The "explanatory gap"

[The Black Jester]

For anyone who is interested in consciousness (if anyone else is...), here's a link to a famous (brief) paper by Levine on the supposed "explanatory gap."  Would love to know what other people thought of this in terms of how a materialist might reply to the challenges posed by Levine.  I'm not entirely sure myself.  I have some vague intuitions, but nothing well formed thus far.

http://www.uoguelph.ca/~abailey/Resources/levine.pdf

Wikipedia has a decent entry on the "explanatory gap." as well:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Explanatory_gap

[Caecilian]

The whole idea of the 'explanatory gap' and its putative consequences for materialism rely on the concept of qualia. In other words: if you buy into qualia, then you get an explanatory gap. Levine says as much towards the end of the article.

Now personally, I don't buy into qualia. I think that the concept of qualia is misleading, and causes a lot more problems than it solves. For one thing, it appears to be a prime example of a Wittgenstinian 'beetle in a box'. From the Investigations, section 293:

Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! â€" Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a ‘beetle’. No one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. â€" Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. â€" But suppose the word ‘beetle’ had a use in people’s language? â€" If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. â€" No, one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

[The Black Jester]

The whole idea of the 'explanatory gap' and its putative consequences for materialism rely on the concept of qualia. In other words: if you buy into qualia, then you get an explanatory gap. Levine says as much towards the end of the article.

Now personally, I don't buy into qualia. I think that the concept of qualia is misleading, and causes a lot more problems than it solves. For one thing, it appears to be a prime example of a Wittgenstinian 'beetle in a box'. From the Investigations, section 293:

Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! â€" Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a ‘beetle’. No one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. â€" Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. â€" But suppose the word ‘beetle’ had a use in people’s language? â€" If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. â€" No, one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

YAY!!! Someone finally replied.  Unfortunately for the two of us, we may be the only ones (on this forum, in any case) interested in this topic, and so our conversation will be limited.  It is decidedly more unfortunate for you than for me, as the discussion will be mostly be limited by my ignorance.  My interests in the philosophical side of this problem have recently grown out of my amateur studies in the neurobiological side of the 'matter.'  As it is a recent philosophical  fascination, thereby necessarily limiting the amount of time I have spent on the subject, my actual learning is likely proportionately meager.  However I hope that my own "Philsophical Investigations" are just beginning, and I am eager to learn whatever you may deign to teach.

I love this passage from Wittgenstein, particularly the gall with which he dispenses, via metaphorical mathematecal operation, with a 'common-sense' intuition.  I follow him right through...until I balk at the end.  So...do you entirely rebut the idea of the subjective?  Do you deny that there are realms of experience which, though we may not speak of them, nevertheless exist?  Is it truly possible to have a heterophenomenological process capable of fully exploring and explaining all so-called 'private' experiences, so that the epistemological difficulties are solved?  How do you answer Chalmers and his ilk?

On a related note, is there a significant difference between the metaphysical positions of a self-described 'physicalist' and a similarly self-styled 'materialist'?

[Davin]

The explanatory gap is a very poetic and well thought out appeal to ignorance.

The example the "beetle" in the box is a good example, because what one calls a thing doesn't change what the thing is. If we used the word "noun" in the place of nouns, everything suddenly wouldn't change into the same thing simply because everything is called the same thing. So while this may be a good topic for when one is tripping balls, I find the whole thing pretty useless, but sometimes interesting to talk about.

[The Black Jester]

The explanatory gap is a very poetic and well thought out appeal to ignorance.

This is precisely what bothers me about the arguments against the possibility of a physicalist explanation of consciousness.  My sense is the opponents of physicalism are trying to make something that is presently unkown, unkowable in principle.  It sounds arrogant and lazy to me at the same time.  There is much more work to do on consciousness, and there is no reason to just pack up shop and give in to a declared 'logical impossibility.'

I'm currently considering going back to school, and my current interests are in both Philosophy and Neuroscience.  This kind of discussion, fascinating as I find it, is generally what tips the balance for me toward Neuroscience.

We'll see.  There's that whole money issue to sovle first.

[Davin]

The explanatory gap is a very poetic and well thought out appeal to ignorance.

This is precisely what bothers me about the arguments against the possibility of a physicalist explanation of consciousness.  My sense is the opponents of physicalism are trying to make something that is presently unkown, unkowable in principle.  It sounds arrogant and lazy to me at the same time.  There is much more work to do on consciousness, and there is no reason to just pack up shop and give in to a declared 'logical impossibility.'

I'm currently considering going back to school, and my current interests are in both Philosophy and Neuroscience.  This kind of discussion, fascinating as I find it, is generally what tips the balance for me toward Neuroscience.

We'll see.  There's that whole money issue to sovle first.

The way I see philosophy is a bunch of dudes contemplating what could be if <something />, and while I have no problems with that, it often gets taken that because everything after the "if" makes senses, then the "if" is more likely to be true. So my problems aren't with philosophy in general, it's with many self proclaimed philosophers and those who use philosophical arguments as if the arguments are reality. Except stand up philosophers, they're usually funny.

[The Black Jester]

Except stand up philosophers, they're usually funny.

How completely and utterly true.  

Usually.  Sometimes they suck, to be fair.

But mostly true.

In my admittedly amateur investigations of philosophy, I have found that the subject is quite useful in clarifying the thinking behind argument, and in clarifying the concepts used in specific arguments.  And in seeing what truly follows from what.  All of this is tremendously useful, I personally feel - but I agree with you that it cannot determine, by itself, the truth of axioms - only what follows logically from them.

[Davin]

Yes, I suppose I was a bit hasty in my statement.

While I see the usefulness of philosophy, I relate to it as a tool instead of a profession. Like that a carpenter will use a hammer, but you don't see many professional hammerers. While I think that an understanding of philosophical principles (no matter how they're gained), is very essential to a rational discussion, I don't see the merits in using only philosophy. These are the kinds of analogies I give to my friend who majored in philosophy.

[The Black Jester]

While I see the usefulness of philosophy, I relate to it as a tool instead of a profession. Like that a carpenter will use a hammer, but you don't see many professional hammerers.

An apt and good analogy.  However, I would argue that it depends entirely on how you fill out the rest of your body of knowledge.  I would say that a case can be made that they are more akin to specialists, in the same way that mathematicians are specialists.  

You will no doubt argue that mathematics is more productive, that its fruits are more readily useful to practical applications in the sciences and engineering disciplines.  I would, while readily acknowledging this, only counter that formal logic has made its contributions to theoretical mathematics, and that there is a truism buried under the perhaps tired observation that many of the sciences began as more properly philosophical endeavors.  It can be argued that, while progress in the sciences may lead to revolutions within a discipline, the discipline itself retains its identity as science, and yet similar progress in philosophy ends with a daughter discipline abandoning its parent and becoming a science, its roots no longer recognizable.  But, in any case.  The thinkers I find worth the reading are ones steeped in knowledge outside of their proper discipline.  Their academic training has enabled them to think about this other knowledge in ways that people without such training may not, and can help push the other branches of knowledge beyond their traditional borders.  My favorite philosophers of mind, for instance, are well versed in neurobiology, so much so as to be called experts in their own right.

But you've likely heard all this nonsense before.  

[Davin]

Yeah, the comment was made mostly in jest, in reality a major in philosophy has pretty much a pick of professions and without philosophers I doubt the world would have improved as it did (albeit slowly). I'm not only guilty of making a failed joke, but also derailing the thread. If I were you I'd exclude the bad philosophers from your consideration of following up with philosophy, because I doubt that you'll be using philosophy for unscrupulous purposes. My friend also makes fun of me in the same ways, at least I assume that we have an understanding that it's all in jest from us making sure that it's clear that we're joking. You do however make some very good points that if I was actually under the impression that philosophy was as useless as I made it seem I did, that I would likely change my opinion on the subject. From what I've read of your posts I think your very apt to go either way and be exceptional at them, and the world does need some exceptional neurologists as well as philosophers. Sorry I can't offer any help into your decision, but I do hope that you do pursue at least one of those options... then later you can finish up the other, because it appears you have an interest in both and that is the best line of work to go into (one that interests you).

[The Black Jester]

Thank you very much for your kind words, Davin.  I've been impressed, by the way, with your thoughts and how you express them here.  I am glad you are part of these forums.

[Caecilian]

I love this passage from Wittgenstein, particularly the gall with which he dispenses, via metaphorical mathematecal operation, with a 'common-sense' intuition.  I follow him right through...until I balk at the end.  So...do you entirely rebut the idea of the subjective?  Do you deny that there are realms of experience which, though we may not speak of them, nevertheless exist?  Is it truly possible to have a heterophenomenological process capable of fully exploring and explaining all so-called 'private' experiences, so that the epistemological difficulties are solved?  How do you answer Chalmers and his ilk?

On a related note, is there a significant difference between the metaphysical positions of a self-described 'physicalist' and a similarly self-styled 'materialist'?

Well, I'd question whether the experiences that we label as 'private' and 'subjective' really are as 100% private/ subjective as we sometimes think. The quote from Wittgenstein that I used forms part of the Private Language Argument, the upshot of which is that if a phenomenon really was entirely private, we wouldn't be able to meaningfully discuss it.

You mention heterophenomenology, so I assume that you've read some Dennett. Don't know if you've come across this one:

http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm

Its worth reading- goes over the problems with qualia in some depth.

And yeah- physicalism = materialism (or materialist monism), at least in contemporary usage.

Re: Philosophy/ Neuroscience

Philosophy is a huge subject, an theres an awful lot of it that I don't find interesting. Imo the really cool Philosophy is the stuff that is heavily engaged with the empirical subjects. So: Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, Political Philosophy. But not: Ethics, Aesthetics, Metaphysics etc.

Personally, I studied Psychology as an undergrad, and then did postgrad Philosophy. This had the advantage of giving me a grounding in an empirical subject, and also allowed me to go directly to the area of Philosophy that I was actually interested in.

On balance, I think this was a good strategy (although it wasn't really planned!). So I'd go for Neuroscience. You can always study Philosophy of Mind later on, and if you do you'll have a really solid intellectual foundation.

[The Black Jester]

You mention heterophenomenology, so I assume that you've read some Dennett. Don't know if you've come across this one:

http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm

Its worth reading- goes over the problems with qualia in some depth.

I'm just beginning my investigation of him.  Have read some of his essays, but not this one.  Thanks, I'll take a look at it!

So I'd go for Neuroscience. You can always study Philosophy of Mind later on, and if you do you'll have a really solid intellectual foundation.

Good advice, I've definitely been leaning in this direction...