Consciousness and Special Relativity

[fdesilva]

fdesilva, thanks for taking the time to get into this in more depth. I definitely appreciate the effort. To try to help make sure I'm same page I'm going to break up your last post and respond to it in several parts so where I might diverge should be clear.
 
Now from what you have said so far I think I would be right in saying that you agree
1.   Assumption 1. Consciousness is a result of the activity that takes place in the brain at nerve synapses and nerve impulses.

Aye. There is a great deal going with consciousness and much not well understood, but its well established that the nervous systems plays an essential part.

2.   And that these events are always multiple discrete points in time & space

Aye. I'd add that they are discrete as in individually unique but also interconnected.

Now do you also agree that given that a nerve impulse is a localised change in the concentration of ions.

Yes

That in the progress on the Nerve impulse along a nerve fibre, it will also give rise to other events such as an ion colliding with a water molecule, which results in the water molecule changing speed and direction, and then heating a protein molecule etc.

I follow.

Now these other events while supporting the conscious experience do not form the set of events directly responsible for it?

Here things get problematic for me.

These other events are essential - just as essential as those nerve synapses and related to them. They are part of the processes going on in the brain. So, they are part of the events responsible for consciousness.

The notion of them being direct or indirect would not make sense in this context.

Now if you agree with the above could you also say what in your opinion would be the reason, for them not to be part of the events directly responsible for the consciouss experience?

Well I do take them to be part of the events responsible for the conscious experience. I'm not sure if that helps or hinders where you are going with this but you definitely have my attention.  

"The notion of them being direct or indirect would not make sense in this context"
I think we need to understand each other on this point
If we agree on
Assumption 1. Consciousness is a result of the activity that takes place in the brain at nerve synapses and nerve impulses.
Now my understanding of the above assumption is that any change in a persons conscious experience will be reflected or be a one to one mapping with changes in nerve impulses and synaptic activity.  
I guess you agree on that, if that is the case then is not right to say, all other activity in the brain while essential in terms of creating the supporting infrastructure for the activity of consciousness, does not map to events in the persons conscious experience?
To give an example lets say by some external means, such as inserting an electrode, nerve impulses are created , we would not be surprised if the person reported a light or something in their conscious experience.
However if we injected a bit of water or some other chemical in a way that it did not disturb the nerve impulses or synaptic activity in any way, we would not expect the person to detect any change in their conscious experience.
If you agree with the above ,then would I be right in saying that a nerve impulse in its progress, will give rise to changes in the brain that is part of the conscious experience as well as changes that are not a part of the experience (e.g water molecules changing direction)

[Chewbie Chan]

*nods* I follow.

[fdesilva]

*nods* I follow.

Great so then I would like to propose this thought experiment.
Consider a Nerve impulse travelling along a Nerve fibre.  Suppose we map a selection of  points  along the Nerve fibre to a series of Light bulbs.  So that when a Nerve impulse is at one of the mapped point  the corresponding light bulb will light. In other words we make a structure of light bulbs, external to a person, that is mapped to points in the persons brain.  I hope I have made myself clear on the thought experiment.
If all is clear, could you tell me in your opinion, will the set of light bulbs, be having a conscious experience that is comparable to that of the person? Please explain the reasons for your answer
(I am finishing for the day now, I look forward to reading your response in the morning. thanks)

[Chewbie Chan]

Although the series of lightbulbs could be used to help build a model of a conscious brain state they would not & could not constitute a consciousness.

The lightbulbs themselves would merely show the electrical processes going on in the brain. They would not perform any significant function other than as indicators. Nothing more. Neurons on the other hand perform several important functions. As part of their essential functions neurons have a basic capacity for receiving information, retaining information, processing information and communicating information. Collectively in their many billions they constitute a complex awareness capable of the kind of consciousness we are familiar with. All the series of lightbulbs could ever do would be to copy patterns of a consciousness.

So no, the lightbulbs would not be conscious.

(What I write next is probably superfluous but I want to add some thoughts. Ignore if unnecessary.)

If the lightbulbs were replaced with neurons then would I regard the series of neurons as constituting consciousness? No. They would still not constitute consciousness because they would still be functioning as mere indicators of a consciousness.

To highlight that point I'll introduce a thought experiment of my own. Lets do away with the limited lightbulbs and neurons. Instead we're going to set up an imaginary machine that could from moment to moment make an exact copy of a human being. (This machine would definitely violate relativity but let's just imagine it is possible.)

Currently the machine is set to replicate fdesilva. Everything that you do, say and think is copied exactly.

Now, You and I are in a house, watching a film. Your copy is being created by the machine so that it is in a crowded bar down the street.

Would the exact copy of you be conscious of anything happening in the crowded bar? No. Would the original you be conscious of anything happening in the crowded bar? No.

While the machine is set to making a copy of you the copy itself would not be capable of anything other than being an exact replica. In a sense it would be less conscious than the most basic of lifeforms, or perhaps even inanimate matter since even inanimate matter has reactions to its environment.

If the machine were to malfunction and stop working but leave the last made copy, the copy would suddenly retain the functions of a fully living fdesilva (for arguments sake). It would feel as if it had just been watching a film in a house and had then been instantly transported to a crowded bar. Finally it experiences consciousness of itself. Now it could be said to be conscious.

[elliebean]

I would like to order 100 of those.  

[fdesilva]

Although the series of lightbulbs could be used to help build a model of a conscious brain state they would not & could not constitute a consciousness.

The lightbulbs themselves would merely show the electrical processes going on in the brain. They would not perform any significant function other than as indicators. Nothing more. Neurons on the other hand perform several important functions. As part of their essential functions neurons have a basic capacity for receiving information, retaining information, processing information and communicating information. Collectively in their many billions they constitute a complex awareness capable of the kind of consciousness we are familiar with. All the series of lightbulbs could ever do would be to copy patterns of a consciousness.

So no, the lightbulbs would not be conscious.

(What I write next is probably superfluous but I want to add some thoughts. Ignore if unnecessary.)

If the lightbulbs were replaced with neurons then would I regard the series of neurons as constituting consciousness? No. They would still not constitute consciousness because they would still be functioning as mere indicators of a consciousness.

To highlight that point I'll introduce a thought experiment of my own. Lets do away with the limited lightbulbs and neurons. Instead we're going to set up an imaginary machine that could from moment to moment make an exact copy of a human being. (This machine would definitely violate relativity but let's just imagine it is possible.)

Currently the machine is set to replicate fdesilva. Everything that you do, say and think is copied exactly.

Now, You and I are in a house, watching a film. Your copy is being created by the machine so that it is in a crowded bar down the street.

Would the exact copy of you be conscious of anything happening in the crowded bar? No. Would the original you be conscious of anything happening in the crowded bar? No.

While the machine is set to making a copy of you the copy itself would not be capable of anything other than being an exact replica. In a sense it would be less conscious than the most basic of lifeforms, or perhaps even inanimate matter since even inanimate matter has reactions to its environment.

If the machine were to malfunction and stop working but leave the last made copy, the copy would suddenly retain the functions of a fully living fdesilva (for arguments sake). It would feel as if it had just been watching a film in a house and had then been instantly transported to a crowded bar. Finally it experiences consciousness of itself. Now it could be said to be conscious.

Firstly thanks for a great response. Like I said I intend to present my case from many angles. I can now give you an overview of one angle I intend use. I am sure you know that in mathematics one of basic forms of proof, is to show that System A is Equivalent to System B. Now since you see the light bulbs as something that cannot be conscious, if I were to show that neuronal activity is equivalent to it, I have made my case, from one angle.
You have given some great additions to the thought experiment. I will classify these experiments as follows
Experiment A = Light Bulb
Experiment B = Neurons replace Light Bulb
Experiment C = Copy of Fdesilva
As far as fdesilva goes you have my word I am conscious
Q1 With regards to C, would you say that it is similar to a brian in a vat ? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brain_in_a_vat
Q2. In your opinion can we consider a brain in a vat as having a conscious experience? Please note it is interacting with the artificial environment created by the computer.
In C, true the copy is not interacting with the bar, However like the Vat brain it is interacting with what it perceives to be its environment. (namely fdesilva environment, also consider dreaming)
I would like to add another thought experiment to our list.
Experiment D
Suppose we were to open up fdesilva brain an replace sections of the axons and dendrits with wires. Now as a nerve impulse travels only at around 100m/sec and an electrical signal at speed of light, we would be able to spread out all the nerve cells over a huge Area with each Neurone many Kilometers from another Neurone.
Q3 Would fdesilva still be conscious?

[Chewbie Chan]

Q1 The brain in the vat. Hmm, I guess so.

Q2 I would regard the brain in the vat as having consciousness.

Q3 If there were no impediments to normal brain function I would regard the spaced-out (heh) fdesilva brain as conscious.

[fdesilva]

Q1 The brain in the vat. Hmm, I guess so.

Q2 I would regard the brain in the vat as having consciousness.

Q3 If there were no impediments to normal brain function I would regard the spaced-out (heh) fdesilva brain as conscious.

From before

As part of their essential functions neurons have a basic capacity for receiving information, retaining information, processing information and communicating information.

Now is the above statement you have identified 4 functions for the Neuron.
1.   capacity for receiving information
2.   retaining information
3.   processing information
4.   communicating information.

I would like you to have read of the following from http://www.biologyreference.com/Mo-Nu/Neuron.html

First, a neuron receives information from the external environment or from other neurons. For example, one neuron in the human brain may receive input from as many as one hundred thousand other neurons. Second, the neuron integrates, or processes, the information from all of its inputs and determines whether or not to send an output signal. This integration takes place both in time (the duration of the input and the time between inputs) and in space (across the surface of the neuron). Third, the neuron propagates the signal along its length at high speed. The distance may be up to several meters (in a giraffe or whale), with rates up to 100 meters (328 feet) per second. Finally, the neuron converts this electrical signal to a chemical one and transmits it to another neuron or to an effector such as a muscle or gland.
When combined into networks, neurons allow the human body memory, emotion, and abstract thought as well as basic reflexes.

Q4 Do  you agree with the equivalance with your statements  I am making below ?
1.capacity for receiving information

First, a neuron receives information from the external environment or from other neurons. For example, one neuron in the human brain may receive input from as many as one hundred thousand other neurons.

3.processing information

Second, the neuron integrates, or processes, the information from all of its inputs and determines whether or not to send an output signal. This integration takes place both in time (the duration of the input and the time between inputs) and in space (across the surface of the neuron).

4.communicating information

Third, the neuron propagates the signal along its length at high speed. The distance may be up to several meters (in a giraffe or whale), with rates up to 100 meters (328 feet) per second. Finally, the neuron converts this electrical signal to a chemical one and transmits it to another neuron or to an effector such as a muscle or gland.

With regards to 2. retaining information

When combined into networks, neurons allow the human body memory, emotion, and abstract thought as well as basic reflexes.

Q5. The above seem to imply it is not the property of a single neurone but that of a network.?
Given that Experiment D(fdsilvas brain spread out) is conscious and also brain in the vat conscious I propose Experiment E
Same as D but it is now in a vat. That is all inputs and outputs are to a supercomputer.
I think I can assume You would consider Experiment E conscious as well.
Now as every neuron is a few KM from each other, we  shall do some test.
Test 1
We make a run of the Vat brain from some time T1 to Some Time T2
At this point we will make the assumption that it is possible to take the distributed vat brain back to its exact state at T1.
Q6 Now if we were to repeat exactly the same signals set as the first run we would expect the brain to have the same conscious experiences as the first run do you agree?

[Chewbie Chan]

A4 Yes but with a reservation. See answer below.

A5 Yes. Human memory is an emergent property. As far as we know what we think of as human memory requires a network of neurons all working together but that would not be possible at all if single neurons had no capacity to retain information. Retaining information is definitely one of the essential functions a single neuron must be capable of.

A6 Yes. Again though, I have a reservation. At this point I feel I should ask; What is your working definition of a conscious experience?

[fdesilva]

A4 Yes but with a reservation. See answer below.

A5 Yes. Human memory is an emergent property. As far as we know what we think of as human memory requires a network of neurons all working together but that would not be possible at all if single neurons had no capacity to retain information. Retaining information is definitely one of the essential functions a single neuron must be capable of.

A6 Yes. Again though, I have a reservation. At this point I feel I should ask; What is your working definition of a conscious experience?

With regards to memory, I think the individual neurons play a part by modifying their synaptic connections. However in the end,in my opinion, when something in memory is recalled to consciousness, these pathways need to come "alive" by way of having nerve impulses etc as covered by assumption 1. Your thoughts?

What is your working definition of a conscious experience?

This is actually the most important question. Without it nothing really can be said. However I have been presenting this thoughts, assuming you would be using your own conscious experience or your definition of it to evaluate it. Further, I have refrained from bringing it up as it may stall our progress, as it did happen on this thread. viewtopic.php?f=5&t=4753
However, what I would like to use is a minimal description. Such as
The Conscious experience consist of 3 components.
1. The observed. (U ) (I am looking at a computer monitor, the monitor is U)
2. The Observer (I)( The thing within me, that I call me that’s looking at the monitor)
3. Free will ( The thing I call me, can press any key on the computer key pad)

Your thoughts and suggestions please.
Now to experiment D and Test 1.
Please consider the following. Test 2
Since we have wires,
1.   Lets say we reduce the length of the wires on each connection by an amount X KM
2.   To compensate for the reduced length we introduce a little storage device (S1), that will store the signal for a time corresponding to the reduced length and then release it.
Test 3
Now consider that the signals on each wire are recorded in a device S2.
As such on the next run, it is possible to read the next input value to a given neurone from either S1(see Test2) or S2.
However if it is read from S2 then the neurones are totally isolated from each other.
If I have been clear on the setup, what’s your thought on Test 2 and 3?

[elliebean]

The "minimal description" of conscious experience you've provided (incessantly) is not the same thing as a definition. You've given us what you propose to be its parts, without really explaining what it is. Perhaps that is one reason it tends to stall the discussion; we're still not certain what it is we're supposed to be discussing.

A definition might look more like this:

conscious
adj.
Having an awareness of one's environment and one's own existence, sensations, and thoughts.

experience
n.
The feeling of emotions and sensations as opposed to thinking; involvement in what is happening rather than abstract reflection on an event.

Thus conscious experience might be defined as emotional and sensory involvement in (as opposed to merely thinking about) an event, whilst having an awareness thereof.

Supposing it's impossible to have such an involvement without being aware of it, this definition seems redundant.

It would appear that it is impossible to have an experience that is (or while being) unconcious. So there's no need to speak of "conscious experience" when "experience" will do.



Unless you mean to refer to the experience of consiousness. In which case we might revise our definition to:

emotional and sensory involvement in (as opposed to merely thinking about) having an awareness of one's environment and one's own existence, sensations, and thoughts

or, being involved in one's awareness


So, is that what you mean, or something else?

[edit:typo]

[fdesilva]

The "minimal description" of conscious experience you've provided (incessantly) is not the same thing as a definition. You've given us what you propose to be its parts, without really explaining what it is. Perhaps that is one reason it tends to stall the discussion; we're still not certain what it is we're supposed to be discussing.

A definition might look more like this:

conscious
adj.
Having an awareness of one's environment and one's own existence, sensations, and thoughts.

experience
n.
The feeling of emotions and sensations as opposed to thinking; involvement in what is happening rather than abstract reflection on an event.

Thus conscious experience might be defined as emotional and sensory involvement in (as opposed to merely thinking about) an event, whilst having an awareness thereof.

Supposing it's impossible to have such an involvement without being aware of it, this definition seems redundant.

It would appear that it is impossible to have an experience that is (or while being) unconcious. So there's no need to speak of "conscious experience" when "experience" will do.



Unless you mean to erefer to the experience of consiousness. In which case we might revise our definition to:

emotional and sensory involvement in (as opposed to merely thinking about) having an awareness of one's environment and one's own existence, sensations, and thoughts

or, being involved in one's awareness


So, is that what you mean, or something else?

I am looking for the a first person simplest definition of consciousness.

The feeling of emotions and sensations as opposed to thinking; involvement in what is happening rather than abstract reflection on an event.

The above, however in the first person.  That is sensation and/or perception as described by the person having it.

Have a read of this
http://www.biology-online.org/dictionary/Sensation

Sensation, Perseption. The distinction between these words, when used in mental philosophy, may be thus stated; if I simply smell a rose, I have a sensation; if I refer that smell to the external object which occasioned it, I have a perception. Thus, the former is mere feeling, without the idea of an object; the latter is the mind's apprehension of some external object as occasioning that feeling. Sensation properly expresses that change in the state of the mind which is pr 7bd oduced by an impression upon an organ of sense (of which change we can conceive the mind to be conscious, without any knowledge of external objects). Perception, on the other hand, expresses the knowledge or the intimations we obtain by means of our sensations concerning the qualities of matter, and consequently involves, in every instance, the notion of externality, or outness, which it is necessary to exclude in order to seize the precise import of the word sensation. .

[Davin]

Sensation, Perseption. The distinction between these words, when used in mental philosophy, may be thus stated; if I simply smell a rose, I have a sensation; if I refer that smell to the external object which occasioned it, I have a perception. Thus, the former is mere feeling, without the idea of an object; the latter is the mind's apprehension of some external object as occasioning that feeling. Sensation properly expresses that change in the state of the mind which is pr 7bd oduced by an impression upon an organ of sense (of which change we can conceive the mind to be conscious, without any knowledge of external objects). Perception, on the other hand, expresses the knowledge or the intimations we obtain by means of our sensations concerning the qualities of matter, and consequently involves, in every instance, the notion of externality, or outness, which it is necessary to exclude in order to seize the precise import of the word sensation. .

Should let that source know that they misspelled "perception" as "perseption" and "pr 7bd oduced" is probably supposed to be "produced"

Do you vet your sources or do you just check to see if it says what you want it to say then just copy and paste?

[Chewbie Chan]

Hi fdesilva.

I could see that the question of what conscious experience actually is would likely cause problems. Much of how you and I will approach the discussion will stem from our ideas (or lack of them) about this. I suppose sticking to the basic idea of 'sensation' as a gloss on the question of what conscious experience is might have to do. Leaving out 'free will' is a good idea too, unless there is some vital need for such a problematic metaphysical concept in your ongoing explanation.

I follow Test 2 and Test 3 as thought experiments but I can't get my head around why neurons would be totally isolated if S2 was read. Totally is a big word. Would this electronic brain somehow violate cause & effect?

[fdesilva]

Hi fdesilva.

I could see that the question of what conscious experience actually is would likely cause problems. Much of how you and I will approach the discussion will stem from our ideas (or lack of them) about this. I suppose sticking to the basic idea of 'sensation' as a gloss on the question of what conscious experience is might have to do. Leaving out 'free will' is a good idea too, unless there is some vital need for such a problematic metaphysical concept in your ongoing explanation.

I follow Test 2 and Test 3 as thought experiments but I can't get my head around why neurons would be totally isolated if S2 was read. Totally is a big word. Would this electronic brain somehow violate cause & effect?

Sensation is fine for now. However, if opportunity provides and I am able to give my whole story, then one its strongest points is its explanation of free will. Its not just an explanation, but it also has experiments to back it , anyway lets see how long I can keep you interested first.

In Test 3 what we are doing is recording the input to each and every neuron. Then in the 2nd run isolating each neuron and repeating the run, but this time the inputs will come from the recording devices used.  As such each and every neuron is isolated.
Now compare this with Test 2 , in the case of test 2 each neuron is still receiving its input from a storage device, as it is stored for a fraction of a second.
Consider also the possibility of having a switches that can switch between the storage device and the recording device.