Uploaded Minds

[billy rubin]

how does the reassemmbled you become alive?

if i transport a recently alive hamster that is currently dead, will it arrive dead or alive?

what is transported that makes a live hamster show up alive? rather than dead?

i dont know what separates living from non living, nor what would be transported.

[Asmodean]

Just to be clear, we are in philosophy/sci-fi territory here.

That said, if the hamster was alive (a second from death by non-teleportation-related causes, say) at the point of dematerialisation, the rematerialised hamster would also be alive and about as close to death.

The principle is that every particle that constitutes an object with its velocity, momentum and other relevant attributes (such as electric or color charge, etc) gets replicated in a system identical to the one that has been read/measured. From what I understand, that very process of measuring is the reason a dematerialiser would destroy the original. This form of teleportation does not transport - it destroys, then creates a "perfect" (let us assume, because a-whole-nother conversation) replica elsewhere.

[billy rubin]

if i am rematerialized with a molecular-perfect physical attributes including a molecular-perfect continuous memory, but my original is destoyed in the act of creating me, molecule by molecule, then can i tell that i am a new and different being?

hes my "self" been lost, or is that merely a metaphysical construct? because i am rematerialized in a form that is identical to my earlier form, undetectable even by me.   

[Asmodean]

Ah! Yes, I think I understand the question. All light bulb and everything.

The replica-you would consider himself "just-you," as would the original consider himself, beyond perhaps the very same mental exercises we do here.

It's like... You died, then a divergent (from that point because you do not exist any more) you came to and carried on. Say, when you wake up after surgery, having been "offline" for a time. For the replica, I suppose it's a bit like that, but perhaps for the sensation of having lost time. For the original, it's (hopefully) like going under anaesthesia, except he dies in surgery.

I do think that your "self" is "preserved," though in a similar way as you could "preserve" a classic car by building a perfect replica without using any original components. (again, we are assuming a perfect dematerialiser-rematerialiser, also assuming that both the original you and the replica are aware of what's happened) In this case, yourself is thusly "preserved" as the replica's "self." There is an important disctinction though. From the point of the original's demise, the replica is his legacy rather than himself. Every choice and decision, every sensation and stimuli from that point are the replica's. Sure, from his perspective, he's just you. From your perspective... Well, you no longer have one.