Happy Atheist Forum

I'm a subjectivist, which I define as one who denies the existence of meaning, purpose, value, or standards of conduct on the objective plane, but upholds their existence on the subjective plane, and affirms their full weight and substance on that plane, whence all four have their origin, their motive force, their natural habitat, and their ongoing evolution.

Anyone else out there with the same perspective?

For convenience I'll coin the term shouldmust, a noun, which I'll define as any single instantiation, or the sum of all instantiations, of meaning, purpose, value, or standards of conduct.  

It's obvious, I think, that if all subjectivity vanished from the universe, all shouldmust would simultaneously vanish.  I suspect an important reason why some entertain the God hypothesis is because they see it as a way of placing shouldmust out on the objective plane, presumably because they somehow view God as an instantiation of objectivity.  Even if I were willing to entertain the God hypothesis, I would remain a subjectivist, since the only way God could establish shouldmust would be if God were a subject.

Some who propose an objective basis for shouldmust will try to hang their proposal on some natural law or process, such as natural selection.  They will argue, for example, that natural selection brought our species, and thus ourselves, into reality, and so natural selection deserves to be honored as the fount of shouldmust.  My response is always the same, regardless what natural law or process has been proposed as the fount.  If I haven't already been told, I first ask why the thing deserves to be honored.  Receiving an answer, I begin enumerating all the other natural laws or processes that can claim the same dignity.  For example, natural selection is put forward because it brought our species into existence.  Well, mutation can claim the same dignity.  Why not claim mutation as the fount of shouldmust?  Cell division can likewise claim the same dignity, as can, originally, asexual reproduction, and then, later, sexual reproduction.  I would spin some poetic calls to action on the basis of mutational shouldmust, reproductive shouldmust, and sexual shouldmust.  Then I would ask on what basis we prefer natural selection over these other three?  If the answer proposed is some objective fact about natural selection, I start the process all over again.  If I haven't already been told, I first ask why that objective fact deserves to be honored as the foundation of shouldmust.  Receiving an answer, I begin enumerating all the other objective facts about laws or processes, such that, those objective facts can claim the same dignity as the one proposed.  The only way this ever ends is out of fatigue or boredom on my part or the other person's, or if, finally, the other person concedes that nothing can unassailably establish shouldmust but the honest and unapologetic pronouncement, "It is so for me, because I say so."

Why recoil from that?  "It is so for me, because I say so."  Why be uncomfortable with that, or wary, or embarrassed?  I think the only reasons would be (1) the desire to be able to win debates or (2) the desire to be able to win converts to one's own camp or (3) the conviction that subjectivity can't be trusted if others do it or even perhaps if I do it - that only objectivity is trustworthy.

I have to stop here and get ready for work.

Quote from: "Inevitable Droid""It is so for me, because I say so."

I agree.
I can abide a little individual or cultural variation, but too much and I become a wrathful pudding.

I've been carefully reading many of your posts about subjectivism.  What continues to occur to me is that subjects are locked in a game of pinball with one another; as soon as subjectivity drives a subject to act in some way, the action translates into a causal force on the objective plane which will then impinge new order upon all subjects.  Thus an action which a subject may evaluate as preferable in one instant may well evaluate as the opposite in the next.  How does/can a subject aware of this complex relationship best evaluate potential actions?

Quote from: "Persimmon Hamster"Thus an action which a subject may evaluate as preferable in one instant may well evaluate as the opposite in the next.  How does/can a subject aware of this complex relationship best evaluate potential actions?

I'll sketch out the beginnings of an answer, which will then impinge on your subjectivity, you pinball, you.

We all have to operate in a temporal milieu where the past is known but untouchable, while the future is touchable but unknown, and the present is our point of power, wherein we wield our ability to know the past and touch the future.  The most effective attitude toward the past is that of student, and toward the future, that of engineer.  The goal of the student is to learn the principles that explain the processes under study.  The goal of the engineer is to apply the principles that will enable, preserve, modify, or terminate processes in the future.  Both the student and the engineer, then, are involved with principles.  The answer to your question above, then, is, "Be principled."

I suggest to the subjectivist that six areas of study would be frutiful, those being (1) justice; (2) utility; (3) reasonableness; (4) social appropriateness; (5) sanity; and (6) authenticity.  But don't study these as if they existed on the plane of objectivity.  They don't.  Their natural habitat is the plane of subjectivity, where they were born, and have their motive force, and undergo their evolution.  This means the student must be self-taught.  Autodidactism is necessary and, thankfully, sufficient.  Your own judgment must anoint the principles you will make your own, and the good news is, your judgment is up to the task, indeed it was born for the task.  Just don't lie to yourself.  Self-deceit is kryptonite for your judgment.  So long as you are unflinchingly honest with yourself, the principles you consecrate will serve you as intended, and the future you engineer will at least have its original impulse in truth - your truth.  What your truth sets in motion will at least be yours.  As the future unfolds and becomes the past, you-the-engineer will become again you-the-student, and you will apply your judgment to interpreting what you wrought, so as to learn from it, and refine your truth, that your next feat of engineering might be even truer, and even more yours.

What separates subjectivity from objectivity? If, as I believe, we are robots made of meat without anything that could reasonably be called free will, then all our subjective experience and value judgements are the result of an objective causal chain. We are forced to assign the values we assign to things by brute circumstance.

Since the entire causal chain is a series of objective events, where does this subjectivity sneak in? If it's just the experience of being conscious, then that's great, but it doesn't really accomplish anything given that there's no reason to assume that creatures without experience of consciousness couldn't be forced by circumstance to make the same value judgments.

So what is subjectivity, and what is it's utility?

Quote from: "dloubet"What separates subjectivity from objectivity?

I'll belatedly define some terms.

I'll define the psyche as the sum of processes undertaken by the brain, excluding those that run the machinery of the body, and excluding those that maintain the brain's database.  I'll define subjectivity and objectivity as perspectives available to the psyche, with objectivity being the perspective that excludes all emotion and all appetite, and subjectivity being the perspective that incorporates all emotion and all appetite.  

QuoteIf, as I believe, we are robots made of meat without anything that could reasonably be called free will, then all our subjective experience and value judgements are the result of an objective causal chain. We are forced to assign the values we assign to things by brute circumstance.

Now that I've (belatedly) defined objectivity as a perspective available to the psyche, I would have to delete the word objective from your quote above before I could agree with it, since you aren't using that word to describe a perspective of the psyche.  However, once that word is deleted, I can agree with your quoted statements, albeit only to the extent that the psyche isn't a function of quantum mechanical phenomena, which include quantum leaps, which are spontaneous changes independent of direct triggering mechanisms.  Neuroscience has recently taken seriously the proposition that the psyche may in fact be a function of quantum mechanical phenomena.  Investigations along these lines are still preliminary.

QuoteSince the entire causal chain is a series of objective events, where does this subjectivity sneak in?

My belated definition of the term objectivity has, after the fact, rendered your question indecipherable without rewording, but I will reword it.  "Is subjectivity, being the perspective of the psyche that incorporates all emotion and all appetite, rendered illusory or at least irrelevant by the possibility that all emotion and all appetite might be the results of plodding Newtonian causality, easily mappable strings of actions and their equal and opposite reactions?"  I would answer, no.  Emotions and appetites are phenomena that occur in the brain and are studied by neuroscientists.  There's no reason we can't talk about them as being real or as being relevant to a given discussion.  

QuoteIf it's just the experience of being conscious, then that's great, but it doesn't really accomplish anything given that there's no reason to assume that creatures without experience of consciousness couldn't be forced by circumstance to make the same value judgments.

For example, robots could be programmed with emotion subroutines and appetite subroutines that are continually running and continually processing input, while the robots presumably remain devoid of all sentience.  Such robots could likewise be programmed with two modes of computation, one that excludes the outputs of the emotion and appetite subroutines, call it objectivity mode, and another, call it subjectivity mode, which incorporates the outputs of the emotion and appetite subroutines.  Given the foregoing, the human roboticists could study the differing behavior of their robots when one or the other of the two modes is dominant, and there's every reason to anticipate that there would in fact be differing behaviors.  I conclude, therefore, that subjectivity, as I've belatedly defined it, is worth talking about, even if all emotion and all appetite are the results of plodding Newtonian causality, easily mappable strings of actions and their equal and opposite reactions.
 

QuoteSo what is subjectivity, and what is it's utility?

The utility is whatever utility emotion and appetite have.  Presumably they facilitate survival, since their impact on behavior is so great, burning so much energy, commandeering so much time, and directing so much attention, that if they didn't facilitate survival, surely they would have been selected against.
 
My thesis, then, can be restated rather succinctly as follows: Shouldmust is a function of emotion and/or appetite plus ratiocination.  For example, robots can be said to exhibit shouldmust to the extent they have emotion and/or appetite subroutines running in their architecture, as some in fact do, for example the creations of Cynthia Breazeal and her teams.  Cynthia is a hero of mine.  Here is a link to her web page: http://iwaswondering.org/cynthia_homepage.html

A rock, lacking emotion or appetite, cannot be said to exhibit shouldmust, nor can a glass of water, or a cloud, or a flame, or an automobile, for all of these lack emotion or appetite.

QuoteI'll define subjectivity and objectivity as perspectives available to the psyche, with objectivity being the perspective that excludes all emotion and all appetite, and subjectivity being the perspective that incorporates all emotion and all appetite.

So objectivity is a dispassionate evaluation, and subjectivity is all emo.  ;-)

Yet we can objectively evaluate subjective states, in ourselves and others. I suppose we can even subjectively evaluate our objective evaluations.

QuoteNeuroscience has recently taken seriously the proposition that the psyche may in fact be a function of quantum mechanical phenomena. Investigations along these lines are still preliminary.

Well, that's pretty much irrelevant to the issue of free will. Random does not equal freedom. Being a slave to a roll of the dice is no better than being a slave to a deterministic causal chain.

QuoteI would answer, no. Emotions and appetites are phenomena that occur in the brain and are studied by neuroscientists. There's no reason we can't talk about them as being real or as being relevant to a given discussion.

I agree with this.

There are phenomenon in the brain we have agreed to call emotions and desires, but these phenomenon are still intrinsically molecules doing what molecules do.

One strange question is the issue of ownership. Since all our mental activity is the result of a causal chain beyond our control, on what basis do we claim ownership of those mental activities? Sure, they happened in our brain, but we had nothing to do with them. I might as well claim the mental activity of the guy next to me as my own since I had as much to do with his thoughts and feelings as the ones in my own head.

Quote from: "dloubet"So objectivity is a dispassionate evaluation, and subjectivity is all emo.  ;-)

Yet we can objectively evaluate subjective states, in ourselves and others. I suppose we can even subjectively evaluate our objective evaluations.

Yes, yes, and yes.

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QuoteNeuroscience has recently taken seriously the proposition that the psyche may in fact be a function of quantum mechanical phenomena. Investigations along these lines are still preliminary.

Well, that's pretty much irrelevant to the issue of free will. Random does not equal freedom. Being a slave to a roll of the dice is no better than being a slave to a deterministic causal chain.

At this point I need to ask you to define self as you would use the term.  I have been assuming self and body to be two different words for precisely the same reality.  My body is me.  I am my body.  Thus if my body does something, then it is I who have done it.  If my brain does something, then my body has done it, and I have done it, since my brain is a sub-system of my body, and my body is me.  

I also need to ask you to define free will as you would use the term.  I would define free will as the ability to behave independently of external causality.  The adjective external is key to that sentence.  If the only causality I am absolutely dependent on is internal, I can claim free will for myself, as I define the term.  I also think it's important for me to say how I do not define free will.  I do not define it as having no definite behavioral tendencies.  Thus the fact that someone could predict my behavior via statistical analysis doesn't deny me the right to claim free will for myself.  I do not define free will as independence from all causality and all probability, for causality and probability are part and parcel of all that is.  One could argue that being subject to causality and probability is precisely what it means to exist.  I do not define free will in such a way as to require a thing to not exist before free will could be attributed to it.

QuoteOne strange question is the issue of ownership. Since all our mental activity is the result of a causal chain beyond our control, on what basis do we claim ownership of those mental activities? Sure, they happened in our brain, but we had nothing to do with them. I might as well claim the mental activity of the guy next to me as my own since I had as much to do with his thoughts and feelings as the ones in my own head.

Before I can respond fully to that, I need to hear your definition of self.  By my definition; I.e., the self is the body; if my brain does something, then it is I who have done it.

QuoteAt this point I need to ask you to define self as you would use the term. I have been assuming self and body to be two different words for precisely the same reality. My body is me. I am my body. Thus if my body does something, then it is I who have done it. If my brain does something, then my body has done it, and I have done it, since my brain is a sub-system of my body, and my body is me.

I strongly suspect something more than just a body is necessary for selfhood. If I look at a dead body, I see no self there. The self is gone even though the body and brain remain. Clearly self also incorporates consciousness and those two perspectives you're always on about.  ;-)  

But the word I also suggests ownership of a sort. An I that claims credit or responsibility for the things the body does. But surely you don't claim responsibility for your heart beating, or your pancreas producing insulin. So you can't really pump your fist and claim you did it!

QuoteI would define free will as the ability to behave independently of external causality. The adjective external is key to that sentence. If the only causality I am absolutely dependent on is internal, I can claim free will for myself, as I define the term.

I would say no. All your internal cause and effect is ultimately the result of external causality.

Plus, the term free will is usually brought up as a means of assigning responsibility for one's actions. But if all your internal goings on are a direct result of external sources beyond one's control, where's the responsibility?

In other words, circumstance forces a nature upon us, and although we had no hand in determining that nature, we are held responsible for acting according to that nature. It's like holding dice responsible for the number they roll.

Quote from: "dloubet"I strongly suspect something more than just a body is necessary for selfhood. If I look at a dead body, I see no self there. The self is gone even though the body and brain remain. Clearly self also incorporates consciousness and those two perspectives you're always on about.  ;-)  

OK.  I use words differently.  Here's how I would talk about death.  The self is dead, the body is dead, the psyche is inactive.  I wouldn't say the psyche is gone or absent, because I would never have said previously that the psyche was here or present, because I don't think of the psyche as an object, but rather, as processes that are running; I.e., as multiple parallel series of events.  I would always be willing to replace the word psyche with the compound gerund perceiving/thinking/feeling/lusting/deciding.

QuoteBut the word I also suggests ownership of a sort. An I that claims credit or responsibility for the things the body does. But surely you don't claim responsibility for your heart beating, or your pancreas producing insulin. So you can't really pump your fist and claim you did it!

Here too I use words differently.  My purpose is to avoid positing the existence of a thing that doesn't need to be posited except to satisfy a clumsy use of words.  I am my body.  I pump my fist.  It is I who pumped my fist and I who claim credit.  I digest my dinner.  It is I who digest my dinner and I who claim credit.  I do some things with psyche and some things without psyche.  The things I do with psyche are done by me, and the things I do without psyche are likewise done by me.  My brain runs perceiving/thinking/feeling/lusting/deciding processes but it also runs other processes engaged in directing the processes of other organ systems, and still other processes engaged in maintaining the brain's database, these latter two sets of processes being excluded from psyche but still functions of the brain, with the brain being a sub-system of the body and thus a sub=system of me.  By no other discipline than a careful use of words, I eliminate the need to posit some supernatural entity called soul or atman or other similar name.  I won't posit a soul or atman until neuroscience isolates behaviors of the body that have no correlation in the brain.  So far, no such behaviors have been isolated.

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QuoteI would define free will as the ability to behave independently of external causality. The adjective external is key to that sentence. If the only causality I am absolutely dependent on is internal, I can claim free will for myself, as I define the term.

I would say no. All your internal cause and effect is ultimately the result of external causality.

I didn't appear from nowhere out of nothing, this is true.  My existence had a cause, namely, sperm and egg uniting, which likewise had a cause, coitus.  All discrete entities that exist, were caused.  Let me ask you, is there any way, in your view, that a thing could be caused, and be subject to causality, and have tendencies, and be subject to probability, yet have free will?  If not, then in effect you're defining free will as non-existence, and making it logically impossible, since that which exists cannot have non-existence as an attribute.  Why do that?  By doing it, you've left free will as something trivial to talk about.  I can't simultaneously exist and be non-existent.  So what?

Still, your comments have caused me to revise my own definition of free will, which I would now define as, "the capacity to make decisions that aren't entirely dependent on external causes that are active at this present moment."  I therefore grant free will to a robot, which makes decisions, and those decisions are responsive to, and thus somewhat dependent on, external causes that are active at this present moment, but aren't entirely dependent on those external causes, as there is also a dependency on the robot's software processes currently running, and those software processes are internal.  Apparently you will reject such a use of the term free will because the robot isn't responsible for its software processes and therefore isn't responsible for its decisions.  I will therefore define two kinds of free will, the kind with responsibility and the kind without it.  The day may come when robots will be able to decide to modify their own software, and will be able to carry out such a decision.  On that day, robots will become responsible for the current state of their own software, and will embark on the adventure of responsible free will.  To say they haven't will be to say that responsibility must be utterly independent of all causality, and thus will render responsibility as a synonym for non-existence, leaving it as something trivial to talk about, since of course a discrete entity cannot exist and simultaneously have an attribute of non-existence.  I reject that, and suggest instead that we define responsibility as, "the capacity to decide, and the capacity to carry out the decision, to modify one's own decision-making parameters."  Thus humans and perhaps one day robots will be able to be described as responsible.

QuoteIn other words, circumstance forces a nature upon us, and although we had no hand in determining that nature, we are held responsible for acting according to that nature. It's like holding dice responsible for the number they roll.

The alternative is to hold nothing and no one responsible for anything, ever, rendering all morality and all law moot.  That outcome is unacceptable to me, so I reject the thought process that leads up to it, and hold to my foregoing definition of responsibility.

There is no free will. It's an illusion, along with "the self."

Reality is algorithmic causal process that is deterministic from all the events that every occurred in the universe since it began 13.72 years ago.

There is no certainty, but only probability, and degrees of that, fact being very high probability.

There IS objectivity, and that is determined by what works well for us: pragmatism, which is the principle of science.   Subjectivity is corrected by objectivity, through peer-review of either a group of people or scholars and scientists.  Subjectivity persists but is corraled by science, which finds truth through what works in experimentation and falsification.

The fact that we live and our species is still here, having evolved over millions of years, proves objectivity.

Richard.

Quote from: "meta"There is no free will. It's an illusion, along with "the self."

I experimented with thinking like that.  Denying myself the alleged illusion of free will, I denied myself the capacity to take responsibility for my actions, and thereby denied myself the capacity to commit to principled behavior.  I quickly recognized this condition as survival-threatening, prosperity-threatening, and relationship-threatening.  Any perspective that debilitating must be rejected.

QuoteI wouldn't say the psyche is gone or absent, because I would never have said previously that the psyche was here or present, because I don't think of the psyche as an object, but rather, as processes that are running; I.e., as multiple parallel series of events. I would always be willing to replace the word psyche with the compound gerund perceiving/thinking/feeling/lusting/deciding.

I view consciousness as an emergent property of the activity of the brain. Yeah, it's a process. I don't know if I draw a distinction between calling it present or not, it seems obvious that it's present when it's present.

QuoteIt is I who digest my dinner and I who claim credit.

Well, okay...

QuoteLet me ask you, is there any way, in your view, that a thing could be caused, and be subject to causality, and have tendencies, and be subject to probability, yet have free will?

No. If free will operates within the realm of cause and effect, then it's the same as everything else, and there's no point in giving it a name. It only has special meaning if it's a means of operating outside of cause and effect. The only thing that operates outside of cause and effect is quantum events such as atomic decay. But as I've said before, neither randomness nor determinism, nor a mixture, make you free.

Free will does not exist. It's not even an illusion, it's just a claim. For it to be an illusion, you have to observe something that you mistake for free will, but that doesn't really happen. No one points to a specific spot in their decision making and says that's where the free will came in.

QuoteIf not, then in effect you're defining free will as non-existence, and making it logically impossible, since that which exists cannot have non-existence as an attribute.

I'm not defining it as non-existent, I'm saying it's common definition does not make sense.

Your robot is not free. It's operating according to its programming, and cannot do otherwise. It is irrelevant if its processes are internal or external, they are mechanical. The ability to re-program itself is not a solution either. It would only choose to re-program itself in accordance with it's current programming. The same way we can't escape our nature by trying to re-invent ourselves.

QuoteThe alternative is to hold nothing and no one responsible for anything, ever, rendering all morality and all law moot. That outcome is unacceptable to me, so I reject the thought process that leads up to it, and hold to my foregoing definition of responsibility.

That constitutes the logical fallacy of Appeal to Consequences. What's true is true regardless of our wishes.

However, the truth that we are not responsible for our actions does not affect the fact that we still experience happiness and suffering, and seek to minimize the suffering and maximize the happiness. To this end, holding people responsible for their actions, even though they're not, can affect their behavior in a positive direction. Therefore it is in our collective interest to treat people as if they are responsible for their actions. This has worked fine throughout human history up until now as a behavioral modifier and there's no reason to think it will change anytime soon.

This works great with the stochastic universe we find ourselves in. A universe in which our otherwise deterministic future is modified by the heavy bombardment of random quantum events. This leaves the future wide open for meat-robots such as ourselves to explore.

Quote from: "meta"There IS objectivity, and that is determined by what works well for us: pragmatism, which is the principle of science.   Subjectivity is corrected by objectivity, through peer-review of either a group of people or scholars and scientists.  Subjectivity persists but is corraled by science, which finds truth through what works in experimentation and falsification.

Are you mistaking an overall consensus among highly similar subjects for absolute objectivity?

Quote from: "Inevitable Droid"

Quote from: "meta"There is no free will. It's an illusion, along with "the self."

I experimented with thinking like that.  Denying myself the alleged illusion of free will, I denied myself the capacity to take responsibility for my actions, and thereby denied myself the capacity to commit to principled behavior.  I quickly recognized this condition as survival-threatening, prosperity-threatening, and relationship-threatening.  Any perspective that debilitating must be rejected.

I have no problem acknowledging that there is no free will in the traditional sense.  However, I also have no problem acknowledging that my brain capacity is so limited [as to be incapable of considering the vast array of complex variables involved in every one of my decisions] that on my own scale of consciousness I have what largely resembles free will.  I must always take responsibility for my direct actions, for I am the direct cause.  If I were to directly cause unjust suffering for another then I would hope to be the first to suggest perhaps I ought to be appropriately excluded from the relevant causal chain.

Quote from: "dloubet"The only thing that operates outside of cause and effect is quantum events such as atomic decay.

AFAIK, this remains to be conclusively determined.  Many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory is deterministic, as are non-local hidden variable theories such as in the Bohm interpretation.

Quote from: "dloubet"I view consciousness as an emergent property of the activity of the brain. Yeah, it's a process. I don't know if I draw a distinction between calling it present or not, it seems obvious that it's present when it's present.

I'll ask a question and then drop the topic, since it isn't really germane to much of anything.  Right now I'm breathing.  Is my breathing present?  I would say no, based on how I understand and use the word present.  But if you would say yes, OK.

QuoteNo. If free will operates within the realm of cause and effect, then it's the same as everything else, and there's no point in giving it a name.

Breathing operates within the realm of cause and effect, and breathing has a name.  What is it about free will that makes it different from breathing in this context?  Is it the fact that breathing can be perceived by my sensory apparatus whereas free will can only be inferred by analytic reasoning?  Arithmetic can only be inferred by analytic reasoning.  Does arithmetic operate within the realm of cause and effect?  Surprisingly, since I think the answer is no, I think you may be onto something.  The person performing calculations is operating within causality, but the propositions put forward aren't.  Nothing causes 7+5 to equal 12.  It is simply true that 7+5 equals 12, and no action, no event, no stimulus, nor non-action, non-event, or non-stimulus, can alter the fact that 7+5 equals 12.  I continue on this line of thought directly below.

QuoteIt only has special meaning if it's a means of operating outside of cause and effect.

What I think you're doing is defining the term free will as, "the capacity to operate outside of cause and effect."  This would require human decisions to be on, or at least be tightly coupled with, the same order of being, and have, or at least be tightly coupled with, the same kind of truth, as analytic propositions, such as those of formal logic or of mathematics, since analytic propositions are the only order of being, and have the only kind of truth, toward which causality is irrelevant.  Oddly, by what I think is your definition of free will, we could say that mathematics and formal logic have free will, since they operate outside of cause and effect.  A semantic curiosity and nothing more, of course, deriving from the versatility of the verb, operate.

My DNA code is spatial and termporal, as is my environment, and my memory bank, the database in my brain.  Because these three things are 100% spatial and temporal, and because we assume my decision-making apparatus is 100% dependent on these three things, we conclude that my decision-making apparatus is itself 100% spatial and temporal, and therefore 100% subject to cause and effect.

But what if my decision-making apparatus were tightly coupled with formal logic or mathematics?  These things don't exist in space and time, and therefore aren't subject to cause and effect.  What if the capacity to operate outside of cause and effect isn't simply yes/no, either/or, on/off, 100% or zero percent, but rather is a spectrum, a range, such that, a thing's capacity to operate outside of cause and effect can be greater than zero percent but less than 100%?  What if, furthermore, a thing's capacity to operate outside of cause and effect can vary, relative to what that thing is currently doing?

Thinking is part of my decision-making apparatus, and thinking, at any given moment, is more or less tightly coupled with formal logic or mathematics, and thus is more or less tightly coupled with that order of being and that kind of truth which operates outside of space and time and outside of cause and effect.

I will suggest that thinking, by tightly coupling itself with formal logic or mathematics, grants itself to some extent, less than 100% but greater than zero percent, free will as I think you define it, the capacity to operate outside of cause and effect, and by carrying forward these tight couplings into the decision-making process, grants decision-making to some extent, less than 100% but greater than zero percent, free will as I think you define it.

Does analytic truth set us free?
 

QuoteThe only thing that operates outside of cause and effect is quantum events such as atomic decay. But as I've said before, neither randomness nor determinism, nor a mixture, make you free.

Out of curiosity, do you define randomness as operating outside of cause and effect?  I'm not sure that randomness actually exists, but if it does, and if we define it as operating outside of cause and effect, and if we define free will as the capacity to operate outside of cause and effect, then the capacity for randomness is free will.

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QuoteThe alternative is to hold nothing and no one responsible for anything, ever, rendering all morality and all law moot. That outcome is unacceptable to me, so I reject the thought process that leads up to it, and hold to my foregoing definition of responsibility.

That constitutes the logical fallacy of Appeal to Consequences. What's true is true regardless of our wishes.

In the quote above, I wasn't making a truth claim, nor even suggesting one.  I said I reject the thought process.  When I say that, I mean I reject the thought process itself, not merely its conclusions, but the very act of engaging in it, prior to engaging in it, and thus prior to even considering its conclusions.  I short-circuit the thought process before it begins.  Before it even arranges its premises or assumptions, I shut it down.  I will do this if I perceive a thought process to be so dangerous that it threatens my very survival, or my very sanity.  "Not every thought should be thunk," one might say, if one were willing to employ a non-standard grammatical construction.

QuoteTherefore it is in our collective interest to treat people as if they are responsible for their actions.

I strongly agree.  I would also say that it is in my own personal interest to treat myself as if I am responsible for my actions.  This is the assessment that underlies my comment above, that not every thought should be thunk.

I found this excellent article on free will: http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Free_will

Quote from: "Inevitable Droid"I found this excellent article on free will: http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Free_will

I in turn found this excellent article on compatibilism: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/

It is logically necessary that I develop myself into a coherent compatibilist, since I am unwilling to deny determinism, yet am unwilling to deny free will.  Facing the intellectual challenge while staving off self-deceit is a daunting aspiration, yet it is my only option short of closing my eyes to the whole problem.  The good news is, I can be confident that if I post my thoughts here on this thread, the likelihood of being let off the hook with respect to sophisms is almost nill.  

Quote from: "Inevitable Droid"I in turn found this excellent article on compatibilism: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/

I haven't committed yet, but it intrigues me that I can formulate a variant of Strawsonian Compatibilism (see the artice referenced above) in terms of my own theory of subjectivism, as follows:

1. Subjective truth derives primarily from emotion and/or appetite as responsive (or unresponsive) to analytic or synthetic propositions.
2. Objective truth derives exclusively from analytic or synthetic propositions, independent of emotion and/or appetite.
3. Objective truth is powerless to overcome subjective truth because it is powerless to overcome emotion and/or appetite.
4. The fact of determinism is an objective truth.
5. The fact of moral responsibility is a subjective truth.
6. The fact of determinism is powerless to overcome the fact of moral responsibility.

meta wrote:
There is no free will. It's an illusion, along with "the self."

I experimented with thinking like that. Denying myself the alleged illusion of free will, I denied myself the capacity to take responsibility for my actions, and thereby denied myself the capacity to commit to principled behavior. I quickly recognized this condition as survival-threatening, prosperity-threatening, and relationship-threatening. Any perspective that debilitating must be rejected.

Meta:  Of course responsibility is necessary, but your supporting free will because of that is faulty logic as best.  Conflicts in the mind abound in many ways, and this is one of them.  As I said, our illusion of free will is necessary for our survival.  I should have added that one reason (a minor one) is that it is needed for responsiblity in the social arena.  So we must then just stay with the illusion, even as we do for existence of a self.


I have no problem acknowledging that there is no free will in the traditional sense. However, I also have no problem acknowledging that my brain capacity is so limited [as to be incapable of considering the vast array of complex variables involved in every one of my decisions] that on my own scale of consciousness I have what largely resembles free will. I must always take responsibility for my direct actions, for I am the direct cause. If I were to directly cause unjust suffering for another then I would hope to be the first to suggest perhaps I ought to be appropriately excluded from the relevant causal chain.

Meta:  Yes we do need to stay with the illusion, but seeking truth requires we face it head on and admit it is but an illusion. Also we do need to stay with responsibility, but you have no ability to extract yourself from causality.

The system of this forum is very bad, either takes a long time or just fails.  Too bad.

Thank you,
Richard.

On consciousness, in a book review, these excerpts:

In his new book, Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain, Antonio Damasio, director of the USC Brain and Creativity Institute and David Dornsife Professor of Neuroscience, explores how the brain constructs a mind and how the brain makes that mind conscious.

Without consciousness - that is, a mind endowed with subjectivity - you would have no way of knowing who you are. -Antonio Damasio....According to Damasio, the brain uses specific mechanisms to produce consciousness, which is made of mind and self. The mind is the basic component and self is derived from the mind where consciousness emerges.  â€œWe take consciousness for granted because it is so available, so easy to use, so elegant in its daily disappearing and reappearing acts, and yet when we think of it, scientists and nonscientists alike, we do puzzle,” Damasio writes in the book’s first chapter.....Damasio cautions that consciousness does not happen instantly as it may appear, as evidenced by sequences recorded on brain scans. For example, if you wake up in a different country several time zones removed, select areas of your brain will work together to bring you to full consciousness.

“You wake up and it takes you more than an instant to realize that you are not in your bed,” he said. “In several hundreds of milliseconds you open your eyes, take in images that become increasingly vivid to form your proto self, and receive a message of who you are from a high level coordination of memory processes.

“The brain stem, cerebral cortex and memory act in unison in the complex mental process that tell us who we are and generate the feelings that are at the heart of being conscious,” he said.....In addition to humankind’s high level of reasoning, unique memory and rich language, Damasio holds that what separates us from primates is a sense of autobiography.

I think he says about all that can be said now about consciousness.

Richard.

QuoteBreathing operates within the realm of cause and effect, and breathing has a name. What is it about free will that makes it different from breathing in this context?

The fact that you're not calling it "Free Breathing". The word "Will" already exists, and is perfectly adequate to describe human behavior. The addition of the word "Free" is there only to push the source of our decisions into an acausal, supernatural realm.

Of course arithmetic occurs within the realm of cause and effect. Addition and subtraction are not acausal. They do not occur in and of themselves. If I perform math, it is caused by the desire or need to perform math. Yes, math does not exist in space and time, it only exists as patterns of pigment on paper, or magnetic domains on a fast spinning disk or electrochemical patterns in a brain. And all those things DO only exist in space and time.

QuoteWhat I think you're doing is defining the term free will as, "the capacity to operate outside of cause and effect.

This is an atheist forum. I am trying to debunk the theistic conception of free will that is the thing that keeps us from being robots because believers don't like the idea that their god would judge and punish automatons. They invent this bogus idea of free will that does two things, it severs human behavior from the mechanical chain of cause and effect to keep us from being automatons, and through that means nails responsibility to the individual.

I say human behavior cannot be severed from the mechanical chain of cause and effect, and thus we are automatons, and that this also implies that as automatons we cannot be responsible for our actions.

QuoteOut of curiosity, do you define randomness as operating outside of cause and effect? I'm not sure that randomness actually exists, but if it does, and if we define it as operating outside of cause and effect, and if we define free will as the capacity to operate outside of cause and effect, then the capacity for randomness is free will.

Theists don't like either determinism or randomness as the determining factor of human behavior. Both means result in actions they feel one should not be held accountable for. If one's action is inevitable, how can one be accountable, and likewise if one's action is necessarily random, how can one be judged? So the theist is stuck with positing something that affects our decision-making but is neither random nor deterministic.

The problem you bring to light is that "outside of the chain of cause and effect" is actually a pretty good definition of randomness! That being the case, the theistic definition of free will has to be something that is neither inside nor outside the chain of cause and effect. This pretty much defines free will right out of existence.

Quote"Not every thought should be thunk,"

Ah, well, here we disagree.

QuoteI strongly agree. I would also say that it is in my own personal interest to treat myself as if I am responsible for my actions. This is the assessment that underlies my comment above, that not every thought should be thunk.

But I have thunk the thought. The outcome is that I appreciate the truth, and at the same time appreciate the practicality of utterly ignoring it.

Quote from: "Inevitable Droid"Does arithmetic operate within the realm of cause and effect?  Surprisingly, since I think the answer is no, I think you may be onto something.  The person performing calculations is operating within causality, but the propositions put forward aren't.  Nothing causes 7+5 to equal 12.  It is simply true that 7+5 equals 12, and no action, no event, no stimulus, nor non-action, non-event, or non-stimulus, can alter the fact that 7+5 equals 12.  I continue on this line of thought directly below.
...
Oddly, by what I think is your definition of free will, we could say that mathematics and formal logic have free will, since they operate outside of cause and effect.  A semantic curiosity and nothing more, of course, deriving from the versatility of the verb, operate.
...
These things don't exist in space and time, and therefore aren't subject to cause and effect.  What if the capacity to operate outside of cause and effect isn't simply yes/no, either/or, on/off, 100% or zero percent, but rather is a spectrum, a range, such that, a thing's capacity to operate outside of cause and effect can be greater than zero percent but less than 100%?  What if, furthermore, a thing's capacity to operate outside of cause and effect can vary, relative to what that thing is currently doing?

Thinking is part of my decision-making apparatus, and thinking, at any given moment, is more or less tightly coupled with formal logic or mathematics, and thus is more or less tightly coupled with that order of being and that kind of truth which operates outside of space and time and outside of cause and effect.

I got up this morning, read the above, it did not sit right with me, and I left for the day and have now returned.  I spent the day thinking about why this did not sit right with me during whatever moments I could afford.  I have not yet read everything posted since, but I skimmed and don't think I saw anyone address this, so here is the result of my thinking thus far:

Your words suggest that you think mathematics/logic hold some kind of "truth" on an absolute scale.  You also suggest they "operate" in some active sense (this may not be what you meant, but the word operate nevertheless sounds that way).  I think there is a problem with either of these suggestions.  I would say mathematics is nothing more than a language, totally abstract and arising from consciousness as a means for evaluating propositions.  In your example, "5 + 7 = 12", there is no more absolute truth than in the English sentence "grass is green".  For either statement to make sense, you must fully define every term that is used.  But the harder you try to absolutely qualify/define "grass", "is", or "green", the more elusive you will find the abstract ideas they represent.  Similarly, try to define what is meant by "5".  It seems simple, but I tried, and the best I could do was to admit that it is simply a relative term with respect to an abstract concept of "1", which is a relative term to an abstract concept of "0"--and can we even prove that "0" exists beyond the abstract?  If we cannot, what exactly is "1"?  I offer for your considering that these things are not truths, and we can not be certain they are even things at all...they are straws we created for grasping at to understand the universe, just as any other language.

Actually as I considered the above I went off on all manners of interesting philosophical tangents, considering (not for the first time) that everything is entirely relative to something else, and I began to suspect even more strongly a proposition I have been considering of late--that "I" (internal consciousness) cannot exist in the absence of "you" (external consciousness).  And of course that "I" and "you" are actually inseparably "we", and, as Carl Sagan has stated, "we are a way for the cosmos to know itself".

Then my head exploded.  They need an animated smiley for that.  

Quote from: "meta"In his new book, Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain, Antonio Damasio, director of the USC Brain and Creativity Institute and David Dornsife Professor of Neuroscience, explores how the brain constructs a mind and how the brain makes that mind conscious.

Coincidentally, I actually picked this very book up today at the book store and skimmed the inside jacket.  After doing so I was left with the feeling that perhaps it was written "for the layman/novice"...which is not a bad thing, and I don't claim to be much farther ahead of this proverbial "layman", but, it did leave me with the overall conclusion that I might have already heard most of what it might say.  Judging further by your excerpts alone I am not yet convinced that conclusion was inaccurate, but, if the book also gives any concrete scientific data pertaining to the study of consciousness that could certainly be interesting to me, and a useful foundation on which to base propositions & debates.  Would you say it does?

Quote from: "meta"Of course responsibility is necessary, but your supporting free will because of that is faulty logic as best.  Conflicts in the mind abound in many ways, and this is one of them.  As I said, our illusion of free will is necessary for our survival.  I should have added that one reason (a minor one) is that it is needed for responsiblity in the social arena.  So we must then just stay with the illusion, even as we do for existence of a self.

After reading the two articles I referenced in posts above, I've learned a better way of speaking, along the lines of what you're doing in what I've quoted here.  I don't have to say, "I have free will."  I can say instead, "I have moral responsibility."  I agree with the author of the Standford article, that saying I have free will is really just another way of saying I have moral responsibility, so I might as well just say the latter and drop the former.  I've also become very clear on the fact that I can't uphold my moral responsibility objectively, I can only uphold it subjectively, so the latter is the only thing I attempt.

Quote from: "dloubet"The word "Will" already exists, and is perfectly adequate to describe human behavior. The addition of the word "Free" is there only to push the source of our decisions into an acausal, supernatural realm.

Good point.  I agree.  In addition, I have learned, from the Standford article that I reference in a post above, that to say, "I have free will," is really just a way of saying, "I have moral responsibility."  I therefore, from now on, will say the latter, and drop the former.  Furthermore, I have concluded that I cannot uphold my moral responsibility on objective grounds, but only on subjective ones, for reasons of emotion and appetite, and so I will drop any attempt to uphold moral responsibility on objective grounds, and will incorporate my claim (that I have moral responsibility) into my subjectivism.  

QuoteOf course arithmetic occurs within the realm of cause and effect. Addition and subtraction are not acausal. They do not occur in and of themselves. If I perform math, it is caused by the desire or need to perform math.  Yes, math does not exist in space and time, it only exists as patterns of pigment on paper, or magnetic domains on a fast spinning disk or electrochemical patterns in a brain. And all those things DO only exist in space and time.

After a head-splitting struggle, I think I know how to think about math in relation to nature.  "Quantity is an attribute of natural phenomena."  Now I need to take some aspirin.

QuoteThis is an atheist forum. I am trying to debunk the theistic conception of free will that is the thing that keeps us from being robots because believers don't like the idea that their god would judge and punish automatons.

Yes.  Baron d'Holbach (18th century atheist author) did the very same thing.  I get it.

QuoteI say human behavior cannot be severed from the mechanical chain of cause and effect, and thus we are automatons, and that this also implies that as automatons we cannot be responsible for our actions.

Yes.  The Stanford article offers three propositions that no one yet has successfully refuted:

1. If determinism is true, no one can do otherwise than one actually does.

2. If determinism is true, no one is the ultimate source of actions.

3. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).

I am left, therefore, with the fact that I cannot do otherwise than I actually do, and I am not the ultimate source of my actions, yet I insist on my moral responsibility, for reasons of emotion and appetite.

QuoteTheists don't like either determinism or randomness as the determining factor of human behavior. Both means result in actions they feel one should not be held accountable for. If one's action is inevitable, how can one be accountable, and likewise if one's action is necessarily random, how can one be judged? So the theist is stuck with positing something that affects our decision-making but is neither random nor deterministic.

Randomness wouldn't be a choice, in other words, but a brute fact, outside the scope of will, and thus outside the scope of moral responsibility.  You're right.

QuoteThe problem you bring to light is that "outside of the chain of cause and effect" is actually a pretty good definition of randomness! That being the case, the theistic definition of free will has to be something that is neither inside nor outside the chain of cause and effect. This pretty much defines free will right out of existence.

Ha!  Glad to be of service!

QuoteBut I have thunk the thought. The outcome is that I appreciate the truth, and at the same time appreciate the practicality of utterly ignoring it.

The cognitive dissonance doesn't bug you.  It bugs me, unfortunately, so I have to resolve the conflict, which I accomplish by subjectivism.

QuoteYes. The Stanford article offers three propositions that no one yet has successfully refuted:

1. If determinism is true, no one can do otherwise than one actually does.

2. If determinism is true, no one is the ultimate source of actions.

3. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).

I am left, therefore, with the fact that I cannot do otherwise than I actually do, and I am not the ultimate source of my actions, yet I insist on my moral responsibility, for reasons of emotion and appetite.

If I thought the universe was actually deterministic, I would feel kind of disappointed that the future was set in stone and unchangeable. Luckily, it seems the otherwise deterministic universe accommodates random inputs such as atomic decay, which means the future is not set in stone and what I do makes a difference.

Quote from: "dloubet"If I thought the universe was actually deterministic, I would feel kind of disappointed that the future was set in stone and unchangeable. Luckily, it seems the otherwise deterministic universe accommodates random inputs such as atomic decay, which means the future is not set in stone and what I do makes a difference.

From what I've been able to glean, the question of whether quantum mechanics can be formulated so as to eliminate randomness has been reopened in this decade.  Here are two articles I was able to find:

The mathematical basis for deterministic quantum mechanics: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0604008

Submicroscopic deterministic quantum mechanics: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0109012

Here's a third that was written in 2008, admittedly by a college student, but it has math in it, so for all I know it may be legitimate - Is a deterministic theory of quantum mechanics at least plausible? - http://www.physics.utoronto.ca/~cpaul/BBTtheory.pdf

I've decided to let go of randomness entirely, as a philosophical lynchpin.  I just don't trust it to still be a good assumption twenty years from now.  It seems to me that the longer scientists study a field of knowledge or an area of nature, the more they will attack and ultimately defeat assumptions of randomness, because calling something random is just a way of saying it's unpredictable, and calling something unpredictable is just a way of saying we lack sufficient knowledge to be able to predict, and lacking knowledge is precisely the condition that gets lessened the longer scientists study a field of knowledge or an area of nature.
 
But even if it is utterly true that events at the quantum level are random, I haven't heard any real, working physicists, as opposed to writers of popular science texts, say or even imply that events at our macro level are random too.  Have you?  Got any articles?  If macro events lack randomness, then randomness at the quantum level is irrelevant to me in my life.  

Furthermore, even if macro events are random because quantum events are random, this only matters from a moral perspective if randomness is at least sometimes either an input to, or an output from, human will.  Otherwise - if human will neither receives as input nor yields as output any kind of randomness - then human will must still be viewed as Classically deterministic, regardless of such phenomena as atomic decay.  I haven't heard any real, working physicists, or real, working neuroscientists, talk about human will in the way I'm saying I would need them to talk before what they're saying would be relevant to moral philosophy.  Have you?  Got any articles?

As things stand in my head right now, I'm taking determinism as a fact that I need to deal with, undiluted by the concept of randomness or any other concept.

QuoteBut even if it is utterly true that events at the quantum level are random, I haven't heard any real, working physicists, as opposed to writers of popular science texts, say or even imply that events at our macro level are random too. Have you? Got any articles? If macro events lack randomness, then randomness at the quantum level is irrelevant to me in my life.

Ask yourself if your life would be different if Abraham Lincoln had died of cancer as a child because a radioactive particle decayed at just the wrong time in just the wrong place. Microscopic events can have profound macroscale consequences.

Meanwhile, I'll check out those links.

In my Robotics thread I diverged briefly into the same topic we've been discussing here, because I deemed it relevant over there too.  I'll quote myself from over there:

Quote from: "Inevitable Droid"I will take an approach to moral responsibility that can be applied to robots as readily and appropriately as to humans, and isn't dependent on any assumption as to the truth or falsehood of determinism or the condition of the subject as being or not being an automoton.  This approach, a legalistic one, will derive moral responsibility from moral competency, which I'll define as, "having (1) the intellectual capacity for moral reasoning; (2) the intellectual understanding of moral reasoning's goals and methods; (3) no developmental anomalies that made the formation of conscience impossible or implausible; and (4) no history of one's brain being abused by self or others."  It should be obvious that all four tests could be applied to a robot as readily and appropriately as to a human.

Now, the question to ask, from the perspective of this thread, would be - By what right, objectively speaking, do I define moral responsibility in the above manner?

The answer would be - By no right whatsoever, objectively speaking.  There is no fact about nature that would support my definition.  I simply made it up.  It's arbitrary.  It represents a decision, not a discovery.  If I were to debate on behalf of my definition, I wouldn't do so on the basis of its accuracy, for a criterion of accuracy cannot be applied to decisions.  Rather, I would debate on behalf of its justice, utility, social appropriateness, sanity, and authenticity, for these are criteria that can be applied to decisions.  But these criteria are themselves arbitrary, because they follow from five prior decisions, those being, the decisions to favor justice, to favor utility, to favor social appropriateness, to favor sanity, and to favor authenticity.  I can't defend those those decisions objectively.  I favor those five principles because favoring them is what I want to do.  Emotion and appetite make those five principles appeal to me.

Quote from: "Inevitable Droid"In my Robotics thread I diverged briefly into the same topic we've been discussing here, because I deemed it relevant over there too.  I'll quote myself from over there:

Quote from: "Inevitable Droid"I will take an approach to moral responsibility that can be applied to robots as readily and appropriately as to humans, and isn't dependent on any assumption as to the truth or falsehood of determinism or the condition of the subject as being or not being an automoton.  This approach, a legalistic one, will derive moral responsibility from moral competency, which I'll define as, "having (1) the intellectual capacity for moral reasoning; (2) the intellectual understanding of moral reasoning's goals and methods; (3) no developmental anomalies that made the formation of conscience impossible or implausible; and (4) no history of one's brain being abused by self or others."  It should be obvious that all four tests could be applied to a robot as readily and appropriately as to a human.

Now, the question to ask, from the perspective of this thread, would be - By what right, objectively speaking, do I define moral responsibility in the above manner?

The answer would be - By no right whatsoever, objectively speaking.  There is no fact about nature that would support my definition.  I simply made it up.  It's arbitrary.  It represents a decision, not a discovery.  If I were to debate on behalf of my definition, I wouldn't do so on the basis of its accuracy, for a criterion of accuracy cannot be applied to decisions.  Rather, I would debate on behalf of its justice, utility, social appropriateness, sanity, and authenticity, for these are criteria that can be applied to decisions.  But these criteria are themselves arbitrary, because they follow from five prior decisions, those being, the decisions to favor justice, to favor utility, to favor social appropriateness, to favor sanity, and to favor authenticity.  I can't defend those those decisions objectively.  I favor those five principles because favoring them is what I want to do.  Emotion and appetite make those five principles appeal to me.

I'm sorry this is just ridiculous.  You are in essence defining a new term and then saying "Man I wish subjectivism could possibly be "true" but seriously, it can't possibly be true in any meaningful sense, because its essence is saying that there is no such thing as truth..."

Saying that there is no objective truth, is like shooting yourself in the foot, because apparently you assume the statement "there is no objective truth" is true, right? if not, what are you saying in the first place?

-Ihateusernames.

Quote from: "Ihateusernames"Saying that there is no objective truth, is like shooting yourself in the foot, because apparently you assume the statement "there is no objective truth" is true, right? if not, what are you saying in the first place?

I'm not saying there's no objective truth.  Of course there's objective truth.  But morality isn't part of it.  There's no objective morality.  Only subjective.  Science continually teaches us about objective truth.  Science can't teach us anything about morality.  We make morality up for ourselves, each of us independently, albeit some of us pretend to be doing otherwise, and some of voluntarily make it a team effort, collectively agreeing on a moral code.

Quote from: "Inevitable Droid"

Quote from: "Ihateusernames"Saying that there is no objective truth, is like shooting yourself in the foot, because apparently you assume the statement "there is no objective truth" is true, right? if not, what are you saying in the first place?

I'm not saying there's no objective truth.  Of course there's objective truth.  But morality isn't part of it.  There's no objective morality.  Only subjective.  Science continually teaches us about objective truth.  Science can't teach us anything about morality.  We make morality up for ourselves, each of us independently, albeit some of us pretend to be doing otherwise, and some of voluntarily make it a team effort, collectively agreeing on a moral code.

 I am inclined to agree with you, Sir. Sam Harris, however, has good point, too here:http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/sam_harris_science_can_show_what_s_right.html

Quote from: "wildfire_emissary"I am inclined to agree with you, Sir.

Welcome to my world, then.

QuoteSam Harris, however, has good point, too here:http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/sam_harris_science_can_show_what_s_right.html

His argument is specious.  He assumes I should care about suffering, and then talks about how science illuminates the causes of suffering and how to remove those causes.  It is certainly true that science illuminates the causes of suffering and how to remove those causes.  But to say that I should care about suffering - yours, mine, or anyone's - and call that an objective truth, is specious.  I may well care about your suffering, but if I do, it's for reasons of emotion and/or appetite.  Even my concern for my own suffering is a matter of emotion and/or appetite.  All concern, without exception, is emotional and/or appetitive.  All concern is subjective.

To use different words - morality begins with motivation.  Nothing is good, to me, except that I am motivated toward doing it, experiencing it, having it, knowing it has occurred or is occurring, or knowing it has existed or exists.  Nothing is bad, to me, except that I am motivated toward not doing it, not experiencing it, not having it, knowing it hasn't occurred or isn't occurring, or knowing it hasn't existed or doesn't exist.  Motivation is subjective.

I am a scientarian.  This means I am motivated toward doing what scientists do when I consider truth or falsehood.  It also means I am motivated toward experiencing the learning that comes from reading about science, and also am motivated toward knowing that the activities of science continue to occur, the latter in turn motivating me to speak up as science's advocate when the occasion presents itself.

Once I deem something good, I then consider how to accomplish, experience, have, or be confident of the perpetuation of that which I deem good.  Likewise, once I deem something bad, I then consider how to avoid accomplishing, avoid experiencing, avoid having, or be confident of the cessation of that which I deem bad.  Questions of how are questions best put to science, or at least science's methods.  Empiricism and logic, with intuition a powerful source of hypotheses, are the only path to reliable answers for questions of how.  Questions of why must be put to one's own emotional and appetitive apparatuses, as tbey are the only path to answering questions of why.  The right tool for the right task.

Quote from: "Inevitable Droid"

Quote from: "wildfire_emissary"I am inclined to agree with you, Sir.

Welcome to my world, then.

QuoteSam Harris, however, has good point, too here:http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/sam_harris_science_can_show_what_s_right.html

His argument is specious.  He assumes I should care about suffering, and then talks about how science illuminates the causes of suffering and how to remove those causes.  It is certainly true that science illuminates the causes of suffering and how to remove those causes.  But to say that I should care about suffering - yours, mine, or anyone's - and call that an objective truth, is specious.  I may well care about your suffering, but if I do, it's for reasons of emotion and/or appetite.  Even my concern for my own suffering is a matter of emotion and/or appetite.  All concern, without exception, is emotional and/or appetitive.  All concern is subjective.

To use different words - morality begins with motivation.  Nothing is good, to me, except that I am motivated toward doing it, experiencing it, having it, knowing it has occurred or is occurring, or knowing it has existed or exists.  Nothing is bad, to me, except that I am motivated toward not doing it, not experiencing it, not having it, knowing it hasn't occurred or isn't occurring, or knowing it hasn't existed or doesn't exist.  Motivation is subjective.

I am a scientarian.  This means I am motivated toward doing what scientists do when I consider truth or falsehood.  It also means I am motivated toward experiencing the learning that comes from reading about science, and also am motivated toward knowing that the activities of science continue to occur, the latter in turn motivating me to speak up as science's advocate when the occasion presents itself.

Once I deem something good, I then consider how to accomplish, experience, have, or be confident of the perpetuation of that which I deem good.  Likewise, once I deem something bad, I then consider how to avoid accomplishing, avoid experiencing, avoid having, or be confident of the cessation of that which I deem bad.  Questions of how are questions best put to science, or at least science's methods.  Empiricism and logic, with intuition a powerful source of hypotheses, are the only path to reliable answers for questions of how.  Questions of why must be put to one's own emotional and appetitive apparatuses, as tbey are the only path to answering questions of why.  The right tool for the right task.

So basically if I'm reading you right you are saying that a child molester should molest kids to their hearts content because the only 'right' thing for them to do is fulfill their "appetite"

This model of morality seems so counter intuitive to anything most of us would purport.  I'm not saying it's wrong (in this post). Just wanted to know your response to the question.

Quote from: "Ihateusernames"So basically if I'm reading you right you are saying that a child molester should molest kids to their hearts content because the only 'right' thing for them to do is fulfill their "appetite"

If "right thing" was the only factor in this equasion, then yes for all I care. However, it is not, so I think a better way of looking at it is this: "Do what thou willst - then pay the price"  

QuoteHis argument is specious. He assumes I should care about suffering, and then talks about how science illuminates the causes of suffering and how to remove those causes.

Well, yes, he does make the outrageous assumption that he's talking to a human being about morality.

Quote from: "Asmodean"

Quote from: "Ihateusernames"So basically if I'm reading you right you are saying that a child molester should molest kids to their hearts content because the only 'right' thing for them to do is fulfill their "appetite"

If "right thing" was the only factor in this equasion, then yes for all I care. However, it is not, so I think a better way of looking at it is this: "Do what thou willst - then pay the price"  

You do realize that a vast majority of pedophiles don't ever pay any 'price', correct?  But its just nice to know that you will admit that you think they are doing something 'good' by abusing children.

Quote from: "Ihateusernames"So basically if I'm reading you right you are saying that a child molester should molest kids to their hearts content because the only 'right' thing for them to do is fulfill their "appetite"

No.  My point has nothing to do with whether child molesting is wrong, but rather, with why it's wrong.  It's wrong because we say so.  If we stopped saying so, and nobody else was saying so, then there would be no basis by which it could be wrong.

If I saw someone molesting a child, I would intervene to protect the child, because my morality would require it - but I wouldn't claim that my morality was objectively true.  I would claim my morality as mine, and do what I considered right, because I considered it right.  I would also consider the child molester to be wrong, but not for any objective reason, but simply because I judged him wrong by my own morality, which belongs to me, and which I made for myself.  

But go ahead, if you wish - offer an objective reason why molesting a child is wrong.  It will have to be a reason that (1) isn't grounded in opinion; (2) isn't true because we say so; and (3) isn't extrapolated from the supernatural or some other abstraction unavailable to the five senses or to mechanical instruments of detection.

Quote from: "Asmodean"I think a better way of looking at it is this: "Do what thou willst - then pay the price"  

Excellent point.  We don't rely on morality to stop or punish child molesters.  We have something better.  We have law and the gun-toting cops who champion it.

Quote from: "dloubet"Well, yes, he [Sam Harris] does make the outrageous assumption that he's talking to a human being about morality.

I presume you're offering consensus as our objective measuring rod.  If I'm right, then I will ask, by what right do you claim consensus as objective?  I'll note that consensus is notoriously unreliable as to matters of fact and notoriously fickle as to matters of opinion.

Quoteby what right do you claim consensus as objective?

Consensus gets to define what the word means.

I'm trying to sway the consensus to my definition of morality being those behaviors that allow people to live together in peace and harmony.

Good luck swaying the consensus to your definition.

Quote from: "dloubet"Consensus gets to define what the word means.

I agree.  (For those who just now came into the discussion, the word in question is morality.)

QuoteI'm trying to sway the consensus to my definition of morality being those behaviors that allow people to live together in peace and harmony.

You would thus be attempting to sway public opinion your way.  If you start a thread that explicitly attempts precisely that, I would enjoy observing and participating.  I promise not to bother discussing subjectivism on a thread with that exact agenda, as there won't be any point in doing so, since you won't be attempting to prove objectively what morality is, but rather will be attempting to convince others to embrace your vision of what morality should be - an attempt at propaganda, and, like all propaganda, subjectivist to the core.

QuoteGood luck swaying the consensus to your definition.

I don't know if I explicitly defined the term - an oversight I should rectify.  I will define morality as, "the criteria by which the individual or collective judges a behavior as proper or improper for sapients to engage in."  My definition is agnostic toward what those criteria are and unopinionated as to what they should be.  As such, I doubt anyone will attempt to dispute it.  A definition that instead was gnostic toward what those criteria are would be hotly debated from all sorts of angles, a proliferation of angles that would multiply like rabbits.  The thread I propose above, by contrast, would be presenting a definition that was, instead, opinionated as to what the criteria should be, without attempting to be gnostic as to what they are - and,if open about its agenda, might fulfill it.

Quote from: "Ihateusernames"But its just nice to know that you will admit that you think they are doing something 'good' by abusing children.

Wrong. I clearly stated that, at the end of the day, I don't care. I find pedophilia distasteful, but that does not make it an objective wrongdoing, and I can't be bothered to care unless it hits close to home. THAT I always have, and will be, honest about.

Quote

QuoteConsensus gets to define what the word means.

I agree. (For those who just now came into the discussion, the word in question is morality.)

And that is my objective criteria.

Quotean attempt at propaganda, and, like all propaganda, subjectivist to the core.

The propaganda may be subjective, but any result will be objective.

QuoteI will define morality as, "the criteria by which the individual or collective judges a behavior as proper or improper for sapients to engage in."

What do proper and improper mean in this context?

Quote from: "dloubet"

Quote from: "Inevitable Droid"

Quote from: "dloubet"Consensus gets to define what the word means.

I agree. (For those who just now came into the discussion, the word in question is morality.)

And that is my objective criteria.

If you can get people to agree to define the word the way you want, then the word will mean what you want it to mean.  No argument there.  That's a big if, however.

Quote from: "dloubet"

Quote from: "Inevitable Droid"an attempt at propaganda, and, like all propaganda, subjectivist to the core.

The propaganda may be subjective, but any result will be objective.

First it has to succeed.  I look forward to watching you give it a try.

Quote from: "dloubet"

Quote from: "Inevitable Droid"I will define morality as, "the criteria by which the individual or collective judges a behavior as proper or improper for sapients to engage in."

What do proper and improper mean in this context?

Whatever the reader wants them to mean.

That's interesting.

Since proper and improper can mean what ever the reader wants, that means there's no limit on what can be proper or improper. This is also true of the absence of morality. Thus there is no difference between morality, and no morality.

If the presence of something can't be discerned from the absence of that same thing, it's a strong indicator that the something doesn't exist.

Or the definition is wrong.

Quote from: "dloubet"Since proper and improper can mean what ever the reader wants, that means there's no limit on what can be proper or improper. This is also true of the absence of morality.  Thus there is no difference between morality, and no morality.

No.  Here are propositions A, B, C, D, and E, all of which can logically be made if we assume my definition of morality, which is, "the criteria by which the individual or collective judges a behavior as proper or improper for sapients to engage in."

A) If morality doesn't exist at all, then proper and improper are null sets.

B) If morality exists, then proper and improper aren't null sets.

C) If objective morality exists, then proper and improper aren't null sets and their contents include propositions that don't rely for their condition of being true on opinion, commitment, or imagination.

D) If subjective morality exists, then proper and improper aren't null sets and their contents include propositions that in fact do rely for their condition of being true on opinion, commitment, or imagination.

E) If morality exists but its attributes are completely unknown at this time, then proper and improper aren't null sets and their contents cannot in any way be predicted at this time, except that they aren't null.

All five of the above propositions are consistent with my definition.  With respect to your claim, it is falsified by the fact that proposition A and proposition E are utterly distinct.

Are you insisting that all behaviors are either proper or improper?

If you aren't, then it's possible that (B) If morality exists, then proper and improper aren't null sets. is false. It could be that morality exists, but no behaviors are considered proper or improper.

Quote from: "dloubet"Are you insisting that all behaviors are either proper or improper?

No.

QuoteIf you aren't, then it's possible that (B) If morality exists, then proper and improper aren't null sets. is false. It could be that morality exists, but no behaviors are considered proper or improper.

How could morality exist if no behaviors at all are either proper are improper?  The utter absence of propriety or impropriety would be the absence of morality, by any definition I've ever heard, and certainly by mine.

All that's required for proper and improper to avoid being null sets would be for one behavior to be proper, and one improper.

QuoteHow could morality exist if no behaviors at all are either proper are improper?

Easy, if you can justify "E) If morality exists but its attributes are completely unknown at this time, then proper and improper aren't null sets and their contents cannot in any way be predicted at this time, except that they aren't null. then I can justify claiming that there may be unknown behaviors that would be considered proper or improper thus justifying the existence of morality, but at the same time there are no current behaviors judged as proper or improper so the sets are null.

Quote from: "dloubet"Easy, if you can justify "E) If morality exists but its attributes are completely unknown at this time, then proper and improper aren't null sets and their contents cannot in any way be predicted at this time, except that they aren't null. then I can justify claiming that there may be unknown behaviors that would be considered proper or improper thus justifying the existence of morality, but at the same time there are no current behaviors judged as proper or improper so the sets are null.

Out of curiosity, what's the point of this exercise?  If I were to admit that you had me stumped, what would that demonstrate, other than a failure of my own capacity for logical thought?

As it turns out, the above brain teaser is resolved by recourse to the definition of morality originally posed, namely, "the criteria by which the individual or collective judges a behavior as proper or improper for sapients to engage in."

Per the above definition, if morality exists, then criteria exist by which the individual or collective judges a behavior proper or improper.  If such criteria exist, then judging by those criteria can occur.  If judging by those criteria can occur, then the judgments that would be logically necessary are available to be rendered, and those judgments are the ones in question, namely, propriety or impropriety.
 
Now, given the above, we can query said criteria, as to whether they are known or unknown.  If they are known, we can employ them.  If they are unknown, then we must either (1) discover them; (2) create new ones; or (3) conclude that no such criteria exist or can exist, and thus conclude that morality doesn't exist and can't exist.  If we reject option 3, that leaves us with attempting discovery, or attempting creation.  It may be plausible* that we could fail to discover the elusive criteria, but it isn't plausible that we would fail to create new ones, given a serious attempt, unless our creative capacities are so severely limited that we are incapable of creating any mental objects at all.  Anyone capable of posting on a message board is capable of creating mental objects.  Being one member of that class of people, I exert my brain, and start brainstorming.  The first mental object that pops into my head is the one you had previously proposed, namely, "behaviors that allow people to live together in peace and harmony."  So I run with that.  I create a definition for proper, that being, "(of behavior) the quality of allowing people to live together in peace and harmony"; and, for improper, "(of behavior) lacking the quality of allowing people to live together in peace and harmony."

At this point, I am faced with deciding whether to commit to my definitions or not.  If I choose not to commit, then I must go back to the drawing board, and either discover the criteria for judging, or else create new criteria, and if I still choose to create, then I resume brainstorming.  But if, instead, I decide to commit to my definitions, then I will have my own private definitions, subjective ones, since at this point they are mine and only mine, and they are mine only because I committed to them.   I could theoretically have committed to other ones, but I committed to these.

Now I am faced with whether to be satisfied with my accomplishment, and thus be satisfied with definitions that are strictly private, or whether, instead, I shall attempt to convince others to commit to my definitions, establishing a consensus, whereby, at least for those committing, the definitions shall be available for use in communication, and in fact will be taken for granted; I.e., assumed.  I had previously invited you to attempt this very exercise, and I invite you again.

* The only way we might fail to discover criteria is if we insisted the criteria had to be absolutely universal, and we would only insist that if we insisted on objective morality, and, in turn, insisted that objective criteria would be universally held by all sane humans in all time periods, as I would insist.  Subjective morality doesn't require universality.

QuoteOut of curiosity, what's the point of this exercise?

To show your definition of morality is not only not congruent with the consensus, but devoid of meaning.

Since you refuse to offer any specifics as to the meaning of proper and improper, your current definition of morality is "Anything goes."

This is pretty much everyone else's definition of no morality at all.

Mine at least provides a handle on the meaning and purpose of the word.

Quote from: "dloubet"

QuoteOut of curiosity, what's the point of this exercise?

To show your definition of morality is not only not congruent with the consensus, but devoid of meaning.

Have you looked up morality in a dictionary?  You'll find my definition is very much in line with how dictionaries define the word.  For example, my Random House Webster's College Dictionary defines morality as, "(1) conformity to the rules of right conduct; (2) moral quality or character; (3) virtue in sexual matters; chastity; (4) a doctrine or system of morals; (5) moral instruction; a moral lesson, precept, discourse, or utterance; (6) MORALITY PLAY."

Definition (1) is agnostic as to what the rules of right conduct are.  Definition (2) depends on the definition of moral, which I'll come back to.  Definition (3) is the only definition that says anything really specific.  Shall we accept chastity as a moral precept?  I suppose we could.  It never occurred to me to do so.  Definition (4) is agnostic as to which doctrine or system of morals is being referenced.  Definition (5) is agnostic as to which lessons, precepts, discourses, or utterances fit the category.  Definition (6) is specific to Christianity and thus is surely outside our discussion, since surely we are assuming atheism.

My dictionary defines the adjective moral as, "(1) of, pertaining to, or concerned with the principles of right conduct or the distinction between right and wrong; ethical; (2) conforming to accepted or established principles of right conduct; virtuous; upright; (3) expressing or conveying truths or counsel as to right conduct; (4) based on fundamental principles of right conduct rather than on law, custom, etc.; (5) capable of recognizing and conforming to the rules of right conduct; (6) virtuous in sexual matters; chaste; (7) of, pertaining to, or acting on the mind, feelings, will, or character; (8) based on strong probability; virtual."

Definition (1) is agnostic as to what the principles of right conduct are.  Definition (2) leaves us to determine for ourselves what the accepted or established principles of right conduct, if any, are, just as my definition does.  Definition (3) is agnostic as to what right conduct is.  Definition (4) leaves us to determine what the fundamental principles of right conduct, if any, are, just as my definition does.  Definition (5) is agnostic as to what right conduct is.  Definition (6) is the only definition that says anything really specific.  Shall we accept chastity as a moral precept?  I suppose we could.  It never occurred to me to do so.  Definition (7) addresses a meaning of the word moral that doesn't fit our discussion, but in any case, it offers no opinion as to how the mind, feelings, will, or character should be acted upon.  Definition (8) addresses a meaning of the word moral that doesn't fit our discussion, being pertinent to a discussion of epistemology rather than ethics.

Your idea of defining morality in such a way that our definition would inherently constrain our behavior in specific, concrete, pre-determined, falsifiable ways, is the underlying idea of the branch of philosophy known as ethics, notorious for the inability of its many alleged experts to come to any consensus, despite millennia of debate going back at least to the ancient Greeks.

At this point, I will take up my dictionary's definitions for the adjective right, so as to offer a complete response to your contention.

My dictionary defines the adjective right as, "(1) in accordance with what is good, proper, or just; (2) in conformity with fact or reason, as in, the right answer; (3) correct in judgment, opinion, or action; (4) appropriate, suitable; (5) most desirable; (6) of, pertaining to, or located on or near the side of a person or thing that is turned toward the east when the subject is facing north; (7) sound; sane; (8) in good health or spirits; (9) principle, front, or upper; (10) having conservative or reactionary views in politics; (11) socially desirable or influential, as said of people; (12) straight, as said of a drawn line; (13) having an axis perpendicular to the base; (14) in mathematics, pertaining to an element of a set that has a given property when placed on the right of an element or set of elements of a given set; (15) genuine, authentic."

Definition (1) is agnostic as to what constitutes the good, proper, or just.  Notice the presence of my own suggested adjective, proper.  Definition (2) pertains to epistemology rather than ethics.  Definition (3) is agnostic as to what would constitute being correct.  Defintion (4) is agnostic as to what constitutes the appropriate or suitable, presumably leaving it to society to make a determination, and thus is friendly to subjectivism.  Definition (5) is subjectivist to the core.  Definition (6) is irrelevant to our discussion.  Definition (7) is agnostic as to what constitutes sanity, a concept that has evolved over the course of history.  Definition (8), if used as a criterion for moral rightness, would be subjectivist to the core.  Definitions (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), and (14) are irrelevant to our discussion.  Definition (15) leaves us to determine what is genuine or authentic with regard to a given situation or its principle agents.  

As it happens, definitions (1), (7), and (15) address concerns that are often or at least sometimes taken up by ethicists as potential candidates for devising an allegedly objective system of ethics.  The absence of consensus among the alleged experts in said branch of philosophy would argue against the utility of this approach.  In other words, the alleged experts debate incessantly as to what is good, what is just, what is sane, or what is authentic.

I'm going to start a new thread around the concept of the sane competent adult as a paradigm that might provide a lynchpin for morality.  We'll see where that goes.  I invite you a third time to start a thread around your own proposed paradigm of a peaceful and harmonious society.

The only universal moral sentiment I can discern is a distrust for the genuinely amoral.  When we who aren't amoral encounter someone we instinctlvely know to be without a conscience of any kind, we recoil, horrified, for we know that absent fear of detection, or absent fear of punishment or humiliation if detected, this individual would do absolutely anything, and thus would potentially be the enemy of all life.  So I say that this is the sole maxim of objective morality: Have a conscience.  What sort of conscience?  That is entirely up to you.  Just have one, please.  

All else is arbitrary.

I found this excellent article on moral realism, which is, essentially, the doctrine that objective morality exists.  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, on Moral Reaslism: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/

After reading the above, I became clear on precisely why I'm a subjectivist.  Consider the basic building blocks of the sapient psyche: (1) sensory perception; (2) logic; (3) intuition; (4) emotion; (5) appetite.  Of these, which can yield knowledge, which can yield hypotheses, and which can yield neither?

I claim the following.  
1. Logic by itself can yield knowledge about mathematics or formal logic but cannot (by itself) yield knowledge about nature.  
2. Sensory perception plus logic can yield knowledge or hypotheses about nature, or hypotheses about mathematics; the latter being testable later by sustained application of logic alone; but cannot yield even hypotheses about formal logic, since sensory perception is irrelevant to that discipline, beyond the fact that we need eyes to read a treatise or ears to listen to a lecture.  
3. Intuition can yield hypotheses about mathematics, formal logic, or nature but cannot yield knowledge of any of those.  
4. Emotion, coupled with logic, can yield knowledge or hypotheses about one's own emotional apparatus, and hypotheses about the evolution of one's own species, but cannot yield knowledge about nature (beyond one's own emotional apparatus) or even hypotheses about mathematics or formal logic.  
5. Appetite, coupled with logic, can yield knowledge or hypotheses about one's own appetitive apparatus, and hypotheses about the evolution of one's own species, but cannot yield knowledge about nature (beyond one's own appetitive apparatus) or even hypotheses about mathematics or formal logic.  

Where would the principles of objective morality reside, then?  In nature, mathematics, or formal logic?  Not in mathematics, presumably, since goodness is presumably a quality, not a quantity.  In formal logic?  Only to the extent that formal logic itself, the act of engaging in it, might be deemed good, or that reliable accuracy might be deemed good - but it wouldn't be formal logic that renders that judgment, since formal logic can only yield conclusions regarding the reliable accuracy of logical constructions, as opposed to the conclusions one would draw after applying a reliable logical construction to a set of premises, those premises always deriving from outside formal logic itself.  In nature?  Well, if not in nature, then apparently nowhere, so we'd have to hypothesize that the propositions of objective morality are to be found in nature.

Beyond knowledge of my own emotional or appetitive apparatuses, knowledge of nature is available to me via one course, and one course alone, that of applying sensory perception plus logic.

Applying sensory perception plus logic to nature is science, or would be, once we add certain disciplines, which are really just rules about how to apply sensory perception plus logic to nature in order for one's conclusions to be most reliable.
 
Thus the propositions of objective morality would have to come from science.  How could this occur?  I don't see how this could occur.  I can't even tentatively grasp at a hypothesis as to how this could occur.  Science tells us what is.  Morality concerns what should be.  What is and what should be aren't identical by any means, from any perspective I've ever heard, except the best of all possible worlds theory, which claims that what is, is the best of all possible worlds, and thus must be deemed good.  But the best of all possible worlds theory derives from the premise of an omnipotent, omniscient, and all-loving God.  That premise is intellectual treason for the empiricist and in any case is useless to the atheist.  We're left with what is as sometimes intersecting with what should be but sometimes not, with the points of intersection and the points of non-intersection only discernible once we already have in place our propositions of morality, which are strictly propositions about what should be, not at all about what is.  I can't escape what seems self-evident to me, that science and morality are two utterly distinct disciplines, the former sometimes providing data to the latter, and the latter sometimes imposing constraints or agendas upon the former, but the two disciplines always separated by a bright line.

And so I can't escape the conclusion that objective morality is impossible.

Part 1 -

Try this on for size:

It is absolutely and universally true that it is morally wrong to do what you believe is morally wrong.

Put another way:

Acting against your own moral code is absolutely and universally wrong.

Part 2 -

Try this on for size:

It is absolutely and universally true that it is morally wrong to believe nothing is morally wrong.

Put another way:

Having no moral code is absolutely and universally wrong.

Quote from: "Inevitable Droid"Part 1 -

Try this on for size:

It is absolutely and universally true that it is morally wrong to do what you believe is morally wrong.

Put another way:

Acting against your own moral code is absolutely and universally wrong.

I reject the above as I know of no universal source whence a normative demand to honor one's own moral code might spring.

However, I assert this, and firmly:

It is illogical to do what you believe (or have decided) is morally wrong.  Acting against your own moral code is illogical.  Either change or delete your moral code or do what it demands, if you want to be logical.  Being illogical is certainly an option available to you.

QuotePart 2 -

Try this on for size:

It is absolutely and universally true that it is morally wrong to believe nothing is morally wrong.

Put another way:

Having no moral code is absolutely and universally wrong.

I reject the above as I know of no universal source whence a normative demand to have a moral code might spring.  Amoraliy and immorality do not intersect.  Because non-erroneous moral objectivity does not and cannot exist, and thus the only existent non-erroneous morality is subjective, it follows that an amoral creature cannot be immoral, since subjective morality would by definition be lacking, and an immoral creature cannot be amoral, since it could only be immoral from its own subjective perspective, which by definition would deny it the status of being amoral.

It can also be perfectly logical to believe nothing is morally wrong.  Having no moral code can be perfectly logical.  Logic as such makes no normative demands on behavior.  Logic stipulates what must be true, not what must be done.

I posted what follows on another thread in response to questions from a theist.  I realized later that it was directly relevant to this thread.  So here it is.

Premise A1. Absolute causality implies determinism.
Premise A2. Determinism implies no real choice.
Premise A3. Real choice is necessary for there to be moral culpability.
Conclusion A. There is no moral culpability.

Premise B1. The existence of objective morality is necessary for there to be objective moral culpability.
Premise B2. Objective moral facts are necessary for objective morality to exist.
Premise B3. The only kinds of objective facts are empirical, mathematical, and logical.
Premise B4. Empirical, mathematical, and logical facts are not moral facts.
Conclusion B1. There are no objective moral facts.
Conclusion B2. Objective morality does not exist.
Conclusion B3. There is no objective moral culpability.

Premise C1. The existence of subjective morality is necessary for there to be subjective moral culpability.
Premise C2. My commitment is necessary for subjective morality to exist in my case.
Premise C3. I have withdrawn my commitment.
Conclusion C1. Subjective morality does not exist in my case.
Conclusion C2. There is no subjective moral culpability in my case.

Premise D1. Moral culpability must either be objective or subjective.
Premise D2. There is no objective moral culpability.
Premise D3. There is no subjective moral culpability in my case.
Conclusion D. There is no moral culpability in my case.