Probability of theism (multiple choice)

[Norfolk And Chance]

I was speaking tongue in cheek. I just mean that the fact that we don't need a God shouldn't be considered conclusive evidence that he doesn't exist. A religious person might tell you some bs like god made the universe to look like he wasn't there. I'm certainly not saying I agree with it, but it is POSSIBLE, however ridiculously unlikely.

It isn't possible, because the religious person has just made it up.

[bandit4god]

There is currently no way to tell what the probability is and I don't care to speculate what the probability is.

I think probable and possible are too often used interchangeably in contexts where they can't be.   I'm not sure if the OP realizes they mean two different yet similar things or not

I understand full well that they represent ways to describe states of the world in two different types of decisions.

In any decision problem, the way the world is, and what an agent does, together determine an outcome for the agent. We may assign utilities to such outcomes, numbers that represent the degree to which the agent values them. It is typical to present these numbers in a decision matrix, with the columns corresponding to the various relevant states of the world, and the rows corresponding to the various possible actions that the agent can perform.

In decisions under uncertainty, nothing more is given — in particular, the agent does not assign subjective probabilities [only possibilities] to the states of the world. Still, sometimes rationality dictates a unique decision nonetheless. Consider, for example, a case that will be particularly relevant here. Suppose that you have two possible actions, A1 and A2, and the worst outcome associated with A1 is at least as good as the best outcome associated with A2; suppose also that in at least one state of the world, A1's outcome is strictly better than A2's. Let us say in that case that A1 superdominates A2. Then rationality surely requires you to perform A1.

In decisions under risk, the agent assigns subjective probabilities to the various states of the world. Assume that the states of the world are independent of what the agent does. A figure of merit called the expected utility, or the expectation of a given action can be calculated by a simple formula: for each state, multiply the utility that the action produces in that state by the state's probability; then, add these numbers. According to decision theory, rationality requires you to perform the action of maximum expected utility (if there is one).

[bandit4god]

Why didn't you have a 0.5 choice?  That's what I would have chosen, but I had to choose another one.

You can choose 0.5 if you like, Ecurb, my choices should have included this. 

Well only 0.000,000,000,000,1% appear to separate our world view then 

Curious, Tank--thanks for your even-handedness and scientific response.  Incedentally, if you assign a probability of 0.000,000,000,000,1, rationality would dictate that it's worthwhile to believe in God given the utility of being right (infinite happiness).  See here for more:  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pascal-wager/

[Whitney]

There is currently no way to tell what the probability is and I don't care to speculate what the probability is.

I think probable and possible are too often used interchangeably in contexts where they can't be.   I'm not sure if the OP realizes they mean two different yet similar things or not

I understand full well that they represent ways to describe states of the world in two different types of decisions.

In any decision problem, the way the world is, and what an agent does, together determine an outcome for the agent. We may assign utilities to such outcomes, numbers that represent the degree to which the agent values them. It is typical to present these numbers in a decision matrix, with the columns corresponding to the various relevant states of the world, and the rows corresponding to the various possible actions that the agent can perform.

In decisions under uncertainty, nothing more is given — in particular, the agent does not assign subjective probabilities [only possibilities] to the states of the world. Still, sometimes rationality dictates a unique decision nonetheless. Consider, for example, a case that will be particularly relevant here. Suppose that you have two possible actions, A1 and A2, and the worst outcome associated with A1 is at least as good as the best outcome associated with A2; suppose also that in at least one state of the world, A1's outcome is strictly better than A2's. Let us say in that case that A1 superdominates A2. Then rationality surely requires you to perform A1.

In decisions under risk, the agent assigns subjective probabilities to the various states of the world. Assume that the states of the world are independent of what the agent does. A figure of merit called the expected utility, or the expectation of a given action can be calculated by a simple formula: for each state, multiply the utility that the action produces in that state by the state's probability; then, add these numbers. According to decision theory, rationality requires you to perform the action of maximum expected utility (if there is one).

ok...then why did you say probable instead of possible?

[Tank]

Well only 0.000,000,000,000,1% appear to separate our world view then 

Curious, Tank--thanks for your even-handedness and scientific response.  Incedentally, if you assign a probability of 0.000,000,000,000,1, rationality would dictate that it's worthwhile to believe in God given the utility of being right (infinite happiness).  See here for more:  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pascal-wager/

I knew with a probability of very close to 1 that you would abuse my response by taking it literally and not alogorically. But then you are much more worried about winning your point than exploring reality.

[DeterminedJuliet]

Well only 0.000,000,000,000,1% appear to separate our world view then 

Curious, Tank--thanks for your even-handedness and scientific response.  Incedentally, if you assign a probability of 0.000,000,000,000,1, rationality would dictate that it's worthwhile to believe in God given the utility of being right (infinite happiness).  See here for more:  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pascal-wager/

I knew with a probability of very close to 1 that you would abuse my response by taking it literally and not alogorically. But then you are much more worried about winning your point than exploring reality.

Yup, pretty much.

[Heisenberg]

Curious, Tank--thanks for your even-handedness and scientific response.  Incedentally, if you assign a probability of 0.000,000,000,000,1, rationality would dictate that it's worthwhile to believe in God given the utility of being right (infinite happiness).  See here for more:  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pascal-wager/

Yea we're all familiar with Pascal's wager and pretty sure no one takes it seriously.

Your initial question was if we believed in a God that created Earth. Now you're asking about a God who can grant infinite happiness? Now you understand why your question was unclear.

Which is it? Because if the question is whether Yahweh exists, I'm confident that just about every single person would have said zero chance.

[Whitney]

It's probably also good to point out here that you have to be careful in philosophy to not jump ahead of yourself by running with a false premise.

We can make up possible situations all day long but if at the end of the day you choose action based on a false situation then you are still wrong even if it appeared to be the most beneficial option....and by choosing the false option you end up missing out on the path that is truly beneficial.

Pascal's wager...lol...I'm surprised that any person even partially versed in critical thought ever thought that was a good argument.  Hint....one can't magically start honestly believing in something they are not convinced of just because they want to hedge their bets.