Axioms of Objective Morality

[Inevitable Droid]

Excellent article: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Moral Epistemology: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-epistemology/

OK. After reading not only the above article, but others to which on other threads I have provided links, and still others to which I haven't, It has become crystal clear to me that the only way to have objective morality is to accept these three axioms:

OM Axiom 1: Moral facts are anthropologically contextual.

OM Axiom 2: There is a will to be moral in man and moral facts and only moral facts trigger it.

OM Axiom 3: Moral facts have their own analytic domain unavailable to sensory perception but fully available to logic.

That facts can be contextual is non-controversial.  If I say the temperature outside is 48 degrees, the context of that statement would be the longitude and latitude at which I happen to be positioned at the moment.  Temperature is always geographically contextual.  If I say it is raining outside, the same applies.  Weather is always geographically contextual.  Even logical and mathematical facts have context, albeit in both cases the context is so obvious as to seem trivial to mention.  Bear in mind I'm talking about facts, not principles.  Logical fact: "If it is true that all dogs have four legs, and if it is true that Fido is a dog, then it is true that Fido has four legs."  The context of that fact is the English language, outside of which the statement we are calling factual would be gibberish.  Mathematical fact: "7+5=12."  The context of that fact is the base ten number system, outside of which the statement we are calling factual would either be gibberish (for example in the base six number system) or else false (for example in the base eleven number system).

The context of moral facts is anthropological.  We either accept that as axiomatic or we abandon the project of objective morality.  Moral facts are natural or logical facts that trigger the will to be moral.  Thus moral facts are subsets of two other sets, the set of natural facts and the set of logical facts.  Moral facts are identified by whether or not they trigger the will to be moral.  They will trigger it in some anthropological contexts but not in others.  In a Christian church on Sunday during worship, a man standing up and disrobing will trigger the will to be moral in some onlookers, and thus will be a moral fact.  At an outdoors beer bash on the side of a lake on a hot summer night in a town where skinny-dipping routinely occurs, a man standing up and disrobing probably won't trigger the will to be moral in any onlookers, and thus won't be a moral fact.
 
That there is a will to be moral in man will be self-evident after any sustained observation of human behavior over a duration of at least a month in any anthropological context that doesn't self-exclude itself, examples of the latter being a maximum security prison or an insane asylum, yet even in those contexts it is entirely possible that sustained observation over a duration of at least a month may provide indisputable evidence of a will to be moral in man, and that evidence may be all the more striking and convincing given its context.

It is likewise self-evident that moral facts as moral facts, and not as natural facts, are unavailable to sensory perception.  That a man is disrobing, taken as a natural fact, can be verified by the sense of sight, but taken as a moral fact, it cannot be verified by the sense of sight alone, but only in conjunction with at least some knowledge of the anthropological context.  All facts without exception are available to logic, ready to be made into premises.  Logic can construct an analytic domain out of any coherent set of facts, and moral facts are no exception.  Anyone with at least some knowledge of an anthropological context can set logic to operate in the analytic domain of moral facts applicable to the given context.

It is my contention that the stipulated three axioms provide a basis, and the only basis, for any activity that even approximates objective morality.

[hackenslash]

There's a beautiful bit of question-begging going on in the above, namely the existence of moral 'facts'.

The universe doesn't give a toss how we behave, so there can be no such thing as objective morality. All morality is, as you say, contextual. Anything contextual is necessarily subjective.

Game over.

[Wilson]

In the absence of God the scorekeeper, there can be no absolute morality.  You postulate that all moral "facts" are anthropologically contextual, which is sort of saying the same thing.  I agree that most (but not all) people do have a drive to be "good" or "moral" and follow the moral standards of the community, which in my opinion came to us through evolution because groups whose members had empathy and cooperation and a certain degree of altruism survived better than those groups whose members did not.  I don't know what your last axiom means but suspect that I don't agree.

I believe that there is a kind of natural morality where those of us with the ability to empathize with others feel that things which benefit people are good and those which hurt people are bad.  Obviously such calculations involving multiple people get complicated, but at least to me that's how I know without thinking if something is morally good or bad.  Faced with a situation where someone is in need of help, most of us don't check a list of rules, we usually know right away what's right and wrong and react instinctively to do what's moral - or we act in our own self interest if the moral path isn't clear or easy.

[hackenslash]

Even in the presence of a celestial peeping-tom, there can be no objective morality. Indeed, it could be argued that if there is a cosmic score-keeper, then objective morality is even further ruled out, because then morality is subject to the whim of this individual, which is in fact what many believers argue, which is how they justify the immoral behaviour and mandates of this individual in their holy books of guff. Thus, predicated on the whim of a single individual, it is even more subjective than it would be without him.

[Inevitable Droid]

The universe doesn't give a toss how we behave, so there can be no such thing as objective morality.

If by give a toss we mean care, and if by universe we mean the universe taken as a whole, then one could argue that the universe taken as a whole doesn't care about anything, yet presumably we claim that there are at least some objective facts.  The universe taken as a whole doesn't care about mass, distance, duration, chemical composition.  Why single out morality and require that, in the case of morality, the universe taken as a whole has to care?  

If by give a toss we mean merely respond, and if by universe we continue to mean the universe taken as a whole, then one could argue that the universe taken as a whole doesn't respond to anything, since all responses are local to some finite portion of space.  If I kick a pebble, the universe as a whole doesn't respond.  The pebble responds, and anything the pebble hits along its trajectory before coming to rest will respond to the pebble, but even if we insist on wildly generalizing the butterfly effect, nothing on the moon will respond in any way to my kick, nor anything on the sun, nor certainly anything in orbit around Alpha Centauri.      

If we allow universe to mean the universe by virtue of any of its parts, then we permit ourselves to say that the universe cares about things, since living creatures care about things and are parts of the universe, and the universe responds to things, since specific entitites, living or not, respond to things and are parts of the universe.  So now, presumably, we permit ourselves to talk about objective facts.  Humans are specific entities, and living creatures.  Humans respond to and care about a great diversity of things, including moral facts.  When humans respond, the universe, as defined in this paragraph, responds.  When humans care, the universe, as defined in this paragraph, cares.  And so, by the parameters of this paragraph, the universe responds to, and cares about, moral facts.  If we dispute the parameters of this paragraph, then we are left having to explain to what extent objective facts of any kind exist.

All morality is, as you say, contextual. Anything contextual is necessarily subjective.

Temperature?  Weather?  Average height?  (Ethnically contextual.)  Context matters for most objective facts as typically stated.  "A dog just bit me!"  The context is time of day, due to the word, just.  Remove the word just, and the listener, if not a direct observer, will ask, "When?  Where?"  (The question of location would refer to location on the speaker's body.)  When and where are relevant context for the fact of a dog bite.  Most objective facts need to be clarified as to when and where, and often who, the latter exemplified by average height, or most common eye color and shade, or most common hair color and shade, all being contextual by ethnicity.  Context doesn't negate the objectivity of a fact.

[Inevitable Droid]

Even in the presence of a celestial peeping-tom, there can be no objective morality. Indeed, it could be argued that if there is a cosmic score-keeper, then objective morality is even further ruled out, because then morality is subject to the whim of this individual, which is in fact what many believers argue, which is how they justify the immoral behaviour and mandates of this individual in their holy books of guff. Thus, predicated on the whim of a single individual, it is even more subjective than it would be without him.

I agree.  Strongly.  As soon as we privilege one individual as the source of morality for all other individuals, we make morality entirely subjective.

[Asmodean]

If by give a toss we mean care, and if by universe we mean the universe taken as a whole, then one could argue that the universe taken as a whole doesn't care about anything

On the other hand, if your favourite toe gets infected, does that not also mean that your whole body is, the toe being a part of it and all..? WE are the part of the "whole", and we do tend to care. Does it matter to a black hole whether or not I choose to eat babies..? Not likely, no. But if you put that black hole in a system in which our own Earth is included, then it does matter to the system, even though on microscopic component-level. You get my drift, yes..?

However, as humans hold hundreds and thousands opposing moral ideals, and we have no way of knowing what is considered moral on other worlds - or even if they are familiar with the concept of morality, we can not claim objectivity beyond a given society here on Earth.

[Inevitable Droid]

In the absence of God the scorekeeper, there can be no absolute morality.  You postulate that all moral "facts" are anthropologically contextual, which is sort of saying the same thing.

It is saying precisely the same thing.  I am arguing that most objective facts are relative, not absolute.  I am therefore contending that a fact can be relative and still be objective.  I am further contending that being relative to anthropological context is no more fatal to morality than being relative to spatial, temporal, taxonomic, or any other context.

I agree that most (but not all) people do have a drive to be "good" or "moral" and follow the moral standards of the community

Or at least respond to the moral standards of the community.  This clarification is central to why I talked about moral facts rather than moral principles.  A moral fact is a natural fact that has moral relevance in a particular anthropological context.  A natural fact would be, "That man is disrobing!"  The anthropological context in which that natural fact becomes a moral one would be any where people would be expected to respond either with approval or with disapproval.  In an anthropological context where people would be expected to withhold approval or disapproval of a given natural fact, or never even consider the question, the given natural fact wouldn't be a moral fact.  Why not talk about principles instead?  Because principles need facts on which to be applied.  Facts come first.  Without facts, principles are gibberish.  Without moral facts, there is no morality.  

which in my opinion came to us through evolution because groups whose members had empathy and cooperation and a certain degree of altruism survived better than those groups whose members did not.

Plausible and widely entertained.

I don't know what your last axiom means but suspect that I don't agree.

It was an epistemological point.  It means we can achieve knowledge about morality through logic.  Not just opinion, but knowledge.  This is another reason, incidentally, for talking about moral facts.  Knowledge can only exist if facts exist.  To claim the possibility of knowledge is to claim the existence of facts.

I believe that there is a kind of natural morality where those of us with the ability to empathize with others feel that things which benefit people are good and those which hurt people are bad.

You're equating morality with empathy, then.  Either you're making them literally identical or you're claiming that one implies the other, either morality implies empathy or empathy implies morality.  Making them identical would mean we could drop one of the terms and lose nothing.  We would drop morality, then, since dropping empathy would confuse people constantly.  "I have such morality for you, Emma!"

Faced with a situation where someone is in need of help, most of us don't check a list of rules, we usually know right away what's right and wrong and react instinctively to do what's moral - or we act in our own self interest if the moral path isn't clear or easy.

Thus someone in need of help would be a moral fact for most of us on this message board, a moral fact to which we would respond either by offering aid or by refusing to do so.  I would contend that someone being in need of help is a moral fact for us only because of anthropological context.  As to whether the need for help elicited empathy or not, that would either be a separate question or else, if not a separate question, the reason for that would be anthropological context, as laboriously laid out above.
 
It is entirely conceivable that in a given anthropological context, helping someone in need would elicit neither approval or disapproval; I.e., people simply wouldn't care either way.  Granted, in our own anthropological context that seems incredible.  But that's how all of this works, and in fact is largely my point, at least with respect to OM Axiom 1.  Calling something a moral fact is very different from calling it a moral opinion.  Facts grab our faces with both hands and force our eyes in their own direction.  Facts are imperious.  They take dominion of our consciousness.  They demand to be picked up, scrutinized, and then placed in the proper container.  They refuse to be treated as if they don't exist.

[Inevitable Droid]

If by give a toss we mean care, and if by universe we mean the universe taken as a whole, then one could argue that the universe taken as a whole doesn't care about anything

On the other hand, if your favourite toe gets infected, does that not also mean that your whole body is, the toe being a part of it and all..? WE are the part of the "whole", and we do tend to care. Does it matter to a black hole whether or not I choose to eat babies..? Not likely, no. But if you put that black hole in a system in which our own Earth is included, then it does matter to the system, even though on microscopic component-level. You get my drift, yes..?

Not only do I get it but I argued the exact same thing in the exact same post you're replying to!

I care, therefore the universe cares, by virtue of a part of it caring.  Agreed.  Strongly.

However, as humans hold hundreds and thousands opposing moral ideals, and we have no way of knowing what is considered moral on other worlds - or even if they are familiar with the concept of morality, we can not claim objectivity beyond a given society here on Earth.

Thus moral facts are anthropologically contextual.  OM Axiom 1.  Agreed.  Strongly.

What I am arguing is that a fact's contextuality doesn't destroy its factuality, nor its objectivity.  The temperature outside my condo in the parking lot is an objective fact.  It is also geographically and temporally contextual.  I am arguing that there is no good reason to give anthropological context a different status from geographic, temporal, or other contexts.  Context is context.  Facts have context.  Fact remain facts even so, and objective as well.

[Asmodean]

I am arguing that there is no good reason to give anthropological context a different status from geographic, temporal, or other contexts.  Context is context.  Facts have context.  Fact remain facts even so, and objective as well.

I agree.

However, it also means that objectivity needs to be defined where unclear. For instance, one might want to limit the group of observers of the said fact, it's scale, magnitude, domain and the like.

As an example, 2+2=4 can be considered an objective fact. However, it does rely heavily on 4, as defined, being the sum of two twos, as defined. It can be difficult to imagine what else two plus two might be, but a child who has never seen a math book might well define it as one. Or seven. Or a potato.

Thus, objectivity in this case is that of basic mathematical context and the observer group is that of people familiar with it. For the said group, it would be considered wrong to define 2+2 outside the said context, but for any other group, it might well seem wrong to define it within.

Not too good an example, but still...

[Inevitable Droid]

For the said group, it would be considered wrong to define 2+2 outside the said context, but for any other group, it might well seem wrong to define it within.

I think I understand your point, and to the extent I do, I agree with it.  To use the lingo I've been developing in this thread, a natural fact can be interpreted in one of three basic ways from within an anthropological context:

1. Neither approval nor disapproval, hence not a moral fact
2. Approval
3. Disapproval

All three of the above could occur in the same situation.  A woman in a burka walks into a supermarket.  Reactions are mixed.  Radical Muslims approve, secular French disapprove, feminists disapprove, Zionists disapprove, misogynists and misanthropes approve out of malice, sociologists reserve judgment.  Contradictory?  Not at all, because moral facts are anthropologically contextual.  Moral facts simply don't exist at all unless and until you step into a context, but once you step in, the facts are in your face, accosting you.  Similarly, if it were possible to step outside all space and time, presumably one would feel no temperature at all, neither hot nor cold.  So far as we know, temperature literally doesn't exist outside space and time.  Context is mandatory.

[Inevitable Droid]

OM Axiom 4: Multiple anthropological contexts can be operative in the same situation.
 
OM Axiom 5: Moral allegiance to an anthropological context implies predictable reactions of approval and disapproval in response to moral facts.
 
OM Axiom 6: Moral allegiance to an anthropological context is always optional.
 
OM Axiom 7: Approval and disapproval do not have to be codified into principles before they can operate in an anthropological context.
 
 
Consider the natural fact, "That man is disrobing!"  In the context of a Christian worship service, that fact would be a moral fact, engendering predictable reactions of disapproval from the faithful.  Yet other contexts could be operative at the same time, usually evidenced by the particular way the statement would be phrased.  Nuclear family context - "Dad's disrobing!"  Multiracial America context - "That white cracker's disrobing!"  Employment context - "That guy who's disrobing works for me!"  In each case the disapproval would be nuanced a little differently.
 
Even so, some people in the pews wouldn't react with disapproval at all, nor with approval.  Perhaps they would merely be amused, or nosy.  These people have opted out of any of the anthropological contexts that could view the disrobing with disapproval.  For these people, the natural fact remains strictly a natural fact.  It doesn't rise to the level of a moral fact.
 
If someone claims to participate in the anthropological context of worshipping Christians, yet doesn't react with disapproval to the man disrobing, there is very good reason to doubt the veracity of the claim made.  The person who made the claim may even recognize this discrepancy, and perceive the cognitive dissonance.  This perception may even be the first step in a long process that will culminate in the person rejecting Christianity altogether, on the grounds that Christianity conflicts with the person's epistemological commitments.  But the person would long ago have opted out of the anthropological context.  Proof would reside in the person's failure to react with disapproval to the man disrobing.      
 
Similarly, an offspring may have opted out of the nuclear family context.  Proof would reside in the offspring's complete lack of approval or disapproval regarding the fact that Dad is disrobing.  Of course, the offspring might still be opted into the worshipping Christians context, and might disapprove from that perspective.  The same would hold true for the multiracial America context.  Blacks or hispanics out in the pews might have opted out of the multiracial America context, and thus might lack any approval or disapproval from that perspective, while retaining (or not retaining) the capacity for disapproval from the worshipping Christian perspective.  Likewise, the disrobing man's boss might have opted out of the employment context, and thus might lack any approval or disapproval from that perspective, while retaining (or not retaining) the capacity for disapproval from the worshipping Christian perspective.
 
Notice that I haven't had to talk about moral principles at all.  Moral principles aren't the least bit necessary.  Approval and disapproval in an anthropological context are quite often a matter of reflex, learned as any imitating monkey learns, by observing what others around it do and when.  This is a very important point.  Moral principles can be derived from moral facts through the application of logc, but this is a sapient level of functioning that rises above mere simian imitation.  Morality doesn't have to be very sapient.  It can be largely simian.  The codifying of principles isn't by any means integral to morality.  Integral to morality are (1) anthropological context; (2) an individual having opted into that context; (3) a context's capacity for compelling approval or disapproval; (4) natural or logical facts that engender approval or disapproval; and (5) the will to be moral.  Those five are the core, essence, heart, soul, of morality.  Logic is added on later like a layer of skin, by individuals and groups sapient enough to want to live at least partially by logic.

[Persimmon Hamster]

What I am arguing is that a fact's contextuality doesn't destroy its factuality, nor its objectivity.

This is what I am having a problem with.  When you add "anthropological contextuality" into the equation I think you are no longer talking about "objective morality".  What is objective about that?  That makes it entirely subjective.  So you get a bunch of subjects together who all agree on acceptable behavior (Sunday church-goers who do not wish to see a man disrobe, skinny-dippers who expect to see a man disrobe)...so what?  It's still subjective.

I am left wondering if this total opposite definition presented here for "objective morality" as compared with the usual definition is some kind of tongue-in-cheek persuasion tactic, or devious attempt to rope in debaters and get them to admit there is no such thing as objective morality, or what?

Cultural beliefs (anthropological contexts) are extremely malleable which poses a serious problem for repeatability of any moral test.  If it is X degrees outside, at this precise location, at this precise time, then you can take any intelligent individual (human or otherwise) with sufficient measurement tools (thermometer) from any time (past, present, future) and place them in those exact same temporal/spatial coordinates and they will all agree on the temperature.  Not so with a moral test drawing from anthropological contexts, and indeed you have said as much already, when talking about the incredible disrobing man.

So basically, I'm left wondering exactly what it is you think you are saying here, because as far as I can tell you're certainly not talking about objective morality.

[Inevitable Droid]

This is what I am having a problem with.  When you add "anthropological contextuality" into the equation I think you are no longer talking about "objective morality".  What is objective about that?  That makes it entirely subjective.  So you get a bunch of subjects together who all agree on acceptable behavior (Sunday church-goers who do not wish to see a man disrobe, skinny-dippers who expect to see a man disrobe)...so what?  It's still subjective.

Philosophers distinguish between moral relativism and moral subjectivism.  But they have to argue the case for that distinction.

I view it as follows.  Facts about subjectivity are themselves objective.  Objective facts are falsifiable.  If I say, "Most Zionists condemn Arafat as a bad man," I have made a statement that purports to be an objective fact, and it is falsifiable.  I can survey a representative sample of Zionists and ask them if they condemn Arafat as a bad man.  If less than 50% said they do, then my statement would be falsified.  

Objective facts constitute knowledge.  I know without a shadow of a doubt that if I try to pull the burka off some Muslim woman, and there are Taliban men around, those Taliban men will disapprove of what I'm doing.  I know they will.  Yet that which I know is a fact about subjectivity.  I know they will disapprove of me pulling the burka off a Muslim woman.  I don't speculate that they will.  I don't merely believe that they will.  I don't even hypothesize that they will.  I absolutely know beyond a shadow of a doubt how they will react, with precisely the level of certainty that I have with respect to what will happen to an apple if I hold the apple up and then let go of it.  Taliban disapproval of me pulling off that woman's burka is as utterly dependable as gravity.

Cultural beliefs (anthropological contexts) are extremely malleable which poses a serious problem for repeatability of any moral test.  If it is X degrees outside, at this precise location, at this precise time, then you can take any intelligent individual (human or otherwise) with sufficient measurement tools (thermometer) from any time (past, present, future) and place them in those exact same temporal/spatial coordinates and they will all agree on the temperature.  Not so with a moral test drawing from anthropological contexts, and indeed you have said as much already, when talking about the incredible disrobing man.

Try the Taliban test with anybody you want, so long as they know what a Taliban is.  Ask your selected individuals whether Taliban men would disapprove of me pulling a burka off a Muslim woman.  Not only can I predict how the Taliban would react, but I can predict what your individuals knowledgeable about the Taliban will answer to the proposed question.  I can predict their answer as surely as I can predict that an apple will fall to the ground.

Do you agree that a fact about subjectivity is itself an objective fact?

[Persimmon Hamster]

Do you agree that a fact about subjectivity is itself an objective fact?

What if I do?  It seems to me that all you are doing here is attempting to usurp the definition of "objective morality", and replace it with your own definition which is really just the definition of subjective morality with some logical proofs and scientific reasoning slathered on top to make it sound more "objective".  I can see the appeal of such an approach, because it would allow the atheist to claim acceptance of a system of "objective morality", but having redefined the term you are effectively just pulling a fast one over on those who are still using the original definition.

Objective morality would hold that pulling off that woman's burka was "right" or "wrong", "proper" or "improper", regardless of whether any Taliban were present, whether the woman was Muslim, etc -- and the assignment of morality to that action would be indisputable fact of a higher order immune to anthropological contexts.

You've used reason to identify what the likely outcome of your action is--what the surrounding subjects are likely to think about it--but you've failed to identify the morality of your action itself.  Reactions do not morality make.  You've in fact rendered it an even colder calculation than I imagined you might because you based your moral fact entirely on what the men think....not even the woman...not even yourself...  The latter two are the most important, I would argue.

When I ponder the possibility of objective morality of late, I tend to think more along the lines of this: how does a being that has achieved consciousness differ from one that has not?  Once a being gains a conscious sense of "self", which in turn requires a conscious sense of "other", what implications does that have for the being?  If I exist, and others like me exist, am I not bound to conclude something akin to the golden rule (if I ponder on it long enough)?  In your Taliban test, one should think to oneself, were I a Muslim woman (surrounded by Taliban or not), would I want a westerner to walk up and yank off my burka?  And if the answer is most likely "no" then why on earth would you do it?  I might argue that if you did go through with it, you have an underdeveloped sense of "self" and "other" and you need some more schoolin' on the subject.