Thought experiment that logically proves existance of your s

[Siz]

Well actually (for the full effect, imagine this said as if I had a clogged nose and a high piched Urkil-like voice), those are Matt Smith episodes from season 6.I have n
ot yet seen the Matt Smith seasons

Indeed. I stand corrected.

[tennenrishin]

Okay.  And then the what is the question? ...

Why are there two possibilities for me, but only one possibility for the physical universe?

[tennenrishin]

No, they wouldn't have heard all information contained in the universe, because that would include the color of the room that they were in. The color of the room is information, and you ignore this for the sake of your argument. The colors of each respective room existed in the physical world before the lights were turned on-- this isn't "new" information at all, except to the subjects of the experiment who have not been given "all" information, despite your assertion to the contrary.

Yes, it is information that RoomRed is Red and RoomBlue is Blue, and this information, as you say, exists in the physical universe. Also, this information is given to the subjects. Still, when the lights go on, the subjects realize something they did not know before ("oh, I was in the blue room" / "oh, I was in the red room"). That is the information I am referring to.

The same is true of your "colorless version." The digit is extant on the paper at the start of the experiment, and is not "new" information except to the experimental subjects who have been placed in the rooms. The physical universe contains the information, which the subjects are not aware of until they pick up the pieces of paper.

When they receive the description of the physical universe, the subjects are told what is written on the note in room0 and what is written on the note in room1, for this is information, as you say. Still, as the subject, I would not know what is written on the note in front of me, and gain this bit of information when I turn over the note.

Now, you may say that I am trading on an ambiguity in the term 'me'. I claim that my sentience (as the subject in the experiment) solves that problem (at least from my perspective), because it leaves me no room for doubt about the meaning of 'me'.

[Ali]

Okay.  And then the what is the question? ...

Why are there two possibilities for me, but only one possibility for the physical universe?

Because "me" is a function of my mind (which lives in the brain) and there are two brains in the mix. 

In other words, there is only one possibility to the universe, because the universe doesn't care which me is in the box and can't see me thinking.  If the universe could measure my thoughts and brainwaves though, they would see an actual physical difference between the two brains in the two boxes - One would be thinking "Red!" and one would be thinking "Blue!" and each would be thinking "I am me." and probably going on to other individual thoughts like "How did I get in this box?" and "I wonder if they have a public restroom."  In other words, just because an observer can't see a difference between the two people in the boxes and doesn't care about the differences, they still are two different people, and therefore, there are always two different possibilities, regardless of what the observer can percieve.  You explain that by using the soul (there are always two different souls) but my point is and always has been that the soul isn't needed to explain this - the mind (which is a function of the brain, which is physical) will do just as well.

[tennenrishin]

In other words, there is only one possibility to the universe

We agree that there is only one possibility to the physical universe.
Do you deny that there are two possibilities to me, or are you saying that that it is not meaningful for me to ask which room I am in?






EDIT: Sorted out quotation - Tank
EDIT: Thanks. What did the quotation originally say? - tennenrishin
EDIT: I didn't change the wording, you'd placed the quote tags in the wrong place as you had clicked quote when you ment to click modify. Thus your modified post appeared in quotation form. I deleted the original post and corrected the tags in this one so it was formated correctly. The original post ended at me - Tank
EDIT: Thanks. I keep making that mistake. - tennenrishin

[Ali]

In other words, there is only one possibility to the universe

We agree that there is only one possibility to the physical universe.
Do you deny that there are two possibilities to me, or are you saying that that it is not meaningful for me to ask which room I am in?

Neither, actually.  If you took my full sentence, I was saying that there is only one possibility to the universe because the universe can't "see" the two separate brains having two separate experiences.  So to the universe, it APPEARS that there is only one possibility, when in fact, there are still two.  And actually, if the universe has the right technology on hand, it CAN see the two brains having two different experiences (measuring brainwaves and whatnot). 

What I am saying is that there are ALWAYS two possibilities for me, and for the physical universe.  It's just that a casual outside observer from the physical universe may not see the two possibilities, if they do not have the ability to monitor thoughts and brainwaves.  But thoughts and brainwaves are still physical manifestations - they happen in the brain.

[tennenrishin]

It's just that a casual outside observer from the physical universe may not see the two possibilities, if they do not have the ability to monitor thoughts and brainwaves.  But thoughts and brainwaves are still physical manifestations - they happen in the brain.

I'm saying that even if that observer could see and track every quark in the universe, including the subject's brains, he still wouldn't have access to the information that the subject has access to, for in both cases the guy in the red room is thinking "I'm in the red room" and the guy in the blue room is thinking "I'm in the blue room".

[Ali]

It's just that a casual outside observer from the physical universe may not see the two possibilities, if they do not have the ability to monitor thoughts and brainwaves.  But thoughts and brainwaves are still physical manifestations - they happen in the brain.

I'm saying that even if that observer could see and track every quark in the universe, including the subject's brains, he still wouldn't have access to the information that the subject has access to, for in both cases the guy in the red room is thinking "I'm in the red room" and the guy in the blue room is thinking "I'm in the blue room".

Surely they'd be thinking other stuff too?  Like "How the heck did I get in this freaking room?" or "I need to use the bathroom."

[tennenrishin]

Well, that's a good sign.
Melmoth, if you still get to read this, I should thank you for some real thought-provoking discussion.

Lastly, to one and all - just a thought...
It doesn't change the underlying logic, but we can make the argument more emotive. Imagine, for example, that both subjects knew that the red room is about to be filled with poison gas. According to the physicalist, it matters not who goes where, because both results are physically the same. As a subject, would you agree with him?

[Wessik]

What color room do you find yourself in?

This is just me... but couldn't you quite easily explain that you are in both a red and a blue room? Assuming the two copies of myself count as one entity.

I also find it interesting that one would think the two entities in each room are exactly distinguishable. Can I distinguish them by their position? One is in a red room and the other is in a blue room. So logically, the allegedly "indistinguishable" copy of me that is in a blue room is in a blue room, and vice versa. What's the problem?

[tennenrishin]

What color room do you find yourself in?

This is just me... but couldn't you quite easily explain that you are in both a red and a blue room? Assuming the two copies of myself count as one entity.

If you were the subject of the experiment, could you say "I am in both a red and a blue room"? If yes, what would it look like? Magenta?
"I" is not ambiguous, because it is based on things like "If you drop a bowling ball on tennenrishin's toe, I feel the pain."

What color room do you find yourself in?
I also find it interesting that one would think the two entities in each room are exactly distinguishable. Can I distinguish them by their position? One is in a red room and the other is in a blue room. So logically, the allegedly "indistinguishable" copy of me that is in a blue room is in a blue room, and vice versa. What's the problem?

They are indeed distinguishable by location. Physicalism provides a distinction by location, in the sense that it can label them "Mr Red" and "Mr Blue". As a subject, I can provide labels "me" and "him". From my perspective (as a subject), there are two possible mappings between these label sets:
Me -> Mr Red, Him -> Mr Blue
Me -> Mr Blue, Him -> Mr Red
It takes 1 bit of information to select one of these two mappings, and that bit is not expressed in the state of the physical universe.
See the revised argument, if you like.

[Wessik]

Oh... I see. Well, distinction in color not need be made on a purely subjective basis. For example, differences in the frequency of certain color wavelengths certainly provide the information necessary to distinguish between the two different colored rooms.

Now, the actual ability to percieve a red wavelength as "red" and vice versa is another matter. However, there are two propositions: That everything in the mind and body needed to percieve and understand the difference between "red" and "blue" is in the physical world, or that the material forms are not enough, and some sort of soul is needed. Unfortunately, to assume that some sort of soul is needed in order to distinguish the two colors ignores the proposition that there could be a material basis for perception in the molecules that make up the brain and central nervous system. Without discounting the first proposition, the second proposition creates a circular argument, sadly...

[tennenrishin]

Oh... I see. Well, distinction in color not need be made on a purely subjective basis. For example, differences in the frequency of certain color wavelengths certainly provide the information necessary to distinguish between the two different colored rooms.

I agree, but it doesn't affect the argument, because
- In case 1, there is a Mr Blue in the blue room with blue wavelengths, and a Mr Red in the red room with red wavelengths.
- In case 2, there is a Mr Blue in the blue room with blue wavelengths, and a Mr Red in the red room with red wavelengths.
The state of the physical universe is the same in both cases.

Unfortunately, to assume that some sort of soul is needed in order to distinguish the two colors ...

That is not at all the proposition being made. (Did you look at the revised argument I linked, which doesn't use color?) The argument merely points out a contradiction in the physicalist's world view, if that physicalist also has a subjective perspective on the world.

Imagine the two subjects in the experiment were blindfolded physicalists. Describe the state of the entire physical universe to both of them, to the quark. Since physicalism says that universe==physical universe, they should know everything there is to know in the universe. Yet, they cannot tell you which room they are in because they both received the same description.

[Wessik]

You seem to be implying that a subjective viewpoint can not be valid in accordance with the physicalist view that the entirety of universe = reality, and that since we clearly percieve subjective viewpoints, this forms a contradiction.

I like this argument. Ya le me gusta porque tu razón aparece verdad. Muy bien... muy bien...

I only wonder if this forms a correct interpretation of physicalism. It may be claimed that the entirety of physical matter is equivalent to reality, pero porque si if simple subets of physical perception might be accepted as facets of reality in their own right? A subjective viewpoint would be equivalent to a facet of reality, and perfectly within the bounds of the physicalist proposition. Hay que mas trabaje hacer...

[NatsuTerran]

This is one of the most bizarre arguments I have ever heard. I have tried and tried and still cannot fully grasp what the OP is trying to get at. I think it's just a bunch of circular reasoning, especially considering this entire scenario is purely hypothetical and cannot exist in physical reality by very definition of the things that exist in the example wouldn't exist in real life.

But that's besides the point. From what I can gather, there is a "me" and a clone of myself that is 100% similar in terms of brain matter, etc. Either this clone has been made at the time of the experiment to emulate exactly who I am, or it has been developing as I have the whole time but in two completely equal dimensions, so to speak. Either way, the only difference occurs when I am placed in a red room and the other guy is placed in the blue room. I think the problem that the OP makes is that he assumes that because our minds are completely identical, that they need to continue to be identical after the different experiences. This defies all logic and knowledge on biology/psychology of the brain. Once we both get placed in different rooms, our minds adapt to that situation differently, even though it is a minute difference. All it takes is that tiny difference to alter the courses of our minds. At that point, we are now two completely different individuals, albeit absurdly similar in life experiences. The longer we live, and the longer we are exposed to different experiences (which we will be due to the initial difference which will grow exponentially), we will become more and more different.

Think of it like this. Say there is me living in Texas, and then an entire clone of Texas thrown out in the middle of the Pacific somehow. Both of us have had 100% identical life experiences, including clones of all people we have interacted with. Say the Texas we live in share every possible variable, including night/day shift and weather patterns, somehow. All things are equal. Now assume the "me" in the Pacific encounters a foreigner who visits. There is not a foreigner that visits the actual "me" in Texas, however. Now regardless of what kind of experience the other me has, whether the foreigner gives off a negative, positive, or neutral experience, that "me" has fundamentally been changed and shaped by experience. Even if that very same foreigner then in turn visited the other me the next day, that me will react entirely differently to the foreigner because the foreigner herself will have had experiences (with the other me) that shapes her personality further down the line. Along with the fact that it isn't occurring on the same day and any other myriad of factors will shape the experience. All it takes is minute differences in experiences to start a huge shaping process in the brain. So while we may have been 100% identical at one point, as soon as the most minor difference occurs, they are both two completely different people, and will branch out exponentially due to those differences. So no, the physical universe does NOT see only one situation while I see two. I see only one (or two, depending on my knowledge of the other guy) while reality knows from the get-go that we are two completely different people. The similarities mean nothing; it only means that absolutely every variable has somehow someway been static. This is obviously entirely impossible for the real world, so no matter how compelling this argument might seem to you, it will never apply to reality, but only to your subjective views of reality.

This is junk philosophy if I have ever seen it. In fact, I can even use this same argument against you to claim that each person has multiple souls that all shoot off to dozens of different afterlives upon death. Instead of your example, I can merely assert that there is a red, blue, green, yellow, purple, pink, black, white room as well. This proves dualism just as easily as it proves that you have an army of souls. The argument says nothing at all and is very poorly conceived in my opinion.