How do we know we know?

[idiotsavant]

Hi,

This strange idea hit me the other day:

I've yet to isolate any knowledge I have that isn't related somehow to some experience. For instance: I "know" that time is maleable. I "know" this because I have experiential knowledge of math. I trust Albert when he tells me that the formula E=mc2 is simply a higher form of that math. Others I trust verify this, so I know(?) / believe(?) that time is maleable, even though I've never manipulated time.

Any thoughts?

[i_am_i]

I've yet to isolate any knowledge I have that isn't related somehow to some experience. Any thoughts?

Yes, I have one. If you've yet to isolate any knowledge that isn't related somehow to some experience then how can you be a theist? In other words, do you have knowledge of a god or deity that is related to personal experience?

[Ellainix]

Time isn't a part of E=mc2...

[Sophus]

I think psychologically we are not capable of knowledge. The mind functions to accept new data if it must. All I mean by that is, if I know the name of my friend's dog is Rex and I am one day astonished to find out I've been calling him the wrong name all these years, I'll get over the initial feeling and accept that the dog's name is actually Rover. If I believe in a geocentric model of the universe I can come to believe in a heliocentric one. Even if somebody argued 2 + 2 = 5 you could come to believe it should your mind truly be persuaded. It doesn't matter the plausibility of the issue, the point is that the brain doesn't really know anything. Its job is to calculate based on experience, even if that experience means the input of new information.

[theTwiz]

Read the intro paragraph of this

[Sophus]

Instincts affect behavior but I don't think it's an actual form of knowledge. Depends upon how you wish to define "knowledge" I suppose.

[curiosityandthecat]

Isn't epistemology fun?  

[joeactor]

... it's turtles all the way down...

[idiotsavant]

... it's turtles all the way down...

What?

[Whitney]

... it's turtles all the way down...

What?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turtles_all_the_way_down

[Will]

I know that I am. Everything after that is just frosting on the cake.  

[elliebean]

Ahh...the ol' ergo sum.

I once read a really interesting critique of Descartes' famous statement. All I can remember of it is something along the lines of, "it thinks" (as in "it rains" or it snows", ie. a thought is happening), for all I know possibly without me. So thought happens (or this thought is happening), therefore thought exists.
 


Btw, it was Descartes' "proofs" for the existence of god that were collectively the final straw the finally convinced me there were no gods.

[idiotsavant]

Isn't epistemology fun?  :hmm:
Btw, it was Descartes' "proofs" for the existence of god that were collectively the final straw the finally convinced me there were no gods.

I paused here for a bit and then I realized I am aware of said thought, ergo I am, but, as the one aware of the other, I am not the other, ergo I am not thought...

Descartes tried to prove God?  I find that odd.  The posit “God is” is no more tenable than “God isn’t”.  I’m surprised he didn’t know that.  Btw, what was his argument?  Maybe I’m wrong.

[elliebean]

I once read a really interesting critique of Descartes' famous statement. All I can remember of it is something along the lines of, "it thinks" (as in "it rains" or it snows", ie. a thought is happening), for all I know possibly without me. So thought happens (or this thought is happening), therefore thought exists.
 

Descartes tried to prove God?  I find that odd.  The posit “God is” is no more tenable than “God isn’t”.  I’m surprised he didn’t know that.  Btw, what was his argument?  Maybe I’m wrong.

I don't recall what arguments he made, atm, but I do remember finding them so transparently fallacious as to suggest that he might have thrown them in just to satisfy the church and save his skin; they were still executing heretics then, iirc.

[Sophus]

I once read a really interesting critique of Descartes' famous statement. All I can remember of it is something along the lines of, "it thinks" (as in "it rains" or it snows", ie. a thought is happening), for all I know possibly without me. So thought happens (or this thought is happening), therefore thought exists.

436 (1885-1886)

To what extent dialectic and faith in reason still rest on moral prejudices. With Plato we are, as former inhabitants of an intelligible world of the good, still in possession of a heritage from that time: divine dialectic, as proceeding from the good, leads to all things good (â€"therefore, as it were, "backwards"â€"). Even Descartes had a notion of the fact that in a fundamentally Christian-moral mode of thought, which believes in a good God as the creator of things, only God's veracity guarantees to us the judgements of our senses. Apart from a religious sanction and guarantee of our senses and rationalityâ€"where should we derive a right to trust in existence! That thinking is a measure of actualityâ€"that what cannot be thought, is notâ€"is a rude non plus ultra of a moralistic trustfulness (in an essential truth-principle at the bottom of things), in itself a mad assumption, which experience contradicts every moment. We are altogether unable to think anything at all just as it isâ€"



484 (Spring-Fall 1887)

"There is thinking: therefore there is something that thinks": this is the upshot of all Descartes' argumentation. But that means positing as "true a priori" our belief in the concept of substanceâ€"that when there is thought there has to be something "that thinks" is simply a formulation of our grammatical custom that adds a doer to every deed. In short, this is not merely the substantiation of a fact but a logical-metaphysical postulateâ€" Along the lines followed by Descartes one does not come upon something absolutely certain but only upon the fact of a very strong belief.
If one reduces the proposition to "There is thinking, therefore there are thoughts," one has produced a mere tautology: and precisely that which is in question, the "reality of thought," is not touched uponâ€"that is, in this form the "apparent reality" of thought cannot be denied. But what Descartes desired was that thought should have, not an apparent reality, but a reality in itself.



533 (Spring-Fall 1887)

Logical certainty, transparency, as criterion of truth ("omne illud verum est, quod clare et distincte percipitur." [1]â€"Descartes): with that, the mechanical hypothesis concerning the world is desired and credible.
But this is a crude confusion: like simplex sigillum veri. [2] How does one know that the real nature of things stands in this relation to our intellect?â€" Could it not be otherwise? that it is the hypothesis that gives the intellect the greatest feeling of power and security, that is most preferred, valued and consequently characterized as true?â€" The intellect posits its freest and strongest capacity and capability as criterion of the most valuable, consequently of the trueâ€"
"True": from the standpoint of feelingâ€": that which excites the feeling most strongly ("ego");
from the standpoint of thoughtâ€": that which gives thought the greatest feeling of strength;
from the standpoint of touch, seeing, hearingâ€": that which calls for the greatest resistance.
Thus it is the highest degrees of performance that awaken belief in the "truth," that is to say reality, of the object. The feeling of strength, of struggle, of resistance convinces us that there is something that is here being resisted.


NOTESâ€"
[1]: Translated by Kaufmann, "All that is true which is perceived clearly and distinctly."

[2]: Translated by Kaufmann, "Simplicity is the seal of truth."


*Nietzsche, F. The Will to Power. Translated by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale. Edited by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, Inc., Vintage Books Edition, 1968.

Btw, it was Descartes' "proofs" for the existence of god that were collectively the final straw the finally convinced me there were no gods.

They were quite awful.

But if the mere fact that I can produce from my thought the idea of something that entails everything which I clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to that thing really does belong to it, is not this a possible basis for another argument to prove the existence of God? Certainly, the idea of God, or a supremely perfect being, is one that I find within me just as surely as the idea of any shape or number. And my understanding that it belongs to his nature that he always exists is no less clear and distinct than is the case when I prove of any shape or number that some property belongs to its nature (AT 7:65; CSM 2:45).

The intuition above can be formally described as follows:

1.Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive to be contained in the idea of something is true of that thing.
2.I clearly and distinctly perceive that necessary existence is contained in the idea of God.
3.Therefore, God exists.

Remind you of something else? http://www.happyatheistforum.com/viewtopic.php?f=5&t=4686&p=61844#p61844