The "Open Question" argument

[The Black Jester]

A number of ethical philosophers have attempted to give an analysis of 'the good' in natural terms.  I have been thinking about this recently in reference to Sam Harris' The Moral Landscape, and his arguments that science can somehow determine our values.  Wanting to avoid theological invocations, many moral philosophers have struggled with how values can be grounded by other means.  Many, of course, have gone the relativistic route, but others have tried give an analysis of concepts like 'good' in terms of other natural facts.  G.E. Moore in Principia Ethica (1903) gives the following refutation of such attempts:

The hypothesis that disagreement about the meaning of good is disagreement with regard to the correct analysis of a given whole, may be most plainly seen to be incorrect by consideration of the fact that, whatever definition may be offered, it may always be asked, with significance, of the complex so defined, whether it is itself good. To take, for instance, one of the more plausible, because one of the more complicated of such proposed definitions, it may easily be thought, at first sight, that to be good may mean to be that which we desire to desire. Thus if we apply this definition to a particular instance and say 'When we think that A is good, we are thinking that A is one of the things which we desire to desire,' our proposition may seem quite plausible. But, if we carry the investigation further, and ask ourselves 'Is it good to desire to desire A?' it is apparent, on a little reflection, that this question is itself as intelligible, as the original question, 'Is A good?' – that we are, in fact, now asking for exactly the same information about the desire to desire A, for which we formerly asked with regard to A itself. But it is also apparent that the meaning of this second question cannot be correctly analysed into 'Is the desire to desire A one of the things which we desire to desire?': we have not before our minds anything so complicated as the question 'Do we desire to desire to desire to desire A?' Moreover any one can easily convince himself by inspection that the predicate of this proposition – 'good' – is positively different from the notion of 'desiring to desire' which enters into its subject: 'That we should desire to desire A is good' is not merely equivalent to 'That A should be good is good.'

I'm curious to hear how others see this argument specifically.  Does it definitively show, as Moore thought it did, that any attempts to define 'the good' in terms of any natural facts about the universe are doomed?  This argument would seem to follow fairly straightforwardly from Hume's famous observation that one may never derive an 'ought' from an 'is.'  And if the argument is sound, does it mean that we are better off disposing of such notions as 'the good' altogether, or do we have other resources or means by which such a notion might be clarified?

[penfold]

Does it definitively show, as Moore thought it did, that any attempts to define 'the good' in terms of any natural facts about the universe are doomed?  This argument would seem to follow fairly straightforwardly from Hume's famous observation that one may never derive an 'ought' from an 'is.'  And if the argument is sound, does it mean that we are better off disposing of such notions as 'the good' altogether, or do we have other resources or means by which such a notion might be clarified?

Certainly Moore starts from Hume's insight. Interestingly Moore still thought we could engage in meaningful ethical discussion as 'good' was accessible through intuition; however he never managed to address the problem of differing intuitions between people.

This problem was taken up by CL Stevenson and AJ Ayer who developed a radical hypothesis of the form that all ethical statements are no more than expressions of emotional preferences. "x is good" means, according to Ayer, little more than "hurrah for x".

Thus if I say to someone, 'You acted wrongly in stealing that money,' I am not stating anything more than that if I had simply said 'You stole that money.' In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I has said, 'You stole that money,' in a peculiar tone of horror, or written it with the addition of some special exclamation marks. The tone or exclamation marks, adds nothing to the literal meaning of the sentence. It mearly serves to show that the expression of it is attended by certain feelings in the speaker. - A J Ayer Language Truth and Logic - Ch 6 p.142

However there are some dissenting voices. Wittgenstein's brilliant pupil GEM Anscombe in Modern Moral Philosophy (full text here: http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/mleldrid/cmt/mmp.html) makes the case that the kind of moral confusion Moore is pointing to is a result of history not philosophy. Her point is that our ethical systems are 'rule-conception' (ie lists of permitted and prohibited behaviours - murder is wrong, love is good etc...). This, she argues, made sense in the Medieval period when we had a God who could enforce these rules (with the promise of eternal reward or damnation)*. However we are now in a situation where we have kept the 'rule-conception' ethics but lost our 'rule giver' with the abolition of God. She compares the situation to a future were all laws and courts have been abolished: in such a society she says, the word 'criminal' would suffer from the same problems as the word 'good' does in the modern world. Her proposal is that we try and reconstruct an Aristotelian version of ethics which is not rule-based but person-based.

More recently the ethicist Alisdair MacIntyre has developed this point (most noticeably in the terrifyingly brilliant After Virtue); there is no way in the confines of this post I could do his thinking justice. However in broad terms he proposes that while we may all be confused with the word 'good' we do all understand virtue terms; words like 'courage', 'honesty', 'just' as applying to humans. He is not claiming that this should be an absolute system, just like Aristotle he sees ethics as more of an art, akin to story-telling, and not an science (in fact Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics Bk I 1094b12 is explicit on this point).

The goal of such an ethical system is not to discern 'right' from 'wrong' but how humans can achieve 'eudaimon' (happiness/flourishing). In this sense MacIntyre sees Moore and his followers as having a completely pointless discussion about a 'rule-conception' ethical system which was developed in a period when universal assent to a God of judgement existed. By re-focusing ethics onto virtues and human lives and away from rules and judgement MacIntyre seeks to develop a coherent system of ethics which completely avoids the kind of critique that is made by Moore.

My own view is that MacIntyre is pretty successful at pointing to the limitations of figures like Moore, Stevenson and Ayer. Where I think he is less successful is in developing his new virtue ethics framework; though it is a valiant attempt and well worth reading for anyone with even a passing interest in ethics. (A clip of the great man discussing his ideas can be found here http://technorati.com/videos/youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DLzYm3tqmiKk)

I think Moore is absolutely right about the way we use 'good'; however I agree with Anscombe and MacIntyre that he is not really criticising ethics as such, rather a very particular 'rule-conception' ethics that has been left over from the Medieval Christian system. My suspicion is that by using an Aristotelian framework we can develop a new and more robust system of ethical meaning.

Fascinating OP.

* It should be noted that even this 'God as rule-giver' has its own problems, Plato's Euthyphro dilemma is worth a look on this point.

[The Black Jester]

Very illuminating, penfold.  I'm intrigued, and will definitely have to read Anscombe and MacIntyre as you suggest.  My primary focus in philosophy has always been in the area of contemporary philosophy of mind, but I definitely am fascinated by ethical considerations as well.  My own frustrations with how to ground 'rule-based' ethics has left me unsatisfied with the field in general.  I have been reading Stevil's arguments for amoralism here with considerable interest.  But I do wonder if a system based on what is mutually beneficial for survival can suffice in itself.  I suppose it depends upon what we actually want...what goal we can agree on.  Something like 'human flourishing' seems on first inspection to have promise, but I wonder if each of us could actually come to an agreement on what that meant.  It seems far too personal and amorphous a term. 

In addition, why could Moore's argument not be extended to 'virtue' - how are we to define that in clear and non-circular terms?  Why is any particular example of virtue 'virtuous'? It seems like you might end up in a similar position with respect to defining 'the good.'

[Hector Valdez]

*slap*
To be good is to be fit for a particular purpose. One's worldview and emotional state initiates a volitional purpose.SIMPLE.

[The Black Jester]

*slap*
To be good is to be fit for a particular purpose. One's worldview and emotional state initiates a volitional purpose.SIMPLE.

*duck*
Fitness relative to a particular purpose may be one sense in which we use the term 'good,'  but the meta discussion of  purposes themselves seems to involve another sense of the term, one that is trying to evaluate some intrinsic quality.  It may be that this is an incoherent notion, which is what I'm trying to determine by evaluating the 'open question' argument.
*swift knee to the nutsack*

[penfold]

In addition, why could Moore's argument not be extended to 'virtue' - how are we to define that in clear and non-circular terms?  Why is any particular example of virtue 'virtuous'? It seems like you might end up in a similar position with respect to defining 'the good.'

I think the primary point to make here is that virtue ethical systems do not operate in either a 'scientific' or 'legalistic' manner.

That it does not operate in a 'scientific' manner means that no one can attack this kind of system as committing Moore's naturalistic fallacy. As for the 'open question', Anscombe points out that we do not require exact definitions for terms to be meaningful, she gives the example of 'unjust'. She does not attempt a definition in Moore's sense, but instead argues that it is a vague term which can be well defined by examples. So she can't give a strict definition of 'unjust' but she is happy with the following being a definitive example: "the knowing punishment of an innocent man". It should also be noted that such a system allows for cultural relativism, for example, Aristotle himself had no problem with slavery, you would be hard pressed to find a modern virtue ethicist who doesn't either!

Instead what virtue ethics provides us with is a framework for talking about ethics without prescribing rules or judgement (which would be, according to Aristotle, a political not ethical task).

Perhaps an example would clarify. First we should pick a sphere of human activity; for the purposes of this example we will look at the sphere of dealing with moments of duress and danger.

Having chosen our 'sphere of activity', we can then move onto some examples.

(i) Captain Schettino abandoning the Costa Concordia before the passengers have disembarked.

(ii) The charge of the light brigade.

(iii) The man standing in front of a tank in Tiananmen Square.

Of these examples we understand (i) to be cowardly (ii) to be foolhardy and (iii) to be courageous [always bearing in mind that this is not a 'scientific approach' and these opinions may vary between societies]. Thus when confronted by a moment of duress and danger we, in the modern western world, would endeavour to be like the man in Tiananmen.

Aristotle's point is that by practicing within sphere we become more like the people we admire and less like those we disdain. In the Ethics he says that a person living well is analogous to a flutist playing her instrument well - it requires practice and skill.

Two other points should be made about this system.

First is that, not being a science, this all operates under the authority of common-sense ['phronesis']; we are enjoined to make our own judgements on what is admirable and what is not – my suspicion is that we will, within societies, find broad agreement.

Secondly that we do these things for their own sake. MacIntyre gives a nice example of teaching a child to play chess. At first the child is reluctant and has to be bribed, a chocolate per victory. Such a child, MacIntyre points out, is well incentivised to cheat (after all, as long as they get away with it they gain more chocolate). As the child gets older they start to play chess for its own sake; at this point the child is not incentivised to cheat; if they do they rob themselves of the very thing they are trying to gain!

Perhaps it is in this division between inner and outer goods that the true meaning of eudaimon can be found. We flourish when we act well for the sake of acting well (as opposed to the legalist who only obeys rules to avoid punishment). I would contend that MacIntyre is onto something here. Think of any recent scandal, it is often the greed or manipulation which upsets us more than the technical breach of rules. Take the Costa Concordia disaster; no one really focused on the reckless (and probably illegal) manoeuvres which lead to hitting the rocks. What really offended us was Captain Schettino's cowardice in leaving the ship, irrespective of its legality.

[NatsuTerran]

The naturalistic fallacy of deriving an "ought" from an "is" is even more profound when we DON'T do as Sam Harris would, and rely on moral relativism over scientifically based morality. The absence of making a reasoned out moral decision is itself a moral decision with consequences all the same.

*slap*
To be good is to be fit for a particular purpose. One's worldview and emotional state initiates a volitional purpose.SIMPLE.

The empirical facts from science describe the only "purpose" one could possibly want. Who could possibly disagree with, for instance, the avoidance of a physical disease that causes despair and pain? Objective facts can show us what the disease is, how to prevent or cure it, and what consequences it all comes down to.

Objective well-being can have no disagreement. Disagreement only arises whenever it comes into conflict with other subjective values. For example, let's say we have a person who has developed a masochistic value of cutting off his own hand. The libertarian says that this is his life choice that he completely chose of his own will, and that the only moral thing to do is to allow unfettered choice play out regardless of the consequences.  Now, let's say we could make magic happen and change the laws of nature.  Let's say that in an alternate reality, cutting off your hand will not hurt one bit, and your hand will merely grow back right away. We have now stripped away the objective loss tied to this individual's cherished desire. What changes? I'd assume that the masochist would love this change, as it would allow him to continue doing the hobby without the pain (which previously he had to make a risk/reward decision on) and even get to continually do a previously one-time-only thing. To take another example, would any smokers seriously hate it if all of a sudden smoking was no longer dangerous at all? Say there were no adverse effects of smoking period, and it was a hobby all the same as jogging or tennis. Would any smokers object to this? Of course not, assuming that all the experiential effects of smoking remain identical. What this shows is that there is a clash of subjective vs. objective. It's kind of impossible to say that smoking is a better hobby than jogging.

I see many drugheads use this fallacy to justify their choices. "I may be killing myself with my hobby, but at least I'm having WAAAY more fun in life than you are with your hobby!" This is a fallacy because it assumes equal pleasure amongst different hobbies for every person. Surely not everyone enjoys drugs, even if the objective harm was removed from the equation. Glorifying subjective interests in this sense can be dangerous for a balanced society. As the saying goes "you don't know what you're missing." Good. "What you don't know won't hurt you." If you developed in a society that does not have (insert dangerous but socially acceptable activities), then you are achieving better criteria for an objectively good life. Say there are two countries, A and B. A has a socially acceptable attitude towards hard drugs. B outright bans them. If you have the choice of which society to be born in, A or B, and you strip yourself all subjective values (you will develop them later), which would you choose?

I think a mistake many people make is saying "Oh gee, if I get born in country B, and I end up liking hard drugs, I will feel heavily infringed on and lose out on a lot." The reason this is a mistake in thinking is that it ignores probabilities. I think it is logical to assume that country B does not have a socially positive outlook on hard drugs *because* it bans them, that is, the majority of people voted for such a thing. So chances are very good that you would be born into a family and environment that does not instill a liking to drugs in the first place. No harm, no fowl. On the other hand, the chances are much higher that you may fall into a trap of being influenced into doing hard drugs in the other country do to the lax outlook on things. Remember, in this exercise you *don't know* how you will develop as a person. While the B option may seem quite tame to some of you, keep in mind that what is "tame" is entirely subjective. Some people live the most fulfilled lives ever in their own opinion, but you would call it tame because it's subjective. This is why I don't think politics/morality is *entirely* a matter of opinion, although to an extent it is (as far as how much is too much/striking a balance). In the above example, you are taking major risks going with country A. You would have to believe in free agency to think you are immune and free from whatever experiences you are born into. (what if your parents were crack heads?)

My cognitive psych text explains my views very well. There's an entire chapter dedicated to how terrible people are at rational decisions. People are generally horrible at thinking in terms of the future. One example, for instance is that people largely overstate how a perceived loss will be for them in the future. Think of a little kid that gets a toy taken away and thinks it's the end of the world. People are constantly underestimating their abilities to adapt and make life meaningful no matter what changes occur. People who are spoiled constantly throw fits about having to give up a small, almost meaningless freedom when in reality they get used to it in a very short notice. Likewise, people have a tendency to seek expensive things that will only bring very short-term satisfaction, although they perceive the pleasure to be much greater in the past. Also, the unconscious mind does the vast majority of the work in people. Even conscious, deliberate decisions are largely framed by the unconscious mind, priming a certain decision to be made based on context rather than rational choice. All of this and many, many more findings prove to me that individuals are inept at making rational choices 100% of the time in their lives (rationality is usually more ephemeral), and that others are better at making choices for us(!). That may sound unintuitive, aren't other people just as inept as us? But the truth is that other people, when making decisions for us are able to see through any bias, implicit behavior, or unconscious reasoning and give a much more objective account. There's mountains of evidence in neuroscience and cognitive psych that suggest other people know us much better than we know ourselves.

A lot of that material is hard to grasp. And many people simply refuse to believe this sort of thing because humans are more or less wired to want to feel an illusion of control, much like belief in a deity. It's very functional to feel like we are rational and have control over our destiny. Even as a strong determinist, I can't actually go through my day without tacitly feeling a sense of control.

Another thing I want to clarify is that I don't think every last, slightly harmful freedom should be done away with to the point that we are living like fish in a bowl. I am simply stating a rule of thumb that objective facts from science definitely seem to be the way to go over just glorifying relativism and allowing nature to have its way with us. You can still disagree if you believe in free will. All that said, I still think a degree of relativism is needed to strike a balance between "house cat" and "wild cat." I tend to favor more tame lifestyles. I think many people assume that more freedom is a better life. Thus, the wild cat would have it better despite facing more dangers. However, if the house cat has *no recollection whatsoever* of a forest life, it has nothing to lose at all. I think my housecats are very pleased with their lives. They are still full of energy.

There are only two rebuttals I have heard to my position on morality. The first is to just assume free will as a common sense retort, which I simply don't care to argue against (free will is unfalsifiable, like god). The other is that there is a slippery slope that will lead us to living in cages. I see this used a lot but I just don't think it is true. Most people advocate change one step at a time. If we were to start cracking down on problem hobbies and behaviors in this country, there would be a point where we just wouldn't give a crap about "stopping people who watch TV because they are unproductive" simply because there are always more demanding issues like poverty and world-hunger that will never be solved and always overshadow the trivial things that hardly even have consequences. That is why I think there will be an equilibrium of balance. And by the way I do NOT support banning things that are already a part of society like with prohibition. If someone's views are already shaped into liking something, there's not much we can do about it. I mainly speak and care about consequences for FUTURE generations. Thus, when Ron Paul says "if we legalized crack cocaine, I sure wouldn't start doing it" he is being extremely ignorant/egocentric. He only thinks of consequences when they apply to himself. If society as a whole becomes more accepting of a behavior, there is surely a stronger probability that future generations will be influenced by it. It's why I think tobacco is more popular than marijuana. The more dangerous one is legal and the non dangerous one is illegal. But there's still many more who smoke tobacco primarily due to exposure in society in my opinion. Prohibition would have worked if no one was a drinker or encouraged drinking during the time it was enacted. I believe THAT is the lesson to learn from prohibition, and not that "we should legalize everything." It is crucial to always ask ourselves how *necessary* certain freedoms of life are. But as cited above, people's subjective interests tend to exaggerate this. Think honestly! Obviously, someone who is already a developed person would not get up and start doing something if it were made legal, but societal acceptance can utterly influence future person's values towards things. If I were born in the next 20 years, I would not want to have the chance to get influenced into doing something as harmful as cocaine to myself. This is why I believe marijuana: yay, hard drugs: nay. This again plays into the concept of "free will" and allows you to peer into the psyche of libertarians like Paul, who think a person will grow into whatever person they wish regardless of environment or genes. It's important to think in terms of probability and not possibility. Anything is possible, that doesn't mean we have free will or anything. It just means chaos theory makes it hard to predict things. Probability is the best thing to go on.

I have a firm disbelief in free will and agency, and a firm belief in determinism and structuralism. While it is indeed true that one's "worldview and emotional state initiate a volitional purpose," we must also never forget that we can control other people's worldviews and emotional states. Many people find this thought distasteful. But consider this: if you refrain from depositing influences into a person, perhaps thinking you are doing them a favor by letting them "think for themselves," you will actually find that they will simply develop along the lines of *other* influences that were posited to them. To not place any control over a person's development is to allow them to develop according to the laws of their natural environment, which is just as much an absence of free choice as straight up coercion. The only difference is in how it "feels" which is not a good basis for anything really.

It's true that one could use Hume as ammo in saying something like "science says we experience pain by doing X, this is an objective fact. However, just because that is what exists, doesn't mean we shouldn't strive for X, despite its consequences." I think this is a pretty pathetic attempt to cast the naturalistic fallacy over Harris' ideas on morality. I think it's important to use these empirical facts as the basis for morality. Also, bear in mind like I said that any moral position, even pure relativism, falls victim to the naturalistic fallacy. Why should the laws of nature be glorified? Maybe people should try to conquer and correct what is natural instead of throwing hands up and letting things just happen.

Going back to "the good" being fit for a purpose, I totally agree. But I disagree that we shouldn't attempt to sculpt even individual outlooks and views in order to be more objectively better. Failure to sculpt a person in a specific direction is not letting them sculpt themselves. It merely passes the sculpting onto their genes and environment. No one is truly the product of their own will.

[penfold]

@NatsuTerran, really interesting post. There are a couple of parts that I was unclear on and hoping you could help clarify.

First on the relationship between objective facts and ethics:

The empirical facts from science describe the only "purpose" one could possibly want. Who could possibly disagree with, for instance, the avoidance of a physical disease that causes despair and pain? Objective facts can show us what the disease is, how to prevent or cure it, and what consequences it all comes down to.

Objective well-being can have no disagreement.

It is obvious that we can agree on objective facts. That is, propositions which are falsifiable. What confused me was when you said no one could argue with the "avoidance of ... pain." What are you saying here?

If you mean that no one could argue with the falsifiable claim "humans behave in such a way as to avoid pain" that seems fine to me; but I am not sure how this would relate to ethics. I could for example take your astute observation that "humans most often behave irrationally", again this is fine, but you seem to be saying that the former is preferable and the latter is not, how do you distinguish?

However if you are saying that no one could argue with the claim "humans should behave in such a way as to avoid pain" then I think you are making a misstep. That statement is unfalsifiable. Even if there were universal consent (and I can think of at least two philosophers who say the opposite: Hobbes & Zhuangzi) that would still not make you statement factual as it still could not be falsified!

In general 'purpose' is not falsifiable, so any statement of the form "humans should..." cannot be held to be an objective fact. How can you square this circle?

My second issue is with your reference to determinism:

A lot of that material is hard to grasp. And many people simply refuse to believe this sort of thing because humans are more or less wired to want to feel an illusion of control, much like belief in a deity. It's very functional to feel like we are rational and have control over our destiny. Even as a strong determinist, I can't actually go through my day without tacitly feeling a sense of control.
[....]
There are only two rebuttals I have heard to my position on morality. The first is to just assume free will as a common sense retort, which I simply don't care to argue against (free will is unfalsifiable, like god).

If we accept the hard determinist account of human behaviour then ethics becomes meaningless. Not only am I doomed to behave as I behave (no choice), but I am doomed to believe what I believe. Any 'reason' we give for anything would always be the same:
Ie:

"Why do you wash your hands?"

- A hard determinist could not answer "to avoid disease" but would have to answer "because I am determined to do so by material precursors."

"Why do you not believe in God?"

- A hard determinist could not answer "for the following good reasons...." but would have to answer "because I am determined to do so by material precursors."

If we accept the hard determinist account we cannot talk of 'good' or 'bad' reasons, only material causes. This reduces most of human discourse (especially, but not exclusively, ethics) to a nonsense.

Yet you seem to imply that despite being a hard determinist some kind of ethical discourse is possible. Could you clarify?

cheers.

[NatsuTerran]

First, I do think making a "should" statement about things like pain avoidance is acceptable. Based on what we know about animals through biology, it is obvious that pain is something to avoid. It then follows logically that since we are animals it is in our interest to avoid it. Obviously there might be some lunatic, masochist fringe, but they have been tampered with in some way. As Harris outlines, our moral purpose *should* be based on the conscious experience of being an animal. He speaks about the "worst possible misery for everyone." Once you assume that, it becomes clear that it is just objectively bad for the most amount of creatures. This then creates a spectrum, he would argue, that allows us to work away from the "worst possible misery for everyone." Because morality and purpose can't exist in a universe filled with pure matter, it follows that purpose should be based on improving the conscious experience.

Second, I don't understand how determinism hinders any moral pursuit at all. It's very strange when people take it that way. Determinism is not destiny. It is important to distinguish between being determined to do something and being PRE-determined to do something. I really don't see how being determined to do something hinders our pursuits. For instance, I can say it is my goal to achieve X. Now, I realize my goal was based on genes and environment, but I still choose X. Furthermore, others can bounce ideas off me in order to give me a larger pool of information to work with. The underlying premise being that education leads to more ideas which gives people a larger arsenal of tools in order to achieve goals. What those goals are based on is determined. I don't see the problem here. Like I said, even as a determinist, I still live my life as if I had free will. We all do. It's only natural to think that way; only through deep introspection can you see through the curtain. But I must ask, what does that change? I think the only thing it changes is a jump from retributionism towards consequentialism.

Your answers to the questions of handwashing and God do not capture determinism at all. It is taking things way too literally. Obviously if we boil it down those answers might be correct, but in everyday life people don't behave that way. Saying "I don't believe in god for X reasons" doesn't mean we can't be deterministic. Like I said, determinism does not exclude the ability to bounce ideas off of others in order to change them. Saying you don't believe because you were raised that way is not going to give believers anything to think about. Giving justified reasons is going to give them more thoughts. By spreading more thoughts we are continuing out the process of determinism tacitly. Your interpretation of determinism is too literal in my opinion. No one thinks that way when we live on a day-by-day basis.

Also, I don't quite get your point about linking "humans are irrational" to "pain is bad." When I say humans are irrational, I'm not glorifying that they are and that they should always be that way. Clearly education and scientific methods can strip away these faults, just as clearly as modern medicine can ease pain. When I talk of what's natural, I don't imply any value judgements. But I still maintain that the best possible goal for humanity is to focus morality on the conscious experience of well-being. I know you said two philosophers would disagree, but on what grounds? They would have to substitute a subjective morality in place. Subjectivity is just "he said, she said." The way I see it, there are three options:

1. No species in existence. This assumes that morality doesn't exist, because no creature exists to think of it.
2. Morals are entirely relative. This assumes your own opinion has no more basis than anyone else. The logical conclusion is that anything goes. If there are no truthful value judgements, how can you disagree with a state of jungle in which everyone acts on instinct and in their own best interest? Furthermore, even if a group came to power and imposed its morality on others, there is still no grounds to attack this if you yourself have no morals.
3. Some/most morals are universal in their application. Like what I'm saying about harm reduction based on empirical principles. We all have a recollection of harm and seek to avoid it.

The thing I don't understand about relativism is that, even if you're right and that morals is total BS, why *not* just act out option 3? If a state of nature is just as justifiable as a structured, first world society, then why not assume the society is the goal based on those objective reasons outlined? The failure to make a moral position is itself a moral position. As such, I think the most logical thing to do is simply compromise morals and purpose based on objective principles. One line of argument is where we draw the line on this. My talk is mostly about humanity, which means we are being immoral to other species. But I think humans are generally more benign to other creatures than the predators of nature would if they got their hands on them. As such, we are not really making things worse for other species, but just keeping things equal for them (state of nature) while excluding the nature clause from our own species.

Again, I am not saying that all morality is objective. But that I think there is definitely some rules of thumb that should be universally followed in order to accomplish the only goal sentient beings could want. A space gets created for that continuum of worst possible misery to best possible happiness that Harris talks of. As long as we can assume such a spectrum, we can work towards the right of it while avoiding the left. We may disagree about where *exactly* we are on the spectrum, but we know we are always somewhere between those two points and so it then becomes easier to see what decisions will take us in either direction. Basically, what I mean by objective morality is just logical, rational inductive reasoning that is *based* off of empirical facts. I don't think that qualifies as violation of naturalistic fallacy.

Edit: Perhaps I should also note that I'm not saying "humans should avoid harm" is an "objective fact" but that it is the only logical goal one could want on the basis of what biology tells us about ourselves. You keep implying that I commit the naturalistic fallacy of deriving an ought (humans should avoid harm) from an is (humans can experience an unpleasantness known as harm). What I'm actually saying is that failure to carry out my desired goal in this case is to live off of no morality whatsoever. And that in itself also falls to the naturalistic fallacy. Because in this case the ought (humans should not avoid harm) stems from the is (because humans are naturally programmed to receive harm). Now which sounds more like the naturalistic fallacy? Like I said, three options. Either we avoid harm, embrace harm, or just don't care and let the harm flow naturally. The biological facts I use are not deriving an ought from an is, but using them as a basis or rule of thumb in order to form some structured rules that all of us can agree on, at least in principle. It's like a mix of relativism and objectivity. I realize others will have their views, but I think mine pack more substance due to the objective basis. Kind of like how an atheist may feel more substantiated in her beliefs due to the scientific inductive reasoning, whereas a theist has only sheer faith to run off of. If you embrace harm or embrace nature because you are trying to avoid the naturalistic fallacy due to your relativism, then you are also taking a moral stance.

[penfold]

@ NatsuTerran

Objectivity:

I think you are trying to derive 'ought' from 'is' statements. I'm not saying that's philosophically impossible (in this sense I am not a strong Humean), what I do quibble with is that any 'ought' statement can be an objective fact. An objective fact is a proposition capable of empirical falsification, and no 'ought' statement can ever be falsified.

I do not agree with Hume that all 'ought' statements should be discarded, merely that they can't be used as facts - which is how you seem to be using them. The problem is that we can deal with facts as (loosely) objective truths; if we could develop factual moral principles we could then create a 'truth based' ethical system – which seems to be what you are proposing.

However unless you can convince me that "humans ought to avoid pain" can be falsified then I cannot agree with your thinking.

As for the 'masochistic lunatic fringe' I don't think that is a fair categorisation at all. Many thinkers over the years have seen the need for individual suffering in human development – in fact I have to say I agree with them; as a teacher I have seen students really benefit from bad results; as a human being I have seen people often change for the better in the face of personal tragedy. You may not agree with this way of thinking, but without any factual basis to show it to be wrong, you have done nothing to show that your principle of pain-avoidance is preferable (even as a 'rule of thumb').

Determinism:

Of course no one can really act as though they are determined (as Sartre said "we are doomed to be free"). However as a hard determinist you must surely agree that any 'reasons' given by people for their actions will have little, if any, relationship to the truth (which will have to do with material causes). The reasons I might give for my lack of belief in God, may sound very pretty, plausible even, but the actual, real, reason for my lack of belief is because the universe has determined me that way.

I am not saying that the hard determinist won't give 'reasons' for why they think and behave as  they do. I am saying that any 'reasons' they give, are by the lights of their own philosophical system, meaningless.

I really do not understand why this is not the clear result of any understanding of hard determinism...

Relativism:

I wouldn't actually describe myself as a relativist (though others might!) My own view is pretty close to the Virtue systems outlined in posts above. My general feeling is that any ethical system that tries to derive rules or pass judgement is hopeless. Those roles should be taken on by legal systems (which derive their authority, not from philosophy, but from the polis – ie legal systems are political not ethical).

My view is that ethics should be about how we become better human beings through practice. This system is radically non-factual. At heart it agrees with the existentialist dictum "existence precedes essence". My system, such as it is, has absolutely no interest in 'objective facts' (which is why I am so interested in your point of view as it seems to stand in stark opposition to my own .

[The Black Jester]

I think the primary point to make here is that virtue ethical systems do not operate in either a 'scientific' or 'legalistic' manner.

That it does not operate in a 'scientific' manner means that no one can attack this kind of system as committing Moore's naturalistic fallacy. As for the 'open question', Anscombe points out that we do not require exact definitions for terms to be meaningful, she gives the example of 'unjust'. She does not attempt a definition in Moore's sense, but instead argues that it is a vague term which can be well defined by examples. So she can't give a strict definition of 'unjust' but she is happy with the following being a definitive example: "the knowing punishment of an innocent man". It should also be noted that such a system allows for cultural relativism, for example, Aristotle himself had no problem with slavery, you would be hard pressed to find a modern virtue ethicist who doesn't either!

Intriguing and provocative reply, penfold.  (I have also been reading your exchange with NatsuTerran with interest). 

I am reluctant to disagree, since it is clear your erudition in these matters exceeds my own, but it still seems to me that we can still ask, meaningfully why one should prefer any given virtue.  Your assumption that we would find 'broad agreement' in these matters seems to me suspect and irrelevant.  Suppose we do agree that courage, as opposed to, say, cunning, should be cultivated.  Does that actually mean that courage is the 'superior' virtue, and that we would all be better off if we adopted an ethos that celebrates it?  Or merely that we, as we currently are psychologically constituted,  like this virtue?  But why should we?

I have great sympathy for your defense of this outlook, but I cannot shake the feeling that, in the end, it does not really tell us what we 'ought' to be, or how we should come to that determination.  Merely that, given a particular world-view, we should go about cultivating ourselves in a particular way.  Please let me know if I am missing a key point.

[NatsuTerran]

On Objectivity, You are essentially saying what I am as well. That the "ought" is not actually an empirical fact, but that based on the state of where the majority of humans are, it can become clear through *inductive* reasoning what some of the best courses of action are. I agree that suffering can be useful depending on what the end results are that come from it. I wasn't denying that. I am looking towards the underlying end results and judging the merit of those based on how well they comply with what humans generally want as their goals. These goals have the capacity to be subjective, but through experience we might learn that the goals we held were not actually desirable, and thus change our minds. It's not going to be a law of nature that all humans prefer X even if they go through every experience possible. There will still be different conclusions. But I think there will be a general rule to follow based on a spectrum between two extremes. When I use the spectrum I am not implying that all the suffering should be ruled against all the well-being. But rather, that the end results should be weighed against each other to determine well-being. Your example that suffering can bring about good things is only looking at a single instance. I am examining a sort of meta-analysis of the totality of well-being, taking into account suffering and the consequences that can come from it (even good).

On Determinism, I think you are looking too deeply into it. As I said, the only thing that changes from adopting the philosophy is a more consequentialist outlook and a less retributionist one. Again, determinism is not destiny. Additional external factors can *override* the prior ones. But the main theme of determinism is the idea that what is true for one is not true for all, and that all things may seem possible, but they are not necessarily probable to happen. Determinism is just an explanation of what is, which doesn't necessarily cast any doubt on the person that asserts it.

I think what you are trying to say is that my sense of morality cannot be concrete if I am a determinist, because my morality is truthfully the product of external factors and not whatever logical-sounding reasons I give for it. This has little bearing on whether my morality is right OR wrong. I don't see how the two topics are connected at all. While it may still be my opinion, said opinion is still based on empiricism such as "disease X causes Y misery." This is something that will exist regardless of what a person's morality is. It shouldn't matter that everyone's morality is chemically derived from external and situational factors. Facts are what are still there even after you stop believing in them.

I think ultimately, my position is heavily based on inductive reasoning from objective facts. Not saying that objective facts = the only obvious morality. I know you say that I cannot derive an ought from is, but I still think morality should be based on the conscious experience. What alternative is there? It doesn't matter if it is unfalsifiable to me because we aren't dealing with a claim of truth. I will admit that it is an assumption to say morality should be based on overall well-being of conscious creatures, but that is because through inductive reasoning it follows logically that morality can't even exist without said creatures. I think evolution, psychology, and biology do not necessarily say anything about what we should do, but it can make it clear what we would most enjoy.

Bottom line: If seeking an overall better life in terms of objective principles which dictate what we truly *are* cannot be seen as a logical form of morality, nothing can. At which point everyone's morality is just as good as any other. In terms of policy, which would we prefer? A random hodgepodge of goals that are very subjective and based on chance values, or a set of goals that at least comes close to pleasing most people due to the scientific rules that dictate what truly makes us happy? Again, this is not to say that we attempt to maximize well-being and minimize suffering on a case by case basis as you outlined, but to instead weigh them against each other, keeping in mind all the possible consequences that stem from each and every action, all in one large attempt to push towards that side of the spectrum that makes the most amount of us happy.

[NatsuTerran]

"Yet you seem to imply that despite being a hard determinist some kind of ethical discourse is possible. Could you clarify?"

Let me go back to this now that I know where you are coming from more. I find it very difficult to clarify really. I just don't see how being utterly determined by external factors has any effect on the fact that I have a conscious experience. If a conscious being's life could be improved upon (in terms of things that definitively lead to greater well-being as based on science) then that being would want such an improvement, whether or not it agreed. As I already outlined, most beings, when acting in their own self-interest,  tend to be incredibly short-sighted and may choose incorrectly about "what's good for them" in the long run. But I am asking to first assume perfect knowledge, and then to realize that there *is* some semblance of a "better" life for it.

I haven't read any of Sam Harris' books yet, but if you are actually interested in this position, I think his views are the same as mine. I'm getting kind of tired of defending it. The steps are something like:

1. Morality cannot exist in a world of sheer matter with no consciousness.
2. Because we ourselves are conscious beings, we can have varying degrees of well-being and suffering which impact us in positive or negative ways.
3. Assuming that we are to weigh the pros and cons of different ways of life and modes of morality, it should be clear that whichever promotes a stronger end result of well-being is desirable, because we are conscious and are the only things that can actually feel the consequences of such choices.

I think the first two steps are pretty indisputable. You seem to be attacking the "should" assumption of the third statement. It feels more like inductive reasoning than an assumption to me, but either way I just think it follows naturally from the first two statements. Furthermore, to me it makes zero sense to "attack" such a system of morality and then substitute *nothing* in return. Surely, ANY criticism on this line of reasoning would apply to any other sense of morality as well. Therefore, I think it would still be better to prefer this one based on the grounds that it keeps our own best interest in mind. To me, it's self-defeating to reject a moral position like this one in favor of one that does not care about the objective well-being of the very agents that are postulating it. If the agents are not taken care of, that philosophy will die out as well. Does that make sense?

[penfold]

... but it still seems to me that we can still ask, meaningfully why one should prefer any given virtue.  Your assumption that we would find 'broad agreement' in these matters seems to me suspect and irrelevant.  Suppose we do agree that courage, as opposed to, say, cunning, should be cultivated.  Does that actually mean that courage is the 'superior' virtue, and that we would all be better off if we adopted an ethos that celebrates it?  Or merely that we, as we currently are psychologically constituted,  like this virtue?  But why should we?

This is a profound difficulty for Virtue Ethical systems. A nice example that is often given is the Nazi officer, he may well have displayed many virtues: courage, loyality etc... What good is an ethical system which allows one to operate in murderous and psychotic frameworks?

Similarly Aristotle argues that righteous revenge ('nemesis') was a virtue and modesty (being a species of dishonesty) was a vice. In later Christian virtue ethical systems (most notably that of Aquinas) these positions are reversed. How then do we chose which framework to follow?

I suppose the answer is simply that our social and familial frameworks (especially our stories - for the Greeks the works of Homer, for Christians the New Testament, for modern secular societies the life stories of people like Mandela etc...) will determine what is considered virtuous. Which means, perhaps uncomfortably, virtue ethical systems could lead to almost any behavior within a given social framework (in fact the Juche ideals of North Korea have a deeply virtue ethical tone to them!)

Many ethical theorists would argue this is ducking the question; and virtue ethics is rendered impotent. On this point I have to acquiesce; virtue ethics is a system of personal development it does not operate well (or at all) as a system of judgement.