"God exists"

[PoopShoot]

Because no one likes it when people make spiteful comments about them, of course.

Hypocrisy involves words.  That said, I don't tend to get butthurt much.  Moreover, something as silly as calling god "it" is ridicuolous to classify as a spiteful comment.  Indeed, it never bothered me, even when I was a christian.

[Jac3510]

Hypocrisy involves words.  That said, I don't tend to get butthurt much.  Moreover, something as silly as calling god "it" is ridicuolous to classify as a spiteful comment.  Indeed, it never bothered me, even when I was a christian.

You may not have, but clearly, dloutbet knows plenty who have. In his own words, "They hate hearing that."

As far as hypocrisy being just words, it includes attitudes and actions as well. Besides, it seems to me that atheists as a whole--at least the kind on this board--would discourage such rhetoric. Considering how strongly you all insist that you can be just as--if not more--moral than the average Christian, an idea I have said in the past that I agree with, it hardly seems appropriate to engage in such flaming. Thumper made a fantastic point years ago about not saying anything if it isn't nice. Violating that rule is hardly good PR.

It all boils down to common decency. Saying something just to get a rise out of someone is just plain rude, and it is rather obvious that if you don't want people to be rude to you, you shouldn't be rude to others.

edit: but I don't want to derail pen's very interesting thread. Sorry, dude. I made my observation -- people can agree or not as they will. On with the discussion. I'll not comment further on this.

[dloubet]

It's hard to be completely civil towards a group of people, many of whom believe at the outset that I deserve to be tortured forever in a lake of fire.

It's hard to get past that.

[penfold]

Thanks to everyone for letting that simmer down. Hell, I too, like to refer to God as 'she' or 'it'; though I wouldn't say I do it to be malicious, merely to be subversive. And I do like a good bit of subversion. (@ dloubet; while many theists think you and I will end up in a lake of fire, none of them wish to push us in. If anything they wish to help. We may think they are both irritating and crazy, but, for the most part, it is hard to fault thier intentions).

but I digress...

@Jac, superb post, really made me stop and think. Coming at me with Hume, the horror; like being assaulted by a close friend...

... Following Hume, you have no access to the real world, only the sense-data as you perceive it. But even more literally, you don't even have access to the sense-data directly, but only to your interpretation of that sense-data, which is to say, your ideas of it. Thus, again, all language is necessarily about ideas, not about reality, including the phenomenal reality you think you have access to.

[...]

This is evident in your distinction of public and private data. There is no public data. How could there be? How can I compare my interpretation of my sense-data with your interpretation of your sense-data? Even a pragmatic argument fails here, namely, "Well we've done things like put men on the moon, so our interpretation of the data must be similar enough." But even my interpretation of putting men on the moon is only that -- an interpretation of sense data. I have no clue as to whether or not you have made the same interpretation!

There is a lot to unpack here. So let us start with Hume and pragmatism. I think you have missed a lot of what Hume was saying. In fact Hume himself responded to the kind of scepticism you have proposed with a pragmatic argument:

We need only ask such a sceptic, What his meaning is? And what he proposes by all these curious researches? He is immediately at a loss, and knows not what to answer. [...] ...he must acknowledge ... [all] discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men would remain in a total lethargy... [Yet] so fatal an event is very little to be dreaded. Nature is always too strong for principle.
- An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, David Hume, p104
[Bold my own]

Actually I think this pragmatic argument is a valid philosophical move, and in particular in reference to what I call public data.

Take two people in a room with a table in it. The first says “point to the table”, the second does. That is the nub of what I mean by public data, the complexities of how we abstract ideas from sense data, while fascinating, need not be delved into [incidentally I think it is properly a subject for neurology not philosophy]. This simple methodology of public data has huge pragmatic force, to the extent that, as you point out, we have landed on the moon. The sceptical principle you raise does not really serve to undermine this at a pragmatic level. As Hume himself puts it:

... all his [the sceptic's] objections are mere amusement, and can have not other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and reason and believe, though they are not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations, or to remove the objections which may be raised against them.
- ibid.
[Bold my own]

So the point you raise about the incommensurability of our interpretations of sense data, while being impossible to resolve, can (in fact Hume says must) be sidestepped. A foreriori as I am making no claim that language refers to a thing in itself merely that it refers to something. This also rescues causality:

You do realize, I'm sure, that if all metaphysical statements are meaningless, then so are all causal statements.

As causation has the same pragmatic pedigree as what I call public data (in fact it is, by my definition, a type of public data). In reductive terms we can point to examples of it. Hume realised this too, his assault on causality was an attack upon necessary connection. However at a pragmatic level we can talk of causality as a contingent connection; contingent, that is, upon us. Remember I am talking about meaning which is, but its very nature, contingent; not about truth which is necessary.

So it seems reasonable to ask: why can't the same pragmatic move cannot be made with “God exists”? especially as my argument against it having meaning seems to rest upon the incommensurability of people's unique interpretations of God.

"God" is obviously not a meaningless term. If it were, by the way, then atheism would be an equally meaningless term, and I'm pretty sure everybody here means something when they confidently assert the meaning of atheism.

I never claimed that “God” was meaningless, rather my point was that the statement “God exists” is meaningless. There is a fundamental difference. The word “God” refers in exactly the same way “love” refers. This explains why I contend that the statement “I believe in God” is meaningful, in exactly the same way “I love her” is meaningful. To quote from the OP:

(v/ii) Reference and the Subjective

The situation is slightly different for subjective statements. “I love her” does not directly refer to something that is publicly accessible. Only I can know what I am referring to with the word “love”, my emotions are not accessible to anyone other than me. However this is not a problem as in terms of public reference we understand “love” in the 1st person as referring to something private in terms of content. HOWEVER the statement “he loves her” (“love” in the 3rd person) does refer to something publicly accessible in terms of behaviour.

So for example if I say “I love her”; then others can meaningfully say “he loves her” by reference to my behaviour (not least the evidence of me saying “I love her”) which is publicly accessible.

Thus even subjective reference to my private reality is meaningful because of its ability to refer to behaviour which is publicly accessible.

[NOTE: The statement “I believe that God exists” is meaningful in exactly this manner.]

“God exists” is however a different type of statement. The reason being that it is making a claim beyond the pragmatic realm of public data. It is making a truth claim about reality. Incidentally it also follows that “the table exists” is meaningless. The pragmatic shield of contingent reference which gives language meaning cannot stretch to ontology. A final quote from Hume:

Here indeed lies the justest and most plausible objection against a considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not properly a science; but arise either from the fruitless efforts of human vanity, wich would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the understanding, or from the craft of popular superstition.
- An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, David Hume, p5
[Bold my own]

In that quote there is an interesting use of the word 'science' by that I take Hume to mean exactly the kind of pragmatic meaning derived from reference to public data that I have been talking about.


Finally a very brief word on the Wittgensteinian ladder: (would say more but have a vicious, home-made polish spirit induced, hangover and I urgently need to stop staring at a screen)

The reasoning is rather simple, I think. If the statement "all metaphysical statements are meaningless" is really meaningless, then it doesn't refer to metaphysics at all. You may as well say, "Hiwehhd aveeohea aplweihdafn weihern er." Now, if I said that, would you conclude that metaphysics is inherently meaningless? Of course not.

The thing is I am not relying upon the general statement. Rather my aim is, by approaching, from first principles, what meaning is, we find that we cannot assign particular meaning to metaphysical statements. Does that help?

peace

[hackenslash]

I'll start with your claim that “God exists” is in fact empirical. I think you are quite wrong in this analysis. What defines an empirical statement is the verification principle. For a statement to be considered empirical it must refer to phenomenal data; I don't think this is at all contentious.

God's existence cannot be verified by reference to phenomenal data. Even if we were to accept that God itself could be phenomenally verified â€" ie God could be 'seen' (which as far as I am aware no theology claims) â€" this would still leave the problem of “exists” which cannot be empirically verified. Simply put empiricism by its very nature is limited to the phenomenal; it cannot deal with ontology (cf Hume â€" Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779)). As such “God exists” cannot be empirical.

Quite wrong. Firstly, verificationism, being a version of Popper's principle of falsification, doesn't preclude a statement being empirical. All that is required for any statement to be an empirical statement is that it have consequences. This brings us back to 'god' being incoherent. The proposition 'god exists' has very real consequences, whether or not they can be verified or falsified, not least because, on most conceptions of deity, this entity is responsible for the creation of the cosmos, which is about as consequential in real terms as it gets.

Incidentally, 'ontology' is one of the most inappropriately thrown about, and therefore among the most useless, principles in thought. It's only surpassed in this regard by the word 'epistemology', which is not bad, since most of the people employing the word have no fucking clue what actually constitutes knowledge, let alone have any idea of how to acquire it, given as they are to studying the colour of the lint in their belly-buttons.

On my use of “subjective/objective”. You are quite correct to point out that my use is lax; I was trying to avoid too many technical phrases. However I think my use is consistent and so I'm not sure you are right in your analysis that this leads me into error. Let me explain.

Your use may be constitent, but it isn't correct.

I think what I should have made clear is that “I believe God exists” is subjective in terms of reference. Remember I am talking of language which, you agree with me, is all about reference. I AM NOT TALKING ABOUT REALITY. So “I believe God exists” is subjective, not in terms of reality, but in terms of what is being referred to by the language.

Wrong. That statement is a statement about reality, as in, it is really true that you believe god exists. However you slice it, that is an objective statement, not a subjective one. There is no sense in which this could be a subjective statement, because it's true regardless of your perspective.

You are quite correct that in terms of reality “I believe God exists” is objective (cf Spinoza's discussion of 'modes' in Ethics (1677)). However only the person stating “I believe in God” has access to what is being referred to (their belief). This is what I meant by reference to the “subjective”; I should really have said is reference to “private data”. Similarly for “objective” I should have used “public data”. Sorry I did not make that clearer.

Doesn't actually make any difference. That what you are referring to when you state 'I believe that god exists' doesn't actually alter the objective fact that you believe that god exists. The conception of god under discussion is irrelevant. I thought I'd made that clear in my earlier post, but I'll go back and have another look.

This also explains why I hold that “God exists” holds a contradiction. You are correct to say we can make statements which are subjective but deal with the objective. However that is relying upon the subjective/objective distinction in terms of reality; in terms of reference (and so meaning) it is a contradiction.

I hope that explains better what I was driving at.

ACtually, I thought I'd said the opposite, although the corrollary is also true. I'll have to go back and look at what I said, but I thought that I'd said that we can make statements that are objective but deal with the subjective. Either way, the qualification is irrelevant. It doesn't actually matter to what you are referring when you make the statement. I had thought that my example with the colour red should have dealt with this, not least because the reverse is also true.

[penfold]

Hackenslash, thank you for your reply. It did leave me a little confused. Either you are misunderstanding me, or I'm misunderstanding you. Anyway I hope the following will help us narrow down on what exactly it is we are in disagreement over.

Quite wrong. Firstly, verificationism, being a version of Popper's principle of falsification, doesn't preclude a statement being empirical. All that is required for any statement to be an empirical statement is that it have consequences.

I was not referring to verificationalism, of which I am not a fan, nor Popper's principle of falsification. The principle I was referring to is not one of logical theory (to be fair I have re-read what I wrote and I can't find even a hint that I was) rather I was simply making a point regarding empirical method.

Let me reiterate. By empirical statement I mean a statement that can be verified or falsified by reference to data.

The statement “God exists” is thus precluded from being empirical, as there is no data which can verify or falsify. The reason for this is the not particularly controversial view that a statement of existence is a statement about a thing in itself which cannot be accessed. That data pertaining to a thing in itself is not accessible is not surprising, we only have indirect access to things through observation, and observation tells us only of the thing as observed.

I really did not understand your point about consequences of the statement “God exists”. I would just reiterate that I have no problem with the meaningfulness of “I believe that God exists”. Perhaps that is where the confusion is arising?

Incidentally, 'ontology' is one of the most inappropriately thrown about, and therefore among the most useless, principles in thought. It's only surpassed in this regard by the word 'epistemology', which is not bad, since most of the people employing the word have no fucking clue what actually constitutes knowledge, let alone have any idea of how to acquire it, given as they are to studying the colour of the lint in their belly-buttons.

Well I agree that 'ontology' is an oft misused term, however I don't think I have been misusing it. Nor for that matter do I think I have misused the word 'epistemology'. If I have please walk me through it. I am always keen to learn.

Incidentally, maybe I have got the wrong end of the stick, and I sincerely apologise if I have, but I did find the above passage quite aggressive in tone. I'm a very sensitive soul (have a Dr's note and all) and while I respect your right to disagree with me, and have genuinely enjoyed working with what you have written, could perhaps you tone down the ad hominem? I share my thoughts for interest and discussion's sake, I really don't want to fight. If you find the topic to be one of navel gazing only then that's fine, just don't take part.

Anyhow onto the subjective/objective stuff.

As I understand the word subjective means: relating to the subject and his/her thoughts.

You said in reference to my claim that “I believe God exists" is subjective:

That statement is a statement about reality, as in, it is really true that you believe god exists. However you slice it, that is an objective statement, not a subjective one. There is no sense in which this could be a subjective statement, because it's true regardless of your perspective.

Now it seems to me that it is correct to say that the statement “I believe in x” is a reference by the speaker (ie the subject) to their own thoughts. So the statement, in terms of reference is subjective QED.

Where am I making the mistake?

peace

Edit for syntax

[hackenslash]

Hackenslash, thank you for your reply. It did leave me a little confused. Either you are misunderstanding me, or I'm misunderstanding you. Anyway I hope the following will help us narrow down on what exactly it is we are in disagreement over.

I'm sure the misunderstanding will be cleared up forthwith.

I was not referring to verificationalism, of which I am not a fan, nor Popper's principle of falsification.

You should be a fan. Popper's principle lies at the heart of theory selection, and is one of the most important principles in modern science.

There's an interesting discussion to be had somewhere there, in that while verificationalism and falsification may seem to be complementary, they are actually at odds. Only one of them describes an important principle in science, while the other actually describes a caricature of science. Nothing can ever be truly verified. That's why science doesn't deal in proof, only disproof. We can't say with certainty that soemthing is true, only that it isn't, which nails verificationalism to the wall in many respects. Verification requires one observation to take something as true (although that's oversimplifying the principle a little), while only one observation is required to falsify a hypothesis.

Let me reiterate. By empirical statement I mean a statement that can be verified or falsified by reference to data.

Then your understanding of what constitutes an empirical statement is fundamentally flawed. Again, an empirical statement is simply a statement whose implications have real consequences.

I won't deal with much of the rest, as it's rooted in this misunderstanding. Were I to agree with you on what constitutes an empirical statement, I would have no argument, so should you convince me that I am wrong about this, I will take the rest as agreed, unless stated.

Incidentally, maybe I have got the wrong end of the stick, and I sincerely apologise if I have, but I did find the above passage quite aggressive in tone. I'm a very sensitive soul (have a Dr's note and all) and while I respect your right to disagree with me, and have genuinely enjoyed working with what you have written, could perhaps you tone down the ad hominem? I share my thoughts for interest and discussion's sake, I really don't want to fight. If you find the topic to be one of navel gazing only then that's fine, just don't take part.

Several things here. Firstly, there was no ad hominem (another term that is thrown around without understanding what it actually is)*. I didn't attack you. I didn't even attack your ideas. Certainly I used robust language, but that shouldn't be confused with agression. If that's the way I came across, it wasn't my intention. I can definitely be very agressive, when the occasion demands, but this wasn't one of those times. As for my participation, I take part in those topics that interest me, or that I find flaws of reasoning in. Addressing flaws of reasoning is my real objective, especially when flawed reasoning is presented as unassailable fact (not that that's what you did here).

As I understand the word subjective means: relating to the subject and his/her thoughts.

And that's the real flaw. That which is subjective is, loosely, anything that is only true for the person making the statement. That which is objective is universally true. This has to be clarified in the interest of rigour, simply because any other treatment opens the door for such wibble as 'objective morality', which is a nonsense, however you look at it. The universe doesn't care about how we treat each other, and all our morals, even those that we hold to be universally true, are only true from the perspective of Homo sapiens, which is still subjective. It's simple a matter of being absolutely categorical in what we're saying, and in what terms mean.

Now it seems to me that it is correct to say that the statement “I believe in x” is a reference by the speaker (ie the subject) to their own thoughts. So the statement, in terms of reference is subjective QED.

The thoughts are subjective, but the statement is universally true, hence objective.

peace

A nice sentiment, and reciprocated.

*Edit: Forgot to deal with this substantially. An ad hominem is commited only when the arguer is attacked. The ad hominem fallacy is only committed when an attack on the arguer is substituted for an argument with the specific intent of implying that the arguer must be talking nonsense because they are (insert epithet here).

Hence, I would be commiting an ad hominem if I said 'you are a fuckwit'. I would be committing the ad hominem fallacy if I said 'you're a fuckwit, therefore your arguments are nonsense', because even a fuckwit makes a sound and valid argument, which is why it would be a fallacy. If I said, however, 'your arguments are nonsense, therefore you're a fuckwit', I wouldn't be commiting the ad hominem fallacy, but I would be committing and ad hominem.
Note: In none of the above am I actually calling you, penfold, a fuckwit. I am simply highlighting the particulars of the ad hominem and the ad hominem fallacy, which are two very distinct things.

In any event, in the above, which you questioned as ad hominem, you will notice if you read it that I only ever questioned your arguments, and at no point did I direct any comments at yourself. Agressive I may have been (though that was not my intent, as I stated. Seriously, you will know when I come out swinging), but nothing was directed 'at the man', which is the literal translation of ad hominem.

Hope that clears some things up.

Peace, brother.

[penfold]

Dear hackenslash,

Clearly I did misinterpret your tone, and I am sorry, years of being brutalised on web forums has left me somewhat over-sensitive. Incidentally, while I appreciate the lengthy description of ad hominem I am familiar with its meaning (all those years of studying classics and law). The reason I used it was that I thought you were implying that I was a navel gazer who had no fucking clue what constituted knowledge. Anyhow that cleared up...

Then your understanding of what constitutes an empirical statement is fundamentally flawed. Again, an empirical statement is simply a statement whose implications have real consequences.

Interesting. Where do you get this definition from? I must say I have never come across it. It seems to me prima facie that it has several weaknesses. I wonder if you could answer a few queries that immediately spring to mind:

i. How does one discern what a statement's consequences are?
ii. What is the relationship between a statement and its consequences; are we talking causal, interpretive, etc...?
iii. What discerns a 'real' consequence from any other type of consequence?
iv. Do not all statements carry consequences? If not can you give an example of a consequence-less statement?

Nothing can ever be truly verified. That's why science doesn't deal in proof, only disproof. We can't say with certainty that soemthing is true, only that it isn't, which nails verificationalism to the wall in many respects. Verification requires one observation to take something as true (although that's oversimplifying the principle a little), while only one observation is required to falsify a hypothesis.

This point is well taken, and is a serious error in my argument. I seem to have gotten myself confused. My purpose was to limit the discussion to that of meaning but by talking of verification and falsification I am of course talking about matters of fact. Given that is the case then you are entirely correct to point out that the very notion of verification is flawed in terms of empirical method. So let me try and claw back some ground.

I should have limited myself to classifying an empirical statement as that which refers to observed data. It seems to me that this definition is more robust and would still exclude “God exists” from being an empirical statement as it refers to a thing in itself; which is clearly beyond the scope of empirical reference.

Or am I making another error?

That which is subjective is, loosely, anything that is only true for the person making the statement. That which is objective is universally true. This has to be clarified in the interest of rigour, simply because any other treatment opens the door for such wibble as 'objective morality', which is a nonsense, however you look at it. The universe doesn't care about how we treat each other, and all our morals, even those that we hold to be universally true, are only true from the perspective of Homo sapiens, which is still subjective. It's simple a matter of being absolutely categorical in what we're saying, and in what terms mean.

[...]

The thoughts are subjective, but the statement is universally true, hence objective.

I still think we are talking at cross purposes here. I am not talking about truth or matters of fact. I have agreed that, in terms of matters of fact, all belief statements are objective. They accurately describe something that is true as a matter of fact about the universe.

However; my point was about language and reference. So when I say that “I believe in God” is subjective I am not talking about the truth value of the statement. What I mean is that the use of language is subjective in that it refers to qualia (ie the belief itself). The sensation of belief is subjective, even if the belief itself is in truth terms objective (ie it is true that the belief is held). The language of the statement though refers to the former (the sensation of belief), not to the latter (the holding of belief). So while “I believe in God” is objectively true, the language is referring to something subjective. Hence my claim that in terms of reference it is subjective.

In fact were it to be argued, conversely, that a belief statement was objective in terms of reference, we would be lead into error. The position would be that because a statement of belief is objective so that which was being referred to, the belief itself, is also objective.

peace

[dloubet]

(@ dloubet; while many theists think you and I will end up in a lake of fire, none of them wish to push us in. If anything they wish to help. We may think they are both irritating and crazy, but, for the most part, it is hard to fault thier intentions).

No. They may not wish to push me in, and may be trying to help me avoid it, but they cannot say that they disagree with their god that, as an atheist, I somehow deserve it. They would think it unfortunate, but also consider it Perfect Justice. They think I deserve it, there's no getting around it unless they're willing to criticize their god's judgments as too harsh, and they won't do that.

They enter the discussion agreeing with their god that I personally deserve to be tortured forever, that such a thing would be justified in my case. A thing I would not wish on my worst enemy, or indeed anyone.

Why should I be civil?

[penfold]

Why should I be civil?

Because civility is a virtue in itself; it is the mark of a reasonable person. Aggression almost never works, it just entrenches people's position and ultimately leads to upset and hatred. To put it bluntly; civility works, aggression doesn't.

To quote from a far wiser man than me:

When I despair, I remember that all through history the ways of truth and love have always won. There have been tyrants, and murderers, and for a time they can seem invincible, but in the end they always fall. Think of it, always. - Mahatma Gandhi

peace

[dloubet]

Because civility is a virtue in itself;

Which is why I actually do try to be civil. Because civility is a virtue in and of itself.

But regardless of Mr. Gandhi's quote, I don't think history has established that civility works and agression doesn't.

[Tank]

Because civility is a virtue in itself;

Which is why I actually do try to be civil. Because civility is a virtue in and of itself.

But regardless of Mr. Gandhi's quote, I don't think history has established that civility works and agression doesn't.

In the hundreds of thousands of posts I have read on different fora aggression has never worked, not once, ever. In my years as a project manager and business analyst aggression has never worked, not once, ever. Civility allows discourse, aggression stops it dead. Being aggressive may satisfy one's own ego but it does nothing practical in furthering a discussion. Civility may be wasted on some, but it costs nothing, gives one the moral high ground and may, under favourable circumstances, be the only route to changing another persons world view.

Aggression is just wasted adrenaline.