What is science?

[MarcusA]

What is science but a collection of facts that legitimate theories are made of.

[Asmodean]

The opposite, really.

A theory (sc.) is an explanation of some aspect of the natural world. It is, in fact, often stronger than fact, which can be "merely" an observed phenomenon. It may not be built from facts, as such, but can explain how to construct, or, as I like to put it, "model" a fact.

Look at it this way; let us assume that we have observed apples falling. "Apples fall" is now a fact. The [Newtonian] theory of gravitation is not built from that fact - on the contrary, it acts as a model for explaining why it must be. Apples fall because they are massive objects - as is the Earth. Being far more massive than the apples or the trees, it attracts them more strongly. When this attraction is able to overcome the "binding forces" in the stem or the branch (the sum of the opposing forces, in actuality, but simplifying.) - that's when them apples meet the Earth.

Now, you may ask, "but isn't 'massive objects attract each other' a fact?" and it is. In its turn, it has a theory to explain why this must be.

Of course there are axioms in science, but one does tend to try and limit their use as much as practically possible.

So, if anything, science is a method for creating theories, from which the explanations of legitimate facts arise.

[MarcusA]

The opposite, really.

A theory (sc.) is an explanation of some aspect of the natural world. It is, in fact, often stronger than fact, which can be "merely" an observed phenomenon. It may not be built from facts, as such, but can explain how to construct, or, as I like to put it, "model" a fact.

Look at it this way; let us assume that we have observed apples falling. "Apples fall" is now a fact. The [Newtonian] theory of gravitation is not built from that fact - on the contrary, it acts as a model for explaining why it must be. Apples fall because they are massive objects - as is the Earth. Being far more massive than the apples or the trees, it attracts them more strongly. When this attraction is able to overcome the "binding forces" in the stem or the branch (the sum of the opposing forces, in actuality, but simplifying.) - that's when them apples meet the Earth.

Now, you may ask, "but isn't 'massive objects attract each other' a fact?" and it is. In its turn, it has a theory to explain why this must be.

Of course there are axioms in science, but one does tend to try and limit their use as much as practically possible.

So, if anything, science is a method for creating theories, from which the explanations of legitimate facts arise.

I see your point, but is it not a fact that facts legitimise theories?

[Asmodean]

Not as such. Initially, observations legitimise predictions. Legitimate predictions legitimise the theory.

In our example, "Apples fall." Yes, they do, but the underlying theory says nothing of apples. You can use that model for "anything" (or, if you will, anything on Earth) such that if faced with a tyre iron, you may ask, "Do tyre irons fall?" Using the theory, you will then predict that indeed they do. With a well-enough established theory, at that point, you know that they do without ever having observed such an event, but you can do so.

[No one]

One time, I knew this girl, she was so sciencetastical, she blinded me with it.

[MarcusA]

One time, I knew this girl, she was so sciencetastical, she blinded me with it.

I am blinded by my own brilliance half the time.

[MarcusA]

What is science but too far away to help me.

[No one]

What is help but too science to me away far?

[MarcusA]

Ah yeah.

[Bluenose]

The opposite, really.

A theory (sc.) is an explanation of some aspect of the natural world. It is, in fact, often stronger than fact, which can be "merely" an observed phenomenon. It may not be built from facts, as such, but can explain how to construct, or, as I like to put it, "model" a fact.

Look at it this way; let us assume that we have observed apples falling. "Apples fall" is now a fact. The [Newtonian] theory of gravitation is not built from that fact - on the contrary, it acts as a model for explaining why it must be. Apples fall because they are massive objects - as is the Earth. Being far more massive than the apples or the trees, it attracts them more strongly. When this attraction is able to overcome the "binding forces" in the stem or the branch (the sum of the opposing forces, in actuality, but simplifying.) - that's when them apples meet the Earth.

Now, you may ask, "but isn't 'massive objects attract each other' a fact?" and it is. In its turn, it has a theory to explain why this must be.

Of course there are axioms in science, but one does tend to try and limit their use as much as practically possible.

So, if anything, science is a method for creating theories, from which the explanations of legitimate facts arise.

Yeah, that Newton guy was pretty clever, and he got it mostly right, well close enough for most practical purposes, like sending people to the moon or spacecraft to the outer reaches of the solar system.  However, our friend Einstein threw a right spanner in the works and showed that gravity is not a force, but a bending of space-time.  For example, a thrown ball does not really follow a curved path, but a geodesic (straight line) in space-time.  In effect, Newton's laws of motion are special cases that are good enough, so long as the velocities or masses are not too large.

Science is not a collection of facts, but a way to construct models of various aspects of the natural world that, amongst other things, can be used to make predictions about future behaviour of the system in question.  The degree that reality conforms to those predictions is an indication of the strength/value of the model.

[MarcusA]

The opposite, really.

A theory (sc.) is an explanation of some aspect of the natural world. It is, in fact, often stronger than fact, which can be "merely" an observed phenomenon. It may not be built from facts, as such, but can explain how to construct, or, as I like to put it, "model" a fact.

Look at it this way; let us assume that we have observed apples falling. "Apples fall" is now a fact. The [Newtonian] theory of gravitation is not built from that fact - on the contrary, it acts as a model for explaining why it must be. Apples fall because they are massive objects - as is the Earth. Being far more massive than the apples or the trees, it attracts them more strongly. When this attraction is able to overcome the "binding forces" in the stem or the branch (the sum of the opposing forces, in actuality, but simplifying.) - that's when them apples meet the Earth.

Now, you may ask, "but isn't 'massive objects attract each other' a fact?" and it is. In its turn, it has a theory to explain why this must be.

Of course there are axioms in science, but one does tend to try and limit their use as much as practically possible.

So, if anything, science is a method for creating theories, from which the explanations of legitimate facts arise.

Yeah, that Newton guy was pretty clever, and he got it mostly right, well close enough for most practical purposes, like sending people to the moon or spacecraft to the outer reaches of the solar system.  However, our friend Einstein threw a right spanner in the works and showed that gravity is not a force, but a bending of space-time.  For example, a thrown ball does not really follow a curved path, but a geodesic (straight line) in space-time.  In effect, Newton's laws of motion are special cases that are good enough, so long as the velocities or masses are not too large.

Science is not a collection of facts, but a way to construct models of various aspects of the natural world that, amongst other things, can be used to make predictions about future behaviour of the system in question.  The degree that reality conforms to those predictions is an indication of the strength/value of the model.

And what are these models made of but observable truths, in other words, facts.

[Bluenose]

And what are these models made of but observable truths, in other words, facts.

But observations may be wrong, for example due to inaccurate measurement, lack of available precision or indeed the biases of the observers.  The models are not made of facts, they're attempts to explain the things observed, but as better methods of observation or indeed better explanations are made it may well turn out that those previous observations are incorrect.  The concept of facts in the operation of science is not actually helpful.  Things are not so clearly defined as to be able to call them facts, except colloquially, but we're having a scientific discussion, are we not?  In science, we talk about margins for error and degrees of confidence.  The concept of facts is of the same genera as proofs.  Useful in (some) mathematics, but otherwise not generally useful or indeed applicable in science.

[MarcusA]

And what are these models made of but observable truths, in other words, facts.

But observations may be wrong, for example due to inaccurate measurement, lack of available precision or indeed the biases of the observers.  The models are not made of facts, they're attempts to explain the things observed, but as better methods of observation or indeed better explanations are made it may well turn out that those previous observations are incorrect.  The concept of facts in the operation of science is not actually helpful.  Things are not so clearly defined as to be able to call them facts, except colloquially, but we're having a scientific discussion, are we not?  In science, we talk about margins for error and degrees of confidence.  The concept of facts is of the same genera as proofs.  Useful in (some) mathematics, but otherwise not generally useful or indeed applicable in science.

It's just like when Albert Einstein had to wait for confirmation of his Theory of Relativity then, he thought his theory was so beautiful that it had to be right.

[MarcusA]

Science uses both deductive and inductive reasoning.

[Asmodean]

And what are these models made of but observable truths, in other words, facts.

But observations may be wrong, for example due to inaccurate measurement, lack of available precision or indeed the biases of the observers.  The models are not made of facts, they're attempts to explain the things observed, but as better methods of observation or indeed better explanations are made it may well turn out that those previous observations are incorrect.  The concept of facts in the operation of science is not actually helpful.  Things are not so clearly defined as to be able to call them facts, except colloquially, but we're having a scientific discussion, are we not?  In science, we talk about margins for error and degrees of confidence.  The concept of facts is of the same genera as proofs.  Useful in (some) mathematics, but otherwise not generally useful or indeed applicable in science.

Indeed. as a point of clarity, when talking about science, I use "fact" to mean broadly the same as multiple mutually-affirming observations. You see apples fall, I see apples fall... But in itself, that does not mean very much. The purpose of science is to delve into why it must be (or not), on what scale (Are apples just that special? If so, a whoole new set of whys) and how it works. Thus, we can reasonably predict the behaviour of an apple on Earth or a golf ball orbiting Jupiter using the same underlying theory because both these phenomena are the consequence of the same cause.

This is what makes an established theory in science much more powerful than a "fact" - the theory explains your facts and if it does not, it may be the time to adjust the model - or, as is more likely, your measurements and/or interpretation are simply wrong. There are indeed not exceptions that prove the rule. Proven exceptions break the rule and cause adjustments to it, thus resulting in us having a model of the universe that edges ever closer to its "actual" workings.