Uploaded Minds

[Recusant]

So much of human life is sensorial. I wonder, if it were possible (a huge "if") would an average person be able to maintain sanity without the grounding effect of touch and scent/taste, etc. 

I might be willing to try it if I didn't have long to live, but the uploaded personality might not be pleased with that decision.

At this point I think the topic is more philosophy than science . . .

"Could you move from your biological body to a computer? An expert explains 'mind uploading'" | The Conversation

Imagine brain scanning technology improves greatly in the coming decades, to the point that we can observe how each individual neuron talks to other neurons. Then, imagine we can record all this information to create a simulation of someone's brain on a computer.

This is the concept behind mind uploading – the idea that we may one day be able to transition a person from their biological body to a synthetic hardware. The idea originated in an intellectual movement called transhumanism and has several key advocates including computer scientist Ray Kurzweil, philosopher Nick Bostrom and neuroscientist Randal Koene.

The transhumanists' central hope is to transcend the human condition through scientific and technological progress. They believe mind uploading may allow us to live as long as we want (but not necessarily forever). It might even let us improve ourselves, such as by having simulated brains that run faster and more efficiently than biological ones. It's a techno-optimist's dream for the future. But does it have any substance?

The feasibility of mind uploading rests on three core assumptions.

• first is the technology assumption – the idea that we will be able to develop mind uploading technology within the coming decades
• second is the artificial mind assumption – the idea that a simulated brain would give rise to a real mind
• and third is the survival assumption – the idea that the person created in the process is really "you". Only then does mind uploading become a way for you to live on.

How plausible is each of these?

[Continues . . .]

[Bluenose]

I think this will remain a theoretical problem for the foreseeable future at least, and until we can produce at the very minimum a sentient computer.  IMHO we are nowhere near this so-called singularity event.

[The Magic Pudding..]

So much of human life is sensorial. I wonder, if it were possible (a huge "if") would an average person be able to maintain sanity without the grounding effect of touch and scent/taste, etc.

Aren't they offering you touch and scent/taste, etc in your package?
You should shop around more.

and third is the survival assumption – the idea that the person created in the process is really "you". Only then does mind uploading become a way for you to live on.

Are you really you, the you you really were thirty years ago?
I'd prefer to be new improved me anyway, then I'd follow those recent quiz links and report my high scores to the astonishment of all.

[Asmodean]

Let us assume that you could have a vast sensor suite at your microelectronical disposal. I think you would be no more you than the "you" stepping out of a "classical" teleporter (Dematerializer-rematerialiser)

Sure, the new you would "wake up and carry on" the legacy of the original through having his memories, thought patterns and so forth, but there is no getting around that the original is dead by that point.

I think the only way around that would be gradual replacement. Replace broken neurons in the brain with tech as they die... Then the cyborg-you could claim... Originality, I suppose.

Perhaps augmentation could be another route, where your organic brain would coexist symbiotically (to some degree) with tech, which would "carry on" upon organic brain death.

Then, of course, one could ask whether if you-you died and "the next instance" the clone-you woke up with all your you-ness, would that clone than be you? I'd say that in a sense, yes it would. In a different light, however...

But then, are you the yesterday's you when you wake up in the morning?

Pardon the mental diarrhoea. I find this line of philosophy fascinating to consider.

[Tank]

It is a truly fascinating subject.

[Asmodean]

One of the few issues on which I did a 180, in fact. I used to be a proponent of the rematerialised you being you, but then was presented with a very simple argument I found persuasive;

Suppose the dematerialiser malfunctions and does not dematerialise you. "You" get rematerialised at destination, but you are also at source. From that point, there are two divergent "yous." Then, how could the rematerialised you have been you-you in the first place? (Kind-of the same argument as are you the same you when you wake up as the one who went to sleep?)

Or, for that matter, what if the dematerialiser dematerialises you, but you get rematerialised in more than one location, complete with all your memories, experiences and molecule arrangements. Which one would be the you? I think in that case, it would have been the dematerialised one which no longer exists.

The rest... Kinda' extrapolated from there.

[Tank]

There was a short Sci Fi story that posited that the transporter copied you and incinerated the original to get rid of the duplication problem.

[Asmodean]

Yes. The duplicate is you by virtue of being the only copy. However, there is no... What would be the expression? Continuity of conscience?

[Tank]

An interesting thought. If we are the result of all we experience encoded as neurons why would there need to be continuity conscience?

[billy rubin]

how would you know?

[Tank]

Good question

[billy rubin]

its like clones. people argue about whether a clone made from your DNA would be a different person with individual rights.

a silly question asked by people who have never met identical twins.

but a duplicate person? if they coexist in space and time then theyre just identical twins. if one ceases to exist when the other is created, i just dont know.

[Asmodean]

An interesting thought. If we are the result of all we experience encoded as neurons why would there need to be continuity conscience?

Simply because if you get your arse dematerialised properly, then you'll be dead. Of course, if you then happen to step out of a rematerialiser, that you is alive. It is a different you, however, from the first you, who is dead.

[billy rubin]

how would you tell?

do you actually become dead when being dematerialized? if so, how does the rematerialized you become alive and conscious? is something transported along with your atoms, or does life appear automatically when you are correctly reassrmbled?

what is it that separates life from death?

[Asmodean]

Well, yes. The "original" you gets his molecules ripped apart. That's a system destroyed. Being a living system, it is reasonable to call it dead.

The "replica" you gets "the opposite" treatment - that of having his particles assembled and accelerated to replicate the conditions of the former.

For a simple analogy, think of it this way; you want to teleport a copper plate, so you measure the one you have, melting it into a disordered lump in the process, then use those measurements to create an identical - not same - plate at the destination.

How would you tell it's not the same plate? It does not share a single atom with the original.