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See http://www.du-preez.com/dualism (http://www.du-preez.com/dualism).

Read carefully.
Any thoughts?

EDIT 2011:
Two years later... here it is, clarified and expanded. Not an objective proof, but a subjective line of thinking by which you could (if you wanted to) refute physicalism to yourself.
I've posted the revised article in four brief parts. You can access them by starting here (http://www.museful.net/2011/philosophy/ineffability-of-qualia) and following the link to the next post at the end of each post, or jump straight to the argument (http://www.museful.net/2011/philosophy/refuting-physicalism-subjectively).

:spam2:  

Quote from: "tennenrishin"See http://www.du-preez.com/dualism.

Read carefully.
Any thoughts?

My thought is....why are you spamming the forum?  If you want to post something use your own words.

ps, your thought experiment doesn't logically follow to its conclusion, if you bother returning I'll explain why.

Quote from: "Whitney"your thought experiment doesn't logically follow to its conclusion, if you bother returning I'll explain why.

I've returned  

I choose to believe that I exist in both boxes simultaneously. Prove me wrong.

Quote from: "tennenrishin"

Quote from: "Whitney"your thought experiment doesn't logically follow to its conclusion, if you bother returning I'll explain why.

I've returned  

Just because it might be impossible to tell two people apart due to them being completely genetically similar (in reality this would never be an issue since differences in life experiences shape personality) it doesn't follow that souls exist. It simply would mean that the only physical beings that can tell the twins apart are the twins themselves...reality being what it is doesn't require that everyone everywhere have all knowledge.

So not only does the argument not follow logically to the conclusion that "physicalism" (btw, nice made up word...I think you were looking for materialism or naturalistic worldvew) fails but even if that part of your argument held up it wouldn't logically lead to the conclusion that souls exist.

QuoteAs far as the physical universe is concerned, the two cases are indistinguishable. Yet in the first person you are able to distinguish between the two cases (because you either see red or blue). So you have access to information that is not in the physical universe.

(https://www.happyatheistforum.com/forum/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Flolblog.co.uk%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2008%2F06%2Fpicard-no-facepalm.jpg&hash=de8ea6e9954d636fa7953d2f0bebe31f051ae980)

Quote from: "Ihateyoumike"I choose to believe that I exist in both boxes simultaneously. Prove me wrong.

I cannot prove you wrong. One of the assumptions of this thought-experiment (or mind game   ) is the reader's sentience. It requires you to imagine it in the first person. (Contrary to the thread's title, It isn't proof, it is a way in which you can prove to yourself.)
Suppose you are locked into a red room. In another blue room, some matter is arranged into a physical copy of your body. All this time, you remain locked up in the red room. What color room do you find yourself in?

Quote from: "Whitney"

Quote from: "tennenrishin"

Quote from: "Whitney"your thought experiment doesn't logically follow to its conclusion, if you bother returning I'll explain why.

I've returned  

It simply would mean that the only physical beings that can tell the twins apart are the twins themselves...reality being what it is doesn't require that everyone everywhere have all knowledge.

True. So some third person will not be able to tell the difference. What the argument claims, however when it says "physically indistinguishable" is that an omniscient observer of the physical universe cannot tell the two cases apart. An omniscient observer can see everything there is to see about the physical universe. No-one (not even the twins) can have more knowledge than this observer in their physical brains, because this observer can even see everything inside their physical brains. So in this formulation, the point that the argument makes is: "How is it that the you (and your twin) can distinguish between the cases but someone who knows everything about both of your brains can't."

Quote from: "Whitney""physicalism" (btw, nice made up word...I think you were looking for materialism or naturalistic worldvew) fails but even if that part of your argument held up it wouldn't logically lead to the conclusion that souls exist.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism)

This may just be me, but the argument makes no sense.

The two cases, look the same from the point from the perspective of the universe, but from the universe's point of view (Or any third party) the situation is just two people in two boxes, the two states are really the same. Another way one could look at it is, you may think you are in the red room, and your copy is in the blue, while the other, thinks they are in the blue room, and their copy resides in the red room, these states occur mutually, so again, really just one situation viewed from two perspectives.

The information that you say is outside the physical universe, is really inside the universe, ie "The room around me is red, I am in a red room". The room, being red, is in the universe, that is the only information that is gained here.

I read through this thread and the link hoping I missed something important. We have identical twins that can't distinguish between red and blue? I suppose they might be color blind but that would make it a lame thought experiment. And regardless, how are the two cases indistinguishable? The twins are simply in two different rooms, regardless of whether they can distinguish the color.

Quote from: "SSY"The two cases, look the same from the point from the perspective of the universe, but from the universe's point of view (Or any third party) the situation is just two people in two boxes, the two states are really the same.

Exactly the point. Why is it that you can distinguish between the cases if there is no difference in the state of the entire physical universe? You should think in the first person because the argument relies on invoking your sentience.

Quote from: "tennenrishin"

Quote from: "SSY"The two cases, look the same from the point from the perspective of the universe, but from the universe's point of view (Or any third party) the situation is just two people in two boxes, the two states are really the same.

Exactly the point. Why is it that you can distinguish between the cases if there is no difference in the state of the entire physical universe? You should think in the first person because the argument relies on invoking your sentience.

I fear SSY missed the fact that there wasn't actually a problem in the first place. I make that mistake all the time as an engineer.

I say again, there are simply two twins in different rooms and as far as I can tell there is no existential crisis. The rooms being red and blue is irrelevant.

Why does this thread still exist. Good lord.

Quote from: "AlP"I read through this thread and the link hoping I missed something important. We have identical twins that can't distinguish between red and blue?

No.

Quote from: "AlP"I suppose they might be color blind but that would make it a lame thought experiment.

They are not color blind, but possibly the thought experiment is lame Lameness doesn't mean it's invalid.

Quote from: "AlP"And regardless, how are the two cases indistinguishable?

Because from an omniscient perspective, the two cases look exactly the same.

Quote from: "AlP"I say again, there are simply two twins in different rooms and as far as I can tell there is no existential crisis. The rooms being red and blue is irrelevant.

If you are interested, begin at the top, go through the argument until you get to the first point with which you disagree or don't understand, then I'll respond to your objections.

Why is this even summoning a debate? It's a total non-issue.

There's a fallacious jump in logic on the OPs part, one which makes zero sense. The part which I quoted above (prior to massive facepalm);

QuoteAs far as the physical universe is concerned, the two cases are indistinguishable. Yet in the first person you are able to distinguish between the two cases (because you either see red or blue). So you have access to information that is not in the physical universe.

This is simple false reasoning. Yes, from an outside observer the two look identical. From first person you can distinguish (although, I ask, why can't an outside observer see the red/blue anyway?), but this is irrelevant. I don't see where the "not part of the physical universe" is coming from. The individual perceives the difference in color and so can tell...and? It's almost like the OP is implying that perception isn't part of physical reality, which seems to imply that you're presupposing dualism for the sake of proving dualism exists.

Quote from: "Vire70"Why is this even summoning a debate? It's a total non-issue.

There's a fallacious jump in logic on the OPs part, one which makes zero sense. The part which I quoted above (prior to massive facepalm);

QuoteAs far as the physical universe is concerned, the two cases are indistinguishable. Yet in the first person you are able to distinguish between the two cases (because you either see red or blue). So you have access to information that is not in the physical universe.

This is simple false reasoning. Yes, from an outside observer the two look identical. From first person you can distinguish (although, I ask, why can't an outside observer see the red/blue anyway?), but this is irrelevant. I don't see where the "not part of the physical universe" is coming from. The individual perceives the difference in color and so can tell...and? It's almost like the OP is implying that perception isn't part of physical reality, which seems to imply that you're presupposing dualism for the sake of proving dualism exists.

I can't really make out what your objection to the argument is.

Too many responses in too many forums. I'll be back in a month or so with an automated interactive argument.

One last thing before I disappear:

If you are a sincere truth-seeker (i.e. if you do not regard your atheism as a religion), it would do no harm to take a long, careful and honest look at the argument.

Here is the link again:
http://www.du-preez.com/dualism (http://www.du-preez.com/dualism)

Where's the part where this implies souls exist?

Quote from: "tennenrishin"

Quote from: "AlP"And regardless, how are the two cases indistinguishable?

Because from an omniscient perspective, the two cases look exactly the same.

No, from an Omniscient perspective, there is only one situation.

Besides thinking in the first person yields nothing, "I am in a blue room" or "I am in a red room", that is all, it does not imply anything else.

Quote from: "tennenrishin"

Quote from: "Vire70"Why is this even summoning a debate? It's a total non-issue.

There's a fallacious jump in logic on the OPs part, one which makes zero sense. The part which I quoted above (prior to massive facepalm);

QuoteAs far as the physical universe is concerned, the two cases are indistinguishable. Yet in the first person you are able to distinguish between the two cases (because you either see red or blue). So you have access to information that is not in the physical universe.

This is simple false reasoning. Yes, from an outside observer the two look identical. From first person you can distinguish (although, I ask, why can't an outside observer see the red/blue anyway?), but this is irrelevant. I don't see where the "not part of the physical universe" is coming from. The individual perceives the difference in color and so can tell...and? It's almost like the OP is implying that perception isn't part of physical reality, which seems to imply that you're presupposing dualism for the sake of proving dualism exists.

I can't really make out what your objection to the argument is.

I'm just saying that I don't think you're at all justified in claiming anything "outside the physical universe" is happening. You said "So you have access to information that is not in the physical universe."

This statement appears to be completely unsupported by the prior argument as far as I can see.

The only way this works, as I said, is if you were to somehow presuppose that dualism is real and that perception is 'outside the physical universe'. But that is as circular as "God exists because the bible says so, and the bible is true because God says so."

You seem to be saying "Dualism is real because perception of something is part of the mind, which is 'outside the physical universe" The problem is, you're trying to use Dualism to prove that Dualism is true. If we simply dismiss dualism then the whole argument falls apart.

Quote from: "tennenrishin"Too many responses in too many forums. I'll be back in a month or so with an automated interactive argument.

??? so you will return to spam the forum with a bad argument?

Quote from: "tennenrishin"(i.e. if you do not regard your atheism as a religion),

First no Atheist considers Atheism a religion. The only people who do are people who don't know what religion or Atheism are.

Second you argument makes little sense and needs a great deal of clarification.

Third DON'T make an automated anything. If you have questions or commets then YOU should make them.

i may have way over-thought the whole thing but what i'm getting is that the omniscient being can't tell what the individual is thinking as it is not physical?

which is false. thoughts are electrical signals, which are physical things (just a change in charge from negative to positive). supposing the 3rd party is omniscient, we'd assume they can see the physical change in charge (electrical signal) in the brain and be able to interpret the information lying therein. you have no soul. stop crying, start thinking. this whole problem stems from christians confusing the physical existence of thought, with a soul.

Quote from: "tennenrishin""How is it that the you (and your twin) can distinguish between the cases but someone who knows everything about both of your brains can't."

Simple...if there were such a thing as an omniscient being then it could distinguish between the two...otherwise it wouldn't be omniscient.

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/omniscient (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/omniscient)

That was about as enlightening as a Pat Robertson natural disaster theory.

Two years later... here it is, clarified and expanded. Not an objective proof, but a subjective line of thinking by which you could (if you wanted to) refute physicalism to yourself.

I've posted it in four brief parts. You can access them by starting here
http://www.museful.net/2011/philosophy/ineffability-of-qualia (http://www.museful.net/2011/philosophy/ineffability-of-qualia)
and following the link to the next post at the end of each post.

A subjective refutation, eh? That's amusing, but also a waste of 20 minutes (I gave it more than it deserved) that I'll never get back. I can start from any premises that I choose to adopt and "refute" anything subjectively. Then I might go around and inflict my pretentious omphaloskepsis (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/omphaloskepsis) on others, but that would have no bearing on reality.

Quote from: Recusant on December 27, 2011, 08:24:40 PM
A subjective refutation, eh? That's amusing, but also a waste of 20 minutes (I gave it more than it deserved) that I'll never get back. I can start from any premises that I choose to adopt and "refute" anything subjectively. Then I might go around and inflict my pretentious omphaloskepsis (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/omphaloskepsis) on others, but that would have no bearing on reality.

The second half of the third (http://www.museful.net/2011/philosophy/the-dualists-dilemma) part pertains exactly to this type of dismissal.

tennenrishin

how about this...you are no longer allowed to post links to your blog or whatever it is.

Either post here productively or don't post at all.

Frankly, if you don't have an objective proof then you have no business posting anyway because we don't allow preaching.

I've seen similar 'experiments' before. They're interesting, uncanny novelties but I remain unconvinced. Correct me if I'm wrong in this description of the paradox: I am randomly assigned to either the red or the blue room. Since I can only be in one room or the other - I cannot be two people having two different experiences at the same time - there must be two possible situations. Yet there are not, for both are exactly the same to the outsider.

It's about an apparent contradiction between subjective and objective truth. Subjectively, there are three different situations: yours, your doppelgänger's and the outsider's. Objectively there is only one. I would only say that these are different kinds of truth, operating on different planes and meaning different things. This game is simply a clever illustration of that difference: for any one objective scenario, there are as many subjective scenarios as there are people involved. You only perceive a contradiction because you have confused the two, or blurred them together, assuming that there must be one type of truth that incorporates all others.

And even if we were to humour that, say that they do clash, you still have the option of denying one or the other.

Either individual, subjective experience (including qualia) is actually an objective reality - what you might call a soul, which is what you've been getting at.

or

Objective truth does not exist. There is no "from the universe's point of view", so to speak, and all truth is bound within limited, subjective experience. To take the outsider's perspective as the marker for 'objectivity' is as meaningless as taking yours or your doppelgänger's. Two people can think two contradictory things and neither need necessarily be wrong, as there is no "one reality" beyond the two which they separately perceive.

Quote from: Whitney on December 29, 2011, 01:02:13 AMFrankly, if you don't have an objective proof then you have no business posting anyway because we don't allow preaching.

Lol!
But on a serious note, what is wrong with subjective proof when the subject is subjectivity?

Quote from: tennenrishin on December 29, 2011, 11:16:36 PM

Quote from: Whitney on December 29, 2011, 01:02:13 AMFrankly, if you don't have an objective proof then you have no business posting anyway because we don't allow preaching.

Lol!
But on a serious note, what is wrong with subjective proof when the subject is subjectivity?

Some where, a fuse has been blown...a breaker been extended past it's amperage.  This is where we shall find you I am sure. 

Quote from: Melmoth on December 29, 2011, 05:18:57 AMI've seen similar 'experiments' before. They're interesting, uncanny novelties but I remain unconvinced.

Correct me if I'm wrong in this description of the paradox: I am randomly assigned to either the red or the blue room. Since I can only be in one room or the other - I cannot be two people having two different experiences at the same time - there must be two possible situations. Yet there are not, for both are exactly the same to the outsider.

Yes! In fact, I think your formulation is much more reader-friendly than mine. I would change the last bit though:
I am randomly assigned to either the red or the blue room. Since I can only be in one room or the other - I cannot be two people having two different experiences at the same time - there must be two possible situations. Yet, according to physicalism, there are not, for both are physically the same.

Quote from: Melmoth on December 29, 2011, 05:18:57 AM
It's about an apparent contradiction between subjective and objective truth. Subjectively, there are three different situations: yours, your doppelgänger's and the outsider's. Objectively there is only one. I would only say that these are different kinds of truth, operating on different planes and meaning different things. This game is simply a clever illustration of that difference: for any one objective scenario, there are as many subjective scenarios as there are people involved. You only perceive a contradiction because you have confused the two, or blurred them together, assuming that there must be one type of truth that incorporates all others.

I can't say that I understood everything, but I agree at the least with the blue parts, and find the rest interesting.

Quote from: Melmoth on December 29, 2011, 05:18:57 AM
... you still have the option of denying one or the other.

Either individual, subjective experience (including qualia) is actually an objective reality - what you might call a soul, which is what you've been getting at.

or

Objective truth does not exist. There is no "from the universe's point of view", so to speak, and all truth is bound within limited, subjective experience. To take the outsider's perspective as the marker for 'objectivity' is as meaningless as taking yours or your doppelgänger's. Two people can think two contradictory things and neither need necessarily be wrong, as there is no "one reality" beyond the two which they separately perceive.

If I was a physicalist, I would be flabbergasted to be presented with only these two options. The second option just seems insanely crazy, and the first option has ... ew... souls.

To the physicalist, there is one situation.
To the dualist, there are two situations.
To me, there are two situations.
Who should I (personally) believe, the physicalist or the dualist?

Quote from: tennenrishin

Quote from: MelmothI've seen similar 'experiments' before. They're interesting, uncanny novelties but I remain unconvinced.

Correct me if I'm wrong in this description of the paradox: I am randomly assigned to either the red or the blue room. Since I can only be in one room or the other - I cannot be two people having two different experiences at the same time - there must be two possible situations. Yet there are not, for both are exactly the same to the outsider.

Yes! In fact, I think your formulation is much more reader-friendly than mine. I would change the last bit though:
I am randomly assigned to either the red or the blue room. Since I can only be in one room or the other - I cannot be two people having two different experiences at the same time - there must be two possible situations. Yet, according to physicalism, there are not, for both are physically the same.

If you mean that both situations are physically identical, then yes. There are two identical clones with two identical 'selves' each perceiving different things. And you can apply the same principle to any situation, including this one. There is only one objective situation here - two people are having a dialogue over the internet - while there are two subjective ones - yours and mine. I am in my blue room (for it really is a blue room!) perceiving you as nothing but words on a screen, while for you it's the opposite. And wouldn't it be eerie if your room was decourated in redder colours... but again, all this illustrates is the difference between objectivity and subjectivity. This does not a soul make. That idea depends on a confusion between the objective and the subjective.

You propose to take subjective experience as objective reality. According to you, there literally are two situations, only the 'soul' is in a different place from one to the other.

I'll have to humour that for a moment so I can illustrate some of the problems I have with it. There are two identical people in their respective boxes - identical down to every atom. The only difference is that one is experiencing red while the other is experiencing blue. Therefore, according to you, it's that unique subjective experience that contains the essence of a person's 'soul'. So then, what happens when both of the rooms are blue? Then not only are the two clones identical physically, but also in experience. Would that mean the two of them share a single soul? If I were to walk into one of the rooms and prod the person inside, thus making their experiences different, would I be splitting their soul in half?

Let's take another hypothetical. Imagine you are looking at a marble bust of Beethoven. You suppose that it exists as one thing, an objective reality: it is a bust. Yet, with your limited senses, it is impossible to take in every part of it at once. You can only think of it as a whole conceptually, and are forced to build this conceptual model out of many different, limited perspectives. You start by looking at it from every angle, from a distance, then you move in to examine the finer details of the hair, the eyes the nose; you try it at different light levels, touch it everywhere and in every way, even smelling it. You could go on forever, building a finer and finer conceptual model of the objective whole. Now, according to you, a different subjective experience makes a different objective situation. So either there is an infinite number of busts, or you have an infinite number of souls.

I have to say that this is the first time I feel a physicalist has understood my whole argument. This makes me truly curious about your objection.
I have used your formulation (http://www.museful.net/2011/philosophy/refuting-physicalism-subjectively) (trusting you don't mind) and revised my original argument (http://www.museful.net/2011/philosophy/refuting-physicalism-again), to try clear up one or two things.

Quote from: Melmoth
If you mean that both situations are physically identical, then yes. There are two identical clones with two identical 'selves' each perceiving different things. And you can apply the same principle to any situation, including this one. There is only one objective situation here - two people are having a dialogue over the internet - while there are two subjective ones - yours and mine. I am in my blue room (for it really is a blue room!) perceiving you as nothing but words on a screen, while for you it's the opposite. And wouldn't it be eerie if your room was decourated in redder colours... but again, all this illustrates is the difference between objectivity and subjectivity. This does not a soul make. That idea depends on a confusion between the objective and the subjective.

yes, yes, LOL!, yes... but you lose me in the last three sentences.

My claim is that I (the subject) have access to one bit of information (which room I am in) that does not exist in the physical universe. Perhaps what you are saying is that this information is meaningless to the physicalist, because of the symmetry - there are identical sentient humans in both rooms, swapping them is meaningless in the same way that swapping identical atoms is meaningless. So the physicalist's world view is self-consistent, and this argument is not actually an attack on physicalism. Yes, but...

What if the physicalist himself becomes a subject in the experiment. It is then that the contradiction in his world-view becomes evident. That bit of extra-physical information (red/blue or 0/1) now carries meaning (and we could make it even more meaningful by, say, filling the red room with bees - but the logic remains the same.) Whichever other "kinds of truth" there may be, it is his truth that matters to him. So how can he (from his own perspective, if you wish) agree with physicalism?

Quote from: MelmothYou propose to take subjective experience as objective reality.

Perhaps what I am proposing is that physicalism is not consistent with subjective reality, but I'm not sure I understand what I just said. This is what I mean:

Suppose, we blindfold the physicalists before putting them into the rooms. Then we ask one of them how many different possible scenarios there are? If he says "two", he has contradicted physicalism. If he says "one", we ask him what color his room is.

Quote from: MelmothTherefore, according to you, it's that unique subjective experience that contains the essence of a person's 'soul'

Rather, my speculation is that the soul bestows a unique subjective perspective on the person. In my view, the soul is not made up of the person's experience. Rather, it is (or perhaps contains as an aspect) the person's subjective perspective/sentience. I think of the soul as a port into which qualia (or conscious experiences) are admitted.

Quote from: MelmothSo then, what happens when both of the rooms are blue?

You have two distinct souls admitting the same quale (having the same experiences). (That is, if we assume that the mapping from physical signals to qualia is the same in both minds (http://www.museful.net/2011/philosophy/ineffability-of-qualia), but let's just say that it is.)

Quote from: Melmotha different subjective experience makes a different objective situation. So either there is an infinite number of busts, or you have an infinite number of souls.

...or one soul ('port') admitting different successive experiences.

Of course, my last three paragraphs are just speculation in response to your humouring.

My mom is an identical twin, and when she and her sister were kids, they were nearly impossible to tell apart.  My mom told me that more than one person has asked them "How do you tell yourselves apart?  How do you know which one is you and which one is her?"

It was stupid then, and it's stupid now.

As someone else mentioned, thoughts are physical manifestations.  They don't happen outside of the body, or separate from it.  It doesn't matter if an outside observer can actually see the person in the red room thinking "Wow, this is a very red room." or the person in the blue room thinking "Wow, this is a very blue room."  They are still two distinct people with distinct thoughts, and thoughts are physical.  No "soul" is needed.

^ You see what I mean?

Quote from: tennenrishin on January 03, 2012, 07:03:29 PM

Of course, my last three paragraphs are just speculation in response to your humouring.

All of your comments on the soul are speculation, you have no measurable evidence to back up your ideas. No way to know if you are wrong or right.
It is extremely easy to be wrong, an infinite wrong ideas are abound, but there is only one right idea. If you can't validate ideas then using the odds as a guide you would be wise to assume that your idea is wrong.

Quote from: tennenrishin on January 03, 2012, 08:57:00 PM
^ You see what I mean?

I don't. I think that you're trying to prove that since there is no observable physical evidence of a difference between Person Red and Person Blue, the fact that they each have a unique experience proves that they must have something non-physical banging around in there that is having separate experiences.  My point is, no, I don't care how similar they are, so as they they are both capable of thought, they are both capable of having separate experiences, and no "something extra" is needed because thoughts and experiences have a physical basis in the brain.  You may not be able to see me thinking, but I am. With my brain.

What point did I miss?

Quote from: Ali
What point did I miss?

Basically the whole thing, man...
But if you're genuinely interested in understanding the argument, the clearest formulations I can provide at this time are this one (http://www.museful.net/2011/philosophy/refuting-physicalism-subjectively) and this one (http://www.museful.net/2011/philosophy/refuting-physicalism-again). Pick whichever sits better with you. They are quite brief, so pay attention to exactly what is being said.

Quote from: tennenrishin on January 03, 2012, 11:17:07 PM

Quote from: Ali
What point did I miss?

Basically the whole thing, man...
But if you're genuinely interested in understanding the argument, the clearest formulations I can provide at this time are this one (http://www.museful.net/2011/philosophy/refuting-physicalism-subjectively) and this one (http://www.museful.net/2011/philosophy/refuting-physicalism-again). Pick whichever sits better with you. They are quite brief, so pay attention to exactly what is being said.

Yes.  I read it. 

QuoteIn the universe, there is a red room and a blue room. I am randomly assigned to either the red room or the blue room, and a copy* of my body is placed in the other room.

* I call it "a copy" for brevity, but strictly speaking it is "a twin with a brain pre-encoded to the state that mine would have been in, had I been placed in that room."

Okay, so far we have two people - me and my "twin."  My twin is in one room, I am in the other.  Got it.

Quote
Since I can only be in one room or the other – I cannot be two people having two different experiences at the same time – there must be two possible scenarios.

Yep.  2 scenarios.  I am either in the red room and my twin is in the blue, or I am in the blue room and my twin is in the red.  Got it.

QuoteYet, according to physicalism, there are not, for both scenarios** are physically the same.

I think this is where you are losing me.  How are both scenarios physically the same?  If my "twin" and I each have an independent, functioning brain, why would we NOT each have a different physical experience?  Just because we are genetically the same (even if we are genetically the same in every single way) we are still two separate people.  If I'm in the blue room, I'm in the blue room and I will experience blue, while my twin will experience red.  So what?

Again, I am making the leap and assuming that you are arguing that the reason I am me whether I am in the blue box or the red box is that I have a soul that is always me.  If that's not your point, then I don't know what your point is.  Please elaborate.

If that IS your point, my respomse is that you don't need a soul to explain this, because consciousness and identity live within the brain.  As long as my twin and I have two diferrent brains, we are going to have the capability to experience two different things, or even the exact same thing (if we're both in blue rooms) and still be ourselves, because "ourselves" lives within the brain.  I will still be able to recognize myself as me, even if every single thing about me is replicated including experience, because my brain recognizes the differeence between the self and the other.

In other words, even if my mom and my aunt Pam were identical down to their very molecules, it's still not weird or mind blowing that my Aunt is in Florida probably hanging out on her balconey overlooking the water, and my mom is here in Denver probably buying something overpriced.  They have two different brains, and therefore two different experiences and thoughts.  Even when they were identical little kids, they knew who they were (even though my mom tells me that her everyone always just called them both "Sissy" so when she started Kindergarten, she didn't know if her name was "Tammy" or "Pammy."  But she still knew that she was HER and not her sister, regardless of what she was named.)  Why would your twins in the box be any different?

Quote from: AliYep.  2 scenarios.  I am either in the red room and my twin is in the blue, or I am in the blue room and my twin is in the red.  Got it.

Very good.

Quote from: Ali

Quote from: tennenrishinYet, according to physicalism, there are not, for both scenarios** are physically the same.

I think this is where you are losing me.  How are both scenarios physically the same?  If my "twin" and I each have an independent, functioning brain, why would we NOT each have a different physical experience?

Yes, they will each have a different experience. But the scenarios are physically the same, because the twins are physically the same. Swapping them is as meaningless to the state of the physical universe, as swapping, say, two identical atoms. The swap doesn't change anything, according to physics. The state of the physical universe in the swapped (Me-Red, say) case is, according to physics, identical to the state of the universe in the unswapped (Me-Blue, say) case.

You could also think of it this way: Suppose the lights in the rooms are dark initially. If you ask one of the subjects to bet on the color of his room, he would have to bet at 50-50. Now, when the lights go on, the odds become a certainty - he has gained exactly one binary digit (bit) of information (about which room he was in). However, suppose also that, before the lights went on, the state of the entire physical universe was described to them (I agree that there are practical difficulties, but this is a thought experiment). Note that they both would still have to bet at 50-50, for they heard the same description. So they still each gain one bit of new information when the lights go on. Where could this new information be coming from, since, according to physicalism, they have already heard all information contained in the universe.

Now, before someone thinks this is a tortuous version of the Knowledge argument (Mary's room), which is about qualia, see this colorless version (http://www.museful.net/2011/philosophy/refuting-physicalism-again).

Quote from: AliAgain, I am making the leap and assuming that you are arguing that the reason I am me whether I am in the blue box or the red box is that I have a soul that is always me.  If that's not your point, then I don't know what your point is.  Please elaborate.

That is what I would speculate, but the argument is making a weaker claim. The argument simply demonstrates that there is extra-physical information.

Quote from: tennenrishin on January 03, 2012, 11:17:07 PM

Quote from: Ali
What point did I miss?

Basically the whole thing, man...
But if you're genuinely interested in understanding the argument, the clearest formulations I can provide at this time are this one (http://www.museful.net/2011/philosophy/refuting-physicalism-subjectively) and this one (http://www.museful.net/2011/philosophy/refuting-physicalism-again). Pick whichever sits better with you. They are quite brief, so pay attention to exactly what is being said.

No need to be snarky.

Quote from: tennenrishin on January 04, 2012, 06:14:03 AM. . . suppose also that, before the lights went on, the state of the entire physical universe was described to them (I agree that there are practical difficulties, but this is a thought experiment). Note that they both would still have to bet at 50-50, for they heard the same description. So they still each gain one bit of new information when the lights go on. Where could this new information be coming from, since, according to physicalism, they have already heard all information contained in the universe.

No, they wouldn't have heard all information contained in the universe, because that would include the color of the room that they were in. The color of the room is information, and you ignore this for the sake of your argument. The colors of each respective room existed in the physical world before the lights were turned on-- this isn't "new" information at all, except to the subjects of the experiment who have not been given "all" information, despite your assertion to the contrary.

The same is true of your "colorless version." The digit is extant on the paper at the start of the experiment, and is not "new" information except to the experimental subjects who have been placed in the rooms. The physical universe contains the information, which the subjects are not aware of until they pick up the pieces of paper.

Quote from: tennenrishin on January 04, 2012, 06:14:03 AMThe argument simply demonstrates that there is extra-physical information.

How? In each of your thought experiments, there is physical information; either the color of the paint in the room, or the digit on the piece of paper in each room.

Okay, I've thought some more about this (in the shower this morning, thankyouverymuch for getting this stuck in my head.)  I think cutting through all of the room colors and binary digits and whatnot, I know what you're trying to do.

Correct me if I'm wrong:

Let's say that they cut Ali down the middle, and from that made two completely identical Ali's, including "implanting" both Ali's brains with every thought, experience, every thing AliPrime's mind has ever soaked up.

Then they woke up AliA and AliB.  How would they know which one is the "real" Ali?  Which one would I be?  Which one would be the real AliPrime that actually had all of the thoughts and experiences that both AliA and AliB now remember?

Is that a better explanation of what you're trying to get us to think about?

(If so, I already have my answer, but I thought I'd make sure that's really what you are trying to get at.)

Quote from: Tank on January 04, 2012, 07:38:55 AM

Quote from: tennenrishin on January 03, 2012, 11:17:07 PM

Quote from: Ali
What point did I miss?

Basically the whole thing, man...
But if you're genuinely interested in understanding the argument, the clearest formulations I can provide at this time are this one (http://www.museful.net/2011/philosophy/refuting-physicalism-subjectively) and this one (http://www.museful.net/2011/philosophy/refuting-physicalism-again). Pick whichever sits better with you. They are quite brief, so pay attention to exactly what is being said.

No need to be snarky.

Thanks. Sorry about that, Ali. I just meant to say that I made an effort to condense the experiment into a small account - perhaps at some expense to readability.

Quote from: AliCorrect me if I'm wrong: ... ... ...

Thanks for confirming first. What you describe is not, I think, a similar argument. Perhaps the experiment would be easier to imagine if they were just two normal people, who happened to be identical in every respect (memories and all) by fluke. So they have no thoughts about "who is the original" when they are assigned to the rooms.

Quote from: tennenrishin on January 04, 2012, 05:39:54 PM

Quote from: AliCorrect me if I'm wrong: ... ... ...

Thanks for confirming first. What you describe is not, I think, a similar argument. Perhaps the experiment would be easier to imagine if they were just two normal people, who happened to be identical in every respect (memories and all) by fluke. So they have no thoughts about "who is the original" when they are assigned to the rooms.

Okay.  And then the what is the question?  Is it: 
"How do I know which one is me (if all things are physically identical)?"
or
"How does an outside observer know which one is me (if all things are physically identical)?"
or is it something else?

Quote from: Ali on January 04, 2012, 05:55:17 PM
Okay.  And then the what is the question?  Is it:  
"How do I know which one is me (if all things are physically identical)?"
or
"How does an outside observer know which one is me (if all things are physically identical)?"
or is it something else?

Pardon me for just jumping in.  I thought this was interesting...splitting one person into two.

To me it would seem that if you SPLIT a person in two (identical in all points) then EACH person would fully be "You".  However, "You" would cease to be "identical" and each would become individual (from the point of split onwards), or more like twins, where each have a different life and life experience.  In essence, "You" would become "Y'all".

I'm no scientist/philosopher...just my thought.

Quote from: AnimatedDirt on January 04, 2012, 06:09:21 PM

Quote from: Ali on January 04, 2012, 05:55:17 PM
Okay.  And then the what is the question?  Is it:  
"How do I know which one is me (if all things are physically identical)?"
or
"How does an outside observer know which one is me (if all things are physically identical)?"
or is it something else?

Pardon me for just jumping in.  I thought this was interesting...splitting one person into two.

To me it would seem that if you SPLIT a person in two (identical in all points) then EACH person would fully be "You".  However, "You" would cease to be "identical" and each would become individual (from the point of split onwards), or more like twins, where each have a different life and life experience.  In essence, "You" would become "Y'all".

I'm no scientist/philosopher...just my thought.

I agree with this thought. Which is why I have a problem with the idea of copying my brain into a robotic host, the me it came from would still me from my perspective, and the robot would be someone else, but to other people we would be identical. Sorry for the tangent, but I'd also add that the original me would have something to say about being killed even if the robot me lived on.

Quote from: Davin on January 04, 2012, 06:19:26 PM
I agree with this thought.

We agree!  :)

Quote from: Davin on January 04, 2012, 06:19:26 PM
I agree with this thought. Which is why I have a problem with the idea of copying my brain into a robotic host, the me it came from would still me from my perspective, and the robot would be someone else, but to other people we would be identical. Sorry for the tangent, but I'd also add that the original me would have something to say about being killed even if the robot me lived on.

There is an episode of stargate where exactly that happened to SG-1.  The robots thought they were the real SG-1 and had all the same memories up to the point when the copy was made.

Wasn't that in Dr Who too?

Quote from: AnimatedDirt on January 04, 2012, 06:41:37 PM

Quote from: Davin on January 04, 2012, 06:19:26 PM
I agree with this thought.

We agree!  :)

It's very unlikely that we'd dissagree on everything.

Quote from: Whitney on January 04, 2012, 07:07:21 PM

Quote from: Davin on January 04, 2012, 06:19:26 PM
I agree with this thought. Which is why I have a problem with the idea of copying my brain into a robotic host, the me it came from would still me from my perspective, and the robot would be someone else, but to other people we would be identical. Sorry for the tangent, but I'd also add that the original me would have something to say about being killed even if the robot me lived on.

There is an episode of stargate where exactly that happened to SG-1.  The robots thought they were the real SG-1 and had all the same memories up to the point when the copy was made.

One of my favorite episodes, even though the indigenous robot guy irritated me. There was also a follow up episode when the robots started going through the Stargate.

Quote from: Scissorlegs on January 04, 2012, 07:16:28 PMWasn't that in Dr Who too?

I don't remember one specifically, but I think I remember something similar to it. There was the David Tennant one where he split off, sending one of him to another dimension with Rose, but I don't remember them going as deep into the aspect of duplicates and a sense of self.

Quote from: Davin on January 04, 2012, 08:05:45 PM

Quote from: Scissorlegs on January 04, 2012, 07:16:28 PMWasn't that in Dr Who too?

I don't remember one specifically, but I think I remember something similar to it. There was the David Tennant one where he split off, sending one of him to another dimension with Rose, but I don't remember them going as deep into the aspect of duplicates and a sense of self.

It was a Tennant episode called 'the rebel flesh / the almost people'. And typically, the show only brushed the surface of the moral dilemma of these [dopel]Gangers believing themselves to BE the originals. Of course to avoid any actual moral decisions being made in the plot, they conveniently turned evil and then died in a horrible environmental catastrophe through no fault of the protagonists. So, justice was served with no blood-on-hands and all's well with the universe...

Quote from: Scissorlegs on January 04, 2012, 08:44:21 PM

Quote from: Davin on January 04, 2012, 08:05:45 PM

Quote from: Scissorlegs on January 04, 2012, 07:16:28 PMWasn't that in Dr Who too?

I don't remember one specifically, but I think I remember something similar to it. There was the David Tennant one where he split off, sending one of him to another dimension with Rose, but I don't remember them going as deep into the aspect of duplicates and a sense of self.

It was a Tennant episode called 'the rebel flesh / the almost people'. And typically, the show only brushed the surface of the moral dilemma of these [dopel]gangers believing themselves to BE the originals. Of course to avoid any actual moral decisions being made in the plot, they conveniently turned evil and then died in a horrible environmental catastrophe through no fault of the protagonists. So, justice was served with no blood-on-hands and all's well with the universe...

(https://www.happyatheistforum.com/forum/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fprimates.ximian.com%2F%7Emiguel%2Fpictures%2Fwell_actually_small.jpg&hash=a0573a9cebd30c144a84825a891a254def9f1af8)
Well actually (for the full effect, imagine this said as if I had a clogged nose and a high piched Urkil-like voice), those are Matt Smith episodes from season 6.

I have not yet seen the Matt Smith seasons.

There was also a stargate atlantis episode where alternative reality McKay came through a rip in space time (actually many similar cases of this on the show).

Anyway, they knew who the other was and could be told apart because one was a jerk and the other wasn't.

Quote from: Whitney on January 04, 2012, 09:15:01 PM
Anyway, they knew who the other was and could be told apart because one was a jerk and the other wasn't.

Like the Charles/Chaz conundrum in Charles in Charge!

QuoteWell actually (for the full effect, imagine this said as if I had a clogged nose and a high piched Urkil-like voice), those are Matt Smith episodes from season 6.I have n
ot yet seen the Matt Smith seasons

Indeed. I stand corrected.

Quote from: AliOkay.  And then the what is the question? ...

Why are there two possibilities for me, but only one possibility for the physical universe?

Quote from: RecusantNo, they wouldn't have heard all information contained in the universe, because that would include the color of the room that they were in. The color of the room is information, and you ignore this for the sake of your argument. The colors of each respective room existed in the physical world before the lights were turned on-- this isn't "new" information at all, except to the subjects of the experiment who have not been given "all" information, despite your assertion to the contrary.

Yes, it is information that RoomRed is Red and RoomBlue is Blue, and this information, as you say, exists in the physical universe. Also, this information is given to the subjects. Still, when the lights go on, the subjects realize something they did not know before ("oh, I was in the blue room" / "oh, I was in the red room"). That is the information I am referring to.

Quote from: RecusantThe same is true of your "colorless version." The digit is extant on the paper at the start of the experiment, and is not "new" information except to the experimental subjects who have been placed in the rooms. The physical universe contains the information, which the subjects are not aware of until they pick up the pieces of paper.

When they receive the description of the physical universe, the subjects are told what is written on the note in room0 and what is written on the note in room1, for this is information, as you say. Still, as the subject, I would not know what is written on the note in front of me, and gain this bit of information when I turn over the note.

Now, you may say that I am trading on an ambiguity in the term 'me'. I claim that my sentience (as the subject in the experiment) solves that problem (at least from my perspective), because it leaves me no room for doubt about the meaning of 'me'.

Quote from: tennenrishin on January 05, 2012, 05:59:31 AM

Quote from: AliOkay.  And then the what is the question? ...

Why are there two possibilities for me, but only one possibility for the physical universe?

Because "me" is a function of my mind (which lives in the brain) and there are two brains in the mix. 

In other words, there is only one possibility to the universe, because the universe doesn't care which me is in the box and can't see me thinking.  If the universe could measure my thoughts and brainwaves though, they would see an actual physical difference between the two brains in the two boxes - One would be thinking "Red!" and one would be thinking "Blue!" and each would be thinking "I am me." and probably going on to other individual thoughts like "How did I get in this box?" and "I wonder if they have a public restroom."  In other words, just because an observer can't see a difference between the two people in the boxes and doesn't care about the differences, they still are two different people, and therefore, there are always two different possibilities, regardless of what the observer can percieve.  You explain that by using the soul (there are always two different souls) but my point is and always has been that the soul isn't needed to explain this - the mind (which is a function of the brain, which is physical) will do just as well.

Quote from: AliIn other words, there is only one possibility to the universe

We agree that there is only one possibility to the physical universe.
Do you deny that there are two possibilities to me, or are you saying that that it is not meaningful for me to ask which room I am in?






EDIT: Sorted out quotation - Tank
EDIT: Thanks. What did the quotation originally say? - tennenrishin
EDIT: I didn't change the wording, you'd placed the quote tags in the wrong place as you had clicked quote when you ment to click modify. Thus your modified post appeared in quotation form. I deleted the original post and corrected the tags in this one so it was formated correctly. The original post ended at me - Tank
EDIT: Thanks. I keep making that mistake. - tennenrishin

Quote from: tennenrishin on January 06, 2012, 09:35:36 AM

Quote from: AliIn other words, there is only one possibility to the universe

We agree that there is only one possibility to the physical universe.
Do you deny that there are two possibilities to me, or are you saying that that it is not meaningful for me to ask which room I am in?

Neither, actually.  If you took my full sentence, I was saying that there is only one possibility to the universe because the universe can't "see" the two separate brains having two separate experiences.  So to the universe, it APPEARS that there is only one possibility, when in fact, there are still two.  And actually, if the universe has the right technology on hand, it CAN see the two brains having two different experiences (measuring brainwaves and whatnot). 

What I am saying is that there are ALWAYS two possibilities for me, and for the physical universe.  It's just that a casual outside observer from the physical universe may not see the two possibilities, if they do not have the ability to monitor thoughts and brainwaves.  But thoughts and brainwaves are still physical manifestations - they happen in the brain.

Quote from: AliIt's just that a casual outside observer from the physical universe may not see the two possibilities, if they do not have the ability to monitor thoughts and brainwaves.  But thoughts and brainwaves are still physical manifestations - they happen in the brain.

I'm saying that even if that observer could see and track every quark in the universe, including the subject's brains, he still wouldn't have access to the information that the subject has access to, for in both cases the guy in the red room is thinking "I'm in the red room" and the guy in the blue room is thinking "I'm in the blue room".

Quote from: tennenrishin on January 06, 2012, 04:53:27 PM

Quote from: AliIt's just that a casual outside observer from the physical universe may not see the two possibilities, if they do not have the ability to monitor thoughts and brainwaves.  But thoughts and brainwaves are still physical manifestations - they happen in the brain.

I'm saying that even if that observer could see and track every quark in the universe, including the subject's brains, he still wouldn't have access to the information that the subject has access to, for in both cases the guy in the red room is thinking "I'm in the red room" and the guy in the blue room is thinking "I'm in the blue room".

Surely they'd be thinking other stuff too?  Like "How the heck did I get in this freaking room?" or "I need to use the bathroom."

Well, that's a good sign.
Melmoth, if you still get to read this, I should thank you for some real thought-provoking discussion.

Lastly, to one and all - just a thought...
It doesn't change the underlying logic, but we can make the argument more emotive. Imagine, for example, that both subjects knew that the red room is about to be filled with poison gas. According to the physicalist, it matters not who goes where, because both results are physically the same. As a subject, would you agree with him?

Quote from: tennenrishin on December 31, 2009, 06:58:32 AM

Quote from: IhateyoumikeWhat color room do you find yourself in?

This is just me... but couldn't you quite easily explain that you are in both a red and a blue room? Assuming the two copies of myself count as one entity.

I also find it interesting that one would think the two entities in each room are exactly distinguishable. Can I distinguish them by their position? One is in a red room and the other is in a blue room. So logically, the allegedly "indistinguishable" copy of me that is in a blue room is in a blue room, and vice versa. What's the problem?

Quote from: Wessik on January 12, 2012, 06:48:42 AM

Quote from: tennenrishin on December 31, 2009, 06:58:32 AM

Quote from: IhateyoumikeWhat color room do you find yourself in?

This is just me... but couldn't you quite easily explain that you are in both a red and a blue room? Assuming the two copies of myself count as one entity.

If you were the subject of the experiment, could you say "I am in both a red and a blue room"? If yes, what would it look like? Magenta?
"I" is not ambiguous, because it is based on things like "If you drop a bowling ball on tennenrishin's toe, I feel the pain."

Quote from: Wessik on January 12, 2012, 06:48:42 AM

Quote from: IhateyoumikeWhat color room do you find yourself in?
I also find it interesting that one would think the two entities in each room are exactly distinguishable. Can I distinguish them by their position? One is in a red room and the other is in a blue room. So logically, the allegedly "indistinguishable" copy of me that is in a blue room is in a blue room, and vice versa. What's the problem?

They are indeed distinguishable by location. Physicalism provides a distinction by location, in the sense that it can label them "Mr Red" and "Mr Blue". As a subject, I can provide labels "me" and "him". From my perspective (as a subject), there are two possible mappings between these label sets:
Me -> Mr Red, Him -> Mr Blue
Me -> Mr Blue, Him -> Mr Red
It takes 1 bit of information to select one of these two mappings, and that bit is not expressed in the state of the physical universe.
See the revised argument (http://www.museful.net/2011/philosophy/refuting-physicalism-again), if you like.

Oh... I see. Well, distinction in color not need be made on a purely subjective basis. For example, differences in the frequency of certain color wavelengths certainly provide the information necessary to distinguish between the two different colored rooms.

Now, the actual ability to percieve a red wavelength as "red" and vice versa is another matter. However, there are two propositions: That everything in the mind and body needed to percieve and understand the difference between "red" and "blue" is in the physical world, or that the material forms are not enough, and some sort of soul is needed. Unfortunately, to assume that some sort of soul is needed in order to distinguish the two colors ignores the proposition that there could be a material basis for perception in the molecules that make up the brain and central nervous system. Without discounting the first proposition, the second proposition creates a circular argument, sadly...

:(

Quote from: Wessik on January 17, 2012, 09:45:21 PM
Oh... I see. Well, distinction in color not need be made on a purely subjective basis. For example, differences in the frequency of certain color wavelengths certainly provide the information necessary to distinguish between the two different colored rooms.

I agree, but it doesn't affect the argument, because
- In case 1, there is a Mr Blue in the blue room with blue wavelengths, and a Mr Red in the red room with red wavelengths.
- In case 2, there is a Mr Blue in the blue room with blue wavelengths, and a Mr Red in the red room with red wavelengths.
The state of the physical universe is the same in both cases.

Quote from: Wessik on January 17, 2012, 09:45:21 PMUnfortunately, to assume that some sort of soul is needed in order to distinguish the two colors ...

That is not at all the proposition being made. (Did you look at the revised argument I linked, which doesn't use color?) The argument merely points out a contradiction in the physicalist's world view, if that physicalist also has a subjective perspective on the world.

Imagine the two subjects in the experiment were blindfolded physicalists. Describe the state of the entire physical universe to both of them, to the quark. Since physicalism says that universe==physical universe, they should know everything there is to know in the universe. Yet, they cannot tell you which room they are in because they both received the same description.

You seem to be implying that a subjective viewpoint can not be valid in accordance with the physicalist view that the entirety of universe = reality, and that since we clearly percieve subjective viewpoints, this forms a contradiction.

I like this argument. Ya le me gusta porque tu razón aparece verdad. Muy bien... muy bien...

I only wonder if this forms a correct interpretation of physicalism. It may be claimed that the entirety of physical matter is equivalent to reality, pero porque si if simple subets of physical perception might be accepted as facets of reality in their own right? A subjective viewpoint would be equivalent to a facet of reality, and perfectly within the bounds of the physicalist proposition. Hay que mas trabaje hacer...

This is one of the most bizarre arguments I have ever heard. I have tried and tried and still cannot fully grasp what the OP is trying to get at. I think it's just a bunch of circular reasoning, especially considering this entire scenario is purely hypothetical and cannot exist in physical reality by very definition of the things that exist in the example wouldn't exist in real life.

But that's besides the point. From what I can gather, there is a "me" and a clone of myself that is 100% similar in terms of brain matter, etc. Either this clone has been made at the time of the experiment to emulate exactly who I am, or it has been developing as I have the whole time but in two completely equal dimensions, so to speak. Either way, the only difference occurs when I am placed in a red room and the other guy is placed in the blue room. I think the problem that the OP makes is that he assumes that because our minds are completely identical, that they need to continue to be identical after the different experiences. This defies all logic and knowledge on biology/psychology of the brain. Once we both get placed in different rooms, our minds adapt to that situation differently, even though it is a minute difference. All it takes is that tiny difference to alter the courses of our minds. At that point, we are now two completely different individuals, albeit absurdly similar in life experiences. The longer we live, and the longer we are exposed to different experiences (which we will be due to the initial difference which will grow exponentially), we will become more and more different.

Think of it like this. Say there is me living in Texas, and then an entire clone of Texas thrown out in the middle of the Pacific somehow. Both of us have had 100% identical life experiences, including clones of all people we have interacted with. Say the Texas we live in share every possible variable, including night/day shift and weather patterns, somehow. All things are equal. Now assume the "me" in the Pacific encounters a foreigner who visits. There is not a foreigner that visits the actual "me" in Texas, however. Now regardless of what kind of experience the other me has, whether the foreigner gives off a negative, positive, or neutral experience, that "me" has fundamentally been changed and shaped by experience. Even if that very same foreigner then in turn visited the other me the next day, that me will react entirely differently to the foreigner because the foreigner herself will have had experiences (with the other me) that shapes her personality further down the line. Along with the fact that it isn't occurring on the same day and any other myriad of factors will shape the experience. All it takes is minute differences in experiences to start a huge shaping process in the brain. So while we may have been 100% identical at one point, as soon as the most minor difference occurs, they are both two completely different people, and will branch out exponentially due to those differences. So no, the physical universe does NOT see only one situation while I see two. I see only one (or two, depending on my knowledge of the other guy) while reality knows from the get-go that we are two completely different people. The similarities mean nothing; it only means that absolutely every variable has somehow someway been static. This is obviously entirely impossible for the real world, so no matter how compelling this argument might seem to you, it will never apply to reality, but only to your subjective views of reality.

This is junk philosophy if I have ever seen it. In fact, I can even use this same argument against you to claim that each person has multiple souls that all shoot off to dozens of different afterlives upon death. Instead of your example, I can merely assert that there is a red, blue, green, yellow, purple, pink, black, white room as well. This proves dualism just as easily as it proves that you have an army of souls. The argument says nothing at all and is very poorly conceived in my opinion.

Quote from: NatsuTerran on January 20, 2012, 01:16:26 AM. . . I have tried and tried and still cannot fully grasp what the OP is trying to get at.

It seems you have grasped it well enough to give a reasonable critique of the thought experiment.  ;)  Of course, it's a philosophical thought experiment, so whether it is within the possibilities of reality isn't relevant, while if we were considering it as a scientific thought experiment, that criticism would be valid, I think. In any event, there are logical proofs for any number of things which are not possible in the real world. Even a perfect logical proof of the existence of the soul (I don't think that tennenrishin's is, by the way) would not necessarily be of any significant relevance.

I have been coming to the conclusion that philosophy can only tell us about people's opinions on reality, but should not be considered as a means to tell us anything about reality itself. On the other hand, it could be said that science can only tell us about our perceptions of reality, and that reality itself, while it seems to conform to our perceptions in great detail, is not necessarily (and perhaps can never be) completely accurately described by them. However, that is a philosophical observation.   :P  ::)  

Natsu - I agree, and that is what I was trying to get at when I said that they would be thinking other things than "This room is red" and "This room is blue." but Tennerishin seemed to think that was a point in his/her favor, and I decided that I was done mucking around in this ridiculous "experiement."  The thing that I can't grasp is why Ten thinks that "a soul" solves this "connundrum" whereas a "mind" would not (using "mind" to mean the functionings of a physical brain.)  But anyway, I think "junk philosophy" is a perfect way to put it.

ETA:  That's a lot of quotation marks.  Please feel free to picture me doing the bunny ear quote thing wildly during this rant.