Watching the spectacle of a Christian mocking Islam as absurd without any sense of the irony of this has led me to ponder what I'll call metatheism, which I'll define as, "any theological framework that affirms the existence of deity, affirms the validity of all theological frameworks, and explains how contradictory frameworks can all be valid."
Is a non-absurd metaetheism possible? I can think of only one way it could be. It would have to affirm that theology is beauty, not truth; that beauty is in the eye of the beholder; and that deity transcends but is also immanent in any particular attempt by humans to render deity's beauty accessible to human experience.
Think of how theists on this message board have tried to defend the truth of their frameworks. Any intelligible substance in their arguments has been summarized by John Keats in his poem, Ode on a Grecian Urn, to whit, "'Beauty is truth, truth beauty."
Always we hear of the metaphysical beauty of God, the metaphysical beauty of faith, and the metaphysical beauty of life, the universe, love, and death when faith contemplates them - and always it is apparent to us non-believers, if not to the believer, that these beauties are the basis of the believer's truth claim. Sometimes the believer will almost say as much, but will stop just short of open acknowledgement, and, if probed, will backpedal quickly. Presumably the believer realizes we non-believers will never agree with Keats. We will never concede that beauty is truth, truth beauty.
I am suggesting that maybe one day we will meet a believer who, like us non-believers, disagrees with Keats. This believer will affirm that beauty isn't truth, and truth isn't beauty. This believer will also, amazingly, affirm that theology is beauty, not truth; that beauty is in the eye of the beholder; and that deity transcends but is also immanent in any particular attempt by humans to render deity's beauty accessible to human experience. Such a believer will be engaging in metatheism as I have defined it.
One thing I like about my hypothetical metatheists is their lack of rationale or motivation for going to war with other believers. They could welcome all believers into their big tent of metatheism. I also like their lack of rationale or motivation for interfering with science or the teaching of science. Theology as beauty would be utterly unthreatened by science, since science has no opinions on beauty, but only on truth.
Unfortunately, I think metatheists could still vigorously oppose non-believers, so metatheism isn't a silver bullet to eliminate all that's boorish or obnoxious about theism. But it would be a step in the right direction.
I think people like this exist. A lot of the New Agers.
I've always heard of what you describe as metatheism to be called pluralism - the view that all religions are individual pathways to finding the ultimate truth. Are these two words to describe the same thing or do you think there is a difference?
Quote from: "Whitney"I've always heard of what you describe as metatheism to be called pluralism - the view that all religions are individual pathways to finding the ultimate truth. Are these two words to describe the same thing or do you think there is a difference?
Religious pluralism is a broad term that can mean many things. Ecumenism and even secularism can be viewed as religious pluralism. But I agree that metatheism could be placed under that umbrella.
The adjectives
weak and
strong might help here. Weak religious pluralism would say, "I'm right and you're wrong, but that doesn't mean I have to hate you or attack you, or that we can't be friends and allies." Strong religious pluralism would say, "We're both right, and both equally right."
Metatheism would be strong religious pluralism.
Quote from: "Sophus"I think people like this exist. A lot of the New Agers.
I agree that a lot of New Agers have views congenial with metatheism, in that they affirm the existence of deity, and affirm the validity of all theological frameworks. What they typically lack is a good explanation as to how contradictory frameworks can all be valid. Usually if you probe, you get a response based on reincarnation, with lives as younger souls being lived as Abrahamists, and lives as older souls being lived as New Agers. Thus Abrahamism is valid for younger souls, but isn't really valid for older souls, for whom New Age philosphies are more valid. Metatheism, by contrast, would, in its purest form, eliminate any notion of a theological framework being more valid, or less valid, for any particular person based on anything ostensibly objective, such as number of past lives. All frameworks would be valid for everyone always. The only way I can see this logically working is if validity is a function of beauty rather than truth, with deity transcending but also immanent in any particular attempt by humans to render deity's beauty accessible to human experience.