A less selfish Pascal's wager

[bandit4god]

Is it not clear that each person must wager his/her life for or against God existing?

Nope. You can also just not give a fuck.

EDIT: Should probably provide a bit more of a comment...

One can look at it this way: If gods exist and you bet against it, in the afterlife you go to their respective versions of hell OR you just don't get an afterlife.

If you end up in a hell, well woo-hoo! You are dead, yet you still exist. Nice. Then you can start making the best out of your stay there... Research into permanently destroying "souls"... MUST be money and glory in that. If you end up with no afterlife at all, then what does it matter?

If you bet for gods' existence and they do not exist, you may potentially spend a large portion of your life trying to get approval of something that isn't there. Time you could probably better spend elsewhere, I might add.

If you bet on gods and there are such either you bet one the wrong one and are probably back to scenario one or the right one in which case... What? Paradise? How do you know that it actually IS better than scenario one? Ok, you still wake up dead and that is probably a cool sensation, but what if your happiness requires someone else's suffering..? Some paradise that would be.

One CAN look at it this way, but personally, I dont. Because as I see it, it doesn't matter in any case. I'll deal with the afterlife, whatever shape or form it might take, if (And that is one big mother of an "if") I get there. Simple as that.

I agree with this, especially the not giving a fuck part.

The simplest maxims of decision theory would suggest that a rational actor select the option with the highest "utility".  In uncertainty systems, in which the state of the world across two or more variants is unknown, utility is simply a matter of the value to the actor.  In risk systems, utility is defined as the product of the probability of the outcome and the outcome's value to the actor.

Take a game of chance involving two coin flips, and the required wager is $1.  If you flip heads-heads during your two flips, you win $4.  If you flip anything else, you simply lose your dollar.  This is an obvious case of a risk system, and the way to calculate whether I should wager or not is sum the utilities of the system.  If the sum is greater than zero, I should rationally play.

-$1 + (0.25 * $4) = 0

In this case, it's a wash.  Play or not play, rationality per decision theory does not make a case either way.

Now let's change the game a bit.  The wager is still $1, but the return on heads-heads is $12.

-$1 + (0.25 * $12) = $2

Should I play now?  Definitely!!

Now another change to the game--last time, I promise.  Now the wager is still $1, but game is a ten coin flips.  If all of the flips are heads, you gain $10 trillion.  If not, you still lose the dollar.  Does it still make sense to wager?

"But this is no parallel to wagering on God," you say, "because there are many gods one could choose from."  With so much on the line, does it not make sense to find the game with the best odds (the highest probability, even if it's only 10^-100)?  But to be fair, if you find that the probability of any god existing is absolutely zero, this logic does not apply because the utlity would be zero.

[Davin]

The simplest maxims of decision theory would suggest that a rational actor select the option with the highest "utility".  In uncertainty systems, in which the state of the world across two or more variants is unknown, utility is simply a matter of the value to the actor.  In risk systems, utility is defined as the product of the probability of the outcome and the outcome's value to the actor.

Take a game of chance involving two coin flips, and the required wager is $1.  If you flip heads-heads during your two flips, you win $4.  If you flip anything else, you simply lose your dollar.  This is an obvious case of a risk system, and the way to calculate whether I should wager or not is sum the utilities of the system.  If the sum is greater than zero, I should rationally play.

-$1 + (0.25 * $4) = 0

In this case, it's a wash.  Play or not play, rationality per decision theory does not make a case either way.

Now let's change the game a bit.  The wager is still $1, but the return on heads-heads is $12.

-$1 + (0.25 * $12) = $2

Should I play now?  Definitely!!

Now another change to the game--last time, I promise.  Now the wager is still $1, but game is a ten coin flips.  If all of the flips are heads, you gain $10 trillion.  If not, you still lose the dollar.  Does it still make sense to wager?

"But this is no parallel to wagering on God," you say, "because there are many gods one could choose from."  With so much on the line, does it not make sense to find the game with the best odds (the highest probability, even if it's only 10^-100)?  But to be fair, if you find that the probability of any god existing is absolutely zero, this logic does not apply because the utlity would be zero.

Or the rational actor would simply not play the game and keep the dollar.

Edit: I suppose I could elaborate a little:

If you're going to equate a coin toss to a god (let alone the chance that a god has made an eternal playground for humans after we die... let alone the god even cares about humans... and let alone that there even is an "after we die" even if there is a god), then it's:
It's $1 every Sunday, everytime you speak up for the bet and everytime you think about the bet
You only "win" on some unknown combination of heads or tails
The prize is not specified
Person who is supposed to provide the prize has no evidence of its existence
No one has ever been shown to have been paid out

[Norfolk And Chance]

Is it not clear that each person must wager his/her life for or against God existing?

Nope. You can also just not give a fuck.

EDIT: Should probably provide a bit more of a comment...

One can look at it this way: If gods exist and you bet against it, in the afterlife you go to their respective versions of hell OR you just don't get an afterlife.

If you end up in a hell, well woo-hoo! You are dead, yet you still exist. Nice. Then you can start making the best out of your stay there... Research into permanently destroying "souls"... MUST be money and glory in that. If you end up with no afterlife at all, then what does it matter?

If you bet for gods' existence and they do not exist, you may potentially spend a large portion of your life trying to get approval of something that isn't there. Time you could probably better spend elsewhere, I might add.

If you bet on gods and there are such either you bet one the wrong one and are probably back to scenario one or the right one in which case... What? Paradise? How do you know that it actually IS better than scenario one? Ok, you still wake up dead and that is probably a cool sensation, but what if your happiness requires someone else's suffering..? Some paradise that would be.

One CAN look at it this way, but personally, I dont. Because as I see it, it doesn't matter in any case. I'll deal with the afterlife, whatever shape or form it might take, if (And that is one big mother of an "if") I get there. Simple as that.

I agree with this, especially the not giving a fuck part.

The simplest maxims of decision theory would suggest that a rational actor select the option with the highest "utility".  In uncertainty systems, in which the state of the world across two or more variants is unknown, utility is simply a matter of the value to the actor.  In risk systems, utility is defined as the product of the probability of the outcome and the outcome's value to the actor.

Take a game of chance involving two coin flips, and the required wager is $1.  If you flip heads-heads during your two flips, you win $4.  If you flip anything else, you simply lose your dollar.  This is an obvious case of a risk system, and the way to calculate whether I should wager or not is sum the utilities of the system.  If the sum is greater than zero, I should rationally play.

-$1 + (0.25 * $4) = 0

In this case, it's a wash.  Play or not play, rationality per decision theory does not make a case either way.

Now let's change the game a bit.  The wager is still $1, but the return on heads-heads is $12.

-$1 + (0.25 * $12) = $2

Should I play now?  Definitely!!

Now another change to the game--last time, I promise.  Now the wager is still $1, but game is a ten coin flips.  If all of the flips are heads, you gain $10 trillion.  If not, you still lose the dollar.  Does it still make sense to wager?

"But this is no parallel to wagering on God," you say, "because there are many gods one could choose from."  With so much on the line, does it not make sense to find the game with the best odds (the highest probability, even if it's only 10^-100)?  But to be fair, if you find that the probability of any god existing is absolutely zero, this logic does not apply because the utlity would be zero.

Irrelevant meaningless word salad.

[Asmodean]

"But this is no parallel to wagering on God," you say, "because there are many gods one could choose from."  With so much on the line, does it not make sense to find the game with the best odds (the highest probability, even if it's only 10^-100)?  But to be fair, if you find that the probability of any god existing is absolutely zero, this logic does not apply because the utlity would be zero.

No, it makes more sense to keep the dollar and not gamble with it to begin with. A dollar in hand is better than ten frogs in the... No, wait... That's not how the saying went... 

[bandit4god]

The simplest maxims of decision theory would suggest that a rational actor select the option with the highest "utility".  In uncertainty systems, in which the state of the world across two or more variants is unknown, utility is simply a matter of the value to the actor.  In risk systems, utility is defined as the product of the probability of the outcome and the outcome's value to the actor.

Take a game of chance involving two coin flips, and the required wager is $1.  If you flip heads-heads during your two flips, you win $4.  If you flip anything else, you simply lose your dollar.  This is an obvious case of a risk system, and the way to calculate whether I should wager or not is sum the utilities of the system.  If the sum is greater than zero, I should rationally play.

-$1 + (0.25 * $4) = 0

In this case, it's a wash.  Play or not play, rationality per decision theory does not make a case either way.

Now let's change the game a bit.  The wager is still $1, but the return on heads-heads is $12.

-$1 + (0.25 * $12) = $2

Should I play now?  Definitely!!

Now another change to the game--last time, I promise.  Now the wager is still $1, but game is a ten coin flips.  If all of the flips are heads, you gain $10 trillion.  If not, you still lose the dollar.  Does it still make sense to wager?

"But this is no parallel to wagering on God," you say, "because there are many gods one could choose from."  With so much on the line, does it not make sense to find the game with the best odds (the highest probability, even if it's only 10^-100)?  But to be fair, if you find that the probability of any god existing is absolutely zero, this logic does not apply because the utlity would be zero.

Or the rational actor would simply not play the game and keep the dollar.

Edit: I suppose I could elaborate a little:

If you're going to equate a coin toss to a god (let alone the chance that a god has made an eternal playground for humans after we die... let alone the god even cares about humans... and let alone that there even is an "after we die" even if there is a god), then it's:
It's $1 every Sunday, everytime you speak up for the bet and everytime you think about the bet
You only "win" on some unknown combination of heads or tails
The prize is not specified
Person who is supposed to provide the prize has no evidence of its existence
No one has ever been shown to have been paid out

The parallel is $1 to one lifetime.  You are alive.  Therefore, each person HAS to bet.  As Pascal put it, "you are embarked". 

What would the probability of God existing need to be in order to justify wagering one lifetime to gain infinite happy lifetimes?  As decision theory would conclude, unless the probability is zero, the utlity is infinite because the value of the "prize" is infinite.  Therefore, as Pascal put it, "Our proposition has infinite force".

Many on another thread have concluded that the probability is exactly zero, so it is quite true that by not believing in God they are indeed acting consistently with decision theory.  However, anyone on that thread who used words like "possible" or "very unlikely" ascribe some probability (even if quite small) to the thing would be acting quite irrationally NOT to seek out which "wager for God" is most likely to be true and betting their life on it.

[Xjeepguy]

So wether you wager or not, would following a god out of fear only, or just because you want a better afterlife doing it for the wrong reasons? Do most of the people who say they "love" god actually love god or do they fear god? Or do they do it just to get into heaven?

So with that said, to say "I better be a theist just in case it may be true" may just land you in hell if it is?

[bandit4god]

So wether you wager or not, would following a god out of fear only, or just because you want a better afterlife doing it for the wrong reasons? Do most of the people who say they "love" god actually love god or do they fear god? Or do they do it just to get into heaven?

So with that said, to say "I better be a theist just in case it may be true" may just land you in hell if it is?

Whether I choose to obey the speed limit for fear of the cops or out of a love for human life, am I not in alignment with the law either way?  Likewise, while it may be a "higher good" to love God for His attributes and obey Him out of love, is it not still alignment with God to obey Him out of fear?

[The Magic Pudding]

Whether I choose to obey the speed limit for fear of the cops or out of a love for human life, am I not in alignment with the law either way?  Likewise, while it may be a "higher good" to love God for His attributes and obey Him out of love, is it not still alignment with God to obey Him out of fear?

No.
God told me she hates grovelling toadies.
She made the world and stepped back to watch what we could do, and what happens?  Some scum bags come along and pretend to talk in her name, saying the natural is wrong, killing in her name.  Well I wouldn't like to be in the shoes of some theists when she reviews their efforts.

[Davin]

The parallel is $1 to one lifetime.  You are alive.  Therefore, each person HAS to bet.  As Pascal put it, "you are embarked".

So it's not like betting and the coin toss is irrelevant because we have no choice but to wager the dollar. How convenient for your example.

But it is more than one dollar per lifetime. Everytime you take a supernatural explanation over science or admitting ignorance, you're wasting an allegorical dollar. Everytime you spend time on the assumption of a god (going to church, trying to convince other people to believe, teaching other people who already believe... etc.), you're wasting a dollar. Everytime you argue that it's rational to accept the concept of a god without reasonable evidence, you're wasting a dollar.

Everytime I don't give a fuck about whether there is or isn't a god, I save a dollar. I'm not playing the game. If you say I have no choice, then I have no choice I guess, but in that kind of choiceless world where the god removes my free will, it doesn't matter now does it?

What would the probability of God existing need to be in order to justify wagering one lifetime to gain infinite happy lifetimes?  As decision theory would conclude, unless the probability is zero, the utlity is infinite because the value of the "prize" is infinite.  Therefore, as Pascal put it, "Our proposition has infinite force".

There would need to be something in order to make the wager worth something. This is like tossing a dollar into the air and expecting to gain millions. This is not to be confused with spending a dollar on the lottery, at least there is evidence that the lottery exists and has paid out. However, as I pointed out earlier, there is no evidence that anyone wagering on a god has ever been paid out and there is no eveidence that there is even anyone who will pay. So you can toss your dollar into the wind, hide it under a special rock or burn it in sacrifice and expect to receive millions someday... I'll just hold onto mine.

Many on another thread have concluded that the probability is exactly zero, so it is quite true that by not believing in God they are indeed acting consistently with decision theory.  However, anyone on that thread who used words like "possible" or "very unlikely" ascribe some probability (even if quite small) to the thing would be acting quite irrationally NOT to seek out which "wager for God" is most likely to be true and betting their life on it.

Many people who are not me. Because there is no way to determine a probability of a god or gods and because I have no desire to blindly speculate on the probability, there is no utility in it for me. You and others can baselessly assume all ya'll want, but without any kind of solid grounding, it's effectively useless.

[Too Few Lions]

Which of the thousands of gods should one then bet on though?

It still comes down to that, does it not?

I couldn't agree more with you Asmo. Pascal's wager is flawed from the beginning, because it assumes the only god is the Christian god, and the only afterlife is the Christian afterlife.

What Pascal should have done is repeated the wager for Zeus, Odin, Baal, Isis, Mithras, Yahweh etc etc, and ended up realising he'd be better off believing in all the gods, thus becoming a pagan. This would of course have him going straight to the Christian hell after he died for believing in all these other gods! It's a totally pointless exercise.

[OldGit]

Another doubtful assumption with that wager is that an omniscient god would accept a conversion which he knows damn well is an insincere piece of insurance.

[Davin]

Another doubtful assumption with that wager is that an omniscient god would accept a conversion which he knows damn well is an insincere piece of insurance.

Also that people can just believe. I cannot believe by choice, my wanting to know the truth prevents that.

[Too Few Lions]

plus if the wager is merely over whether a god exists or not (rather than specifically the Christian god), there's no evidence said deity would care if we believed in it or not, so why bother with the wager in the first place?

[bandit4god]

Which of the thousands of gods should one then bet on though?

It still comes down to that, does it not?

I couldn't agree more with you Asmo. Pascal's wager is flawed from the beginning, because it assumes the only god is the Christian god, and the only afterlife is the Christian afterlife.

What Pascal should have done is repeated the wager for Zeus, Odin, Baal, Isis, Mithras, Yahweh etc etc, and ended up realising he'd be better off believing in all the gods, thus becoming a pagan. This would of course have him going straight to the Christian hell after he died for believing in all these other gods! It's a totally pointless exercise.

Pascal's Wager is valuable merely as a launching point to one aggressively seeking out an answer this very question.  If given the arguments presented for the existence of God, one determines probability is non-zero, this should rationally catalyze the most deliberative, exhaustive search in that person's life to wager on the God with the highest probability of existing.

Concerning those who throw up their hands as you've done in your above point and seek no further, Pascal shares some strong words in Pensee' 194:  "This carelessness in a matter which concerns themselves, their eternity, their all, moves me more to anger than pity; it astonishes and shocks me; it is to me monstrous."

[DeterminedJuliet]

Which of the thousands of gods should one then bet on though?

It still comes down to that, does it not?

I couldn't agree more with you Asmo. Pascal's wager is flawed from the beginning, because it assumes the only god is the Christian god, and the only afterlife is the Christian afterlife.

What Pascal should have done is repeated the wager for Zeus, Odin, Baal, Isis, Mithras, Yahweh etc etc, and ended up realising he'd be better off believing in all the gods, thus becoming a pagan. This would of course have him going straight to the Christian hell after he died for believing in all these other gods! It's a totally pointless exercise.

Pascal's Wager is valuable merely as a launching point to one aggressively seeking out an answer this very question.  If given the arguments presented for the existence of God, one determines probability is non-zero, this should rationally catalyze the most deliberative, exhaustive search in that person's life to wager on the God with the highest probability of existing.

I did this and God still came out on "bottom". I started as a believer and, upon "aggressively seeking out answers" discovered there was no God. Of course, you, or any other Christian, would not be satisfied with this because it's not the same conclusion that you reached and thus must be wrong, but it was an honest pursuit on my part. I gave it all a "chance" and, if anything, my basis of belief was stacking in Christianity's favour.

But it didn't measure up and I couldn't force myself to believe in something just because I wanted to (which, at points, I really did).

I would like my dollar back please