Happy Atheist Forum

I've been thinking. What does it mean for someone to say “God exists”?

In what follows my focus is on the meaning, not the truth, of “God exists” (there are many great threads on the latter topic, but it is not my purpose here).

I should also make clear that I am talking about the statement “God exists” NOT the statement “I believe that God exists” (see  parts (ii) and (v/ii) below).


(i) Empirical statements

First off let's get one thing sorted out. “God exists” is not an empirical statement. The meaning of a statement like “the atomic weight of deuterium is 2.014 u” rests in empirical observation. Simply put we can conduct a test to verify or falsify that statement (by measurement of deuterium). While there are some who argue for the empirical plausibility of God (ie the cosmological/teleological arguments); there is no test we can conduct which proves the issue one way or the other. The statement “God exists” cannot be demonstrated/invalidated by reference to evidence.

What characterises empirical statements is our ability (even potential ability) to verify/falsify by reference to evidence. If anyone doubts this compare the following statements: “the atomic weight of deuterium is 2.014 u” and “the atomic weight of deuterium is pickle”. We cannot adduce evidence to support or disprove the latter statement, and so it is not empirical. [Note: it follows that it is equally not empirical to say “the atomic weight of deuterium is not pickle”.]

Thus “God exists” is not an empirical statement.

(ii) Subjective statements

It may seem that “God exists” is a subjective statement. However what is important is to understand I am looking for the meaning of “God exists” NOT the meaning of the statement “I believe that God exists”.

Let us take the simple subjective statement “I love her”. Clearly this statement carries huge meaning, however what is important is that the meaning is limited to my personal reality. The statement's meaning is derived from the fact that it is referring to what is true for me. “I love her” has meaning because I have direct access to my own feelings of love.

“God exists”, on the other hand, is making a claim about something external to me. So while “God exists” does not rest on personal reality, rather it is a claim about reality external to me. In other words “I love her” requires that I exist; “God exists” is, in theory, independent of whether I exist or not.

Thus “God exists” is not a subjective statement.

[NOTE: “I believe that God exists”, on the other hand, is a subjective statement]

(iii) Metaphysical statements

To briefly recap: “God exists” is an objective statement about reality (in the late great Philip K Dick's phrase: “that which does not go away when you stop believing in it”) - see part (ii) above. However it is not a statement about empirical reality â€" see part (i) above. We are then left with one option. “God exists” is a metaphysical statement. A metaphysical statement is one which claims something to be true, independent of us, and necessarily beyond our ability to empirically demonstrate.

The question we are left with is: where do metaphysical statements derive their meaning from? To answer that we need to look at how language works.

(iv) Language

In a previous thread I used Chomsky's lovely example of a grammatically correct but meaningless sentence: “Colourless green dreams sleep furiously”. It is profitable to ask why this sentence is meaningless. The problem is one of reference. For example, when we say “dream” we are referring to a particular thing. We do not understand “dream” as referring to something which can “sleep” or have a colour like “green”. The sentence is meaningless because the words used refer to things that cannot meaningfully be held together.

This leads us to the realisation that language is meaningful because it refers.

(v/i) Reference and Empricism

To go back to the examples in part (i), we can understand “the atomic weight of deuterium is 2.014 u” because we agree what the words refer to. On the other hand “the atomic weight of deuterium is pickle” is meaningless because when we say “atomic weight” it does not refer to something that can be “pickle”! Our reference breaks down and so the sentence becomes meaningless.

What is important to understand here is that, for an empirical statement to be meaningful, we must agree on what we are referring to. So for example to agree that “I am six foot tall” we must agree what the words; “six”, “foot”, and “tall”; refer to. The meaning of empirical statements rests upon our ability to agree on what we are referring to; so our points of reference must be publicly accessible (eg a tape measure allowing us to agree on the reference of “six foot”).

Empirical meaning relies upon agreement as to what our language is referring to. Moreover for this to work these references must be to things that are publicly accessible (ie evidence).

(v/ii) Reference and the Subjective

The situation is slightly different for subjective statements. “I love her” does not directly refer to something that is publicly accessible. Only I can know what I am referring to with the word “love”, my emotions are not accessible to anyone other than me. However this is not a problem as in terms of public reference we understand “love” in the 1st person as referring to something private in terms of content. HOWEVER the statement “he loves her” (“love” in the 3rd person) does refer to something publicly accessible in terms of behaviour.

So for example if I say “I love her”; then others can meaningfully say “he loves her” by reference to my behaviour (not least the evidence of me saying “I love her”) which is publicly accessible.

Thus even subjective reference to my private reality is meaningful because of its ability to refer to behaviour which is publicly accessible.

[NOTE: The statement “I believe that God exists” is meaningful in exactly this manner.]

(v/iii) Reference and the Metaphysical

So, finally, back to the initial question what does “God exists” mean?

As discussed above “God exists” is not a subjective statement; it is making an objective claim (ie that God exists independent of my existence). However we have also seen that “God exists”, while being an objective statement, is not an empirical one (see parts (i), (ii), &(iii)). This means that “God exists” cannot refer to merely personal reality, as with subjective statements.

I may have a personal understanding of God so for me “God exists” has meaning. You may also have a personal understanding of God so for you “God exists” has meaning. The problem arises in trying to check if our meanings match.

The reason our meanings must match for “God exists” to be meaningful is that it is an objective statement. The reality it claims is external to us. If a statement is to be meaningfully objective it is necessary that we can ensure we are referring to the same thing.

The problem is that, while “God exists” does refer to personal understandings of God, there is nothing publicly accessible which this can be referring to. So there is no way to verify that my meaning of “God exists” matches to your meaning of “God exits” in terms of reference.

This leads us to a simple paradox. “God exists” claims to tell us something objective; however it can only ever refer to private meanings which cannot be compared. In other words “God exists” rests solely upon subjective reference while making an objective claim! This is a contradiction; which leads us inexorably to the following conclusions:

(vi) Conclusions

1: “God exists” is strictly meaningless;

from which it logically follows that:

2: Any statement of the form “God is x” is strictly meaningless;

it should also be noted, especially by us atheists, that for the same reasons:

3: “God does not exist” is strictly meaningless;

and so:

4: Any statement of the form “God is not x” is strictly meaningless. [@ Jac â€" hence my objection to negative theology â€" sorry I never got back to you on your thread, I was drowning in too much content, I hope this post will suffice as an answer]

NOTE A: None of these conclusions bear on the reality or otherwise of God(s); my point is about meaning, NOT truth.

NOTE B: This line of argument can be applied far more generally to all metaphysical statements, it is not limited to God-talk.

NOTE C: I have possibly lead myself into an ugly paradox. The general statement “all metaphysical statements are, due to lack of reference, strictly meaningless” is, by its own terms, a meaningless statement! I do not think it is fatal to my argument ('cause I don't think my argument requires me to affirm the meaning of that general statement â€" rather it can be approached from first principles â€" a Wittgensteinian 'ladder') but in the interests of full disclosure I thought I should flag it up.

Anyhow hope that was of interest to some.

peace

It was very interesting. Thank you for taking the time and effort to compose and post your thoughts.

Quote from: "penfold"(i) Empirical statements

First off let's get one thing sorted out. “God exists” is not an empirical statement. The meaning of a statement like “the atomic weight of deuterium is 2.014 u” rests in empirical observation. Simply put we can conduct a test to verify or falsify that statement (by measurement of deuterium). While there are some who argue for the empirical plausibility of God (ie the cosmological/teleological arguments); there is no test we can conduct which proves the issue one way or the other. The statement “God exists” cannot be demonstrated/invalidated by reference to evidence.

What characterises empirical statements is our ability (even potential ability) to verify/falsify by reference to evidence. If anyone doubts this compare the following statements: “the atomic weight of deuterium is 2.014 u” and “the atomic weight of deuterium is pickle”. We cannot adduce evidence to support or disprove the latter statement, and so it is not empirical. [Note: it follows that it is equally not empirical to say “the atomic weight of deuterium is not pickle”.]

Thus “God exists” is not an empirical statement.

I can't agree with this, although I do see where you're coming from. 'God exists' is indeed an empirical statement. The difficulty lies not in the statement, but the utter lack of a coherent definition for the word 'god'. Of course, this is precisely what the credulous want, because every time they've attempted to provide a coherent definition, that definition has brought the concept into the realm of falsifiability and, on every occasion that any concept of god has been brought into this realm, it's been falsified. Since there are so many definitions of god, most of them anything but coherent, it is impossible to falsify, not because they are in principle unfalsifiable, but because they are deliberately formulated in such a way as to be unopen to rigorous scrutiny.

Quote(ii) Subjective statements

It may seem that “God exists” is a subjective statement. However what is important is to understand I am looking for the meaning of “God exists” NOT the meaning of the statement “I believe that God exists”.

Again, what you really need here is a definition of 'god' without which the statement is meaningless. As for the distinction between objective and subjective statements, both of the above are objective statements, and neither of them is subjective.

QuoteLet us take the simple subjective statement “I love her”. Clearly this statement carries huge meaning, however what is important is that the meaning is limited to my personal reality. The statement's meaning is derived from the fact that it is referring to what is true for me. “I love her” has meaning because I have direct access to my own feelings of love.

That's to misunderstand what the word 'subjective' means. This statement is, again, an objective one. It is a statement of categorical fact (even if not actually true). To state that you love somebody is an objective statement, although it does pertain to a subjective concept. Your access to your feelings of love isn't actually relevant in determining whether or not the statement is subjective. While your love may be subjective, the statement is not. Let me try to put it another way: It is objectively true, for everybody, and for the universe at large, that you love her.

Quote“God exists”, on the other hand, is making a claim about something external to me. So while “God exists” does not rest on personal reality, rather it is a claim about reality external to me. In other words “I love her” requires that I exist; “God exists” is, in theory, independent of whether I exist or not.

Thus “God exists” is not a subjective statement.

Again, this is to misunderstand what subjective actually means. I agree with your conclusion, but I don't agree with how you arrived at it. An objective statement is one that is true from the perspective of reality. Thus 'I like red' is an objective statement, while 'red is nice' is a subjective statement. Do you see the distinction?

Quote[NOTE: “I believe that God exists”, on the other hand, is a subjective statement]

Again, no. That is an objective statement. Stating that you believe something (god is irrelevant in this context) is always an objective statement. The statement about what you believe is true for everybody. In other words, if you state 'I believe that god exists', then it is true for everybody that you believe that god exists. The subject of the statement in this context is not god, but your belief.

Quote(iii) Metaphysical statements

To briefly recap: “God exists” is an objective statement about reality (in the late great Philip K Dick's phrase: “that which does not go away when you stop believing in it”) - see part (ii) above. However it is not a statement about empirical reality â€" see part (i) above.

For the reasons already stated I don't agree with this. 'God exists' is an objective statement. It is also an empirical statement. Again, the difficulty lies not in the statement itself, but in the lack of a coherent, testable definition of 'god.

QuoteWe are then left with one option. “God exists” is a metaphysical statement. A metaphysical statement is one which claims something to be true, independent of us, and necessarily beyond our ability to empirically demonstrate.

No, it only looks like a metaphysical statement because the lack of a coherent definition rules out rigorous investigation. As soon as a coherent definition is provided, it's testable. This is precisely why the credulous go to such great lengths to keep their definitions either nebulous and loaded with ambiguity, or utterly incoherent, and that's only on the odd occasion that they can actually be pressed into providing one, which is a rare occurence indeed.

Quote(iv) Language

In a previous thread I used Chomsky's lovely example of a grammatically correct but meaningless sentence: “Colourless green dreams sleep furiously”. It is profitable to ask why this sentence is meaningless. The problem is one of reference. For example, when we say “dream” we are referring to a particular thing. We do not understand “dream” as referring to something which can “sleep” or have a colour like “green”. The sentence is meaningless because the words used refer to things that cannot meaningfully be held together.

Exactly. the reason that the phrase makes no sense is because it constitutes a string of category errors, in treating things as what they are not. Dreams aren't capable of sleeping, furiously or otherwise. Sleep also can't be done furiously.

QuoteThis leads us to the realisation that language is meaningful because it refers.

I'd go further, and say that language doesn't just refer, but it is, in essence, reference. That's its job.

Quote(v/i) Reference and Empricism

To go back to the examples in part (i), we can understand “the atomic weight of deuterium is 2.014 u” because we agree what the words refer to. On the other hand “the atomic weight of deuterium is pickle” is meaningless because when we say “atomic weight” it does not refer to something that can be “pickle”! Our reference breaks down and so the sentence becomes meaningless.

What is important to understand here is that, for an empirical statement to be meaningful, we must agree on what we are referring to. So for example to agree that “I am six foot tall” we must agree what the words; “six”, “foot”, and “tall”; refer to. The meaning of empirical statements rests upon our ability to agree on what we are referring to; so our points of reference must be publicly accessible (eg a tape measure allowing us to agree on the reference of “six foot”).

And this goes directly to my point above, namely that until a coherent definition for the word 'god' is provided, the statement is, in principle, untestable. This isn't because the concept itself is untestable, but because the concept has no definition. It has no testable attributes, which is why it's unfalsifiable. It's still an empirical statement, however. The statement 'furblesnarg is red' is an empirical statement. Once we agree upon what furblesnarg actually is, we can get on with testing it.

QuoteEmpirical meaning relies upon agreement as to what our language is referring to. Moreover for this to work these references must be to things that are publicly accessible (ie evidence).

Which again goes straight to the core of what I was saying above, namely that it isn't the statement itself that is untestable, but the lack of any definition for 'god'. Whenever a definition has been provided, it has been open to falsification, and it has failed to withstand scrutiny on every occasion.

Quote(v/ii) Reference and the Subjective

The situation is slightly different for subjective statements. “I love her” does not directly refer to something that is publicly accessible. Only I can know what I am referring to with the word “love”, my emotions are not accessible to anyone other than me. However this is not a problem as in terms of public reference we understand “love” in the 1st person as referring to something private in terms of content. HOWEVER the statement “he loves her” (“love” in the 3rd person) does refer to something publicly accessible in terms of behaviour.

Except, of course, that the statement itself is publicly accessible. That statement is not empirical but it is objective. The love itself might not be objective, but the statement is.

QuoteSo for example if I say “I love her”; then others can meaningfully say “he loves her” by reference to my behaviour (not least the evidence of me saying “I love her”) which is publicly accessible.

Bingo! You have just defined the statement as objective. It is objectively true for all parties that you love her, thus it isn't a subjective statement.

QuoteThus even subjective reference to my private reality is meaningful because of its ability to refer to behaviour which is publicly accessible.

That's why it isn't subjective

Quote[NOTE: The statement “I believe that God exists” is meaningful in exactly this manner.]

And thus it is objective. It's a statement of something that is true about the real world, and this truth holds for everybody, not in the sense that everybody believes that god exists, but in the sense that it is true for everybody that the person making the statement believes that god exists (with the important caveat that it may not be true at all, but that's another topic, and not really germane to this discussion

Quote(v/iii) Reference and the Metaphysical

So, finally, back to the initial question what does “God exists” mean?

As discussed above “God exists” is not a subjective statement; it is making an objective claim (ie that God exists independent of my existence). However we have also seen that “God exists”, while being an objective statement, is not an empirical one (see parts (i), (ii), &(iii)). This means that “God exists” cannot refer to merely personal reality, as with subjective statements.

Again, it is an empirical statement, and we can get on with testing it once a definition has been provided.

QuoteI may have a personal understanding of God so for me “God exists” has meaning. You may also have a personal understanding of God so for you “God exists” has meaning. The problem arises in trying to check if our meanings match.

There is some truth to this, but it's difficult to pin down. You have actually hit the nail on the head, in that what the concept means to you is almost certainly different from the meaning that it holds for others. What this actually means, in real terms, is that it's meaningless, even from a subjectivist point of view. The word itself is meaningless, because it has no coherent definition.

QuoteThe reason our meanings must match for “God exists” to be meaningful is that it is an objective statement. The reality it claims is external to us. If a statement is to be meaningfully objective it is necessary that we can ensure we are referring to the same thing.

No. Reality is reality. Whether it is internal or external is not relevant here, and has no bearing on the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity. Something that is objectively true is something that is true for everybody. This applies even to your internal reality. Again, have a look at the statements above concerning the colour red, because they rigorously define the distinction between an objective statement and a subjective one.

QuoteThe problem is that, while “God exists” does refer to personal understandings of God, there is nothing publicly accessible which this can be referring to. So there is no way to verify that my meaning of “God exists” matches to your meaning of “God exits” in terms of reference.

I'd have to say that there is no such thing as a personal understanding of god. If there were, the credulous would be able to provide a definition.

QuoteThis leads us to a simple paradox. “God exists” claims to tell us something objective; however it can only ever refer to private meanings which cannot be compared.

That's because there is meaning. The word is entirely meaningless.

QuoteIn other words “God exists” rests solely upon subjective reference while making an objective claim!

Again, I can't agree with this. It actually rests solely upon no reference at all while making an objective claim. There is no reference point by which the idea of 'god' can be measured, thus the concept itself is meaningless. The statement is only meaningless by extension, and that extension is removed once a coherent definition has been provided.

QuoteThis is a contradiction;

I wouldn't classify that as a contradiction. There is nothing contradictory about objective statements made from subjective standpoints. 'I like red' is just such a statement. This is made even more problematic by the simple fact that a rigorous definition of 'red' cannot be agreed upon. Certainly, it can be defined as electromagnetic radiation falling within a specific band of frequencies, but that tells us nothing about 'red', which I may experience entirely differently to you. It may be that what you perceive as red actually looks the way I perceive blue, and the fun part is that we'll almost certainly never know the answer to that question, because it's inherently untestable, not least because when we learn the colours, we are directed to things and told that they are 'red' or 'blue', thus we all agree that red is red (due caveats concerning colourblindness aside) and blue is blue, but that says nothing about our perception of them.

Quotewhich leads us inexorably to the following conclusions:

(vi) Conclusions

1: “God exists” is strictly meaningless;

Here, we need to break the statement into its components. 'God' is meaningless, 'exists' is not. The statement itself is meaningless because of the lack of a coherent definition of god.

Quotefrom which it logically follows that:

2: Any statement of the form “God is x” is strictly meaningless;

it should also be noted, especially by us atheists, that for the same reasons:

3: “God does not exist” is strictly meaningless;

and so:

4: Any statement of the form “God is not x” is strictly meaningless. [@ Jac â€" hence my objection to negative theology â€" sorry I never got back to you on your thread, I was drowning in too much content, I hope this post will suffice as an answer]

NOTE A: None of these conclusions bear on the reality or otherwise of God(s); my point is about meaning, NOT truth.

Agreed.

QuoteNOTE B: This line of argument can be applied far more generally to all metaphysical statements, it is not limited to God-talk.

Not sure about that. I'd have to give it some thought, but I wouldn't mind betting I could think of an example of a metaphysical statement that is not meaningless. The difficulty lies only in the metaphysical concept havig a coherent definition.

QuoteNOTE C: I have possibly lead myself into an ugly paradox. The general statement “all metaphysical statements are, due to lack of reference, strictly meaningless” is, by its own terms, a meaningless statement! I do not think it is fatal to my argument ('cause I don't think my argument requires me to affirm the meaning of that general statement â€" rather it can be approached from first principles â€" a Wittgensteinian 'ladder') but in the interests of full disclosure I thought I should flag it up.

There's no paradox, because that isn't a metaphysical statement in and of itself, it's a statement about metaphysical statements, and 'metaphysic' has a clear and coherent definition, although I'm not absolutely sure that its application has followed that here.

QuoteAnyhow hope that was of interest to some.

It certainly was. Interesting stuff.

Therefore:  god is Meaningless

Sounds about right.

I think your Empirical Statements section is wrong, as far as I can tell, right off the bat. You're addressing the god named God -- because you're capitalizing it -- which commonly means the Christian God as described in the Christian bible.

If that's the case, then there's plenty of opportunity for empirical falsification. Are followers of God able to drink any poison without ill effect? No? Then that god demonsterably doesn't exist. Another different god still might exist, but you've eliminated the one that truthfully promises immunity to poison to its followers in the bible.

You can go through the bible and find lots of empirical hooks to examine. Evidence for a ludicrous worldwide flood? No? Another god down the drain. How about moving mountains with prayer? Nope? Another one bites the dust.

Of course, the Christian will make all kinds of ad-hoc excuses to insulate their god from examination, but we don't actually have to listen to them.

Two objections, pen (although, as always, a very interesting read).

1. To say that the self-refutation isn't fatal to your argument is just denial. That is what self-refutation does. Since all metaphysical statements are meaningless, including that one, then your argument can't even get off the ground. Or, in reverse, you've just led yourself down your own reductio.

Fine, so where did you go wrong?

2. Reference does not have to be to a reality itself. Reference could just as well be to a sign, so long as that sign is fixed and itself clearly defined. In the case of God, while any given sentence about God (including "God exists") runs the risk of being meaningless, we can know by proper proportionality (relative to one another; improper proportionality relative to God) that the statements have a proper reference. In other words, the reference to the statement is not God strictly, but the relationship of those statements terminating in God as they relate one to another.

Concerning metaphysics more generally, there is a whole swath of problems here that stem from Kant (as I'm sure you know). He took it that metaphysics was dead in his prolegomena. Obviously, under a representative epistemology, he is right, for there is absolutely no way out of the Cartesian Theater. This is all, however, deeply assumptive and in any case proves too much, because if we can't get out of the Cartesian Theater, then we really turn out not to be talking about reality at all. This is, as you know, why Kant rejected the notion of causality (not that it isn't TRUE, but that we have no access to TRUE causality, to use your terms), and thus, why he rejected all the traditional arguments for God. His argument from morality was very much like mine from rationality, only for him, the duty was to morality and not rationality. If, then, you fundamentally deny causality, you really are left in absolute despair of any knowledge, and I would argue that all language is meaningless because no language refers to anything beyond itself (inverted intentionality again).

To make this simpler:

IF our ideas are strictly representations of reality and are all that we have direct access to, then we have no access to reality itself, only our ideas about reality.
Since we have no access to reality itself, our words cannot refer to reality itself, but only to our ideas.
It follows then that all words refer only to our own personal ideas. They can never refer to any more than that under any circumstances.

Of course, if you reject (1), as we all should, then we do have direct access to objective reality, and in that case, we have direct access to metaphysical concepts, the chief among them being existence and thus by extension causality. More specifically, we can talk meaningfully about causality, in which case "God," when spoken of indirectly as identified through the causal chain, becomes perfectly meaningful.

He really exists! We have no proof but the testimony of the prophets. The only thing I know is we are here because he exists.

Quote from: "rcbako"He really exists!. We have no proof but the testimony of the prophets. The only thing I know is we are here because he exists.

I think it's more accurate to say that he exists because we are here.  

Quote from: "rcbako"He really exists!. We have no proof but the testimony of the prophets.

Then perhaps you can point us to the testimony of the prophets. I'd like to see the originals, please, rather than the poorly translated versions of poorly transcribed versions of what people allegedly said, written down decades after the alleged events.

QuoteThe only thing I know is we are here because he exists.

You know nothing of the sort.

Thanks to all who struggled all the way through my post and replied; some really interesting stuff.


@ doublet. Though I capitalised God I was not particularly referencing the Xian God, nor even a monotheistic God. You are right though, I should have used “god(s)” rather than “God”. Force of habit! I agree that particular claims, for example biblical ones, can be falsified by evidence (eg creation myths...). However my focus was on the particular statement “God exists” (or  more properly “god(s) exist”) not on any of the strange mythology that grows out of this belief. So I don't think it is a problem for my line of argument.


@ hackenslash. Thank you for your reply; really solid piece of work. In the interests of space I am going to try and condense my response, however if you feel I have unfairly missed something out please let me know and I will come back to you.

I'll start with your claim that “God exists” is in fact empirical. I think you are quite wrong in this analysis. What defines an empirical statement is the verification principle. For a statement to be considered empirical it must refer to phenomenal data; I don't think this is at all contentious. God's existence cannot be verified by reference to phenomenal data. Even if we were to accept that God itself could be phenomenally verified â€" ie God could be 'seen' (which as far as I am aware no theology claims) â€" this would still leave the problem of “exists” which cannot be empirically verified. Simply put empiricism by its very nature is limited to the phenomenal; it cannot deal with ontology (cf Hume â€" Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779)). As such “God exists” cannot be empirical.

On my use of “subjective/objective”. You are quite correct to point out that my use is lax; I was trying to avoid too many technical phrases. However I think my use is consistent and so I'm not sure you are right in your analysis that this leads me into error. Let me explain.

Quote[BOLD MY OWN]
that is an objective statement. Stating that you believe something (god is irrelevant in this context) is always an objective statement. The statement about what you believe is true for everybody. In other words, if you state 'I believe that god exists', then it is true for everybody that you believe that god exists. The subject of the statement in this context is not god, but your belief.

[...]

Reality is reality. Whether it is internal or external is not relevant here, and has no bearing on the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity

I think what I should have made clear is that “I believe God exists” is subjective in terms of reference. Remember I am talking of language which, you agree with me, is all about reference. I AM NOT TALKING ABOUT REALITY. So “I believe God exists” is subjective, not in terms of reality, but in terms of what is being referred to by the language.

You are quite correct that in terms of reality “I believe God exists” is objective (cf Spinoza's discussion of 'modes' in Ethics (1677)). However only the person stating “I believe in God” has access to what is being referred to (their belief). This is what I meant by reference to the “subjective”; I should really have said is reference to “private data”. Similarly for “objective” I should have used “public data”. Sorry I did not make that clearer.

This also explains why I hold that “God exists” holds a contradiction. You are correct to say we can make statements which are subjective but deal with the objective. However that is relying upon the subjective/objective distinction in terms of reality; in terms of reference (and so meaning) it is a contradiction.

I hope that explains better what I was driving at.


@Jac. Trust you to pick up on the paradox, pleased you did though. I think that there is some really interesting 'meta-philosophy' here.

First though I will deal with your point about reference and the fallacy of inverted intentionality:

QuoteIF our ideas are strictly representations of reality and are all that we have direct access to, then we have no access to reality itself, only our ideas about reality.
Since we have no access to reality itself, our words cannot refer to reality itself, but only to our ideas.
It follows then that all words refer only to our own personal ideas. They can never refer to any more than that under any circumstances.

Forgive me for saying so but this is a straw man argument. I never said that language was referring to reality. I gave two ways in which language refers, the first is subjective, ie referring to our own concepts. Secondly language can refer to phenomenal data.

The great advantage of phenomenal data is that it is public. A yardstick is a yardstick to everyone! In this sense the sceptical result you are hinting at does not arise.

As for the fallacy of I.I. as I pointed out a few times in the OP, I was not making claims about reality. So it is just not possible I am committing the fallacy (which requires the movement from 2nd to 1st order statements â€" my whole discussion is limited to 2nd order statements).

Onto my paradox. At the end of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Wittgenstein says the following:

Quote6.54: My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognises them as nonsensical, when he has used them â€" as steps â€" to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it). He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.

7: What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.

Essentially my claim is the same as his. The fact that “All metaphysical statements are meaningless” is meaningless does not undermine the sentiment. Rather by coming to the realisation that this statement is itself meaningless becomes virtuously circular.

The very fact the paradox arises demonstrates the coherency of the argument! It is self-supporting.

Now whether you accept this as a valid philosophical move is a deep question. I would love to discuss it so do let me know what your thoughts are.


peace

Quote from: "penfold"@Jac. Trust you to pick up on the paradox, pleased you did though. I think that there is some really interesting 'meta-philosophy' here.

First though I will deal with your point about reference and the fallacy of inverted intentionality:

QuoteIF our ideas are strictly representations of reality and are all that we have direct access to, then we have no access to reality itself, only our ideas about reality.
Since we have no access to reality itself, our words cannot refer to reality itself, but only to our ideas.
It follows then that all words refer only to our own personal ideas. They can never refer to any more than that under any circumstances.

Forgive me for saying so but this is a straw man argument. I never said that language was referring to reality. I gave two ways in which language refers, the first is subjective, ie referring to our own concepts. Secondly language can refer to phenomenal data.

The great advantage of phenomenal data is that it is public. A yardstick is a yardstick to everyone! In this sense the sceptical result you are hinting at does not arise.

As for the fallacy of I.I. as I pointed out a few times in the OP, I was not making claims about reality. So it is just not possible I am committing the fallacy (which requires the movement from 2nd to 1st order statements â€" my whole discussion is limited to 2nd order statements).

If it is a straw man, there is hardly a need to forgive you for pointing it out, now is there? But let me tell you why I think it isn't.

Assuming a representational epistemology (which I think we would both agree is a fair assumption at this juncture), saying that language can refer to phenomenal data doesn't help you in the least and still falls to everything in my initial argument. Following Hume, you have no access to the real world, only the sense-data as you perceive it. But even more literally, you don't even have access to the sense-data directly, but only to your interpretation of that sense-data, which is to say, your ideas of it. Thus, again, all language is necessarily about ideas, not about reality, including the phenomenal reality you think you have access to.

This is evident in your distinction of public and private data. There is no public data. How could there be? How can I compare my interpretation of my sense-data with your interpretation of your sense-data? Even a pragmatic argument fails here, namely, "Well we've done things like put men on the moon, so our interpretation of the data must be similar enough." But even my interpretation of putting men on the moon is only that -- an interpretation of sense data. I have no clue as to whether or not you have made the same interpretation!

The moment you assume that we really have done such a thing, you end up on a one way trip to some kind of realism. So, forgive me for saying so, but I don't think at all that my representation of your position is a straw man at all. And, for the record, I didn't say you did commit II. I just said you would be in danger of it if you did try to talk about reality (as a pragmatic argument would for the reliability of our interpretational models would).

QuoteOnto my paradox. At the end of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Wittgenstein says the following:

Quote6.54: My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognises them as nonsensical, when he has used them â€" as steps â€" to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it). He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.

7: What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.

Essentially my claim is the same as his. The fact that “All metaphysical statements are meaningless” is meaningless does not undermine the sentiment. Rather by coming to the realisation that this statement is itself meaningless becomes virtuously circular.

The very fact the paradox arises demonstrates the coherency of the argument! It is self-supporting.

Now whether you accept this as a valid philosophical move is a deep question. I would love to discuss it so do let me know what your thoughts are.


peace

I wouldn't, although I understand it's appeal. The reasoning is rather simple, I think. If the statement "all metaphysical statements are meaningless" is really meaningless, then it doesn't refer to metaphysics at all. You may as well say, "Hiwehhd aveeohea aplweihdafn weihern er." Now, if I said that, would you conclude that metaphysics is inherently meaningless? Of course not.

Now, you have the problem of trying to use meaningless statements to mean something--namely, that such statements are meaningless. A self-refuting statement cannot be self-supporting, your claim to the contrary. Looking specifically at Wittgenstein, his problem is that while he acknowledges the ladder he has climbed must be thrown away, the problem is that he actually has to realize he has never had a ladder to climb in the first place. He has actually cut the branch out from under him on which he has been sitting. He is not allowed to remain suspended without support.

Beyond all this, allow me to make a strictly pragmatic point that is in no way intended to be an argument in the proper sense of the word: we should be very suspicious of arguments that claim that something intuitively obvious is actually not only false, but meaningless. All philosophy aside (a dangerous statement, I know), "God" is obviously not a meaningless term. If it were, by the way, then atheism would be an equally meaningless term, and I'm pretty sure everybody here means something when they confidently assert the meaning of atheism. Nor is "cause." You do realize, I'm sure, that if all metaphysical statements are meaningless, then so are all causal statements. That, by the way, is precisely the reason Hume rejected the law of causality. But really, are you honestly going to stand there and tell me that if I clap my hands together and I hear a sound then I can't really say that my hands caused the sound? Come on. Such a conclusion says more about our philosophy than about anything else.

Again, that's not a strict argument, and I'm not intending it to be. Honestly, I am appealing to that God-given common sense you have. As fun as philosophy is--and exceedingly useful, I would hasten to add!--there comes a point at which absurd conclusions should be rejected simply because they are absurd. Philosophically, that would mean that we have to change our starting point, but perhaps that is just the point after all. Early in our discussion, you called me (very politely and with no malice!) naive in thinking that I had access to the real world. May I with all humility suggest that, when you start with epistemology, and when you confuse linguistics and philosophy as analytical philosophers have done, you necessarily are left with these absolutely absurd positions, positions that are rather naive in themselves . . .

Thankfully, no one really holds these views these philosophers espouse, not even the great Hume. I obviously can't say for sure, but I am quite certain that were he standing in the middle of a freeway, he would be inclined to get out of oncoming traffic very quickly, his arguments about causality notwithstanding.

QuoteThough I capitalised God I was not particularly referencing the Xian God, nor even a monotheistic God. You are right though, I should have used “god(s)” rather than “God”. Force of habit! I agree that particular claims, for example biblical ones, can be falsified by evidence (eg creation myths...). However my focus was on the particular statement “God exists” (or more properly “god(s) exist”) not on any of the strange mythology that grows out of this belief. So I don't think it is a problem for my line of argument.

Understood. Watch your terminology though.  ;-)

I like to constantly refer to the Christian "god-character" as an "it". Drives the fundies crazy.  "The god-character supposedly created the universe..."  "It is supposedly omniscient, is it not?"    

They hate hearing that.

Quote from: "dloubet"I like to constantly refer to the Christian "god-character" as an "it". Drives the fundies crazy.  "The god-character supposedly created the universe..."  "It is supposedly omniscient, is it not?"    

They hate hearing that.

I must admit, I've always taken a great deal of pleasure in watching people take so much pleasure from being intentionally spiteful. The hypocrisy is absolutely delicious.

Quote from: "Jac3510"The hypocrisy is absolutely delicious.

And what statement made causes that to be hypocrisy?

Because they don't likes it when people make spiteful comments about them, of course.

Quote from: "Jac3510"Because no one likes it when people make spiteful comments about them, of course.

Hypocrisy involves words.  That said, I don't tend to get butthurt much.  Moreover, something as silly as calling god "it" is ridicuolous to classify as a spiteful comment.  Indeed, it never bothered me, even when I was a christian.

Quote from: "PoopShoot"Hypocrisy involves words.  That said, I don't tend to get butthurt much.  Moreover, something as silly as calling god "it" is ridicuolous to classify as a spiteful comment.  Indeed, it never bothered me, even when I was a christian.

You may not have, but clearly, dloutbet knows plenty who have. In his own words, "They hate hearing that."

As far as hypocrisy being just words, it includes attitudes and actions as well. Besides, it seems to me that atheists as a whole--at least the kind on this board--would discourage such rhetoric. Considering how strongly you all insist that you can be just as--if not more--moral than the average Christian, an idea I have said in the past that I agree with, it hardly seems appropriate to engage in such flaming. Thumper made a fantastic point years ago about not saying anything if it isn't nice. Violating that rule is hardly good PR.

It all boils down to common decency. Saying something just to get a rise out of someone is just plain rude, and it is rather obvious that if you don't want people to be rude to you, you shouldn't be rude to others.

edit: but I don't want to derail pen's very interesting thread. Sorry, dude. I made my observation -- people can agree or not as they will. On with the discussion. I'll not comment further on this.

It's hard to be completely civil towards a group of people, many of whom believe at the outset that I deserve to be tortured forever in a lake of fire.

It's hard to get past that.

Thanks to everyone for letting that simmer down. Hell, I too, like to refer to God as 'she' or 'it'; though I wouldn't say I do it to be malicious, merely to be subversive. And I do like a good bit of subversion. (@ dloubet; while many theists think you and I will end up in a lake of fire, none of them wish to push us in. If anything they wish to help. We may think they are both irritating and crazy, but, for the most part, it is hard to fault thier intentions).

but I digress...

@Jac, superb post, really made me stop and think. Coming at me with Hume, the horror; like being assaulted by a close friend...

Quote from: "Jac3510"... Following Hume, you have no access to the real world, only the sense-data as you perceive it. But even more literally, you don't even have access to the sense-data directly, but only to your interpretation of that sense-data, which is to say, your ideas of it. Thus, again, all language is necessarily about ideas, not about reality, including the phenomenal reality you think you have access to.

[...]

This is evident in your distinction of public and private data. There is no public data. How could there be? How can I compare my interpretation of my sense-data with your interpretation of your sense-data? Even a pragmatic argument fails here, namely, "Well we've done things like put men on the moon, so our interpretation of the data must be similar enough." But even my interpretation of putting men on the moon is only that -- an interpretation of sense data. I have no clue as to whether or not you have made the same interpretation!

There is a lot to unpack here. So let us start with Hume and pragmatism. I think you have missed a lot of what Hume was saying. In fact Hume himself responded to the kind of scepticism you have proposed with a pragmatic argument:

QuoteWe need only ask such a sceptic, What his meaning is? And what he proposes by all these curious researches? He is immediately at a loss, and knows not what to answer. [...] ...he must acknowledge ... [all] discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men would remain in a total lethargy... [Yet] so fatal an event is very little to be dreaded. Nature is always too strong for principle.
- An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, David Hume, p104
[Bold my own]

Actually I think this pragmatic argument is a valid philosophical move, and in particular in reference to what I call public data.

Take two people in a room with a table in it. The first says “point to the table”, the second does. That is the nub of what I mean by public data, the complexities of how we abstract ideas from sense data, while fascinating, need not be delved into [incidentally I think it is properly a subject for neurology not philosophy]. This simple methodology of public data has huge pragmatic force, to the extent that, as you point out, we have landed on the moon. The sceptical principle you raise does not really serve to undermine this at a pragmatic level. As Hume himself puts it:

Quote... all his [the sceptic's] objections are mere amusement, and can have not other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and reason and believe, though they are not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations, or to remove the objections which may be raised against them.
- ibid.
[Bold my own]

So the point you raise about the incommensurability of our interpretations of sense data, while being impossible to resolve, can (in fact Hume says must) be sidestepped. A foreriori as I am making no claim that language refers to a thing in itself merely that it refers to something. This also rescues causality:

QuoteYou do realize, I'm sure, that if all metaphysical statements are meaningless, then so are all causal statements.

As causation has the same pragmatic pedigree as what I call public data (in fact it is, by my definition, a type of public data). In reductive terms we can point to examples of it. Hume realised this too, his assault on causality was an attack upon necessary connection. However at a pragmatic level we can talk of causality as a contingent connection; contingent, that is, upon us. Remember I am talking about meaning which is, but its very nature, contingent; not about truth which is necessary.

So it seems reasonable to ask: why can't the same pragmatic move cannot be made with “God exists”? especially as my argument against it having meaning seems to rest upon the incommensurability of people's unique interpretations of God.

Quote"God" is obviously not a meaningless term. If it were, by the way, then atheism would be an equally meaningless term, and I'm pretty sure everybody here means something when they confidently assert the meaning of atheism.

I never claimed that “God” was meaningless, rather my point was that the statement “God exists” is meaningless. There is a fundamental difference. The word “God” refers in exactly the same way “love” refers. This explains why I contend that the statement “I believe in God” is meaningful, in exactly the same way “I love her” is meaningful. To quote from the OP:

Quote(v/ii) Reference and the Subjective

The situation is slightly different for subjective statements. “I love her” does not directly refer to something that is publicly accessible. Only I can know what I am referring to with the word “love”, my emotions are not accessible to anyone other than me. However this is not a problem as in terms of public reference we understand “love” in the 1st person as referring to something private in terms of content. HOWEVER the statement “he loves her” (“love” in the 3rd person) does refer to something publicly accessible in terms of behaviour.

So for example if I say “I love her”; then others can meaningfully say “he loves her” by reference to my behaviour (not least the evidence of me saying “I love her”) which is publicly accessible.

Thus even subjective reference to my private reality is meaningful because of its ability to refer to behaviour which is publicly accessible.

[NOTE: The statement “I believe that God exists” is meaningful in exactly this manner.]

“God exists” is however a different type of statement. The reason being that it is making a claim beyond the pragmatic realm of public data. It is making a truth claim about reality. Incidentally it also follows that “the table exists” is meaningless. The pragmatic shield of contingent reference which gives language meaning cannot stretch to ontology. A final quote from Hume:

QuoteHere indeed lies the justest and most plausible objection against a considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not properly a science; but arise either from the fruitless efforts of human vanity, wich would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the understanding, or from the craft of popular superstition.
- An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, David Hume, p5
[Bold my own]

In that quote there is an interesting use of the word 'science' by that I take Hume to mean exactly the kind of pragmatic meaning derived from reference to public data that I have been talking about.


Finally a very brief word on the Wittgensteinian ladder: (would say more but have a vicious, home-made polish spirit induced, hangover and I urgently need to stop staring at a screen)

QuoteThe reasoning is rather simple, I think. If the statement "all metaphysical statements are meaningless" is really meaningless, then it doesn't refer to metaphysics at all. You may as well say, "Hiwehhd aveeohea aplweihdafn weihern er." Now, if I said that, would you conclude that metaphysics is inherently meaningless? Of course not.

The thing is I am not relying upon the general statement. Rather my aim is, by approaching, from first principles, what meaning is, we find that we cannot assign particular meaning to metaphysical statements. Does that help?

peace

Quote from: "penfold"I'll start with your claim that “God exists” is in fact empirical. I think you are quite wrong in this analysis. What defines an empirical statement is the verification principle. For a statement to be considered empirical it must refer to phenomenal data; I don't think this is at all contentious.

God's existence cannot be verified by reference to phenomenal data. Even if we were to accept that God itself could be phenomenally verified â€" ie God could be 'seen' (which as far as I am aware no theology claims) â€" this would still leave the problem of “exists” which cannot be empirically verified. Simply put empiricism by its very nature is limited to the phenomenal; it cannot deal with ontology (cf Hume â€" Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779)). As such “God exists” cannot be empirical.

Quite wrong. Firstly, verificationism, being a version of Popper's principle of falsification, doesn't preclude a statement being empirical. All that is required for any statement to be an empirical statement is that it have consequences. This brings us back to 'god' being incoherent. The proposition 'god exists' has very real consequences, whether or not they can be verified or falsified, not least because, on most conceptions of deity, this entity is responsible for the creation of the cosmos, which is about as consequential in real terms as it gets.

Incidentally, 'ontology' is one of the most inappropriately thrown about, and therefore among the most useless, principles in thought. It's only surpassed in this regard by the word 'epistemology', which is not bad, since most of the people employing the word have no fucking clue what actually constitutes knowledge, let alone have any idea of how to acquire it, given as they are to studying the colour of the lint in their belly-buttons.

QuoteOn my use of “subjective/objective”. You are quite correct to point out that my use is lax; I was trying to avoid too many technical phrases. However I think my use is consistent and so I'm not sure you are right in your analysis that this leads me into error. Let me explain.

Your use may be constitent, but it isn't correct.

QuoteI think what I should have made clear is that “I believe God exists” is subjective in terms of reference. Remember I am talking of language which, you agree with me, is all about reference. I AM NOT TALKING ABOUT REALITY. So “I believe God exists” is subjective, not in terms of reality, but in terms of what is being referred to by the language.

Wrong. That statement is a statement about reality, as in, it is really true that you believe god exists. However you slice it, that is an objective statement, not a subjective one. There is no sense in which this could be a subjective statement, because it's true regardless of your perspective.

QuoteYou are quite correct that in terms of reality “I believe God exists” is objective (cf Spinoza's discussion of 'modes' in Ethics (1677)). However only the person stating “I believe in God” has access to what is being referred to (their belief). This is what I meant by reference to the “subjective”; I should really have said is reference to “private data”. Similarly for “objective” I should have used “public data”. Sorry I did not make that clearer.

Doesn't actually make any difference. That what you are referring to when you state 'I believe that god exists' doesn't actually alter the objective fact that you believe that god exists. The conception of god under discussion is irrelevant. I thought I'd made that clear in my earlier post, but I'll go back and have another look.

QuoteThis also explains why I hold that “God exists” holds a contradiction. You are correct to say we can make statements which are subjective but deal with the objective. However that is relying upon the subjective/objective distinction in terms of reality; in terms of reference (and so meaning) it is a contradiction.

I hope that explains better what I was driving at.

ACtually, I thought I'd said the opposite, although the corrollary is also true. I'll have to go back and look at what I said, but I thought that I'd said that we can make statements that are objective but deal with the subjective. Either way, the qualification is irrelevant. It doesn't actually matter to what you are referring when you make the statement. I had thought that my example with the colour red should have dealt with this, not least because the reverse is also true.

Hackenslash, thank you for your reply. It did leave me a little confused. Either you are misunderstanding me, or I'm misunderstanding you. Anyway I hope the following will help us narrow down on what exactly it is we are in disagreement over.

Quote from: "hackenslash"Quite wrong. Firstly, verificationism, being a version of Popper's principle of falsification, doesn't preclude a statement being empirical. All that is required for any statement to be an empirical statement is that it have consequences.

I was not referring to verificationalism, of which I am not a fan, nor Popper's principle of falsification. The principle I was referring to is not one of logical theory (to be fair I have re-read what I wrote and I can't find even a hint that I was) rather I was simply making a point regarding empirical method.

Let me reiterate. By empirical statement I mean a statement that can be verified or falsified by reference to data.

The statement “God exists” is thus precluded from being empirical, as there is no data which can verify or falsify. The reason for this is the not particularly controversial view that a statement of existence is a statement about a thing in itself which cannot be accessed. That data pertaining to a thing in itself is not accessible is not surprising, we only have indirect access to things through observation, and observation tells us only of the thing as observed.

I really did not understand your point about consequences of the statement “God exists”. I would just reiterate that I have no problem with the meaningfulness of “I believe that God exists”. Perhaps that is where the confusion is arising?

QuoteIncidentally, 'ontology' is one of the most inappropriately thrown about, and therefore among the most useless, principles in thought. It's only surpassed in this regard by the word 'epistemology', which is not bad, since most of the people employing the word have no fucking clue what actually constitutes knowledge, let alone have any idea of how to acquire it, given as they are to studying the colour of the lint in their belly-buttons.

Well I agree that 'ontology' is an oft misused term, however I don't think I have been misusing it. Nor for that matter do I think I have misused the word 'epistemology'. If I have please walk me through it. I am always keen to learn.

Incidentally, maybe I have got the wrong end of the stick, and I sincerely apologise if I have, but I did find the above passage quite aggressive in tone. I'm a very sensitive soul (have a Dr's note and all) and while I respect your right to disagree with me, and have genuinely enjoyed working with what you have written, could perhaps you tone down the ad hominem? I share my thoughts for interest and discussion's sake, I really don't want to fight. If you find the topic to be one of navel gazing only then that's fine, just don't take part.

Anyhow onto the subjective/objective stuff.

As I understand the word subjective means: relating to the subject and his/her thoughts.

You said in reference to my claim that “I believe God exists" is subjective:

QuoteThat statement is a statement about reality, as in, it is really true that you believe god exists. However you slice it, that is an objective statement, not a subjective one. There is no sense in which this could be a subjective statement, because it's true regardless of your perspective.

Now it seems to me that it is correct to say that the statement “I believe in x” is a reference by the speaker (ie the subject) to their own thoughts. So the statement, in terms of reference is subjective QED.

Where am I making the mistake?

peace

Edit for syntax

Quote from: "penfold"Hackenslash, thank you for your reply. It did leave me a little confused. Either you are misunderstanding me, or I'm misunderstanding you. Anyway I hope the following will help us narrow down on what exactly it is we are in disagreement over.

I'm sure the misunderstanding will be cleared up forthwith.

QuoteI was not referring to verificationalism, of which I am not a fan, nor Popper's principle of falsification.

You should be a fan. Popper's principle lies at the heart of theory selection, and is one of the most important principles in modern science.

There's an interesting discussion to be had somewhere there, in that while verificationalism and falsification may seem to be complementary, they are actually at odds. Only one of them describes an important principle in science, while the other actually describes a caricature of science. Nothing can ever be truly verified. That's why science doesn't deal in proof, only disproof. We can't say with certainty that soemthing is true, only that it isn't, which nails verificationalism to the wall in many respects. Verification requires one observation to take something as true (although that's oversimplifying the principle a little), while only one observation is required to falsify a hypothesis.

QuoteLet me reiterate. By empirical statement I mean a statement that can be verified or falsified by reference to data.

Then your understanding of what constitutes an empirical statement is fundamentally flawed. Again, an empirical statement is simply a statement whose implications have real consequences.

I won't deal with much of the rest, as it's rooted in this misunderstanding. Were I to agree with you on what constitutes an empirical statement, I would have no argument, so should you convince me that I am wrong about this, I will take the rest as agreed, unless stated.

QuoteIncidentally, maybe I have got the wrong end of the stick, and I sincerely apologise if I have, but I did find the above passage quite aggressive in tone. I'm a very sensitive soul (have a Dr's note and all) and while I respect your right to disagree with me, and have genuinely enjoyed working with what you have written, could perhaps you tone down the ad hominem? I share my thoughts for interest and discussion's sake, I really don't want to fight. If you find the topic to be one of navel gazing only then that's fine, just don't take part.

Several things here. Firstly, there was no ad hominem (another term that is thrown around without understanding what it actually is)*. I didn't attack you. I didn't even attack your ideas. Certainly I used robust language, but that shouldn't be confused with agression. If that's the way I came across, it wasn't my intention. I can definitely be very agressive, when the occasion demands, but this wasn't one of those times. As for my participation, I take part in those topics that interest me, or that I find flaws of reasoning in. Addressing flaws of reasoning is my real objective, especially when flawed reasoning is presented as unassailable fact (not that that's what you did here).

QuoteAs I understand the word subjective means: relating to the subject and his/her thoughts.

And that's the real flaw. That which is subjective is, loosely, anything that is only true for the person making the statement. That which is objective is universally true. This has to be clarified in the interest of rigour, simply because any other treatment opens the door for such wibble as 'objective morality', which is a nonsense, however you look at it. The universe doesn't care about how we treat each other, and all our morals, even those that we hold to be universally true, are only true from the perspective of Homo sapiens, which is still subjective. It's simple a matter of being absolutely categorical in what we're saying, and in what terms mean.

QuoteNow it seems to me that it is correct to say that the statement “I believe in x” is a reference by the speaker (ie the subject) to their own thoughts. So the statement, in terms of reference is subjective QED.

The thoughts are subjective, but the statement is universally true, hence objective.

Quotepeace

A nice sentiment, and reciprocated.

*Edit: Forgot to deal with this substantially. An ad hominem is commited only when the arguer is attacked. The ad hominem fallacy is only committed when an attack on the arguer is substituted for an argument with the specific intent of implying that the arguer must be talking nonsense because they are (insert epithet here).

Hence, I would be commiting an ad hominem if I said 'you are a fuckwit'. I would be committing the ad hominem fallacy if I said 'you're a fuckwit, therefore your arguments are nonsense', because even a fuckwit makes a sound and valid argument, which is why it would be a fallacy. If I said, however, 'your arguments are nonsense, therefore you're a fuckwit', I wouldn't be commiting the ad hominem fallacy, but I would be committing and ad hominem.
Note: In none of the above am I actually calling you, penfold, a fuckwit. I am simply highlighting the particulars of the ad hominem and the ad hominem fallacy, which are two very distinct things.

In any event, in the above, which you questioned as ad hominem, you will notice if you read it that I only ever questioned your arguments, and at no point did I direct any comments at yourself. Agressive I may have been (though that was not my intent, as I stated. Seriously, you will know when I come out swinging), but nothing was directed 'at the man', which is the literal translation of ad hominem.

Hope that clears some things up.

Peace, brother.

Dear hackenslash,

Clearly I did misinterpret your tone, and I am sorry, years of being brutalised on web forums has left me somewhat over-sensitive. Incidentally, while I appreciate the lengthy description of ad hominem I am familiar with its meaning (all those years of studying classics and law). The reason I used it was that I thought you were implying that I was a navel gazer who had no fucking clue what constituted knowledge. Anyhow that cleared up...

QuoteThen your understanding of what constitutes an empirical statement is fundamentally flawed. Again, an empirical statement is simply a statement whose implications have real consequences.

Interesting. Where do you get this definition from? I must say I have never come across it. It seems to me prima facie that it has several weaknesses. I wonder if you could answer a few queries that immediately spring to mind:

i. How does one discern what a statement's consequences are?
ii. What is the relationship between a statement and its consequences; are we talking causal, interpretive, etc...?
iii. What discerns a 'real' consequence from any other type of consequence?
iv. Do not all statements carry consequences? If not can you give an example of a consequence-less statement?

QuoteNothing can ever be truly verified. That's why science doesn't deal in proof, only disproof. We can't say with certainty that soemthing is true, only that it isn't, which nails verificationalism to the wall in many respects. Verification requires one observation to take something as true (although that's oversimplifying the principle a little), while only one observation is required to falsify a hypothesis.

This point is well taken, and is a serious error in my argument. I seem to have gotten myself confused. My purpose was to limit the discussion to that of meaning but by talking of verification and falsification I am of course talking about matters of fact. Given that is the case then you are entirely correct to point out that the very notion of verification is flawed in terms of empirical method. So let me try and claw back some ground.

I should have limited myself to classifying an empirical statement as that which refers to observed data. It seems to me that this definition is more robust and would still exclude “God exists” from being an empirical statement as it refers to a thing in itself; which is clearly beyond the scope of empirical reference.

Or am I making another error?

QuoteThat which is subjective is, loosely, anything that is only true for the person making the statement. That which is objective is universally true. This has to be clarified in the interest of rigour, simply because any other treatment opens the door for such wibble as 'objective morality', which is a nonsense, however you look at it. The universe doesn't care about how we treat each other, and all our morals, even those that we hold to be universally true, are only true from the perspective of Homo sapiens, which is still subjective. It's simple a matter of being absolutely categorical in what we're saying, and in what terms mean.

[...]

The thoughts are subjective, but the statement is universally true, hence objective.

I still think we are talking at cross purposes here. I am not talking about truth or matters of fact. I have agreed that, in terms of matters of fact, all belief statements are objective. They accurately describe something that is true as a matter of fact about the universe.

However; my point was about language and reference. So when I say that “I believe in God” is subjective I am not talking about the truth value of the statement. What I mean is that the use of language is subjective in that it refers to qualia (ie the belief itself). The sensation of belief is subjective, even if the belief itself is in truth terms objective (ie it is true that the belief is held). The language of the statement though refers to the former (the sensation of belief), not to the latter (the holding of belief). So while “I believe in God” is objectively true, the language is referring to something subjective. Hence my claim that in terms of reference it is subjective.

In fact were it to be argued, conversely, that a belief statement was objective in terms of reference, we would be lead into error. The position would be that because a statement of belief is objective so that which was being referred to, the belief itself, is also objective.

peace

Quote(@ dloubet; while many theists think you and I will end up in a lake of fire, none of them wish to push us in. If anything they wish to help. We may think they are both irritating and crazy, but, for the most part, it is hard to fault thier intentions).

No. They may not wish to push me in, and may be trying to help me avoid it, but they cannot say that they disagree with their god that, as an atheist, I somehow deserve it. They would think it unfortunate, but also consider it Perfect Justice. They think I deserve it, there's no getting around it unless they're willing to criticize their god's judgments as too harsh, and they won't do that.

They enter the discussion agreeing with their god that I personally deserve to be tortured forever, that such a thing would be justified in my case. A thing I would not wish on my worst enemy, or indeed anyone.

Why should I be civil?

Quote from: "dloubet"Why should I be civil?

Because civility is a virtue in itself; it is the mark of a reasonable person. Aggression almost never works, it just entrenches people's position and ultimately leads to upset and hatred. To put it bluntly; civility works, aggression doesn't.

To quote from a far wiser man than me:

QuoteWhen I despair, I remember that all through history the ways of truth and love have always won. There have been tyrants, and murderers, and for a time they can seem invincible, but in the end they always fall. Think of it, always. - Mahatma Gandhi

peace

QuoteBecause civility is a virtue in itself;

Which is why I actually do try to be civil. Because civility is a virtue in and of itself.

But regardless of Mr. Gandhi's quote, I don't think history has established that civility works and agression doesn't.

Quote from: "dloubet"

QuoteBecause civility is a virtue in itself;

Which is why I actually do try to be civil. Because civility is a virtue in and of itself.

But regardless of Mr. Gandhi's quote, I don't think history has established that civility works and agression doesn't.

In the hundreds of thousands of posts I have read on different fora aggression has never worked, not once, ever. In my years as a project manager and business analyst aggression has never worked, not once, ever. Civility allows discourse, aggression stops it dead. Being aggressive may satisfy one's own ego but it does nothing practical in furthering a discussion. Civility may be wasted on some, but it costs nothing, gives one the moral high ground and may, under favourable circumstances, be the only route to changing another persons world view.

Aggression is just wasted adrenaline.