Argument #2: From the Nature of Rationality

[humblesmurph]

None of this answers the question Chris. In order to settle the argument, you have to show  how it happens.  I'm not asking you to do that, because if you could, you wouldn't be on this forum.  You'd be too busy with your world wide fame.  The same could be said for any physicalist that could soundly refute your claims with actual evidence.  Saying that man has an immaterial aspect won't cut it, just as the physicalists claim that proof will come someday doesn't cut it.  Neither solution is compelling to my eyes.

Ok, I think you might be missing my point. Let's start with (1) in the argument. Whether or not physicalists are right or wrong, can you agree with the logic of (1)? If all thought is strictly determined by nature, can you see why such thought could not be classified as rational, but rather, at best, only arational?

I fully admit that I am taking (2) as a given. If you want to believe that rational thought is impossible, I won't try to quarrel with you on it. I'll simply ask that you accept the logical corollary that materialism (and the atheism founded on it) is not a rational position, and further, that all other opposing views are equally rational in that all are perfectly arataionl. In other words, if you agree with (1) but choose to reject (2), I won't challenge you on that, but I will ask you to accept the necessary fact that theism and atheism are completely equal worldviews. Both are just as arataional, and thus, no atheist has the right to say that atheism is more rational than Christianity.

If you accept (2), it doesn't matter if we can explain how rational thought works or not, then you must accept that materialism is false.

So - I am not going to defend the truth of (2). I am assuming it because atheists do. If you want to accept it, then I ask you to accept the conclusion. If you reject it, I ask you to accept the logically necessary conclusion that materialistic atheism is non-rational. All this is built, then, on (1), which is what I am defending. Can you see that? That is my argument.

My basic question then is simple: is (1) correct? Do you agree that if materialism is true then rational thought is impossible? If not, can you explain where I am wrong in arguing that rational thought is impossible if it is completely externally determined and descriptive?

Every single time I disagree with you, you claim I'm missing your point.  Every single time I try to restate your point in my own words you say I have it wrong.  Chris, respectfully, the mind body problem doesn't get solved with a proof, not in 2010.  The proof of God was a fun intellectual exercise.  I mean no disrespect, but this here is a real problem with a real solution.

This is my point. The brain is not the big bang.  Martin T K is a relative expert in this stuff (I presume) and he hasn't said peep.  Why?  Because he doesn't know.  Nobody does.  I don't know if your characterization of rational thought is correct.  I don't know if your characterization of the workings of the brain is correct.  All I know is that the brain has been studied inside and out and we haven't found anything supernatural yet. Logic doesn't change that.

Furthermore, you can't point to one unexplained thing and say a position is arational or less rational than Christianity.  Christianity is full of apparent contradictions that you get away with because we can't know the nature of God, or we don't know what the bible is really saying.  You and I both know that if there was to be proof of a physical solution to the mind body problem, you would just find a way to make it consistent with Christianity, just like you did with evolution.  This problem is not just a problem with human brains.  Animal brains work in much the same way.  What does trudacianism say of animals?

[Reginus]

@Jac
Imagine that you see a bowling ball and a feather.  You think to yourself "If I pick up the bowling ball, it will feel heavier than the feather, because I've held a bowling ball and a feather at some point in my life, and the bowling ball weighed a fair amount while the feather was very light."  It's a rational thought, correct?  Now, I see at least three options for what could really be going on:
1. Something not made of matter is doing the thinking.
2. Thought is purely materialistic, and there is some sort of chemical illusion going on.  Reality is not as it seems.
3. Thought is purely materialistic, but there actually is a ball and a feather, and you actually have held them at some point in time, and so on.  

So is number three exceedingly unlikely?  Impossible?  If number 3 is reality, then does it mean that the "rational thought" you had was actually not rational?

[Davin]

@JAc3510:

I do think it's counter productive, if this is an attempt at an open discussion, to open with a straw man.

It's less productive to make an accusation without demonstration.

The worldview on which most versions of atheism are built is called philosophical naturalism, materialism, or physicalism. The central idea is that everything that exists is strictly natural and obeys the laws of nature. There are no ghosts, gods, angels, demons, souls, or magic. Obviously, on this view, there is just no room for God.

I think we can demonstrate the deficiency of that general position this way:

      1. If rational thought is possible, materialism is false;
      2. Rational thought is possible;
      3. Therefore, materialism is false.

Not only is this an assumption on what most atheists think, but the philosophy not inherently atheist. The only thing it takes to build a "version" of atheism, is to not believe in any god or gods. This is a very common misconception that atheists often have to correct with most theists. To say that atheism is built on a philosophy is straw manning (a misrepresentation of an opponent's position that is attacked instead of the opponents actual position), atheists into one hastily generalized grouping even if the words most, many and/or a lot are used. If you want to take on the philosophies themselves, then all good and fine, but to try to attach opponents to them (unless your opponents had already stated that those are the philosophies that they subscribe to), is disingenuous at best.

That said, you made several positive assertions without the careful language of saying that those positive assertions are merely what you think is true, and that you rely on them without evidence to support them for your conclusion. Being that this is philosophy, and all you've brought forth was speculation I can understand you taking a strong stand on what you've carefully thought out, however I do still take issue with these strong claims as if they're reality. For me, all that does is create a negative view of how you come to conclusions and how you deal with those that you disagree with.

Taking lessons from Hack, are we? How about you demonstrate this to be the case rather than pronouncing my positions as not "carefully thought out"?

See what I mean? Clearly in my post I stated "[...]I can understand you taking a strong stand on what you've carefully thought out[...]" yet you claim I said the opposite of that. You made the conclusion that I said something else despite clear wording. You attacked something other than what I said. You stating strong positions as if they're facts, constantly misrepresenting what I'm saying and/or ignoring the questions I ask in this and other threads lead me to the conclusion that you're not willing to have an honest discussion with me.

Secondly, there is evidence done in scientific studies that show that the brain makes decisions before the people making the decisions are aware that they've made a choice. Now after reading up in the Libet experiments one could say that they're making the decision before they're aware of it, however this does little to show that people are making conscious decisions because their awareness of the decision occurs after the decision was made. Another point against the Libet evidence is that maybe people still make conscious decisions in other areas, however until we can test for this, it remains an unknown. So while I do agree that the Libet experiments and other scientific studies done on decision making aren't enough for me to accept them as truth, that is the way I'm leaning due to people attempting to disprove the studies without success. So right now the evidence is leaning towards the brain doing what it does and then making up the actual decision process as we become aware of the decision.

What makes you think I'm not aware of this research? That's rather presumptive on your part.

Point to where, in my post, that I made this assumption/presumption that shows that I didn't think that you had researched this?

The most this does is challenge (2) in my argument above.

I think this evidence relates to 1) as well because if rational thought is possible along with materialism, then the first premise can be discounted. However it does also relate to the second premise that if the Libet (and similar) evidence shows that we're not making decisions, it would definitely discount the second premise.

I've spent my time defending (1) precisely because atheists spend so much of their time talking about how important it is to be rational.

It's important for me to be rational whether that rationality is determined or something else, however I won't be speaking for other atheists just because I am an atheist, and it seems like a bad idea for you to be speaking for atheists because you're a theist. Whether determinism is true or not it doesn't matter to me, because I'll be the same no matter what reality is shown to be, because I am the way I am right now. So even if determinism is shown to be true, I'll still advocate for rationality, just as I would if it's shown to be false.

If you agree that rational thought is actually impossible, then we can have a different conversation.

I don't yet agree as I clearly stated in my post by saying "So while I do agree that the Libet experiments and other scientific studies done on decision making aren't enough for me to accept them as truth[.]" Discussions are much easier if you discuss what I say instead of something else while pretending to respond to me.

Now, if you would like to actually engage the argument, I'd be happy to have the discussion. I always am. This one is very simple. Without self-determination, "rational" is a meaningless word. In the deterministic world of materialism, self-determination is impossible, ergo, rational thought is impossible. The logical and necessary conclusion is that materialism is arational at best and irrational at worst. If it is arational, then so is belief in God and unicorns and evolution and gravity and everything else. There are no intellectually superior positions the moment we posit materialism. If rational thought is possible, then materialism is irrational and thus intellectually inferior to any kind of supernaturalism.

First we'd have to prove (doesn't require absolute certainty, just enough evidence to support it), that rational thought can't exist in a materialistic world. To just posit without evidence that it is impossible, is an intellectually inferior position, just as assuming supernaturalism without evidence is.

Unless, then, you can present me with a third choice, the dilemma for the materialist is this: is materialism on the one hand arational and perfectly on par with every other belief system or is it irrational and inferior to supernaturalism?

This is a clear false dichotomy (false dilemma, the "either or" fallacy): just because no one can yet bring another option doesn't mean that I must accept either of those positions. If determinism is false, it doesn't mean that I should accept supernaturalism, or vice versa.

[epepke]

1.   If rational thought is possible, materialism is false;

As with the other, it falls down rather quickly.

"Materialism" is one of those words, like "God," that is just a placeholder for goalpost-moving.  Nobody ever is able to pin down what it means or even tries; they just argue vehemently that it means thus-and-such.

In any event, there is a material device before me.  It can prove theorems and play a good game of chess, two things that most people associate with reason.  You could, of course, declare them as "not rational thought," simply because a computer can do them.  Many people do that.  Usually philosophers do so just as soon as a program to do something for the first time is written.  However, it reduces your entire argument to question-begging.  If rational thought is, by definition, something not material, then it can trivially be shown to contradict determinism.  Then the argument presents no new information and isn't an argument at all, just more words about the conclusion you have predefined.

[humblesmurph]

1.   If rational thought is possible, materialism is false;

As with the other, it falls down rather quickly.

"Materialism" is one of those words, like "God," that is just a placeholder for goalpost-moving.  Nobody ever is able to pin down what it means or even tries; they just argue vehemently that it means thus-and-such.

In any event, there is a material device before me.  It can prove theorems and play a good game of chess, two things that most people associate with reason.  You could, of course, declare them as "not rational thought," simply because a computer can do them.  Many people do that.  Usually philosophers do so just as soon as a program to do something for the first time is written.  However, it reduces your entire argument to question-begging.  If rational thought is, by definition, something not material, then it can trivially be shown to contradict determinism.  Then the argument presents no new information and isn't an argument at all, just more words about the conclusion you have predefined.

But what your computer does is %100 predetermined.  It does exactly what you tell it to do, until you tell it to do something different. Isn't software just instructions for a computer?  Rational choices made by living things are a different things from computations performed on computers. Right?

[Davin]

But what your computer does is %100 predetermined.  It does exactly what you tell it to do, until you tell it to do something different. Isn't software just instructions for a computer?  Rational choices made by living things are a different things from computations performed on computers. Right?

That depends on what you mean by "It does exactly what you tell it to do" because in programming, it doesn't only do what you program it to do... it can, but that's just for basic programs and new programmers.

Let's take a chess program for instance:
The programmer doesn't tell the computer what to do for every single move, they don't even tell it what to do for a single move other than it must make a move itself. The programmer gives the computer a set of rules to follow and the computer makes a choice based on those rules. For a chess program, the logic is a lot more complicated than just: if this, then do this. If the human player moves King pawn to King three, the programmer didn't program for that specific instance, nor the billions of other possible chess board configurations. The programmer gave the program the ability to make a choice based on what the program receives as input, not all the things the computer does was specifically programmed into it. If the programmer had to tell the program exactly what to do for every single situation... we wouldn't have 3D computer games yet because the amount of things that would have to be specifically programmed for would take way too much processing and storage and a program as simple as the first Asteroids game would've been too big to even fit on a 1TB hard drive just to fit the if else logic that would require.

Is a computer programmed to assess the inputs, determining what to do with those inputs and then giving the outputs of what the computer chose any different than human rational thought (assessing the situation, going off of what you know might be consequences of your choice and choosing what you think is the best solution)?

I guess ultimately it comes down to what the definition of "rational thought" is, because to me, it's the same thing that programs can do.

[humblesmurph]

But what your computer does is %100 predetermined.  It does exactly what you tell it to do, until you tell it to do something different. Isn't software just instructions for a computer?  Rational choices made by living things are a different things from computations performed on computers. Right?

That depends on what you mean by "It does exactly what you tell it to do" because in programming, it doesn't only do what you program it to do... it can, but that's just for basic programs and new programmers.

Let's take a chess program for instance:
The programmer doesn't tell the computer what to do for every single move, they don't even tell it what to do for a single move other than it must make a move itself. The programmer gives the computer a set of rules to follow and the computer makes a choice based on those rules. For a chess program, the logic is a lot more complicated than just: if this, then do this. If the human player moves King pawn to King three, the programmer didn't program for that specific instance, nor the billions of other possible chess board configurations. The programmer gave the program the ability to make a choice based on what the program receives as input, not all the things the computer does was specifically programmed into it. If the programmer had to tell the program exactly what to do for every single situation... we wouldn't have 3D computer games yet because the amount of things that would have to be specifically programmed for would take way too much processing and storage and a program as simple as the first Asteroids game would've been too big to even fit on a 1TB hard drive just to fit the if else logic that would require.

Is a computer programmed to assess the inputs, determining what to do with those inputs and then giving the outputs of what the computer chose any different than human rational thought (assessing the situation, going off of what you know might be consequences of your choice and choosing what you think is the best solution)?

I guess ultimately it comes down to what the definition of "rational thought" is, because to me, it's the same thing that programs can do.

Thanks for the info.  It makes me wonder why Jac3510 chose "rational thought" for this proof.  He'll explain soon enough I'm sure.   Anyway, I have another question:  

Would you call the choices being made by this complex chess program "free will"?

[Davin]

Thanks for the info.  It makes me wonder why Jac3510 chose "rational thought" for this proof.  He'll explain soon enough I'm sure.   Anyway, I have another question:  

Would you call the choices being made by this complex chess program "free will"?

Well that's another thing people can get all semantic about. The program makes it's choices autonomously, just as people make their choices autonomously, it wouldn't be very useful if the program had to have a man behind it making choices for it. So if you consider autonomous choices "free will" then yes. Now a program can also be programmed to perform actions directly by people. So while I think that a program can be programmed to make autonomous choices, not all programs make autonomous choices and quite often (in the case of the video game example) the program is both making choices and doing what it's told by a user.

So by my definition that a thing that makes autonomous choices has free will, then yes I would consider that a program can have free will. If you have a different definition, then let me know and I'll either try to explain how that matches or concede that a program can't yet do that.

[humblesmurph]

Thanks for the info.  It makes me wonder why Jac3510 chose "rational thought" for this proof.  He'll explain soon enough I'm sure.   Anyway, I have another question:  

Would you call the choices being made by this complex chess program "free will"?

Well that's another thing people can get all semantic about. The program makes it's choices autonomously, just as people make their choices autonomously, it wouldn't be very useful if the program had to have a man behind it making choices for it. So if you consider autonomous choices "free will" then yes. Now a program can also be programmed to perform actions directly by people. So while I think that a program can be programmed to make autonomous choices, not all programs make autonomous choices and quite often (in the case of the video game example) the program is both making choices and doing what it's told by a user.

So by my definition that a thing that makes autonomous choices has free will, then yes I would consider that a program can have free will. If you have a different definition, then let me know and I'll either try to explain how that matches or concede that a program can't yet do that.

Well this is a little disconcerting.  I do believe I'm quite sure that computers don't have free will.  However, I don't have a solid reason for believing so.  I'm sure I could go find one, but that doesn't change the fact that I presently am quite sure of a thing that I have no proof of.   Wait for it..........

    [spoiler:3e3t8fkt]Nope, still nothin[/spoiler:3e3t8fkt]

[Davin]

Well this is a little disconcerting.  I do believe I'm quite sure that computers don't have free will.  However, I don't have a solid reason for believing so.  I'm sure I could go find one, but that doesn't change the fact that I presently am quite sure of a thing that I have no proof of.   Wait for it..........

    [spoiler:zzb0k4v4]Nope, still nothin[/spoiler:zzb0k4v4]

Take your time, you don't have to accept any concept that you're not comfortable in accepting. It's probably because I didn't provide enough for you to accept it or you don't accept my definition of free will.

The other problem is how people define free will, I'm sure this example doesn't match a few of those definitions. However having done quiet a bit of programming from "machine learning" (a program that can learn how to do things based on input, being corrected, watching someone do something and some other methods) to completely sequenced programs (programs that do a specific set of instructions the same way every time), so I'm sure I can provide lots of different examples.

[epepke]

But what your computer does is %100 predetermined.  It does exactly what you tell it to do, until you tell it to do something different. Isn't software just instructions for a computer?  Rational choices made by living things are a different things from computations performed on computers. Right?

Davin's answer is pretty good, so I'll just add to it.  I'll reiterate that there's basic software development, and there's more sophisticated software development.

Entirely aside from the fact that there exist religious sects who think that everything in the universe is predetermined, things aren't that simple for computers.  It is entirely possible to incorporate a true, genuine source of nondeterminism that is made out of material, such as a bit of Americium from a smoke detector with some detectors.  So arguments about determinism fall flat.

Some programs can be very sophisticated indeed.  I once saw a paper describing some artificial life development on the CM-5.  Using a 3-D physics model, simplified body parts (parallelopipeds connected by muscles), and a very simple neurological model, the network of computers evolved various creatures.  They couldn't play chess, but they could do things like leap, swim, compete for a "food" source, and move toward a light.  Some very familiar forms evolved, such as serpents, fish with fins, and crab-like creatures with claws.  There were some unfamiliar forms too (shades of the Cambrian, perhaps).  One interesting thing about this was that it was possible to display the nervous systems of the creatures that evolved.  They worked, but they were hard for engineers to understand exactly how and why they worked.  I'm pretty smart, and I couldn't figure them out by looking at them.

ETA: Another interesting thing was that, using the original simple integration method, a creature evolved to leap by flopping around on the ground until it hit a point where it exploited the inaccuracy of the integration that sent it flying.  Note that there was no intent on the part of the programmer to make this happen; that's just how it evolved.  The programmer had to change the integration to a more sophisticated form (if memory serves, second-order Runge-Kutta) to prevent similar occurrences.

ETA2: I just remembered it was Karl Sims.

Now, I'm not asserting that computers can currently do everything a brain can do.  They obviously cannot, at least currently.  Nor do I have to show that they ever will, because I don't know; I cannot predict the future better than anybody else.  However, there is enough research that has been done to cast a vast amount of doubt on facile assumptions about what is not possible with matter.  Back in the days when matter was a rock or, at most, a gear, I suppose it was understandable to believe that they couldn't think.  At the present time, the more sophisticated of us understand that there is a great deal that we do not understand about what systems can and cannot do to the point that it is not justifiable blithely to assert that matter cannot do this or that.  It's only by using a cartoon of "the mind" or "the computer" that such assertions can be made to seem plausible, and only then when terms are left sufficiently undefined.

Speaking of undefined terms, I don't know what "free will" would mean if it meant anything about reality.  I know that people like to believe that they have free will, and they like to use it to provide certain justifications (such as punishment of criminals apart from any goal of rehabilitation), but so far, nobody has been able to tell me what it means.  I know what it means to be free from something or even, in Nietzschean terms, free for something, but I don't know what it means as a general term for something that is there or not there.  Neither do I know a test that will distinguish between something with free will and something without it.  When I try to think of definitions of the word "free," I come to the conclusion that an atom of Americium in the absence of extra neutrons is about as free as anything I can think of, and it's definitely material.  When I try to think of definitions of the word "will," I come up against Nietzsche, who ascribed will even to things like bacteria.  So I'm inclined not to find the concept particularly descriptive.

[Jac3510]

A guy takes two days off and has to come back and write a book . . . ) but what is reasonable must stand up to tests and scrutiny. There is a smart way to build a bridge, and there is a dumb way, because one won't keep it from collapsing. Thus there's a smart way to conduct science at observe the world around us.[/quote]
Let's not personify reality. Under materialism, it doesn't care about anything. If materialism is true, then our subjective interpretations are nothing more than a necessary effect of the laws of nature. They aren't really "interpretations" at all. They are exactly what you must "think" at this moment because this is what physics directs you to think at this moment. Thus, no interpretation is rational. It is arational. This is evident in your bridge example. Under materialism, there is no smart or dumb way to build a bridge. People build bridges the way the do because physics directed them to. It is meaningless to say that they "should have" built it another way. You may as well say to a rock that it "should not fall if unsuspended."

This scenario of yours would still require an objective universe, an objective reality. In which case some interpretations of it would still be more accurate than others. Not all interpretations are equal, regardless of whether you conform to option 1 or 2.

Again, under materialism, which is the point in discussion, the universe is objective, and this universe would determine all interpretations. No interpretation would be more or less accurate than any other, any more than a rocks falling or not falling is accurate or not. What goes on in your brain is just another physical effect; no more.

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Every single time I disagree with you, you claim I'm missing your point.  Every single time I try to restate your point in my own words you say I have it wrong.  Chris, respectfully, the mind body problem doesn't get solved with a proof, not in 2010.  The proof of God was a fun intellectual exercise.  I mean no disrespect, but this here is a real problem with a real solution.

This is my point. The brain is not the big bang.  Martin T K is a relative expert in this stuff (I presume) and he hasn't said peep.  Why?  Because he doesn't know.  Nobody does.  I don't know if your characterization of rational thought is correct.  I don't know if your characterization of the workings of the brain is correct.  All I know is that the brain has been studied inside and out and we haven't found anything supernatural yet. Logic doesn't change that.

Furthermore, you can't point to one unexplained thing and say a position is arational or less rational than Christianity.  Christianity is full of apparent contradictions that you get away with because we can't know the nature of God, or we don't know what the bible is really saying.  You and I both know that if there was to be proof of a physical solution to the mind body problem, you would just find a way to make it consistent with Christianity, just like you did with evolution.  This problem is not just a problem with human brains.  Animal brains work in much the same way.  What does trudacianism say of animals?

Don't get frustrated, Mike. I appreciate your concern over the Mind-Body problem. The reason I say you are missing the point is that, contrary to your initial statement, the mind-body problem has no effect on my argument. The reason is simple: the mind-body problem presumes that there is a mind that somehow has to interact with the body. It presumes the very thing I am arguing doesn't exist. Actually, I would argue that the mind-body problem is incredibly easy to solve on atheism, and I am telling you how to do it. It is a problem for theists, not atheists.

I am asking to address my argument. If you believe that there is no supernatural, then you must believe that everything is determined by the laws of nature since there is nothing that exists beyond those laws (if there were, that would be supernaturalism, which you reject). That means that there is nothing inside of you that can step outside of the laws of nature, which means that everything inside of you is also determined by the laws of nature, including your thoughts. If your thoughts are externally determined, there is no reason to call them rational, because the word "rational" implies prescription. I ought to think this or that. I ought not to think this or that. But the word ought is meaningless is a materialistic universe, because nothing is prescriptive. You can't say I "ought" to think this or that because I have no control over what I think. What I think is just directed by the laws of nature.

The only way to suggest that I ought to think something else is to accept that there is a part of me that exists supernaturally. Thus, if rational thought is possible, materialism is false.

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@Jac
Imagine that you see a bowling ball and a feather.  You think to yourself "If I pick up the bowling ball, it will feel heavier than the feather, because I've held a bowling ball and a feather at some point in my life, and the bowling ball weighed a fair amount while the feather was very light."  It's a rational thought, correct?  Now, I see at least three options for what could really be going on:
1. Something not made of matter is doing the thinking.
2. Thought is purely materialistic, and there is some sort of chemical illusion going on.  Reality is not as it seems.
3. Thought is purely materialistic, but there actually is a ball and a feather, and you actually have held them at some point in time, and so on.  

So is number three exceedingly unlikely?  Impossible?  If number 3 is reality, then does it mean that the "rational thought" you had was actually not rational?

Under materialism, the thought is not rational. Your second option is closer to correct than the other two. Take out the last sentence in that. There is no point in talking about how things "seem." Let's use your own analogy. Suppose I have the thought you suggest I do, but then you have the opposite - you think that the feather will appear heavier. If I tell you the thought is irrational, I am saying that you ought not think that. But if materialism is true, it is meaningless to say that you ought to or ought not to do anything. I may as well say to a rock that it ought not fall. That just doesn't have any meaning.

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stuff

Davin, I misread you on the comment about things being thought out. Your problem seems to be with the philosophical method as a whole, and if that is the case, I don't really know what we can say to each other. If you don't think we can come to a knowledge of truth by deductive reason (If A and B, then necessarily C), then our problem is much deeper than the evidence or lack there of.

As far as my argument goes, I'm not assuming (1). I am arguing it. You can disagree with it. If so, please demonstrate where you think it is wrong. Talking about this or that study without explicitly showing the connection requires me to infer what connection you had in mind. If you think rational thought is impossible, then just say so. If you think that rational thought is possible, but you think that rational thought can be possible in a materialistic world, then say so, and tell me where you think my reasoning with respect to (1) is wrong. I've argued in favor of it almost exclusively throughout this thread.

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As with the other, it falls down rather quickly.

"Materialism" is one of those words, like "God," that is just a placeholder for goalpost-moving.  Nobody ever is able to pin down what it means or even tries; they just argue vehemently that it means thus-and-such.

Actually, I defined it pretty clearly. Let me quote myself: "The central idea [of materialism] is that everything that exists is strictly natural and obeys the laws of nature." Given this stated definition (before the proof, no less), you can restate (1) as follows:

If rational thought is possible, then everything that exists is not strictly natural and does not necessarily obey the laws of nature

I do appreciate you responding to the actual argument. But since we have be "able to pin down what it means," then your first objection fails. Let's move on to the rest of your post.

In any event, there is a material device before me.  It can prove theorems and play a good game of chess, two things that most people associate with reason.  You could, of course, declare them as "not rational thought," simply because a computer can do them.  Many people do that.  Usually philosophers do so just as soon as a program to do something for the first time is written.  However, it reduces your entire argument to question-begging.  If rational thought is, by definition, something not material, then it can trivially be shown to contradict determinism.  Then the argument presents no new information and isn't an argument at all, just more words about the conclusion you have predefined.

A chess program isn't rational. We can demonstrate that in two ways:

1. From a programming perspective, the way the computer "decides" which move is best to make is to consider all the possible sequence of moves it can make (usually within a given time limitation). It then calculates the "value" of each position, and, depending on the user settings chosen, "moves" based on which value is appropriate. There is no "decision" being made. If there is no randomizing component (which any programmer will tell you is in the strictest sense not random), then you can predict exactly what the computer will do in response to your move--not because it is the rational thing to do, but because it is forced to make a particular move with reference to your particular position and its predefined value system.

2. Given the above, if the computer makes a "bad" move, you can't logically say it "ought" to have done this or that instead. The computer doesn't have the option to "make that choice." Given the same circumstances, the computer will make that same move an infinite number of times. In a very real way, playing chess with a computer isn't at all like playing with a person. It is more like reading a "choose your own ending" book--with just a lot more endings and a lot more starting points.

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As far as HS and Davin's conversation about free will, the basic thing that makes a will free is what I have already point to: self-determination. Computers don't do anything on their own. They do exactly what they are told to do. No matter how complicated the instructions, they always boil down to an "If . . . then."

If you read the addendum to the first post, you'll see where I make this explicit. I said:

As a quick addendum, it's worth noting that this entire argument is built on the idea that rationality must be self-determined to be rational in the first place. This is because if I am forced to make a decision by nature, it isn't really a rational decision. It is just a description of what I had to do by nature. This idea though, can be extended a bit more generally to say that if materialism is true, then nothing is self-determined (because everything is determined by the laws of nature); but our thoughts, if not our actions, are self-determined, and therefore, materialism is false.

For me, self-determination is the key. If I don't have a say in what I say, think, or do, then my words, thoughts, and actions aren't rational. They aren't irrational. They are arational. The entire argument could be rephrased this way:

1. If self-determination is possible on any issue, then materialism is false;
2. Self determination is possible on some issues
3. Therefore, materialism is false.

We can look at this same reduction in another way:

1. If normative statements are meaningful, then materialism is false
2. Normative statements are meaningful
3. Therefore, materialism is false.

Normative statements are "ought" statements. They are prescriptive. If everything is descriptive, as materialism would have it, then nothing is prescriptive. But normative statements do seem to be meaningful. People really ought to do and believe certain things, and they really ought not do or believe other things. That requires them to have a level of self-determination. We're getting a bit Kantian here, but on this one point, he was exactly correct. If everything I think and do is completely externally determined, then it makes no sense to say I "ought" to do anything. There must be, then, a part of me that is not externally determined, which means there is a part of me that is not subject to the laws of nature, which is to say, there is something supernatural.

edit: Rephrased my post to Davin to be more direct - it came across to snarky and obscured the main point I was trying to make.

[humblesmurph]

Jac3510,

Nice book  First, the mind body thing. The brain is part of the body.  I know how the brain connects to the rest of the body, more or less.  What I don't know is how the brain connects to free will, rational thought, and personal identity. I deduce that the brain is producing these things because all evidence of these things cease when the brain dies.  However, I can't give a physical account of how free will, rational thought, and personal identity come to be.  This lack of a physical account is what I call the mind body problem.   Sorry to confuse terms.  I never thought of how some spirit or soul connects to a body, never had any reason to think that spirits or souls existed.  

As for the proof.  The same problem remains for me.  If materialism entails no rational thought, then why does it appear that we are able to think rationally?  On the flip side, if rational thought entails non materialism, why does it appear that rational thought is created by material?  To me, it's an unsolved conundrum.  I know you have already answered this, but your answer was unsatisfactory for me.  Regardless, I am not a physicalist, I am an atheist.

Your characterization of atheism is just untrue.  Look it up in the dictionary.  There won't be a single mention of a physicalist, naturalist, materialist, existentialist, or humanist account of anything.  Atheism is the lack of belief in gods.  It is not a positive claim in any sense.  You can't disprove non-belief.  If evidence is provided, I will change my mind.  There is absolutely nothing that could happen to change yours.  Respectfully, that is not rational.

[Reginus]

@Jac
Imagine that you see a bowling ball and a feather.  You think to yourself "If I pick up the bowling ball, it will feel heavier than the feather, because I've held a bowling ball and a feather at some point in my life, and the bowling ball weighed a fair amount while the feather was very light."  It's a rational thought, correct?  Now, I see at least three options for what could really be going on:
1. Something not made of matter is doing the thinking.
2. Thought is purely materialistic, and there is some sort of chemical illusion going on.  Reality is not as it seems.
3. Thought is purely materialistic, but there actually is a ball and a feather, and you actually have held them at some point in time, and so on.  

So is number three exceedingly unlikely?  Impossible?  If number 3 is reality, then does it mean that the "rational thought" you had was actually not rational?

Under materialism, the thought is not rational.  Your second option is closer to correct than the other two. Take out the last sentence in that. There is no point in talking about how things "seem." Let's use your own analogy. Suppose I have the thought you suggest I do, but then you have the opposite - you think that the feather will appear heavier. If I tell you the thought is irrational, I am saying that you ought not think that. But if materialism is true, it is meaningless to say that you ought to or ought not to do anything. I may as well say to a rock that it ought not fall. That just doesn't have any meaning.

But we already defined "rational" as "based on reason."  I don't see how is the statement "If I pick up the bowling ball, it will feel heavier than the feather, because I've held a bowling ball and a feather at some point in my life, and the bowling ball weighed a fair amount while the feather was very light" suddenly becomes devoid of reason if thought is purely materialistic.

Edit: However your argument "from oughts" is interesting and I'll have to think about it.

[Jac3510]

Nice book

As far as my characterization of atheism, I've already said that not all forms of atheism are built of materialism. Most versions of atheism, however--most views that keep people from professing belief in God--are rooted in naturalism, and often even more specifically in verificationism. I'm sure you agree that most atheists also deny the existence of souls, angels, and demons for precisely the same reason that they deny the existence of God (and yes, I know you don't technically "deny God's existence," you just "lack belief." Whatever. I'm using "plain English" here). Evidence for belief in the supernatural is what is at stake here. So you have two logical choices:

1. There is no supernatural and no such thing as logic;
2. There is the supernatural and such a thing as logic.

You can't maintain that there is logic and no supernatural without there being a self-contradiction (because then you are asserting that which is externally determined is also self-determined).

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But we already defined "rational" as "based on reason."  I don't see how is the statement "If I pick up the bowling ball, it will feel heavier than the feather, because I've held a bowling ball and a feather at some point in my life, and the bowling ball weighed a fair amount while the feather was very light" suddenly becomes devoid of reason if thought is purely materialistic.

And we defined "reason" as "the intellectual faculty by which knowledge is gained." I've already tried to show why this definition of reason requires self-determination. I said, in my first reply to you:

With reference to the definition, reason is that which allows us to gain knowledge, and it in that the knowledge requirement that we see the need for deliberation. Epistemologists have long debated the exact definition of the "knowledge," but most everyone agrees that in order for something to be classified as knowledge, we have to have good reasons for believing it (so the old definition, "a justified, true believe," Gettier's problem acknowledged). This justification implies deliberation. Having reasons (which is different from the general faculty of reason) that can be good or bad implies that some beliefs are rational and some are not based on what we accept and the thought process we employ. Thus, for one person, a fact can be knowledge and for another that same fact may not. For example, I may be holding an ace of spades in my hand and ask you to guess my card. You may say "Ace of Spades," but if it is a pure guess, then while I have knowledge of my card, it seems evident that what you have is not knowledge.

Now, if a person's thought process is necessarily determined by the physics in his brain, then there is no such thing as a "good" or "bad reason" for anything. You don't really believe anything because of this or that; you "believe" it because its just the way the physics works. In still different terms, to be rational is a normative statement; we ought to believe this or that, whereas if our believes are determined, they are not normative, but purely descriptive; we do believe this or that.

The bolded part is particularly important. That is why I said to you in my last reply,

"Under materialism, the thought [that bowling ball will feel heavier than the feather, because I've held a bowling ball and a feather at some point in my life] is not rational." Under materialism, there this statement is not consistent with reason because reason, reasons, and knowledge, do not exist. All that exists is the descriptive "this is what is happening." Description isn't rationality. We require prescription for that.