Thought experiment that logically proves existance of your s

[Whitney]

tennenrishin

how about this...you are no longer allowed to post links to your blog or whatever it is.

Either post here productively or don't post at all.

Frankly, if you don't have an objective proof then you have no business posting anyway because we don't allow preaching.

[Melmoth]

I've seen similar 'experiments' before. They're interesting, uncanny novelties but I remain unconvinced. Correct me if I'm wrong in this description of the paradox: I am randomly assigned to either the red or the blue room. Since I can only be in one room or the other - I cannot be two people having two different experiences at the same time - there must be two possible situations. Yet there are not, for both are exactly the same to the outsider.

It's about an apparent contradiction between subjective and objective truth. Subjectively, there are three different situations: yours, your doppelgänger's and the outsider's. Objectively there is only one. I would only say that these are different kinds of truth, operating on different planes and meaning different things. This game is simply a clever illustration of that difference: for any one objective scenario, there are as many subjective scenarios as there are people involved. You only perceive a contradiction because you have confused the two, or blurred them together, assuming that there must be one type of truth that incorporates all others.

And even if we were to humour that, say that they do clash, you still have the option of denying one or the other.

Either individual, subjective experience (including qualia) is actually an objective reality - what you might call a soul, which is what you've been getting at.

or

Objective truth does not exist. There is no "from the universe's point of view", so to speak, and all truth is bound within limited, subjective experience. To take the outsider's perspective as the marker for 'objectivity' is as meaningless as taking yours or your doppelgänger's. Two people can think two contradictory things and neither need necessarily be wrong, as there is no "one reality" beyond the two which they separately perceive.

[tennenrishin]

Frankly, if you don't have an objective proof then you have no business posting anyway because we don't allow preaching.

Lol!
But on a serious note, what is wrong with subjective proof when the subject is subjectivity?

[Happy_Is_Good]

Frankly, if you don't have an objective proof then you have no business posting anyway because we don't allow preaching.

Lol!
But on a serious note, what is wrong with subjective proof when the subject is subjectivity?

Some where, a fuse has been blown...a breaker been extended past it's amperage.  This is where we shall find you I am sure. 

[tennenrishin]

I've seen similar 'experiments' before. They're interesting, uncanny novelties but I remain unconvinced.

Correct me if I'm wrong in this description of the paradox: I am randomly assigned to either the red or the blue room. Since I can only be in one room or the other - I cannot be two people having two different experiences at the same time - there must be two possible situations. Yet there are not, for both are exactly the same to the outsider.

Yes! In fact, I think your formulation is much more reader-friendly than mine. I would change the last bit though:
I am randomly assigned to either the red or the blue room. Since I can only be in one room or the other - I cannot be two people having two different experiences at the same time - there must be two possible situations. Yet, according to physicalism, there are not, for both are physically the same.

It's about an apparent contradiction between subjective and objective truth. Subjectively, there are three different situations: yours, your doppelgänger's and the outsider's. Objectively there is only one. I would only say that these are different kinds of truth, operating on different planes and meaning different things. This game is simply a clever illustration of that difference: for any one objective scenario, there are as many subjective scenarios as there are people involved. You only perceive a contradiction because you have confused the two, or blurred them together, assuming that there must be one type of truth that incorporates all others.

I can't say that I understood everything, but I agree at the least with the blue parts, and find the rest interesting.

... you still have the option of denying one or the other.

Either individual, subjective experience (including qualia) is actually an objective reality - what you might call a soul, which is what you've been getting at.

or

Objective truth does not exist. There is no "from the universe's point of view", so to speak, and all truth is bound within limited, subjective experience. To take the outsider's perspective as the marker for 'objectivity' is as meaningless as taking yours or your doppelgänger's. Two people can think two contradictory things and neither need necessarily be wrong, as there is no "one reality" beyond the two which they separately perceive.

If I was a physicalist, I would be flabbergasted to be presented with only these two options. The second option just seems insanely crazy, and the first option has ... ew... souls.

To the physicalist, there is one situation.
To the dualist, there are two situations.
To me, there are two situations.
Who should I (personally) believe, the physicalist or the dualist?

[Melmoth]

I've seen similar 'experiments' before. They're interesting, uncanny novelties but I remain unconvinced.

Correct me if I'm wrong in this description of the paradox: I am randomly assigned to either the red or the blue room. Since I can only be in one room or the other - I cannot be two people having two different experiences at the same time - there must be two possible situations. Yet there are not, for both are exactly the same to the outsider.

Yes! In fact, I think your formulation is much more reader-friendly than mine. I would change the last bit though:
I am randomly assigned to either the red or the blue room. Since I can only be in one room or the other - I cannot be two people having two different experiences at the same time - there must be two possible situations. Yet, according to physicalism, there are not, for both are physically the same.

If you mean that both situations are physically identical, then yes. There are two identical clones with two identical 'selves' each perceiving different things. And you can apply the same principle to any situation, including this one. There is only one objective situation here - two people are having a dialogue over the internet - while there are two subjective ones - yours and mine. I am in my blue room (for it really is a blue room!) perceiving you as nothing but words on a screen, while for you it's the opposite. And wouldn't it be eerie if your room was decourated in redder colours... but again, all this illustrates is the difference between objectivity and subjectivity. This does not a soul make. That idea depends on a confusion between the objective and the subjective.

You propose to take subjective experience as objective reality. According to you, there literally are two situations, only the 'soul' is in a different place from one to the other.

I'll have to humour that for a moment so I can illustrate some of the problems I have with it. There are two identical people in their respective boxes - identical down to every atom. The only difference is that one is experiencing red while the other is experiencing blue. Therefore, according to you, it's that unique subjective experience that contains the essence of a person's 'soul'. So then, what happens when both of the rooms are blue? Then not only are the two clones identical physically, but also in experience. Would that mean the two of them share a single soul? If I were to walk into one of the rooms and prod the person inside, thus making their experiences different, would I be splitting their soul in half?

Let's take another hypothetical. Imagine you are looking at a marble bust of Beethoven. You suppose that it exists as one thing, an objective reality: it is a bust. Yet, with your limited senses, it is impossible to take in every part of it at once. You can only think of it as a whole conceptually, and are forced to build this conceptual model out of many different, limited perspectives. You start by looking at it from every angle, from a distance, then you move in to examine the finer details of the hair, the eyes the nose; you try it at different light levels, touch it everywhere and in every way, even smelling it. You could go on forever, building a finer and finer conceptual model of the objective whole. Now, according to you, a different subjective experience makes a different objective situation. So either there is an infinite number of busts, or you have an infinite number of souls.

[tennenrishin]

I have to say that this is the first time I feel a physicalist has understood my whole argument. This makes me truly curious about your objection.
I have used your formulation (trusting you don't mind) and revised my original argument, to try clear up one or two things.

If you mean that both situations are physically identical, then yes. There are two identical clones with two identical 'selves' each perceiving different things. And you can apply the same principle to any situation, including this one. There is only one objective situation here - two people are having a dialogue over the internet - while there are two subjective ones - yours and mine. I am in my blue room (for it really is a blue room!) perceiving you as nothing but words on a screen, while for you it's the opposite. And wouldn't it be eerie if your room was decourated in redder colours... but again, all this illustrates is the difference between objectivity and subjectivity. This does not a soul make. That idea depends on a confusion between the objective and the subjective.

yes, yes, LOL!, yes... but you lose me in the last three sentences.

My claim is that I (the subject) have access to one bit of information (which room I am in) that does not exist in the physical universe. Perhaps what you are saying is that this information is meaningless to the physicalist, because of the symmetry - there are identical sentient humans in both rooms, swapping them is meaningless in the same way that swapping identical atoms is meaningless. So the physicalist's world view is self-consistent, and this argument is not actually an attack on physicalism. Yes, but...

What if the physicalist himself becomes a subject in the experiment. It is then that the contradiction in his world-view becomes evident. That bit of extra-physical information (red/blue or 0/1) now carries meaning (and we could make it even more meaningful by, say, filling the red room with bees - but the logic remains the same.) Whichever other "kinds of truth" there may be, it is his truth that matters to him. So how can he (from his own perspective, if you wish) agree with physicalism?

You propose to take subjective experience as objective reality.

Perhaps what I am proposing is that physicalism is not consistent with subjective reality, but I'm not sure I understand what I just said. This is what I mean:

Suppose, we blindfold the physicalists before putting them into the rooms. Then we ask one of them how many different possible scenarios there are? If he says "two", he has contradicted physicalism. If he says "one", we ask him what color his room is.

Therefore, according to you, it's that unique subjective experience that contains the essence of a person's 'soul'

Rather, my speculation is that the soul bestows a unique subjective perspective on the person. In my view, the soul is not made up of the person's experience. Rather, it is (or perhaps contains as an aspect) the person's subjective perspective/sentience. I think of the soul as a port into which qualia (or conscious experiences) are admitted.

So then, what happens when both of the rooms are blue?

You have two distinct souls admitting the same quale (having the same experiences). (That is, if we assume that the mapping from physical signals to qualia is the same in both minds, but let's just say that it is.)

a different subjective experience makes a different objective situation. So either there is an infinite number of busts, or you have an infinite number of souls.

...or one soul ('port') admitting different successive experiences.

Of course, my last three paragraphs are just speculation in response to your humouring.

[Ali]

My mom is an identical twin, and when she and her sister were kids, they were nearly impossible to tell apart.  My mom told me that more than one person has asked them "How do you tell yourselves apart?  How do you know which one is you and which one is her?"

It was stupid then, and it's stupid now.

As someone else mentioned, thoughts are physical manifestations.  They don't happen outside of the body, or separate from it.  It doesn't matter if an outside observer can actually see the person in the red room thinking "Wow, this is a very red room." or the person in the blue room thinking "Wow, this is a very blue room."  They are still two distinct people with distinct thoughts, and thoughts are physical.  No "soul" is needed.

[tennenrishin]

^ You see what I mean?

[Stevil]

Of course, my last three paragraphs are just speculation in response to your humouring.

All of your comments on the soul are speculation, you have no measurable evidence to back up your ideas. No way to know if you are wrong or right.
It is extremely easy to be wrong, an infinite wrong ideas are abound, but there is only one right idea. If you can't validate ideas then using the odds as a guide you would be wise to assume that your idea is wrong.

[Ali]

^ You see what I mean?

I don't. I think that you're trying to prove that since there is no observable physical evidence of a difference between Person Red and Person Blue, the fact that they each have a unique experience proves that they must have something non-physical banging around in there that is having separate experiences.  My point is, no, I don't care how similar they are, so as they they are both capable of thought, they are both capable of having separate experiences, and no "something extra" is needed because thoughts and experiences have a physical basis in the brain.  You may not be able to see me thinking, but I am. With my brain.

What point did I miss?

[tennenrishin]

What point did I miss?

Basically the whole thing, man...
But if you're genuinely interested in understanding the argument, the clearest formulations I can provide at this time are this one and this one. Pick whichever sits better with you. They are quite brief, so pay attention to exactly what is being said.

[Ali]

What point did I miss?

Basically the whole thing, man...
But if you're genuinely interested in understanding the argument, the clearest formulations I can provide at this time are this one and this one. Pick whichever sits better with you. They are quite brief, so pay attention to exactly what is being said.

Yes.  I read it. 

In the universe, there is a red room and a blue room. I am randomly assigned to either the red room or the blue room, and a copy* of my body is placed in the other room.

* I call it "a copy" for brevity, but strictly speaking it is "a twin with a brain pre-encoded to the state that mine would have been in, had I been placed in that room."

Okay, so far we have two people - me and my "twin."  My twin is in one room, I am in the other.  Got it.

Since I can only be in one room or the other – I cannot be two people having two different experiences at the same time – there must be two possible scenarios.

Yep.  2 scenarios.  I am either in the red room and my twin is in the blue, or I am in the blue room and my twin is in the red.  Got it.

Yet, according to physicalism, there are not, for both scenarios** are physically the same.

I think this is where you are losing me.  How are both scenarios physically the same?  If my "twin" and I each have an independent, functioning brain, why would we NOT each have a different physical experience?  Just because we are genetically the same (even if we are genetically the same in every single way) we are still two separate people.  If I'm in the blue room, I'm in the blue room and I will experience blue, while my twin will experience red.  So what?

Again, I am making the leap and assuming that you are arguing that the reason I am me whether I am in the blue box or the red box is that I have a soul that is always me.  If that's not your point, then I don't know what your point is.  Please elaborate.

If that IS your point, my respomse is that you don't need a soul to explain this, because consciousness and identity live within the brain.  As long as my twin and I have two diferrent brains, we are going to have the capability to experience two different things, or even the exact same thing (if we're both in blue rooms) and still be ourselves, because "ourselves" lives within the brain.  I will still be able to recognize myself as me, even if every single thing about me is replicated including experience, because my brain recognizes the differeence between the self and the other.

In other words, even if my mom and my aunt Pam were identical down to their very molecules, it's still not weird or mind blowing that my Aunt is in Florida probably hanging out on her balconey overlooking the water, and my mom is here in Denver probably buying something overpriced.  They have two different brains, and therefore two different experiences and thoughts.  Even when they were identical little kids, they knew who they were (even though my mom tells me that her everyone always just called them both "Sissy" so when she started Kindergarten, she didn't know if her name was "Tammy" or "Pammy."  But she still knew that she was HER and not her sister, regardless of what she was named.)  Why would your twins in the box be any different?

[tennenrishin]

Yep.  2 scenarios.  I am either in the red room and my twin is in the blue, or I am in the blue room and my twin is in the red.  Got it.

Very good.

Yet, according to physicalism, there are not, for both scenarios** are physically the same.

I think this is where you are losing me.  How are both scenarios physically the same?  If my "twin" and I each have an independent, functioning brain, why would we NOT each have a different physical experience?

Yes, they will each have a different experience. But the scenarios are physically the same, because the twins are physically the same. Swapping them is as meaningless to the state of the physical universe, as swapping, say, two identical atoms. The swap doesn't change anything, according to physics. The state of the physical universe in the swapped (Me-Red, say) case is, according to physics, identical to the state of the universe in the unswapped (Me-Blue, say) case.

You could also think of it this way: Suppose the lights in the rooms are dark initially. If you ask one of the subjects to bet on the color of his room, he would have to bet at 50-50. Now, when the lights go on, the odds become a certainty - he has gained exactly one binary digit (bit) of information (about which room he was in). However, suppose also that, before the lights went on, the state of the entire physical universe was described to them (I agree that there are practical difficulties, but this is a thought experiment). Note that they both would still have to bet at 50-50, for they heard the same description. So they still each gain one bit of new information when the lights go on. Where could this new information be coming from, since, according to physicalism, they have already heard all information contained in the universe.

Now, before someone thinks this is a tortuous version of the Knowledge argument (Mary's room), which is about qualia, see this colorless version.

Again, I am making the leap and assuming that you are arguing that the reason I am me whether I am in the blue box or the red box is that I have a soul that is always me.  If that's not your point, then I don't know what your point is.  Please elaborate.

That is what I would speculate, but the argument is making a weaker claim. The argument simply demonstrates that there is extra-physical information.

[Tank]

What point did I miss?

Basically the whole thing, man...
But if you're genuinely interested in understanding the argument, the clearest formulations I can provide at this time are this one and this one. Pick whichever sits better with you. They are quite brief, so pay attention to exactly what is being said.

No need to be snarky.