A less selfish Pascal's wager

[Asmodean]

"This carelessness in a matter which concerns themselves, their eternity, their all, moves me more to anger than pity; it astonishes and shocks me; it is to me monstrous."

Perhaps Pascal was no fool, although that point is debateable, but your words here are nothing but foolishness.

For starters, you don't have to "throw up your hands and seek no firther" if you have never initiated or joined the search in the first place.

Then, you say "You have a dollar, so you have to bet"... Are you serious?! I can damned well use my dollar to buy smokes with and fuck the lottery.

c) Pascal's wager is useless even as a launch pad since the most likely gods to exist are the Hindu living gods, who actually do live, but they offer you no post-mortem rewards for worshipping them. They expect you to give them stuff, in fact.

and four, without any conclusive proof of a possibility of eternal life after death, betting on the existence of such is foolishness since what we know seems to indicate that after death, you rot and that's about it.

[Davin]

Pascal's Wager is valuable merely as a launching point to one aggressively seeking out an answer this very question.  If given the arguments presented for the existence of God, one determines probability is non-zero, this should rationally catalyze the most deliberative, exhaustive search in that person's life to wager on the God with the highest probability of existing.

I don't see that it has any value, I've listed my problems that I found while aggressively considering Pascal's Wager, which remain unaddressed by anyone. If you have solutions to the problems I presented, then let me know, otherwise Pascal's Wager is worhtless.

Concerning those who throw up their hands as you've done in your above point and seek no further, Pascal shares some strong words in Pensee' 194:  "This carelessness in a matter which concerns themselves, their eternity, their all, moves me more to anger than pity; it astonishes and shocks me; it is to me monstrous."

The problem I see with this quote right here is that Too Few Lions had expressed that Pascal was being careless by only considering one god, to which you reply with this quote about Pascal getting angry at people for being careless... essentially making it appear that Pascal is scolding himself.

[Asmodean]

...essentially making it appear that Pascal is scolding himself.

You think that was not the intention..?

Come to think of it, it probably wasn't... 

[bandit4god]

I don't see that it has any value, I've listed my problems that I found while aggressively considering Pascal's Wager, which remain unaddressed by anyone. If you have solutions to the problems I presented, then let me know, otherwise Pascal's Wager is worhtless.

Sorry, Davin, lots of you and only one me.

But it is more than one dollar per lifetime. Everytime you take a supernatural explanation over science or admitting ignorance, you're wasting an allegorical dollar. Everytime you spend time on the assumption of a god (going to church, trying to convince other people to believe, teaching other people who already believe... etc.), you're wasting a dollar. Everytime you argue that it's rational to accept the concept of a god without reasonable evidence, you're wasting a dollar.

Replace "waste" with "wager" in the above and you're getting warmer.  Anyone is free to not wager on God, but to do so is contrary to what decision theory would dictate as rational action.  To take the dollar (or thousand dollars) in the hand vice wagering on the trillions of trillions in the bush is what you're describing above, and it's certainly your choice.  Pascal and decision theory would call it lunacy, but it remains your choice.

There would need to be something in order to make the wager worth something.

Technically, per decision theory:
- if this is an uncertainty system, there would need to be a possibility of God existing
- if this is a risk system, there would need to be a non-zero probability of God existing

The camp who claims that probability doesn't apply here is making the claim that the question of God existing or not existing is an uncertainty system, and therefore would have to conclude beyond doubt that there is no possibility of God existing.  To allow even the slightest possibility gives "wagering for God" an infinite utility value, giving infinite force to the argument that it is rational to "wager for God".

Concerning those who throw up their hands as you've done in your above point and seek no further, Pascal shares some strong words in Pensee' 194:  "This carelessness in a matter which concerns themselves, their eternity, their all, moves me more to anger than pity; it astonishes and shocks me; it is to me monstrous."

The problem I see with this quote right here is that Too Few Lions had expressed that Pascal was being careless by only considering one god, to which you reply with this quote about Pascal getting angry at people for being careless... essentially making it appear that Pascal is scolding himself.

Earlier in this pensee, and in other pensees, it's clear that the "carelessness" he refers to is to terminate one's reflection of the wager at the many gods question.  His "anger" is because such people wouldn't instead launch an all-in campaign to sort out which wager with infinite utility has the highest probability of being true.

[Davin]

I don't see that it has any value, I've listed my problems that I found while aggressively considering Pascal's Wager, which remain unaddressed by anyone. If you have solutions to the problems I presented, then let me know, otherwise Pascal's Wager is worhtless.

Sorry, Davin, lots of you and only one me.

Only one of me. Don't worry, my statement wasn't meant as a prodding, it was just a statement.

But it is more than one dollar per lifetime. Everytime you take a supernatural explanation over science or admitting ignorance, you're wasting an allegorical dollar. Everytime you spend time on the assumption of a god (going to church, trying to convince other people to believe, teaching other people who already believe... etc.), you're wasting a dollar. Everytime you argue that it's rational to accept the concept of a god without reasonable evidence, you're wasting a dollar.

Replace "waste" with "wager" in the above and you're getting warmer.

Oh really? Can you demonstrate that the proverbial dollars are not going to waste? If not, then your subjective statement is just as good as mine.

Anyone is free to not wager on God, but to do so is contrary to what decision theory would dictate as rational action.  To take the dollar (or thousand dollars) in the hand vice wagering on the trillions of trillions in the bush is what you're describing above, and it's certainly your choice.  Pascal and decision theory would call it lunacy, but it remains your choice.

I do not care whether someone who has demonstrated very limited and inconsistent thinking calls my thinking "lunacy" nor do I think that decision theory has the ability or anything to say about my thinking. I do not see what the point is in bringing up what Pascal or a theory think, is this some kind of appeal to authority inside a thinly veiled ad hominem? I sincerely hope this is not the case, because I prefer you discussing things without resorting to fallacies.

There would need to be something in order to make the wager worth something.

Technically, per decision theory:
- if this is an uncertainty system, there would need to be a possibility of God existing
- if this is a risk system, there would need to be a non-zero probability of God existing

The camp who claims that probability doesn't apply here is making the claim that the question of God existing or not existing is an uncertainty system, and therefore would have to conclude beyond doubt that there is no possibility of God existing.  To allow even the slightest possibility gives "wagering for God" an infinite utility value, giving infinite force to the argument that it is rational to "wager for God".

There is no way to determine if there is a probability and no way to determine what that probability is even if one could determine that there was a probability, so it's useless.

Concerning those who throw up their hands as you've done in your above point and seek no further, Pascal shares some strong words in Pensee' 194:  "This carelessness in a matter which concerns themselves, their eternity, their all, moves me more to anger than pity; it astonishes and shocks me; it is to me monstrous."

The problem I see with this quote right here is that Too Few Lions had expressed that Pascal was being careless by only considering one god, to which you reply with this quote about Pascal getting angry at people for being careless... essentially making it appear that Pascal is scolding himself.

Earlier in this pensee, and in other pensees, it's clear that the "carelessness" he refers to is to terminate one's reflection of the wager at the many gods question.  His "anger" is because such people wouldn't instead launch an all-in campaign to sort out which wager with infinite utility has the highest probability of being true.

Then why did you cite that quote in response to a criticism of Pascal not considering enough possibilities? After all, part of decision theory is to consider all possibilities. You're not clearing anything up here.

[bandit4god]

Technically, per decision theory:
- if this is an uncertainty system, there would need to be a possibility of God existing
- if this is a risk system, there would need to be a non-zero probability of God existing

The camp who claims that probability doesn't apply here is making the claim that the question of God existing or not existing is an uncertainty system, and therefore would have to conclude beyond doubt that there is no possibility of God existing.  To allow even the slightest possibility gives "wagering for God" an infinite utility value, giving infinite force to the argument that it is rational to "wager for God".

There is no way to determine if there is a probability and no way to determine what that probability is even if one could determine that there was a probability, so it's useless.

Read the stuff that comes after "The Camp...".  This is what you're describing--from your perspective, which is fine, it's not a risk system but an uncertainty system.  This is not pulled from my can.  From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

In any decision problem, the way the world is, and what an agent does, together determine an outcome for the agent. We may assign utilities to such outcomes, numbers that represent the degree to which the agent values them. It is typical to present these numbers in a decision matrix, with the columns corresponding to the various relevant states of the world, and the rows corresponding to the various possible actions that the agent can perform.

In decisions under uncertainty, nothing more is given — in particular, the agent does not assign subjective probabilities to the states of the world. Still, sometimes rationality dictates a unique decision nonetheless. Consider, for example, a case that will be particularly relevant here. Suppose that you have two possible actions, A1 and A2, and the worst outcome associated with A1 is at least as good as the best outcome associated with A2; suppose also that in at least one state of the world, A1's outcome is strictly better than A2's. Let us say in that case that A1 superdominates A2. Then rationality surely requires you to perform A1.

In decisions under risk, the agent assigns subjective probabilities to the various states of the world. Assume that the states of the world are independent of what the agent does. A figure of merit called the expected utility, or the expectation of a given action can be calculated by a simple formula: for each state, multiply the utility that the action produces in that state by the state's probability; then, add these numbers. According to decision theory, rationality requires you to perform the action of maximum expected utility (if there is one).

- - -

Earlier in this pensee, and in other pensees, it's clear that the "carelessness" he refers to is to terminate one's reflection of the wager at the many gods question.  His "anger" is because such people wouldn't instead launch an all-in campaign to sort out which wager with infinite utility has the highest probability of being true.

Then why did you cite that quote in response to a criticism of Pascal not considering enough possibilities? After all, part of decision theory is to consider all possibilities. You're not clearing anything up here.

The criticism (as I understood it) was that the wager does not address the potential existence of many gods, all of which promise infinite utility to the wagerer.  My response was that Pascal's intent was not that the reader should zip straight from the wager to Christianity, but that they be persuaded to ardently seek out which of the superdominant wagers (those yielding infinite utility) has the highest strongest case for being true.

Rather than do this, almost all respondents to this thread (with the notable and refreshing exception of DeterminedJuliet) have neglected to undertake such a study.

[The Magic Pudding]

I can imagine advanced aliens who may share technological immortality, but avoid Earth due to the infectious religious disease.  Extremely fanciful but as likely as any theist story I've heard.  The idea that religion could prevent us attaining our own technological immortality isn't fanciful at all.

[OldGit]

^ That would make a wonderful SF novel.

[Too Few Lions]

Earlier in this pensee, and in other pensees, it's clear that the "carelessness" he refers to is to terminate one's reflection of the wager at the many gods question.  His "anger" is because such people wouldn't instead launch an all-in campaign to sort out which wager with infinite utility has the highest probability of being true.

Then why did you cite that quote in response to a criticism of Pascal not considering enough possibilities? After all, part of decision theory is to consider all possibilities. You're not clearing anything up here.

The criticism (as I understood it) was that the wager does not address the potential existence of many gods, all of which promise infinite utility to the wagerer.  My response was that Pascal's intent was not that the reader should zip straight from the wager to Christianity, but that they be persuaded to ardently seek out which of the superdominant wagers (those yielding infinite utility) has the highest strongest case for being true.

Rather than do this, almost all respondents to this thread (with the notable and refreshing exception of DeterminedJuliet) have neglected to undertake such a study.

I think Pascal's wager did refer specifically to the Christian god, for some reason (maybe his lack of knowledge / learning, the bias of his age) he assumed that Christianity was the only true and divinely revealed religion, and all others were false religions. I don't think he ever provides any evidence to back up this assumption, and I don't really see how he could (as there isn't any).

It seems to me that the most likely deity to exist would be a bare theistic entity, not the Christian god, and we have no evidence that this god would give a toss wether or not we believed in him, or that there's any afterlife associated to said deity. Therefore the wager's a waste of time, as there's no evidence we have anything to gain or lose, and it's certainly not something we should be devoting a largrge amount of our lives to.

Concerning those who throw up their hands as you've done in your above point and seek no further, Pascal shares some strong words in Pensee' 194:  "This carelessness in a matter which concerns themselves, their eternity, their all, moves me more to anger than pity; it astonishes and shocks me; it is to me monstrous."

This comments displays the flaw in Pascal's thinking. Where's the evidence that believing in a god or not is 'a matter which concerns themselves, their eternity, their all'. Only a crazed religious zealot could believe such a thing.

[Davin]

Technically, per decision theory:
- if this is an uncertainty system, there would need to be a possibility of God existing
- if this is a risk system, there would need to be a non-zero probability of God existing

The camp who claims that probability doesn't apply here is making the claim that the question of God existing or not existing is an uncertainty system, and therefore would have to conclude beyond doubt that there is no possibility of God existing.  To allow even the slightest possibility gives "wagering for God" an infinite utility value, giving infinite force to the argument that it is rational to "wager for God".

There is no way to determine if there is a probability and no way to determine what that probability is even if one could determine that there was a probability, so it's useless.

Read the stuff that comes after "The Camp...".

I did read it, because it did not address anything I said, I tried to guess what it meant in context of the things I said. You posted it in response my criticism on the lack of something to determine if the wager is even worth something, so I figured I'd restate what I said in clearer terms. Because apparently my assumptions are wrong, please explain how what you said addresses my point that there is nothing to show that the wager is worth something.

This is what you're describing--from your perspective, which is fine, it's not a risk system but an uncertainty system.  This is not pulled from my can.  From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

My problem is not the lack of understanding the concepts, it's that the concepts are useless when applying to something that nothing can be determined about. So please let us move on to the fun bits of discussion.

Please refrain from your condescending tone (as seen in the "Read the stuff that comes after "The Camp..."." and the citing of something I have a good understanding of and have not demonstrated otherwise), and let's just discuss things in a civil manner. This is the second time I'm asking you to remain civil. I've been doing my best to refrain from mimicking your behavior, because one of my faults is that I reciprocate the tone, techniques and rhetorical devices used against me in discussions (aside from using fallacies, being emotional and using threats of violence). These forums have rules that I respect, so if you continue this behavior, I will merely stop discussing things with you. I'm actually quite pleased at how far I've come since starting on these forums.

The criticism (as I understood it) was that the wager does not address the potential existence of many gods, all of which promise infinite utility to the wagerer.  My response was that Pascal's intent was not that the reader should zip straight from the wager to Christianity, but that they be persuaded to ardently seek out which of the superdominant wagers (those yielding infinite utility) has the highest strongest case for being true.

There is at least one kind of god assumed by Pascal and one kind that is not assumed. The assumption (or hidden premise) in Pascal's Wager is that the god cares whether someone believes in it or not and will reward those that do. An equally viable "possibility" is a god that does not want people to believe in it and will punish (for all eternity), anyone who believes that there is a god. So again, Pascal appeared to be scolding himself in context of his limited list and being angered at his own carelessness due to your citations.

The second problem is that there is no evidence to be used to determine which of the concepts of a god is any more true than another, so even if one were to accept that the wager has any merit and seek out the "one true god", they're still left with placing their bet on the roulette of infinite possibilities where the wrong bet "could" result in many other gods sending them to eternal suffering.

Rather than do this, almost all respondents to this thread (with the notable and refreshing exception of DeterminedJuliet) have neglected to undertake such a study.

You assumed people had not just because they are not now doing it? Don't assume because people are not playing your little game this time that they had not taken such a study. You're very far from being the first person to present me with Pascal's wager. I've personally and honestly played this Pascal's Wager game at least a dozen times, as well as addressing it a few hundred times. I've found that it's an irrational means to determine whether one should believe in a god or not.

[OldGit]

Rather than do this, almost all respondents to this thread (with the notable and refreshing exception of DeterminedJuliet) have neglected to undertake such a study.

I've been over it, too - I daresay we all have - and I long ago decided it was not worth further consideration.  You do sound a bit condescending, y'know.

I've found that it's an irrational means to determine whether one should believe in a god or not.

Yes, and a dishonest, opportunist trick to boot.

[Davin]

I've found that it's an irrational means to determine whether one should believe in a god or not.

Yes, and a dishonest, opportunist trick to boot.

I agree, I find it at least intellectually dishonest if not just plain old dishonest.

[Whitney]

I think Pascal's wager did refer specifically to the Christian god,

Yes it did...in fact there would be no basis in stating the wager unless he were working off of a religious viewpoint that belief in god offers rewards in the afterlife; Christianity is one of the few religions which bases reward solely off of belief (most others have action based rewards).

[Tom62]

To me it is more like a lottery game than a wager. With a wager you have far better chances. In this lottery game, you don't know what the rules are, you don't know whether you are betting on the "right horse" and there is no proof that any price has ever been awarded.