thing is to spend it. It is meaningless to speak of a rational choice without an opposite irrational choice. Further, it is meaningless to talk about something being "rational" if there is no choice at all. Suppose you and I are playing chess (since that's the running analogy). Suppose you have forced me into one move from checkmate. The only move I can legally make is, say, a pawn up one space. Is that a "rational" choice? No. It is neither rational nor irrational. If I tried to move my knight, you would object that the move is illegal, not irrational. It is neither a good move nor a bad move. It is the only move the game allows. There is no rationality to it. It is mechanical--determined.

If, however, I have two moves--I can move my pawn or my knight, and if the knight will not only preserve me from checkmate, but put you in checkmate--and I make move the pawn rather than the knight, you can rightly accuse me of being irrational in my move.

So rationality as a whole only has meaning where there is choice--where there is prescription, or "ought." If, then, human thought is determined, there is no ought, there is only "is." Therefore, there is no rationality. No position is rational. All thoughts are arational, just as the falling of rock is arational. If materialism is true and my thoughts are determined not by me, but my physics, then I have no choice to think other than like I do, just as you have no choice but to think other than like you do. I don't think this way by any virtue of my intelligence anymore than you do. I think this way because nature so made me, just as it so made me a white, male human.

No program, DB or otherwise, can meet this criteria of self-determination. It seems that we can. If so, there must be some aspect of us outside of the laws of physics that allows for self-determination. Shy of that, we are completely externally determined and arational.

This doesn't make much sense, in order to make a rational choice one must define an irrational choice? I really don't think it's necessary to define every choice available in order to make a rational choice, otherwise no human could be rational because we can't possibly consider each and every choice when we make a decision, however we can make sure that each choice is rational just by making sure the choice we make is logical, objective and mechanical.

It seems like you're trying to make rational thought into something that it's not. Rationality is cold, determined and mechanical by every definition I've ever seen... until yours. Rationality entails taking the information and seeing where it leads, making sure that your logic is valid, leaving only one or no choice if you're being rational. All you have to do to be irrational, is to use fallacies in your logic.

[i_am_i]

The argument simply proves that there is something that exists and operates beyond the laws of nature. If the only things that exist and operate are found within and governed by the laws of nature, then rational thought is impossible. If you believe that rational thought is possible, I argue that the only way to be logically consistent--indeed, to be rational--is to accept that there must be a supernatural aspect to the human, whatever that aspect may be.

What your argument proves is that you want there to be something that exists and operates beyond the laws of nature. And, of course, that thing that you want to exist and operate beyond the laws of nature is God with a capital G.

That's what your argument proves.

[Jac3510]

The argument simply proves that there is something that exists and operates beyond the laws of nature. If the only things that exist and operate are found within and governed by the laws of nature, then rational thought is impossible. If you believe that rational thought is possible, I argue that the only way to be logically consistent--indeed, to be rational--is to accept that there must be a supernatural aspect to the human, whatever that aspect may be

This claim is still irrational. You're confusing epistemology with reason.

Do I believe rational thought is possible? Sure. Do I believe absolute knowledge can be obtained through it? Nope.

You will never prove anything that exists beyond nature or is supernatural. By its very definition you can't.

Actually, I'm talking about the ontology of reason, not the epistemology of reason.

I'm not talking about what we can know about the external world through reason. I am talking about what the very presence of reason necessarily assumes. For example, suppose you saw fire. You would know that there is oxygen in the room. Why? Because there can be no fire without oxygen. I'm arguing that the nature of rationality is that it requires a supernatural backing.

We know that is true because of the arguments I have made throughout this thread. Rationality depends on prescriptive language because the laws of logic are prescriptive in nature. Yet under determinism, there is no prescription, only description. Therefore, logic, and thus rationality, cannot exist under materialism. Logic and rationality presuppose prescriptive language, which presupposes self-determination, which negates materialism.

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All qualifications aside, fine, I agree. The theory of gravity is descriptive. And why would you not call it prescriptive? Bear with me, because this should help me explain my basic point, and it should help us identify our difference of thought here.

Why don't we just skip the game and you tell me your idea?

Because you keep telling me that I am making too many assumptions. So rather than stretch this out any further, why don't you just tell me why you wouldn't refer to the theory of gravity as prescriptive?

Describe the "ought" because it seems as though there's no solid definition.

Ought - that which refers to duty or obligation

No, not just a dataset. In fact many programs run just fine without datasets. Programs can even run without any input data. They can even run without any output data. What this means is that programs are more complex and sometimes more basic than just something that processes data. I did notice however that you stopped using the term dataset and continued on with the term data as if you were talking about the same thing, very poor form.

We can say the same thing for outputs of humans, if it's not correct, we go back in and help them to be able come up with the correct answer. Again, I see no distinction between the rationality of a computer and the rationality of a person. The difference I see is how we correct the person against how we correct these kinds of basic programs.

I'm not going to quibble about the technical words of programing jargon. Even programs that run without input are operating on something. If I write a program that just prints "Hello, world!" to the screen, the program is still dealing with basic data--"hello, world."

There is a huge difference in correcting a human "output" and a computer's output. In the former, we say, "No, you made a mistake. You should have concluded this." In the latter, we say, "No. I made a mistake. I should have run this."

Programs execute the instructions we give them. The mistakes are our own, not the programs. When Windows crashes, it isn't being "irrational." The mistake lies ultimately with the imperfection of the programmer. We may say colloquially that the program "ought" not to have crashed, but we only mean in so saying that that was not our intention. We didn't intend on it to crash. Strictly speaking the program "ought" not do anything. It just did what it did. It is a purely descriptive process. In the case of a human, if I argue that 2+2=5, then you can well say that I am being irrational, because I "ought" to recognize that two and two make four.

In fact, this entire conversation is evidence of what I am talking about. If you are right, I "ought" to see my mistake and retract the argument once you have proven it fallacious. Even if you do, however, there is no guarantee I will, because I could well be a dishonest hack who doesn't care about being rational. But that, of course, is the rub. To be rational is to do what I ought to do, not to do what I just am doing. Under materialism, there is no such thing as ought. I am just doing what nature determines I will do. All of my, and your, arguments are merely arational.

There are many programs where the whole deal with using them is because we can't determine what they will do. If you go to a grocery store and use the club card thing, then you're participating in that. The reason computers are used is because the process is too complicated for a human and no one can determine what the results will be... because if some one could, then the companies that data mine wouldn't need to spend billions a year on computers that do it. The results however, have shown to be effective, which is why they do it.

Just as Kasparov couldn't determine the moves Deep Blue would make, and if the programmers that programmed deep blue could determine what moves Deep Blue would make, then they could beat Kasparov... which they couldn't. Some of the people that helped with Deep Blue played against Kasparov and lost, yet Deep Blue won. That is an example of Deep Blue performing in a way that could not be determined.

Notice the bolded part above. The reason we can't predict the outcome of such things is not because they are inherently unpredictable, but rather simply because we, as humans, are not capable of such predictions. So we build machines that can predict such things.

So I could build a computer that will predict what Kasparov ought to do. I can take it a step further and build a program that can analyze not only what he ought to do, but what would be the strongest response based on anything that he actually does do. None of this, however, will tell me what Kasparov will do. Even if I had full access to the world's most powerful supercomputer and could map every neuron in his brain and could fully map how every atom would necessarily respond to the others, there is still no reason to suppose that I could predict Kasparov's move unless determinism is true. If it is, then I could predict every move he will make because he doesn't really have any choice in the matter.

In the same way, I can, in principle, write a program that will predict exactly what DB will do. No human, including Kasparov, can do it, of course, because no human can perform those calculations. But if I am fully aware of how the DB programming works and know every piece of data it is operating on, then I can determine, using exactly the same process it uses, what it will choose on any given move. That's because, whatever is true about Kasparov, determinism is true about Deep Blue. And for that reason, we don't call DB "rational." There is no prescription whatsoever. DB "ought" not do anything; it simply does what it does. Kasparov, on the other hand, "ought" to do certain things, since he is a free agent capable of acting in accordance with what he calculates is the best possible move.

Any way, before this goal post moves any further, just state all your objections right now and then we can discuss those.

I'm arguing exactly the same thing I have been arguing the entire time.

If materialism is true, rational thought is impossible, because rational thought presupposes prescriptive language which is not possible under determinism. I said all of this in the very first post.

This doesn't make much sense, in order to make a rational choice one must define an irrational choice? I really don't think it's necessary to define every choice available in order to make a rational choice, otherwise no human could be rational because we can't possibly consider each and every choice when we make a decision, however we can make sure that each choice is rational just by making sure the choice we make is logical, objective and mechanical.

It seems like you're trying to make rational thought into something that it's not. Rationality is cold, determined and mechanical by every definition I've ever seen... until yours. Rationality entails taking the information and seeing where it leads, making sure that your logic is valid, leaving only one or no choice if you're being rational. All you have to do to be irrational, is to use fallacies in your logic.

No, you misunderstood me. I did not say in order to make a rational choice one must first define the irrational choice. I am saying that in labeling a choice irrational you are simultaneously labeling its contraries irrational. In other words, it is logically impossible to have a rational statement without an irrational counterpart. This does not mean that we have to consider all of these irrational counterparts. It only means that we could if we so desired precisely because rational choices define irrational choices. For instance, if I flip a coin and it lands on heads, that doesn't mean that I have to look at tails to know what heads is.

I am not, then, talking about how you know what is rational. That is the same mistake Sophus made above. I am talking about the nature of rationality itself. What does it mean for something to be rational? It means to be in accordance with sound reason, which is a prescriptive definition. What DB does is not "rational." It's mere calculation and execution. It can't act rationally or irrationally. It just acts as it is determined to do so.

Just like you don't call a rock falling "rational," you don't call DB's moves "rational." Both are exactly the same. They are externally determined. The only way for something to be rational is if it conforms with reason; that is, if the person thinks as they ought to think based on what they know.

[hackenslash]

Because you keep telling me that I am making too many assumptions. So rather than stretch this out any further, why don't you just tell me why you wouldn't refer to the theory of gravity as prescriptive?

Because the theory of gravity, like all theories, is an explanatory framework dealing with a class of facts. All theories are, by their very nature, descriptive. Gravity is prescriptive. The theory of gravity is decsriptive.

Ignorant wibble.

[superfes]

Just want to help clarify some things for you here.

If materialism is true, rational thought is impossible, because rational thought presupposes prescriptive language which is not possible under determinism. I said all of this in the very first post.

If I have a reason to be materialistic (i.e. I chose to be this way), then I am both materialistic and rational.

Rational thought and materialism have no direct connection and cannot be canceled out by either one's existence.

You may need to qualify your idea of determinism however... (1. a : a theory or doctrine that acts of the will, occurrences in nature, or social or psychological phenomena are causally determined by preceding events or natural laws. b : a belief in predestination. 2. the quality or state of being determined.)

Looks like you probably believe in one of those, so pick one so you're not arguing with yourself on that.

Just like you don't call a rock falling "rational," you don't call DB's moves "rational." Both are exactly the same. They are externally determined. The only way for something to be rational is if it conforms with reason; that is, if the person thinks as they ought to think based on what they know.

A falling rock is rational if it's falling for a reason (i.e. someone wants it to and dropped it).

A computers choices are rational either because they were created rationally (i.e. A Human told it to do something for a reason) or because they are determined rational by the computer (i.e. after analyzing gobs of data the computer decided a move was best for a reason (Either point based or strategy based, etc.)).

You keep using the term rational as if it can only be applied toward magics... this frightens me because if other people that believe in God believe that people cannot be rational without God there may yet be another Crusade so you can actually win this argument.

On either side, I worry that you actually believe what you're saying.

If you believe in Christ and the Christian God, then you believe in free will. If you believe in free will you have to believe that Humans are independently making choices, finding reasons and therefore being rational.

If you don't believe in the Christian God then perhaps you don't believe in free will, in which case I'm afraid you're just waiting for the world to end in a flaming ball of nuclear explosions...

That's really scary.

[Jac3510]

Just want to help clarify some things for you here.

If materialism is true, rational thought is impossible, because rational thought presupposes prescriptive language which is not possible under determinism. I said all of this in the very first post.

If I have a reason to be materialistic (i.e. I chose to be this way), then I am both materialistic and rational.

Did you? If everything in nature is strictly determined by the laws of nature, then what makes you think that everything except your thoughts are determined by nature? That would be a case of special pleading (which would be irrational). So, in fact, even your "choice" to be materialistic would be no choice at all.

Rational thought and materialism have no direct connection and cannot be canceled out by either one's existence.

Have you read the thread? I've stated the connection many times. You can feel free to dispute the connection if you wish, but assertions to the contrary aren't of much value.

You may need to qualify your idea of determinism however... (1. a : a theory or doctrine that acts of the will, occurrences in nature, or social or psychological phenomena are causally determined by preceding events or natural laws. b : a belief in predestination. 2. the quality or state of being determined.)

Looks like you probably believe in one of those, so pick one so you're not arguing with yourself on that.

Or I could go with one of dictionary.com's defintions:

1. the doctrine that all facts and events exemplify natural laws.
2. the doctrine that all events, including human choices and decisions, have sufficient causes.

In which case, I am specifically referring to (1) as (2) does not specify the nature of the sufficient cause. Even someone who believes in free will could fall under the second of these.

Just like you don't call a rock falling "rational," you don't call DB's moves "rational." Both are exactly the same. They are externally determined. The only way for something to be rational is if it conforms with reason; that is, if the person thinks as they ought to think based on what they know.

A falling rock is rational if it's falling for a reason (i.e. someone wants it to and dropped it).

In this example, the rock falling is rational only relative to the choice of the person who made it. The rock's fall, in and of itself, is neither rational nor irrational. The idea you are pressing for would better be stating," It would be rational to drop a rock if someone wanted it to fall for a reason."

Rationality is always tied to choice, because rationality is a term applied to actions that are in line with the laws of logic. Logic, however, is a prescriptive enterprise, and thus, under materialism, is impossible, since nothing is prescriptive under materialism.

A computers choices are rational either because they were created rationally (i.e. A Human told it to do something for a reason) or because they are determined rational by the computer (i.e. after analyzing gobs of data the computer decided a move was best for a reason (Either point based or strategy based, etc.)).

The first possibility assumes a rational person, not a rational computer. The second is not rational at all, as Davin and I have been discussing, because rationality implies ought, which cannot be legitimately applied to computer software.

You keep using the term rational as if it can only be applied toward magics... this frightens me because if other people that believe in God believe that people cannot be rational without God there may yet be another Crusade so you can actually win this argument.

On either side, I worry that you actually believe what you're saying.

If you believe in Christ and the Christian God, then you believe in free will. If you believe in free will you have to believe that Humans are independently making choices, finding reasons and therefore being rational.

If you don't believe in the Christian God then perhaps you don't believe in free will, in which case I'm afraid you're just waiting for the world to end in a flaming ball of nuclear explosions...

That's really scary.

And this is just an attempt to poison the well. Let's stick to the arguments, my friend.

[i_am_i]

Jac, if I'm understanding all this then it appears to me that the condensed version of what you're saying is that if people are capable of rational thought then there must be a supernatural explanation for that. Is this right?

[Davin]

All qualifications aside, fine, I agree. The theory of gravity is descriptive. And why would you not call it prescriptive? Bear with me, because this should help me explain my basic point, and it should help us identify our difference of thought here.

Why don't we just skip the game and you tell me your idea?

Because you keep telling me that I am making too many assumptions. So rather than stretch this out any further, why don't you just tell me why you wouldn't refer to the theory of gravity as prescriptive?

I'm not asking you make any assumptions... unless you're making assumptions about your "basic point". Otherwise just say what your basic point is and we can skip a boring game.

Describe the "ought" because it seems as though there's no solid definition.

Ought - that which refers to duty or obligation

So rationality now also depends on duty or obligation? What could possibly be the reason to attach such specific meanings onto rationality? You're only rational when performing your duty? This only further complicates the definition for no purpose except, possibly, to make the definition of rational thought as complicated as possible.

A guard decides that he'll take a bribe to let someone in, he could reason it out and be very rational, but not fulfilling his duty. What if a man's duty conflicts with his obligations to his family, then there's no way to make a rational decision with this kind of "rational thought".

No, not just a dataset. In fact many programs run just fine without datasets. Programs can even run without any input data. They can even run without any output data. What this means is that programs are more complex and sometimes more basic than just something that processes data. I did notice however that you stopped using the term dataset and continued on with the term data as if you were talking about the same thing, very poor form.

We can say the same thing for outputs of humans, if it's not correct, we go back in and help them to be able come up with the correct answer. Again, I see no distinction between the rationality of a computer and the rationality of a person. The difference I see is how we correct the person against how we correct these kinds of basic programs.

I'm not going to quibble about the technical words of programing jargon. Even programs that run without input are operating on something. If I write a program that just prints "Hello, world!" to the screen, the program is still dealing with basic data--"hello, world."

Just the same as any thought in your head. They're just electrical signals, just like a computer... except computers still take a lot more power to run.

There is a huge difference in correcting a human "output" and a computer's output. In the former, we say, "No, you made a mistake. You should have concluded this." In the latter, we say, "No. I made a mistake. I should have run this."

However the method you described for correcting a person has been employed as a teaching method with "machine learning" where the person (doesn't have to be a programmer as all), tells the machine what it did wrong and what it should have done, and after a few times, the machine gets it right. So a computers output can be corrected in this way. But for basic programs, the best way is to just fix the code.

Programs execute the instructions we give them. The mistakes are our own, not the programs. When Windows crashes, it isn't being "irrational." The mistake lies ultimately with the imperfection of the programmer. We may say colloquially that the program "ought" not to have crashed, but we only mean in so saying that that was not our intention. We didn't intend on it to crash. Strictly speaking the program "ought" not do anything. It just did what it did. It is a purely descriptive process. In the case of a human, if I argue that 2+2=5, then you can well say that I am being irrational, because I "ought" to recognize that two and two make four.

They also can execute functions they made themselves. And if you say that 2+2=5, I would just that you're wrong and then demonstrate why 2+2=5, instead of just assuming that there was no rational thought behind your conclusion. Just because someone is wrong, doesn't mean they're being irrational, it could just mean they're dealing with bad data or have not fully understood the process.

In fact, this entire conversation is evidence of what I am talking about. If you are right, I "ought" to see my mistake and retract the argument once you have proven it fallacious. Even if you do, however, there is no guarantee I will, because I could well be a dishonest hack who doesn't care about being rational. But that, of course, is the rub. To be rational is to do what I ought to do, not to do what I just am doing. Under materialism, there is no such thing as ought. I am just doing what nature determines I will do. All of my, and your, arguments are merely arational.

By your sad definition of rational, not mine.

There are many programs where the whole deal with using them is because we can't determine what they will do. If you go to a grocery store and use the club card thing, then you're participating in that. The reason computers are used is because the process is too complicated for a human and no one can determine what the results will be... because if some one could, then the companies that data mine wouldn't need to spend billions a year on computers that do it. The results however, have shown to be effective, which is why they do it.

Just as Kasparov couldn't determine the moves Deep Blue would make, and if the programmers that programmed deep blue could determine what moves Deep Blue would make, then they could beat Kasparov... which they couldn't. Some of the people that helped with Deep Blue played against Kasparov and lost, yet Deep Blue won. That is an example of Deep Blue performing in a way that could not be determined.

Notice the bolded part above. The reason we can't predict the outcome of such things is not because they are inherently unpredictable, but rather simply because we, as humans, are not capable of such predictions. So we build machines that can predict such things.

So I could build a computer that will predict what Kasparov ought to do. I can take it a step further and build a program that can analyze not only what he ought to do, but what would be the strongest response based on anything that he actually does do. None of this, however, will tell me what Kasparov will do. Even if I had full access to the world's most powerful supercomputer and could map every neuron in his brain and could fully map how every atom would necessarily respond to the others, there is still no reason to suppose that I could predict Kasparov's move unless determinism is true. If it is, then I could predict every move he will make because he doesn't really have any choice in the matter.

In the same way, I can, in principle, write a program that will predict exactly what DB will do. No human, including Kasparov, can do it, of course, because no human can perform those calculations. But if I am fully aware of how the DB programming works and know every piece of data it is operating on, then I can determine, using exactly the same process it uses, what it will choose on any given move. That's because, whatever is true about Kasparov, determinism is true about Deep Blue. And for that reason, we don't call DB "rational." There is no prescription whatsoever. DB "ought" not do anything; it simply does what it does. Kasparov, on the other hand, "ought" to do certain things, since he is a free agent capable of acting in accordance with what he calculates is the best possible move.

That is quiet an assumption. Why can't we just leave it at that we do not currently know. If we had the same access to Kasparov as we did to Deep Blue that we don't know that we still wouldn't be able to determine Kasparov's moves. What I've brought up as evidence for my position are things that actually happened or currently happening, I don't know why you have to keep going off into mere speculations about what might or might not happen is x were the case... it can't be used as evidence, just mental practice.

Any way, before this goal post moves any further, just state all your objections right now and then we can discuss those.

I'm arguing exactly the same thing I have been arguing the entire time.

If materialism is true, rational thought is impossible, because rational thought presupposes prescriptive language which is not possible under determinism. I said all of this in the very first post.

That's if anyone accepts your very odd definition of rational thought. I'm sure most people don't agree with your definition that it's not rational unless it's for duty or obligation and everything not for duty and obligation is irrational.

This doesn't make much sense, in order to make a rational choice one must define an irrational choice? I really don't think it's necessary to define every choice available in order to make a rational choice, otherwise no human could be rational because we can't possibly consider each and every choice when we make a decision, however we can make sure that each choice is rational just by making sure the choice we make is logical, objective and mechanical.

It seems like you're trying to make rational thought into something that it's not. Rationality is cold, determined and mechanical by every definition I've ever seen... until yours. Rationality entails taking the information and seeing where it leads, making sure that your logic is valid, leaving only one or no choice if you're being rational. All you have to do to be irrational, is to use fallacies in your logic.

No, you misunderstood me. I did not say in order to make a rational choice one must first define the irrational choice. I am saying that in labeling a choice irrational you are simultaneously labeling its contraries irrational. In other words, it is logically impossible to have a rational statement without an irrational counterpart. This does not mean that we have to consider all of these irrational counterparts. It only means that we could if we so desired precisely because rational choices define irrational choices. For instance, if I flip a coin and it lands on heads, that doesn't mean that I have to look at tails to know what heads is.

Aye, all we'd need to do is exchange valid logic for logic with at least one fallacy.

I am not, then, talking about how you know what is rational. That is the same mistake Sophus made above. I am talking about the nature of rationality itself. What does it mean for something to be rational? It means to be in accordance with sound reason, which is a prescriptive definition. What DB does is not "rational." It's mere calculation and execution. It can't act rationally or irrationally. It just acts as it is determined to do so.

Rational means it's without fallacy and/or assumptions. Deep Blue had been programmed to think rationally.

Just like you don't call a rock falling "rational," you don't call DB's moves "rational." Both are exactly the same. They are externally determined. The only way for something to be rational is if it conforms with reason; that is, if the person thinks as they ought to think based on what they know.

I also don't call a falling person "rational" just, "hey look at that falling person." This is exactly how programs function, they think as their duty is to think and the computer's obligation is to the person who requires the computer's work, and the program functions on what it knows.

[Davin]

The second is not rational at all, as Davin and I have been discussing, because rationality implies ought, which cannot be legitimately applied to computer software.

You keep saying requires an "ought," however "ought" is very subjective and counter to the idea of rational thought being objective. Duties and obligations are for individual people, my duties and obligations are different than your duties and obligations, which means that what I "ought" to do is different than what you "ought" to do, which is subjective... which is counter to the objective nature of rational thought.

[superfes]

Did you? If everything in nature is strictly determined by the laws of nature, then what makes you think that everything except your thoughts are determined by nature? That would be a case of special pleading (which would be irrational). So, in fact, even your "choice" to be materialistic would be no choice at all.

And what pray tell do the laws of nature have to say about rational thought, given that God and nature are defined by man, whether or not either existed before or after man is irrelevant. Rational thought therefore is also defined by man.

I could have chosen to be materialistic, but I chose otherwise, therefore in that aspect of my personality, I am rational.

Have you read the thread? I've stated the connection many times. You can feel free to dispute the connection if you wish, but assertions to the contrary aren't of much value.

Afraid I still have yet to actually find a link between the two, I have seen your stated arguments and beliefs, but I have yet to see an actual example of how one may cancel the other out, because they still have no connection as far as I'm aware.

Or I could go with one of dictionary.com's defintions...

I prefer not to use dictionary.com because it is too religiously oriented, which makes it biased. Which in turn I personally do not like.

In this example, the rock falling is rational only relative to the choice of the person who made it. The rock's fall, in and of itself, is neither rational nor irrational. The idea you are pressing for would better be stating," It would be rational to drop a rock if someone wanted it to fall for a reason."

Rationality is always tied to choice, because rationality is a term applied to actions that are in line with the laws of logic. Logic, however, is a prescriptive enterprise, and thus, under materialism, is impossible, since nothing is prescriptive under materialism.

I secede that both of our previous declarations of the rock falling example are poorly worded. However, the rock falling being rational is a bad example because one must talk about the rationale of the person making the choice and not the rock, because as far as we know, rocks are not sentient.

The first possibility assumes a rational person, not a rational computer. The second is not rational at all, as Davin and I have been discussing, because rationality implies ought, which cannot be legitimately applied to computer software.

I still don't agree on this point either, as something that is created with rational thought thus becomes rational, further something that is taught (or programmed if you prefer) to make choices rationally then exhibits the same ability to make thoughtful choices is behaving with rational thought.

The problem with this part of the debate is that we do in fact know how computers think and how the parts move around to make choices, whereas with Humans we do not yet know, this distinction does not make your assertion correct, it merely means we do not yet know.

And this is just an attempt to poison the well. Let's stick to the arguments, my friend.

Just placing a thought out there, it seems as if your argument is being produced to prove that there is sentience in the Universe that is supernatural, which I was trying to say neither creates nor removes the possibility of rational thought.

Just a final question, rational means: "having reason or understanding" or "relating to, based on, or agreeable to reason", thus rational thought is thought with reason.

Do you agree?

Jac, if I'm understanding all this then it appears to me that the condensed version of what you're saying is that if people are capable of rational thought then there must be a supernatural explanation for that. Is this right?

I'm glad that you asked this question, it was what I was trying to get at, but I think I may have pushed too hard.

[deekayfry]

Jac, if I'm understanding all this then it appears to me that the condensed version of what you're saying is that if people are capable of rational thought then there must be a supernatural explanation for that. Is this right?

 :hail: This is the best, by fricken' far, best summary of the entire fricken' post!

[Sophus]

Actually, I'm talking about the ontology of reason, not the epistemology of reason.

I'm not talking about what we can know about the external world through reason. I am talking about what the very presence of reason necessarily assumes. For example, suppose you saw fire. You would know that there is oxygen in the room. Why? Because there can be no fire without oxygen. I'm arguing that the nature of rationality is that it requires a supernatural backing.

We know that is true because of the arguments I have made throughout this thread. Rationality depends on prescriptive language because the laws of logic are prescriptive in nature. Yet under determinism, there is no prescription, only description. Therefore, logic, and thus rationality, cannot exist under materialism. Logic and rationality presuppose prescriptive language, which presupposes self-determination, which negates materialism.

So instead of recognizing our brains are not blank slates and understanding that it inevitably presupposes certain things we are to recognize that a deity's supernatural brain has already presupposed certain things? And um... the relationship between oxygen and fire is a fully explainable through natural causes. Ocam's Razor wins again. If you understand why fire needs oxygen, your metaphysics really don't matter, or make your understanding of it superior in any more rational way.

Rationality, by the way, is not shackled to language. Language is our tool to serve us, we do not serve it. Someone can be rational or not regardless of their worldview. But science always operates under methodological naturalism (if the "supernatural" exists naturalism will prove it). You calling the very basis of science arational.  Needless to say, that's irrational.

I'm begging you, say naturalism instead. Every time I see materialism I think about what materialism really means.

[Jac3510]

Jac, if I'm understanding all this then it appears to me that the condensed version of what you're saying is that if people are capable of rational thought then there must be a supernatural explanation for that. Is this right?

I'm saying that rational thought is impossible in a naturalistic world, and therefore, rational thought requires a non-naturalistic (which is to say, "supernatural") explanation.

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I'm not asking you make any assumptions... unless you're making assumptions about your "basic point". Otherwise just say what your basic point is and we can skip a boring game.

I've been telling you my idea throughout this thread, and you continue to tell me I'm making assumptions. I am trying to get to the root of our disagreement. Really, if you had just answered the question we would have been finished with this by now. Again, why would you call the theory of gravity descriptive and not prescriptive?

Describe the "ought" because it seems as though there's no solid definition.

Ought - that which refers to duty or obligation

So rationality now also depends on duty or obligation? What could possibly be the reason to attach such specific meanings onto rationality? You're only rational when performing your duty? This only further complicates the definition for no purpose except, possibly, to make the definition of rational thought as complicated as possible.

A guard decides that he'll take a bribe to let someone in, he could reason it out and be very rational, but not fulfilling his duty. What if a man's duty conflicts with his obligations to his family, then there's no way to make a rational decision with this kind of "rational thought".

I've been explaining this the entire time. This is the point that no one has even interacted with, much less refuted. And this has been the central point I have made since my very first post.

Rational thought is only rational if it conforms with logic, and logic is prescriptive by nature. We can say logically that a rock will fall if it is dropped. That doesn't make the rock's falling rational. A falling rock is arational. Again, going back to your Deep Blue example, all of its moves, like the falling rock, are strictly determined and are thus are also arational.

The whole concept behind rationality and irrationality is that we have a duty to think rationally. That is what we mean by the word. When we say someone is acting irrationally, we are saying that they did something they reasonably should not have done. The whole reason it was irrational is that they should not have done it (or believed it, or whatever). When something just does what it does with no choice in the matter, that action is neither rational nor irrational. It is arational.

Again, this goes back to a very simple point: the laws of logic are prescriptive whereas the laws of physics are descriptive. Prescription necessarily implies duty, because that is what we mean by prescription. You are supposed to do this or that. If a person doesn't have the ability not to do this or that, then they aren't supposed to do anything. They are just doing what they are doing.

No, not just a dataset. In fact many programs run just fine without datasets. Programs can even run without any input data. They can even run without any output data. What this means is that programs are more complex and sometimes more basic than just something that processes data. I did notice however that you stopped using the term dataset and continued on with the term data as if you were talking about the same thing, very poor form.

We can say the same thing for outputs of humans, if it's not correct, we go back in and help them to be able come up with the correct answer. Again, I see no distinction between the rationality of a computer and the rationality of a person. The difference I see is how we correct the person against how we correct these kinds of basic programs.

I'm not going to quibble about the technical words of programing jargon. Even programs that run without input are operating on something. If I write a program that just prints "Hello, world!" to the screen, the program is still dealing with basic data--"hello, world."

Just the same as any thought in your head. They're just electrical signals, just like a computer... except computers still take a lot more power to run.

Yes, yes. We agree on this. And if all the thoughts in my head are determined by nature--by physics and chemistry--then my thoughts are not rational. They are arational in precisely the same way a falling rock is. I don't have a choice in what I am thinking anymore than you do. You aren't really thinking at all. You are just going through the motions that nature is requiring you to do.

There is a huge difference in correcting a human "output" and a computer's output. In the former, we say, "No, you made a mistake. You should have concluded this." In the latter, we say, "No. I made a mistake. I should have run this."

However the method you described for correcting a person has been employed as a teaching method with "machine learning" where the person (doesn't have to be a programmer as all), tells the machine what it did wrong and what it should have done, and after a few times, the machine gets it right. So a computers output can be corrected in this way. But for basic programs, the best way is to just fix the code.

Even in your case, the output wasn't "wrong." It was exactly what it had to be given its admittedly limited data. Just because we go back and provide it more data to change the output doesn't mean it gets to make "smarter decisions." It just means that it is now acting on new data. It is no more or less rational than it ever was. It is still doing exactly what it is forced to do. Therefore, its actions are not rational. They are determined.

Programs execute the instructions we give them. The mistakes are our own, not the programs. When Windows crashes, it isn't being "irrational." The mistake lies ultimately with the imperfection of the programmer. We may say colloquially that the program "ought" not to have crashed, but we only mean in so saying that that was not our intention. We didn't intend on it to crash. Strictly speaking the program "ought" not do anything. It just did what it did. It is a purely descriptive process. In the case of a human, if I argue that 2+2=5, then you can well say that I am being irrational, because I "ought" to recognize that two and two make four.

They also can execute functions they made themselves. And if you say that 2+2=5, I would just that you're wrong and then demonstrate why 2+2=5, instead of just assuming that there was no rational thought behind your conclusion. Just because someone is wrong, doesn't mean they're being irrational, it could just mean they're dealing with bad data or have not fully understood the process.

And the functions they create themselves have been created because the programming requires it.

Now, I completely agree that just because a person is wrong they aren't necessarily being irrational. I made that same point myself. Rationality is relative to what a person should or should not know and what calculations they have or have not made. For example, suppose I am driving down the road and notice that my gas needle is on empty. I am coming up to a gas station, and the next one is not for another fifty miles. The rational thing to do is stop for gas. Suppose, however, I decide not to stop for gas and drive on anyway. Now suppose I actually make it the next fifty miles because, unbeknownst to me, the needle was broken. I made an irrational decision even though it worked out for the good. Likewise, we could flip the details and have me run out of gas before I got there. My decision then to keep going would be rational because I had no reason to believe that I was out of gas. In that case, the rational worked out for the poor.

Rationality is not decided with reference to the consequences of an action. It is decided on the basis of what a person ought to do or think given a set of propositions. Again, this process is strictly normative. That is, it is prescriptive. Such normative, prescriptive statements however, have no meaning in a deterministic model (such as a computer program, or naturalism). Therefore, rational thought is impossible given determinism, and as materialism necessarily entails determinism, rationalism is impossible.

In fact, this entire conversation is evidence of what I am talking about. If you are right, I "ought" to see my mistake and retract the argument once you have proven it fallacious. Even if you do, however, there is no guarantee I will, because I could well be a dishonest hack who doesn't care about being rational. But that, of course, is the rub. To be rational is to do what I ought to do, not to do what I just am doing. Under materialism, there is no such thing as ought. I am just doing what nature determines I will do. All of my, and your, arguments are merely arational.

By your sad definition of rational, not mine.

Use whatever adjectives you like. Mere assertions and characterizations don't discount arguments. It would be irrational to think that they do.

Here, however, is an admission on your part. You are admitting that under determinism, rationality--insofar as it requires self-determination--is impossible. That's the whole point I am making. If all of our thoughts are determined by nature, you are no more rational than the 9/11 nutjobs. They did exactly what nature forced them to do, just as you are doing. They didn't have any choice in the matter, and neither do you. Your thoughts are on exactly the same level as a rock falling. Just as the falling rock isn't rational, neither are your thoughts.

There are many programs where the whole deal with using them is because we can't determine what they will do. If you go to a grocery store and use the club card thing, then you're participating in that. The reason computers are used is because the process is too complicated for a human and no one can determine what the results will be... because if some one could, then the companies that data mine wouldn't need to spend billions a year on computers that do it. The results however, have shown to be effective, which is why they do it.

Just as Kasparov couldn't determine the moves Deep Blue would make, and if the programmers that programmed deep blue could determine what moves Deep Blue would make, then they could beat Kasparov... which they couldn't. Some of the people that helped with Deep Blue played against Kasparov and lost, yet Deep Blue won. That is an example of Deep Blue performing in a way that could not be determined.

Notice the bolded part above. The reason we can't predict the outcome of such things is not because they are inherently unpredictable, but rather simply because we, as humans, are not capable of such predictions. So we build machines that can predict such things.

So I could build a computer that will predict what Kasparov ought to do. I can take it a step further and build a program that can analyze not only what he ought to do, but what would be the strongest response based on anything that he actually does do. None of this, however, will tell me what Kasparov will do. Even if I had full access to the world's most powerful supercomputer and could map every neuron in his brain and could fully map how every atom would necessarily respond to the others, there is still no reason to suppose that I could predict Kasparov's move unless determinism is true. If it is, then I could predict every move he will make because he doesn't really have any choice in the matter.

In the same way, I can, in principle, write a program that will predict exactly what DB will do. No human, including Kasparov, can do it, of course, because no human can perform those calculations. But if I am fully aware of how the DB programming works and know every piece of data it is operating on, then I can determine, using exactly the same process it uses, what it will choose on any given move. That's because, whatever is true about Kasparov, determinism is true about Deep Blue. And for that reason, we don't call DB "rational." There is no prescription whatsoever. DB "ought" not do anything; it simply does what it does. Kasparov, on the other hand, "ought" to do certain things, since he is a free agent capable of acting in accordance with what he calculates is the best possible move.

That is quiet an assumption. Why can't we just leave it at that we do not currently know. If we had the same access to Kasparov as we did to Deep Blue that we don't know that we still wouldn't be able to determine Kasparov's moves. What I've brought up as evidence for my position are things that actually happened or currently happening, I don't know why you have to keep going off into mere speculations about what might or might not happen is x were the case... it can't be used as evidence, just mental practice.

It is a necessary consequences of determinism, not an assumption. The only reason we can't predict the future, under determinism, is because we don't fully understand all the variables involved and the laws which act on them. Predicting human thought and action, on determinism, is exactly the same as predicting how fast a rock will fall at any given point in its descent. It's just a matter of knowing the variables involved and the laws that are important. Our lack of knowledge doesn't make prediction impossible in principle. Just in practice.

If, however, there is a part of Kasparov that exists beyond the laws of nature that truly does determine its own thoughts, then it would be absolutely impossible to predict his moves. We could only say what he ought to do, and what he will do if he chooses to adhere to the laws of logic as prescribed. In other words, we can know what he would do if he were to be rational. Such language is absolutely meaningless under determinism.

Any way, before this goal post moves any further, just state all your objections right now and then we can discuss those.

I'm arguing exactly the same thing I have been arguing the entire time.

If materialism is true, rational thought is impossible, because rational thought presupposes prescriptive language which is not possible under determinism. I said all of this in the very first post.

That's if anyone accepts your very odd definition of rational thought. I'm sure most people don't agree with your definition that it's not rational unless it's for duty or obligation and everything not for duty and obligation is irrational.

Then people ought to take the time to ask whether or not rationality is prescriptive by nature, which is the point I have been making the entire time.

So it seems now that we are in fundamental agreement. If rational thought is prescriptive by nature, it is impossible on materialism. If not, it may or may not be. That would need to be more fully discussed. So the question is whether or not rational thought is prescriptive by nature. I've offered arguments as to why it is. What say you?

I am not, then, talking about how you know what is rational. That is the same mistake Sophus made above. I am talking about the nature of rationality itself. What does it mean for something to be rational? It means to be in accordance with sound reason, which is a prescriptive definition. What DB does is not "rational." It's mere calculation and execution. It can't act rationally or irrationally. It just acts as it is determined to do so.

Rational means it's without fallacy and/or assumptions. Deep Blue had been programmed to think rationally.

No. Deep Blue was programmed to act in a particular way given particular circumstances. We may label it rational insofar as such actions are consistent with what we ought to do if we were in that situation, but the decisions themselves are neither rational or irrational. They are calculations produced by a mindless machine.

In short, any rationality in Deep Blue is borrowed from human rationality--not in terms of origin, but it terms of prescription. Taken in themselves, Deep Blue's actions aren't the least bit rational. They're just necessary effects.

Just like you don't call a rock falling "rational," you don't call DB's moves "rational." Both are exactly the same. They are externally determined. The only way for something to be rational is if it conforms with reason; that is, if the person thinks as they ought to think based on what they know.

I also don't call a falling person "rational" just, "hey look at that falling person." This is exactly how programs function, they think as their duty is to think and the computer's obligation is to the person who requires the computer's work, and the program functions on what it knows.

Precisely. A falling person is not rational. But falling is not an obligation. It is something that just happens to bodies thanks to gravity. An obligation is something that you ought to do.

Under determinism, there is no such thing as obligation. Thus, under determinism, there is no such thing as rationality.

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The second is not rational at all, as Davin and I have been discussing, because rationality implies ought, which cannot be legitimately applied to computer software.

You keep saying requires an "ought," however "ought" is very subjective and counter to the idea of rational thought being objective. Duties and obligations are for individual people, my duties and obligations are different than your duties and obligations, which means that what I "ought" to do is different than what you "ought" to do, which is subjective... which is counter to the objective nature of rational thought.

There are some things that are universal obligations. Rational thought is one of them. What I ought to think or believe is relative to my knowledge base. The subjective aspect, then, is what I am or am not aware of. Again, return to the gas example I gave above.

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Did you? If everything in nature is strictly determined by the laws of nature, then what makes you think that everything except your thoughts are determined by nature? That would be a case of special pleading (which would be irrational). So, in fact, even your "choice" to be materialistic would be no choice at all.

And what pray tell do the laws of nature have to say about rational thought, given that God and nature are defined by man, whether or not either existed before or after man is irrelevant. Rational thought therefore is also defined by man.

I could have chosen to be materialistic, but I chose otherwise, therefore in that aspect of my personality, I am rational.

I would not give that nature is defined by man. Go step in the middle of an interstate and try to define cars and trucks out of existence. See what happens.

If naturalism is true, then everything--including what goes on inside your head--is determined by nature. You had nothing to do with anything, not even what you think or believe, and that includes the naturalism you do or don't hold to. It also includes the Islamism the 9/11 hijackers held to. It also includes the decision to invade Iraq that "Bush made." If naturalism is true, he made no such decision. Nature made all such decisions by necessity.

Have you read the thread? I've stated the connection many times. You can feel free to dispute the connection if you wish, but assertions to the contrary aren't of much value.

Afraid I still have yet to actually find a link between the two, I have seen your stated arguments and beliefs, but I have yet to see an actual example of how one may cancel the other out, because they still have no connection as far as I'm aware.

I don't know how I can make it any clearer.

Or I could go with one of dictionary.com's defintions...

I prefer not to use dictionary.com because it is too religiously oriented, which makes it biased. Which in turn I personally do not like.

Ah, so you disagree with a definition because the source that produced it. Genetic fallacy.

Now, would you care to address the argument I am putting forward, or do you want to redefine terms by your own standards and interpret my argument by your definitions, rendering your rebuttal a mere straw man?

In this example, the rock falling is rational only relative to the choice of the person who made it. The rock's fall, in and of itself, is neither rational nor irrational. The idea you are pressing for would better be stating," It would be rational to drop a rock if someone wanted it to fall for a reason."

Rationality is always tied to choice, because rationality is a term applied to actions that are in line with the laws of logic. Logic, however, is a prescriptive enterprise, and thus, under materialism, is impossible, since nothing is prescriptive under materialism.

I secede that both of our previous declarations of the rock falling example are poorly worded. However, the rock falling being rational is a bad example because one must talk about the rationale of the person making the choice and not the rock, because as far as we know, rocks are not sentient.

No, we don't have to talk about the rational[ity] of the person dropping the rock. I am talking about the ontology of the actual falling rock. The effect itself is not rational. It is a purely descriptive process necessarily brought about by the laws of nature. The nature of its cause doesn't change the fact that gravity isn't pondering whether or not to pull the rock down.

Now, if determinism is true, then every thought in your mind is of precisely the same type of effect. There is nothing in you pondering what to think. Everything in your mind is just an effect of physics and chemistry. There is no rational thought. Just the laws of nature.

The first possibility assumes a rational person, not a rational computer. The second is not rational at all, as Davin and I have been discussing, because rationality implies ought, which cannot be legitimately applied to computer software.

I still don't agree on this point either, as something that is created with rational thought thus becomes rational, further something that is taught (or programmed if you prefer) to make choices rationally then exhibits the same ability to make thoughtful choices is behaving with rational thought.

The problem with this part of the debate is that we do in fact know how computers think and how the parts move around to make choices, whereas with Humans we do not yet know, this distinction does not make your assertion correct, it merely means we do not yet know.

You are begging the question. If rational thought were possible, I'd accuse you of being irrational right now, but since everything is determined by the laws of nature and you have no choice in how you think, I can't tell you that you are thinking wrong, can I, because you have no choice in the matter. I may as well tell a rock it is wrong for falling.

As far as our knowledge of how humans or computers work, you are totally missing the point. If there is no part of you that can step outside of the laws of nature and think for itself, then every thought you have is determined by nature. Thus, if everything is caused by the laws of nature, then nothing is caused by you. That is exactly the case in computers, and it is exactly the case in you.

Rational thought, in your worldview, is impossible. Thus, you are not a rational person. You are arational, as you have no choice in what to think or not to think.

And this is just an attempt to poison the well. Let's stick to the arguments, my friend.

Just placing a thought out there, it seems as if your argument is being produced to prove that there is sentience in the Universe that is supernatural, which I was trying to say neither creates nor removes the possibility of rational thought.

Just a final question, rational means: "having reason or understanding" or "relating to, based on, or agreeable to reason", thus rational thought is thought with reason.

Do you agree?

Absolutely. I said so in my opening statement. If you would like to see why that is impossible in a deterministic world, see my responses to Reginus.

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Actually, I'm talking about the ontology of reason, not the epistemology of reason.

I'm not talking about what we can know about the external world through reason. I am talking about what the very presence of reason necessarily assumes. For example, suppose you saw fire. You would know that there is oxygen in the room. Why? Because there can be no fire without oxygen. I'm arguing that the nature of rationality is that it requires a supernatural backing.

We know that is true because of the arguments I have made throughout this thread. Rationality depends on prescriptive language because the laws of logic are prescriptive in nature. Yet under determinism, there is no prescription, only description. Therefore, logic, and thus rationality, cannot exist under materialism. Logic and rationality presuppose prescriptive language, which presupposes self-determination, which negates materialism.

So instead of recognizing our brains are not blank slates and understanding that it inevitably presupposes certain things we are to recognize that a deity's supernatural brain has already presupposed certain things? And um... the relationship between oxygen and fire is a fully explainable through natural causes. Ocam's Razor wins again. If you understand why fire needs oxygen, your metaphysics really don't matter, or make your understanding of it superior in any more rational way.

Rationality, by the way, is not shackled to language. Language is our tool to serve us, we do not serve it. Someone can be rational or not regardless of their worldview. But science always operates under methodological naturalism (if the "supernatural" exists naturalism will prove it). You calling the very basis of science arational.  Needless to say, that's irrational.

I'm begging you, say naturalism instead. Every time I see materialism I think about what materialism really means.

I've not mentioned a deity in this thread. I have said merely that if rational thought cannot work in a deterministic context, and if rational thought is possible, then determinism must be wrong. We must be in some sense self-determined, which requires there to be a part of us that exists in some sense beyond the laws of nature. Such an existence would be supernatural by definition.

Whether or not we go on to connect that with God is another point entirely. It does, however, prove that if rational thought is possible that materialism is false. It also proves that if materialism is true, then materialism itself is not a rational position; it is arational, along with every other position out there, equally so.

[i_am_i]

Jac, if I'm understanding all this then it appears to me that the condensed version of what you're saying is that if people are capable of rational thought then there must be a supernatural explanation for that. Is this right?

I'm saying that rational thought is impossible in a naturalistic world, and therefore, rational thought requires a non-naturalistic (which is to say, "supernatural") explanation.

And what is the supernatural explanation for rational thought?

[Jac3510]

Jac, if I'm understanding all this then it appears to me that the condensed version of what you're saying is that if people are capable of rational thought then there must be a supernatural explanation for that. Is this right?

I'm saying that rational thought is impossible in a naturalistic world, and therefore, rational thought requires a non-naturalistic (which is to say, "supernatural") explanation.

And what is the supernatural explanation for rational thought?

That's another discussion that has no bearing on this argument. There are a myriad of suggested answers. We can talk about them in another thread if you like. The point here, however, is simple enough. It is inescapable that if materialism is true, rational thought is impossible. Even if I couldn't explain how rational thought worked in another system, that doesn't do anything to challenge the simple fact that determinism and rationality are mutually exclusive.