The Need for Absolutism for Theists and Atheists

[radicalaggrivation]

I would just like to say hello to everyone before I begin. This is my first night on HAF and my first time participating in a community of like-minded individuals. This is a topic I have been contemplating the past few days. It seems that at the heart of the debate between theists and atheists, there is a fundamental difference in how each perceives morality. I watch debates regularly on the topic and as many have probably witnessed, theists tend to "evolve" (lol) their ideas around the continuing deconstruction that science brings. Regardless of the amount of evidence or reason that is presented, a debate on the topic has now devolved to theists falling back on the idea of moral absolutism or what I like to call universal morality. How do we explain our innate desire to uphold right and wrong? What gave us this instinct? Needless to say, the theist explanation is quite predictable.

It is in no way possible we just developed it. Let us ignore the fact that these basic behaviors (the simple idea of the "Golden Rule") promote a more cohesive society and have been demonstrated in virtually all societies, in some form or another. Had our ancestors been prone to lie, steal, and murder one another, instead of banding together to overcome the overwhelming amount of obstacles they faced, our species would have been stamped out and forgotten by now. To the rational mind, these concepts are quite simple. Working together promotes survival and from there we have developed more complex ways to express this common thread of instinct. So what does this mean for our morality? I have even witnessed some of the most offensive atheists shy away from this point. No one wants to say that there are no moral absolutes. No one wants to admit that this is one of many remarkable, albeit natural, conditions we have developed for ourselves. Just as people have a difficult time understanding how consciousness can be finite. The human species has lived through ice ages, famine, microorganisms, and nuclear weapons and yet our delicate sensibilities about the human mind remains curiously intact.

The question can never be answered truthfully if we are not truthful with ourselves. I would like to think that a person who allows a child to starve to death is universally evil. I would like to think that philanthropists are absolute good and Hitler is absolutely bad. It is probably very unpopular to say that these ideas are all relative to our experience but this is the best explanation outside of God. We cannot have our cake and eat it too. There is either no moral absolutism and it is all a natural development of our species or something placed it there before us. If a meteor the size of Texas slammed into the Earth right now and killed our most of our species that would be tragic to anyone left behind  but would the universe take notice? Is this tragedy of equal proportion and significance in the Andromeda Galaxy? As much as it may crush our grandiose feelings of importance, it seems likely that the universe would continue on unabated, in it's immeasurable ballet of life and death.

As freethinkers, we have a responsibility to be honest when the world refuses to do so. If morality only holds an absolute parameter in the human drama, it is our duty to understand that, so that we might understand ourselves better. But convincing ourselves (once again) that there are supernatural or natural laws that govern our morality outside of the human mind (that have somehow been missed by every scientist to date), is only another exercise in human narcissism and hubris. I would love to discuss this more with anyone willing to weigh in or challenge this idea. What are your views on moral absolutism?

[The Black Jester]

There was a discussion on this going for a while, recently, but it seems to have fizzled.  Here's the link to the other thread, if you're interested in what some others have had to say on the matter:

http://www.happyatheistforum.com/viewtopic.php?f=5&t=5123

My own thoughts continue to be ill-formed, as I'm just beginning my investigations into moral philosophy, and I cannot truly express anything more enlightened than I have in the above thread (most of which expressions were mere questions).  Moral relativism does seem to be, largely, the default position of most modern moral philosophers, cultural anthropologists, and scientists - those who have abandoned the sanction of religion for moral behavior.  

There are some, like Sam Harris (discussed in the thread above), that posit a possible science of morality by which we can develop a secure basis for moral judgement, based on our developing understanding of the neuroscience of consciousness and our willingness to define "morality" as the pursuit of the "well-being" of conscious beings.  

Others try to ground morality in an understanding of the natural moral development of both our species and of the individual (from infancy to adulthood).  

There is a young Philosopher Jesse Prinz, who, in his book The Emotional Construction of Morals develops a case for what is termed emotionism, or sentimentalism, which essentially refers to the belief that moral judgments, and moral properties, both refer to emotional content - so that our ability to know what is moral (epistemological) and the moral qualities of things themselves (metaphysical) are both determined by our emotional reactions to them.  He does insist, however, that a kind of moral progress is possible, I'm not quite sure how, I'm still reading the book, but I believe mainly involving our developing awareness of what is in our best interest as a species and our developing capacity for empathy.

For myself, I cannot find a convincing escape from moral relativism, other than my own abhorrence of certain behaviors (and my contrasting admiration for other behaviors).  But I cannot claim that those emotional reactions are grounded in any absolute sanction, much as I would like them to be.

[Thumpalumpacus]

Not all atheists are absolutists.

[reed9]

You can have a system of morality that is neither absolute nor relative.

Obviously, morals and rights are not derived from God or any divine being, since atheists can be moral and amongst the religious, there is no agreement as to what exactly the Divine actually advocates.

Nor can you derive morality from nature, as nature is patently amoral.

Nor can you derive morality from positive law.  When the law in unjust, we need a source of rights/morality to appeal to beyond the law.

Alan Dershowitz, in his book "Rights From Wrongs: A Secular Theory of the Origins of Rights" argues that the concept of rights and what is moral, derives from our cultural experience of injustice.  A bottom up approach.  We will never agree on the nature of the perfect good, but by and large, we can agree on things which are wrong.  With few exceptions, no one argues for another Holocaust, or McCarthyism, or whatnot, and build up from there.

[The Black Jester]

Alan Dershowitz, in his book "Rights From Wrongs: A Secular Theory of the Origins of Rights" argues that the concept of rights and what is moral, derives from our cultural experience of injustice. A bottom up approach. We will never agree on the nature of the perfect good, but by and large, we can agree on things which are wrong. With few exceptions, no one argues for another Holocaust, or McCarthyism, or whatnot, and build up from there.

This is intriguing, I'll definitely have to read the book.  Sounds similar to what Prinz is arguing, in the book of his I'm currently reading (mentioned above), regarding the possibility of moral progress.

Can you explain, briefly, however, how this does not beg the question of whether a majority social agreement is equivalent to moral good, and the question of where this (presumably) pre-moral outrage comes from in the first place, the outrage that leads to social change (in cases where people violently disagree on what is immoral), and presumably to the agreement that makes an action immoral once the consensus is reached?  Or is this concensus supposed to be largely instictive?

[radicalaggrivation]

You can have a system of morality that is neither absolute nor relative.

Obviously, morals and rights are not derived from God or any divine being, since atheists can be moral and amongst the religious, there is no agreement as to what exactly the Divine actually advocates.

Nor can you derive morality from nature, as nature is patently amoral.
 

I would disagree with you here. Nature is not amoral. If a lion eats a gazelle and the gazelle's baby dies as a consequence, it is not moral or amoral. It is the nature of life. My point really has nothing to do with what ways we go about understanding our morality. Morality is very real to us but so is consciousness. The similarity lies in how we attained them. We either developed both from a natural means (which would be my position) or we developed them outside of nature. We all know what the word for that is. My point is that very few atheists seem willing to take a position that morality is purely relative to our perception. It seems that no one wants to be the one to explain how Hitler is still evil but that he is not universally evil, only evil relative to what we perceive as good and evil. So I agree with you to an extent. You can have a system of morality that you believe is absolute, relative, or something in between but the roots of morality come from one of the two. I do not think anyone wants to argue that morals don't change or differ depending on who and when it is. This fact points to morals being purely relative. I would just like more atheists tear down one of the most commonly used, last resorts of theists. It is long past due that happened.

[elliebean]

I would disagree with you here. Nature is not amoral. If a lion eats a gazelle and the gazelle's baby dies as a consequence, it is not moral or amoral. It is the nature of life.

That's what amoral means. You're thinking of immoral.

[radicalaggrivation]

That's what amoral means. You're thinking of immoral.

Your right. Thanks a lot.

[reed9]

Can you explain, briefly, however, how this does not beg the question of whether a majority social agreement is equivalent to moral good, and the question of where this (presumably) pre-moral outrage comes from in the first place, the outrage that leads to social change (in cases where people violently disagree on what is immoral), and presumably to the agreement that makes an action immoral once the consensus is reached?  Or is this concensus supposed to be largely instictive?

It's been awhile since I read the book, so I'm not sure if I can present the finer points of his argument well.  If we're talking whence the sense of moral outrage comes from, that is a weak point in the book and not a subject he delves into.  He's content to say that by and large, we do have a sense of fairness and justice that is relatively universal.

As for universal vs. relative, I guess the argument is that we have a universal idea, say that free speech is an important right, but the devil is in the details, and the limits to free speech expand and contract based on experience.  In Germany, their experience of Nazism has led to the contraction of free speech - it is illegal to advocate Nazism.  In the U.S., we allow that, but have recently raised questions about allowing radical Muslim clerics to advocate religious violence.

I would say evolution has endowed us, as social animals, with some sense of fairness, justice, and altruism.  This appears to be primarily directed towards family and one's immediate community.  (Sensible, from an evolutionary standpoint.)  Through whatever trick of "consciousness" we can co-opt and expand these evolutionary rudiments of morality.  Law and ethical systems are sort of crutches, I suppose, since we tend to fail to act as though it's as wrong to steal from Jack in Seattle as it is to steal from my sister Jill.

In cases where people have wildly opposing views on what is moral, say abortion, the perceived wrongs that led to legalizing abortion include the danger of backroom procedures and the subjugation of women (can women be truly free and equal if they do not have reproductive rights?), as well as whether the State ought to have the power to legislate something so personal, and if it does, whether that precedent endangers of areas of privacy and our personal lives.  Are those reasons sufficient to justify ending a potential life?  As we've moved farther from the struggle that led to Roe v. Wade, our memory of the injustices has faded and we are moving towards a contraction of reproductive rights.

It seems that no one wants to be the one to explain how Hitler is still evil but that he is not universally evil, only evil relative to what we perceive as good and evil.

What is evil?  A dictionary definition is something morally wrong or bad.  Morality, broadly speaking, is defined as conduct which increases human welfare and flourishing.  Hitler's actions quite clearly did not increase human welfare, being pretty much as far from that as possible, so I would say we could justifiably call him evil.

Morals are not absolute - there are times when almost all of us think killing is justified, for example - but neither are they completely arbitrary and relative.  There is at least some level of empirical evidence that we can use to conclude which actions increase human welfare and flourishing, and that, I submit, is the foundation by which we can declare a practice immoral, regardless of time or culture.

[Davin]

I would just like more atheists tear down one of the most commonly used, last resorts of theists.

When was the last time someone talked to god and got an absolutely clear response that could be verified by others? The reason one would ask this is because if god is not clearly explaining these absolute morals to someone, then where does one get these absolute morals from?
Common sources:
Holy Book -> written by man which means errors which leaves it open to interpretation and therefore not absolute morals, but subjective based on the interpreter.
Internal Moral Compass/Guiding Spirit -> the problem with this method is that nothing is clear, everything is still subjective because everything right or wrong is derived from the person.
Religious Authority -> this is really the same problem as the previous two depending on where the religious authority says they get their idea of "absolute" morals, the only difference is instead of taking the responsibility to make their own decisions, they place that responsibility on the authority.

Mixing and matching any of these doesn't help their argument, it would be like building the second floor of a house without building the first floor.


Ask them if murder, rape, human sacrifice, slavery and/or stealing is absolutely wrong.
At least one is absolutely wrong: then they'll have to concede that either god has sinned or that these absolute morals aren't very absolute since god is allowed to break them and order humans to break them.
God has sinned: If they say that god has sinned then by what right does god have to punish people or deny entrance into heaven? If there are absolute morals then god would send himself to hell.
It's ok to do these things to sinners/non-believers: then these morals are again not absolute if they don't apply all the time to all people, because anything else is subjective.
Only applies to humans and not god: horrible cop out, either these morals are absolute because they apply to everyone at all times and are unchanging or they're subjective because they have exceptions based on people and/or circumstances.


For the "if morals are absolute, then you can't say Hitler/Stalin are bad people" argument: I base whether something is good or bad depending on the amount of harm is caused, because these people most assuredly caused massive amounts of suffering, they are massively bad.

[Davin]

As for universal vs. relative, I guess the argument is that we have a universal idea, say that free speech is an important right, but the devil is in the details, and the limits to free speech expand and contract based on experience.  In Germany, their experience of Nazism has led to the contraction of free speech - it is illegal to advocate Nazism.  In the U.S., we allow that, but have recently raised questions about allowing radical Muslim clerics to advocate religious violence.

Advocating/inciting violence has not been a freedom protected under free speech in the U.S. for a long time, it doesn't matter if it's religious.

[reed9]

As for universal vs. relative, I guess the argument is that we have a universal idea, say that free speech is an important right, but the devil is in the details, and the limits to free speech expand and contract based on experience.  In Germany, their experience of Nazism has led to the contraction of free speech - it is illegal to advocate Nazism.  In the U.S., we allow that, but have recently raised questions about allowing radical Muslim clerics to advocate religious violence.

Advocating/inciting violence has not been a freedom protected under free speech in the U.S. for a long time, it doesn't matter if it's religious.

Yes, I realize it's not protected.  But there has been a debate over where exactly the line gets crossed.  For example, the case in 2005 of Ali al-Timini.  Or in a different vein, the recent ban on providing "expert advice or assistance" to terrorist groups even in the interest of peace.

But the broader point is that we're more concerned about that, and more likely to arrest and convict a muslim for saying God wants Americans killed that we are to arrest someone for saying God wants homosexuals killed.

[Davin]

As for universal vs. relative, I guess the argument is that we have a universal idea, say that free speech is an important right, but the devil is in the details, and the limits to free speech expand and contract based on experience.  In Germany, their experience of Nazism has led to the contraction of free speech - it is illegal to advocate Nazism.  In the U.S., we allow that, but have recently raised questions about allowing radical Muslim clerics to advocate religious violence.

Advocating/inciting violence has not been a freedom protected under free speech in the U.S. for a long time, it doesn't matter if it's religious.

Yes, I realize it's not protected.  But there has been a debate over where exactly the line gets crossed.  For example, the case in 2005 of Ali al-Timini.  Or in a different vein, the recent ban on providing "expert advice or assistance" to terrorist groups even in the interest of peace.

But the broader point is that we're more concerned about that, and more likely to arrest and convict a muslim for saying God wants Americans killed that we are to arrest someone for saying God wants homosexuals killed.

No matter where the line is placed, It's not for religious reasons, it's for other reasons like the safety of people in the society. Now I would be concerned if there were limitations to anything said in support of a religion. Also if anything is permitted under free speech if it's clearly satire.

[Caecilian]

First issue: Does to christian model of absolute morality actually make sense?

I would say not, for two reasons. The first is whats called the Euthyphro Dilemma, which runs as follows: ' (A)Does god command what is good because it is good, or (B)is it definitionally good because god commands it?'

If (A) then morality is in an important sense exterior to god, and also prior to god. And as such, it cannot be absolutely validated by god, and the whole project of a divinely-determined absolute morality collapses.

If (B) then morality becomes arbitrary, dependent on the whim of the deity. If god were to ordain that eating babies was moral, then moral it would be. Morality therefore becomes absolute, but also vacuous.

Theologians have tried to defend absolute morality by claiming that (A) and (B) represent a false dichotomy. In reality, they say, both statements are true. For example, the reformed theologian John Frame:

God's nature is righteous and therefore normative. God loves goodness because he is good, and therefore he commands goodness in his revelation to man. Therefore in one sense, God loves the good because it is good; the concept is not arbitrary. Yet he does not need to look outside himself for a standard of goodness. That standard is his own character...So: God's goodness determines God's revelation, and God's revelation determines His goodness.

Full article: http://www.frame-poythress.org/frame_articles/1993Euthyphro.htm

This seems to be a clear-cut case of circular reasoning, a type of formal logical fallacy. It doesn't work, and so the absolute morality of christianity remains problematic.

And it only gets worse when we consider the actions of the biblical god, which constitute a second reason for doubting absolute theistic morality. Yahweh, the putatively perfectly moral entity, turns out to be a sociopath. Genocide, murder, rape, slavery, baby killing, city burning, you name it. Plus of course he condemns non-believers to an eternity of hell on the basis of...what? Not believing in him, or believing in some similar fairytale instead. A fragile ego, to say the least.

The upshot of this is that the 'absolute morality' of christianity is a joke in very bad taste. Christians can't say that genocide is always wrong, because god himself wiped out the entire human race bar Noah and his family. They can't say that burning cities and slaughtering the inhabitants is always wrong, because David did a lot of that on yahweh's command. And so on.

Second Issue: Do We Want/ Need Absolute Morality Anyway?: In my opinion: NO!!

Morality is a practical matter. In real life, in our everyday lives and especially in the public sphere, making moral decisions involves balancing out various different goods, with additional non-ethical considerations involved too.

For example: Nuclear power. On one hand, if we build nuclear power stations we will bequeath a legacy of radioactive waste to future generations. But then again, there is the issue of greenhouse gases to consider. And also economic costs, and a variety of scientific/ technical issues (how can we store the waste? how safe are the stations?).

For example: Prostitution. Here we balance out the issue of personal freedom (people have the right to do what they want with their bodies) against the social cost of prostitution (objectification of women, links with organized crime etc).

I'm sure that everyone has their own views on these and other contentious issues: drug laws, pornography, private gun ownership, anti-terror legislation, animal experiments etc. My point here is not to support one side or the other. Rather, it is this: absolute morality is of no use whatsoever in navigating the complex issues involved.

We need to think flexibly, to listen to the arguments on both sides, and often to reach uncomfortable compromises. Rushing to judgement based on some absolute code derived from a 2000-year-old book is not going to help.

Third Issue: So if morals aren't absolute, then doesn't that make them completely relative?

Of course not. This really is a false dichotomy, existing only in the minds of silly theists.

Human beings are intrinsically social beings. Physically, one group of people is pretty similar to the next. We all have 2 eyes, 2 ears, 4 limbs, a penis or vagina, 8 fingers and 2 thumbs etc. Our brains are wired in very similar ways; our many languages have a common underlying structure. And so on.

Thus it is hardly surprising that people have worked out similar solutions to living with each other in the world. I don't know how many times pottery has been invented, or writing, or counting, or the wheel. Or, more pertinently, how many times people have come up with marriage, laws, taboos, deities.

To use a Wittgenstinian term: we have a common form of life. And the commonalities of what it is to be human have produced a similar set of solutions. Underlying our moral solutions is the commonality of empathy- our capacity to feel for others, to put ourselves in someone elses shoes. Empathy leads to the 'golden rule'. And atop of this, a wide variety of culturally constructed ethical systems.

But are some of these ethical systems better than others? I would say yes. Just as there are well-designed and badly-designed solutions to technical problems (some cars are better solutions to the car design problem than others), some ethical systems produce better results for people in general than others. Better in what sense? Better in the sense of being a superior solution to the problem. For example: blanket prohibition appears to be a very bad solution to the problem of substance use- it doesn't work, and leads to further difficulties that are at least as bad as the initial problem.

As I said, moral problems are practical problems. Moral solutions therefore need to be pragmatic, which is emphatically not the same as being  completely relative.

Fourth and final issue: Okay then, what about the 'golden rule'? Maybe that is a divinely-ordained absolute.

Nah. Its not even much of a philosophical problem- more of a neuroscience thing, really.

One of the major neuroscientific discoveries of the 90s was mirror neurons. Rather than go over the whole thing myself, heres a link to the wiki article:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirror_neuron

And to an article on the recent discovery of mirror neurons in humans:

http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/04/100412162112.htm

What this research demonstrates is that there is a clear physiological basis for empathy. Just as we have 2 eyes and a mouth, we also have mirror neurons; empathy is as much a part of our physical constitution as seeing and tasting.

Theres a clear evolutionary advantage to it as well, for humans as much as for macaque monkeys- empathy creates group binding. For social creatures like humans (or proto-humans, or macaques) this is vitally important to survival. Also to reproduction: individuals who can empathise will undoubtedly have more mating success than those who can't.

Thus: no need to invoke the supernatural to explain the golden rule.

So there we are. Apologies for the unreasonably long post.